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This thesis presents a deeply contextualized account of law in postcolonial Pakistan and 
situates the judicial review jurisprudence of the superior courts, in particular their recent 
activism and populism, in the contexts of historical developments in constitutional 
politics, evolution of state structures and broader social transformations. It shows how 
in each epoch of the postcolonial state’s history the superior courts positioned 
themselves within the state and vis a vis the demands that different segments of the 
society placed upon the state and its institutions. It brings forth evidence that the courts 
did not define their role in accordance with certain abstract theories of 
constitutionalism, rule of law and separation of powers that had been deeply imbricated 
in the postcolonial state’s self-justifications. Rather, these courts re-fashioned their role 
in accordance with fundamental shifts in constitutional politics, state structure and 
state-society dialectics. In the process, these courts re-cast the theoretical 
conceptualizations of constitutionalism, rule of law, and separation of powers to better 
reflect their evolving role and jurisprudence.  
 
A deeper understanding of these phenomena – the evolution of judicial role in response 
to shifts in socio-political context, and the re-crafting of theoretical frameworks to 
justify it – will enable us to meaningfully scrutinize the courts’ recent jurisprudence 
and evaluate the judiciary’s future role in Pakistan’s governance scheme. As such, it 
will be argued that the courts’ role is deeply political in terms of defining the nature 
and relevant powers of state institutions and the imperatives for their actions. Perhaps 
the Pakistani situation is unique in this respect, but it might be worthwhile speculating 
if theory is often an articulation of such deeply contextualized public law jurisprudence 
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In early 2009, Pakistan was in the international spotlight, and for the right reasons for 
once.  A 'Long March' towards the capital Islamabad, called for by the country’s 
lawyers demanding the reinstatement of the deposed Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, appeared to have morphed into a broader social mobilization for 
constitutionalism, rule of law, the independence of judiciary and greater 
democratization.1 As the Long March steadily progressed towards the capital, the 
incumbent Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, grudgingly announced the restoration 
of Justice Chaudhry as the Chief Justice of Pakistan in the early hours of March 16.  
Pakistan’s so-called 'Lawyers’ Movement' had triumphed dramatically.  This was 
Pakistan’s version of the Arab Spring, Tahrir Square and the Orange Revolution rolled 
into one euphoric and historic moment. The nation-state of 180 million people – 
plagued by militancy, military rule, endemic political instability and chronic under-
development – appeared to have re-joined the global march of liberal political and 
economic progress. 
 
However, by mid-2012 much of the optimism had evaporated. The elected federal 
government had demonstrated an utter inability to govern and had been under relentless 
pressure from the Chaudhry-led Supreme Court, which aggressively pursued a range of 
corruption charges against key members of the ruling party.2  Prime Minister Gilani 
was in the dock, charged with and convicted of contempt of court, and ultimately 
dismissed as prime minister for refusing to re-initiate long-standing corruption and 
money-laundering cases against the president. Anxieties had emerged that the courts’ 
aggressive judicial review actions were undermining a weak elected government to the 
benefit of the military-bureaucratic establishment enabling the latter to reassert, albeit 
covertly, its role in the state structure. One by one even the prominent leaders of the 
Lawyers’ Movement had begun to voice concerns that the courts were acting as political 
                                                 
1 Toby Berkman, ‘The Pakistani Lawyers' Movement and the Popular Currency of Judicial Power’ 
(2010) 123 Harvard Law Review 1705. 
2 See generally, Moeen Cheema, ‘The Chaudhry Court: 'Rule of Law' or 'Judicialization of Politics'?’ in 
Moeen Cheema and Ijaz Gilani (eds), Politics & Jurisprudence of the 'Chaudhry Court' (2005-2013) 
(Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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players, and were threatening to unhinge the transitional-democratic system that had 
been put in place.  The superior judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, faced a chorus 
of charges of judicial over-reach. The term judicial activism had come to acquire a 
distinctly negative connotation. 
 
In less than a half-decade since the restoration of the Chaudhry Court through the 
Lawyers’ Movement, the superior courts of Pakistan stood amidst a political maelstrom 
in a deeply divided polity as the self-proclaimed regulator of the state and the arbiter of 
state-society relations. The courts’ actions had not only brought the proper place of the 
judiciary in Pakistan's constitutional politics sharply into the spotlight, but had also 
brought to the surface deeper contestations over the very structures of the governance 
system, the state and the society. While terms such as judicial activism, separation of 
powers, political questions doctrine and rule of law were frequently used in 
argumentation over the courts’ role, such invocations of abstract discourses originating 
in distant political climes did not appear to shed much light on the concrete 
controversies at hand.  Meaningful instruction on how to establish an institutional 
balance of powers and neat distinctions between law, politics and policy were 
impossible to find.   
 
While many observers reacted to the Chaudhry Court as if the judiciary had broken a 
long tradition of apolitical adjudication to suddenly enter the realm of politics, the fact 
remains that Pakistan’s courts have always been a political institution. Pakistan has a 
fascinating, rich, complex and in several respects unique legal history in which superior 
courts have progressively carved for themselves a prominent role in constitutional 
politics. In the seven decades since the country’s independent existence, the judiciary 
has evolved from a subsidiary state institution with limited functions to a central player 
in the state structure. The courts have incrementally accumulated unprecedented 
judicial review powers and now claim to be the ultimate judge of the constitutional 
ambits of other state institutions. How have Pakistan’s superior courts moved from the 
periphery to the core and fashioned such an expansive role for themselves? Why have 
other state institutions ceded such space to the judiciary? How have the courts shaped 
public law doctrines and constitutional jurisprudence to bolster and legitimize their 
place in the state structure?  Answers to these and related questions are likely to provide 
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insight not only into the development of judicial review in Pakistan but also the nature 
and evolution of its constitutional design and the legal system generally. 
 
This thesis aims to answer these questions by situating the development of public law 
and judicial review in the context of constitutional politics, evolution of state structure, 
developments in political economy and the changing social dynamics in and around the 
state.  The Lawyers’ Movement, the restoration of an independent judiciary and the 
emergence of its particular brand of activism were indeed seminal moments in 
Pakistan’s political history. However, these moments were long in the making and their 
significance cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of the multiplicity of 
perspectives which perceived constitutionalism, rule of law and the independence of 
the judiciary as valuable political and legal goals. These perspectives were informed by 
diverse historical, political, social, geographic and economic contexts within which 
these demands had been forged. It is only when we situate the Lawyers’ Movement, its 
antecedents and consequences, within these contexts that we can develop more 
nuanced, descriptively accurate and analytically coherent account of the nature of the 
constitutional system and the role of the judiciary therein. When analysed in this mode, 
public law also becomes a useful lens to understand the political system it seeks to 
codify, the state structure whose operational rationalities it seeks to mould, the political 
economy that dictates which interests have voice, and the social dynamics which 
reinforce and challenge its legitimacy. 
 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING JUDICIAL POLITICS IN PAKISTAN 
 
As noted, Pakistan’s superior courts have a long history of involvement in the country’s 
constitutional politics. In the decade of 1990s, for example, Pakistan’s superior courts 
embarked on a sustained enterprise of developing Public Interest Litigation modelled 
on the precedents of the Indian courts. In the process, the courts were repeatedly 
embroiled in challenges to elections and governmental change, which to many 
epitomize the ‘judicialization of politics’.3 Earlier, in the late 1980s to early 1990s the 
Shariat courts, especially the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, had 
                                                 
3 See, eg, R Hirschl, ‘The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts’ (2008) 11 
Annual Review of Political Science 93; R Hirschl, ‘The New Constitutionalism and the 
Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 721.  
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engaged in unprecedented judicial review of legislation on the touchstone of Islamic 
law principles, and had even threatened to review constitutional provisions for 
conformity to injunctions of Islam.4 The politicization of Pakistan’s courts in effect 
began right from the outset and can be attributed not just to the courts’ attempts to 
expand their powers but even more so to their pronouncements accepting the 
curtailment of their jurisdictions. Pakistan’s superior courts directly or indirectly 
validated military coups d'état, refrained from entertaining challenges to martial law 
regulations, and accepted subsequent constitutional machinations of military regimes 
from 1958-1971, 1977-1988 and 1999-2007. It is this history of judicial passivity as 
much as their recent activism which has long defined the politics of Pakistan’s courts. 
 
Despite this history of judicial politics and the prominent role the courts have played in 
constitutional crises, there is surprisingly little structural analysis of the politics of 
Pakistan’s courts.5  The limited body of work on Pakistan’s judiciary that does exist is 
largely descriptive, focuses on a handful of notable constitutional cases, and seeks to 
explain the cases and controversies in terms of subservience to regime dictates, political 
affiliations of judges or vagaries of individual personalities. Often this is over-laid with 
an implicit or explicit prescription rooted in liberal constitutionalism which seeks to 
draw a sharp distinction between law and politics. This creates a mutually-reinforcing 
dialectic. The reliance on liberal ideas and languages of separation of powers, 
democracy and rule of law heighten the perception of the politicization of courts when 
they are thrust in the midst of constitutional crises. This in turn justifies the demands of 
liberal constitutionalism – electoral democracy, rule of law, separation of powers and 
judicial restraint – as abstract ends in themselves, rather than as means to concrete 
governance, socio-political and economic goals. 
 
In notable contrast with the extant literature on Pakistan’s courts, this thesis seeks to 
understand and explain the institutional role of the courts, the development of public 
law doctrines and judicial review practices in the context of historical movements in 
constitutional politics, the evolution of state and broader social transformations.  This 
                                                 
4 See Moeen Cheema, ‘Beyond Beliefs: Deconstructing the Dominant Narratives of the Islamization of 
Pakistan’s Law’ (2012) 60 American Journal of Constitutional Law 875. 
5 For a notable exception, see Paula R Newberg, Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics 
in Pakistan (Cambridge University Press, 1995).  
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thesis argues that a deeply contextualised analysis of public law and the role of courts 
provides us with a better understanding of how and why Pakistan’s courts have 
developed certain doctrinal positions, and have defined a particular role for themselves 
in Pakistan’s constitutional scheme. Such a structural and institutional analysis enables 
us to chart the trajectory of public law in ways that not only account for notable 
constitutional moments, cases and crises, but also the relatively subtle and long-term 
evolution of judicial review of executive action, which has progressively emerged as 
the most significant domain of action in Pakistan’s public law.  Further, such an analysis 
renders many aspects of public law and constitutional decisions of courts, which 
superficially appear to be contradictory or whimsical manifestations of personal politics 
and interests, explicable in terms of historical and structural evolution of the courts’ 
role in constitutional politics. 
 
Principally this thesis argues that Pakistan’s courts have evolved for themselves a 
mediatory role within the post-colonial state’s structure. From the beginning, the 
superior courts have been called upon to adjudicate deep-seated tensions within the 
state: between the political executive, the military, and apex civil bureaucracy; between 
the lower rungs of the bureaucracy and ascendant civil or military elites; and as its own 
power increased, between the judiciary and other centres of state power. As the relative 
balance of power between the various institutional players and their affiliated classes 
has changed, so has the courts’ position within the state. Equally significantly, the 
courts have been thrust in a mediatory role by those classes or groups at the margins of 
the state who have found the courts useful in terms of pressing certain demands on the 
state and its affiliated classes and groups. Such is the nature of mediation that the courts 
have had to align themselves largely with the state and dominant classes, but have 
enabled excluded groups to win occasional concessions and exert some pressures on 
the state that they would not have achieved otherwise. As the class and group dynamics 
within and at the margins of the state have evolved, so has the courts’ role, the nature 
of questions they have been asked to resolve, and the doctrinal positions they have 
articulated to rationalise such resolutions.  
 
This thesis further argues that in developing and executing their role in mediating intra-
state tensions and broader state-society dialectics, the judiciary has also acted as a 
strategic institutional player seeking to expand its own powers and relevance. As such, 
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the courts have progressively expanded their judicial review jurisdictions first at the 
expense of the civil bureaucracy, then elected executives, and ultimately even laying 
the groundwork for limited judicial scrutiny of the military’s role in politics, 
governance and the economy.  While this development of judicial review has not been 
linear, it has nonetheless been seemingly inexorable. In each period of military rule the 
courts stepped back or were forced to accept the curtailment of their jurisdiction, but 
vigorously re-asserted themselves and pushed the boundaries in subsequent periods of 
civilian rule. In the process the courts laid stronger foundations for their judicial review 
powers which were harder both for military regimes and elected governments to clip in 
the later cycles of martial and civilian rule. Progressively, the judiciary has acted to 
cultivate specific constituencies within and outside the state including the bar, the lower 
bureaucracy, opposition political parties, and segments of Pakistan’s urban and peri-
urban middle classes. The courts acted with the design to bolster support for judicial 
review and/or resist pressures from ascendant military or political elites, and achieved 
this through privileging the demands and interests of the institutions and classes that 
formed its expanding support base. 
 
In addition to the structural and strategic imperatives informing a certain conception of 
judicial role, an array of discrete institutional factors have also played significant if not 
determinative parts in the development of public law and judicial review in Pakistan.  
The text of the constitutions which empowered the courts in specific ways; the 
intellectual tradition of English Common Law bequeathed by colonial rule; the 
accumulated body of doctrines, precedents and institutional memory of cases and their 
consequences; the processes of judicial appointment, advancement and dismissal; the 
ideologies, training and networks of the judges and lawyers; the existence, strength and 
politics of bar associations; all have at times and to varying degrees had an impact.  
Beyond the personal and overtly political dynamics that often get undue attention, it is 
a combination of these structural, strategic and institutional factors which collectively 
explain the historical trajectory of public law and judicial power in Pakistan. As this 
thesis will elaborate, a detailed analysis of this structural and institutional politics of the 
courts provides a sounder basis for understanding and ultimately evaluating the role 




A CONTEXTUALISED HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
As noted in the previous section, this thesis aims to develop a historical and deeply 
descriptive account of the development of public law, especially the judicial review 
doctrines and practices of the superior courts in Pakistan. This narrative will proceed 
chronologically identifying key changes in state structure, electoral politics, class 
dynamics in and around the state, and over-arching ideas and idioms in which discrete 
interests were articulated and legitimated. Having laid out these contexts in some detail 
each chapter will map the major developments in public law, especially the judicial 
review doctrines and practices of the superior courts, in each era of Pakistan’s history. 
It must be stated at the outset that any historical narrative is ultimately a matter of 
interpretation and analysis of complex social facts, and is only as strong and persuasive 
as the evidence relied upon. It must also be acknowledged that the periodization of such 
developments in public law, state structure, political economy and societal 
arrangements will invariably be somewhat problematic and artificial. While 
transformations in state, society, economy and law are invariably subtle and 
progressive, rather than distinct and abrupt, and are often not susceptible to neat 
divisions in historical eras, the cycles of military rule followed by transitions to civil-
democratic governance provides a relatively easy way to contextualize developments 
of judicial review against changing forms of governance.  
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis provides an account of the emergence of colonial rule in 
British India, the formation of the colonial state and the role of law in the consolidation 
of colonial governance and policies from late 1700s until 1947. The current governance 
system in postcolonial Pakistan has directly descended from the British Raj and 
continues to bear the legacies of colonial rule in significant ways. As the evolution of 
the colonial state in British India is charted, particularly in the parts that later became 
Pakistan, it will be shown that the governance structure remained deeply coercive and 
law was used primarily as a means of projecting power in aid of colonial policies. While 
the rule of law emerged as the primary legitimating idiom of colonial rule, the courts 
remained subservient to the demands of a particularly efficient form of bureaucratic 
authoritarianism.  In the last few decades of the Raj the promise of democratic 
governance tentatively emerged as the overarching strategy for transition from colonial 
rule to dominion status. This promise never fully materialized during the Raj, but it 
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nonetheless bequeathed a language of constitutionalism and rule of law to the 
postcolonial state. In particular, the role that the courts played in moderating the abuse 
of sedition and public order laws gave some concrete shape to these ethereal promises.  
 
In the first decade of postcolonial existence Pakistan experienced rapid and dramatic 
changes in the forms of government and state structure. The Constituent Assembly of 
Pakistan failed to draft a constitution until 1956, which was abrogated in 1958 in 
circumstances that paved the way for direct military rule. The causes of this failure of 
constitutional politics during this period of postcolonial transition will be investigated 
in Chapter 2.  The role of the newly empowered superior courts will be particularly 
scrutinized with regard to their alleged complicity in the uprooting of constitutionalism 
and democracy in the first decade of the republic’s existence. However, despite their 
seeming subservience to the executive the courts continued to push the political elites 
that came to dominate the new state towards framing a republican constitution. 
Furthermore, the courts continued to temper the use of state security laws to suppress 
political dissent just as in the late colonial period.  Most notably, the dislocations in the 
state structure caused by the partition of British India also gave the courts the space to 
extend their administrative law jurisdiction over a bureaucracy that was in the process 
of reconstruction. A combination of these strands of formal constitutionalism and 
procedural rule of law imbued the ‘Writ jurisdiction’ of the superior courts with a 
capacity to exert limited restraint on the authoritarianism of the postcolonial state and 
impose some semblance of administrative propriety on a powerful bureaucracy-
dominated executive. 
 
Chapter 3 will chart the consolidation of judicial review during the first period of direct 
and indirect martial rule under the Ayub regime (1958-1968). Despite the military-
bureaucratic authoritarianism of the Ayub era and the judicial validation of Martial 
Law, the courts managed to preserve the judicial review of bureaucratic action. The 
exercise of the Writ jurisdiction aligned with the priorities of a Martial Law regime that 
was attempting to subdue and co-opt a hitherto powerful bureaucracy. In the post-
Martial Law phase, the promulgation of the 1962 Constitution provided the courts with 
the basis to deepen the foundations of the Writ jurisdiction along three axes – formal 
constitutionalism, administrative law, and procedural safeguards against the abuse of 
public order and state security laws – which have remained at the core of the superior 
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courts’ definition of rule of law in the decades since. In the aftermath of the 1965 war 
between India and Pakistan, as the Ayub presidency suffered the progressive erosion of 
its powers and the opposition gained strength, the regime again became overtly 
authoritarian.  In such circumstances the superior courts insisted on minimal procedural 
safeguards against the enforcement of state security and public order laws and pushed 
the envelope of the judicial review of executive action. The consolidation of the judicial 
review jurisdiction of the courts is a significant legacy of the Ayub era.  
 
As Pakistan emerged from the shadows of military rule, dismembered and disenchanted 
in 1971, democratic governance and progressive politics promised a better future for 
the masses. The adoption of Pakistan’s first constitution by an elected assembly in 1973 
added to the optimism for constitutionalism and rule of law. This optimism was quickly 
dispelled as the elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1970-1976) proved itself to 
be as authoritarian as its predecessors and very much within the mould of postcolonial 
governance. The courts, which attempted to rely on the new constitution to protect 
fundamental liberties and provide a voice to the opposition, were soon undermined by 
constitutional amendments designed to curtail judicial review. The exercise of judicial 
review to preserve the civil rights of the opposition was met with accusations that the 
judiciary was overstepping its bounds and was anti-democratic. Judicial resistance 
gradually faded under the continuance of the state of emergency and the abuse of state 
security laws. Chapter 4 will describe this failure of formal democratic 
constitutionalism in the face of an elective dictatorship. Such was the proof of formal 
constitutionalism and a procedural rule of law that the courts had constructed in the first 
three decades of postcolonial nationhood – the law itself was used to rule arbitrarily 
and ruthlessly. 
 
Chapter 5 will highlight the emergence of a distinctly praetorian governmentality in 
the next cycle of military rule in the 1980s. Having displaced an elected government in 
the aftermath of rigged elections and a sustained agitation movement by the opposition 
political parties, the military regime of General Zia ul Haq (1977-1988) set about the 
task of refining the blueprint for military rule. What was distinctive, however, about 
this form of praetorian governmentality as compared to the earlier period of military 
rule was the hegemonic ideation of an alternate basis of political legitimacy predicated 
on religion. The military regime visibly embarked on the agenda of 'Islamizing' the 
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constitution and the laws. New Shariat courts were given unprecedented powers of 
judicial review of legislation for conformity with Islamic law at the same time that the 
fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution remained under suspension and the 
superior courts’ Writ jurisdiction was incapacitated. Islamization ravaged Pakistan’s 
criminal justice system and created new avenues for the abuse of laws to suppress 
dissent. Nonetheless, Islamization also enabled the superior courts to re-orient their 
public law jurisprudence and to bolster their legitimacy. Pakistan’s appellate courts 
learnt to capitalize on this new rhetoric and restructured a more assertive form of 
judicial review grounded in the normative bedrock of Islamic legality. 
 
As Pakistan emerged from military rule once again upon the death of General Zia in a 
plane crash in 1988, it underwent a new governmental experience marked by tussles 
between unsettled elected governments, a constitutionally empowered civilian 
presidency and a military establishment that covertly exercised considerable power 
often in collusion with the presidency. Chapter 6 will highlight how the superior courts 
utilized the political space available to them in this period of political fragmentation to 
engineer a dramatic expansion of public law and carved a role for themselves as an 
important institution of the state in this era of indirect praetorianism. As the civil 
state’s machinery became the turf of power struggles, safeguarding its independence 
and ensuring its rule-boundedness emerged as a key pillar of the superior courts’ Writ 
jurisdiction. The superior courts also began to develop a more robust jurisprudence of 
rule of law and fundamental rights, while the Supreme Court utilized its Original 
jurisdiction for the first time to institute Public Interest Litigation. In the years leading 
up to another extended period of military rule the superior courts asserted their 
independence, held military courts and specialist tribunals to be unconstitutional, 
circumscribed emergency powers, and whittled away considerable areas of executive 
prerogative. Nonetheless, recurrent involvement in matters of pure politics and 
governmental change resulted in direct confrontations between the judiciary and elected 
governments, and ultimately the politicization of judicial review in this first significant 
wave of judicialization of politics and governance. 
 
Chapter 7 will dissect the subtle shifts in state structure and power relations during the 
third cycle of military rule in Pakistan which for the first time was characterized by a 
successful hybridity of a military-civil composite. When General Pervez Musharraf 
  19
overthrew another elected government in October 1999 the familiar architecture of 
military rule was resurrected. However, heightened levels of elite consolidation and the 
prominent role of the courts in the state structure constrained the space for overt 
authoritarianism.  Unlike previous military regimes General Musharraf was successful 
in holding elections and managing a symbiotic relationship with a civilian government 
whereby real power remained with the military but a semblance of transitional 
democratic governance could be upheld. The Supreme Court once again validated the 
military takeover and the continuity of judicial review of executive action initially 
aligned with the regime’s proclaimed agenda of the structural reform of the state and 
anti-corruption drive. However, when Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry assumed office 
in 2005 this accommodation between the military-dominated regime and the courts 
fractured. Given the Musharraf regime’s close relationship with the civilian 
government operating under it, a more robust form of judicial review of executive 
action initiated by the new Chief Justice increasingly threatened to undermine the 
regime’s core interests. With impending elections in 2007, the regime dismissed the 
Chief Justice sparking the protest movement by the lawyers that would ultimately pave 
the way for another transition to civil democratic rule as well as for the restoration of 
an assertive Chaudhry Court. 
 
Chapter 8 will define the key features of the 'proactivism' of the Chaudhry Court in the 
most recent period of corporatist governance. A fluid and somewhat awkward balance 
of power appeared to have been reached wherein the military was dominant in some 
spheres but lacked the capacity to dictate its will wholesale to the other institutional 
complexes.  It also appeared that the political elites and the judiciary had learned from 
the military’s historical success in safeguarding its institutional interests and were 
similarly acting fairly coherently and strategically in the furtherance of their respective 
corporate concerns. The resulting form of corporatist governance gave the political 
system the kind of dynamic equilibrium that it had historically lacked. Given this 
fragmentation and awkward balancing of institutional power, a resurrected Chaudhry 
Court found the space to engineer the second significant wave of the judicialization of 
politics and governance in Pakistan. The judicial review practices entrenched by the 
court were largely predicated on the three historical strands of legality: namely, formal 
constitutionalism, administrative law and the review of police powers. However, the 
court used its judicial review powers proactively and at an unprecedented level. The 
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lasting legacy of the Chaudhry Court is a superior judiciary with a seemingly permanent 
place as a coequal player in the state structure along with the political executive and the 
military. 
 
KEY THEMES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PAKISTAN 
 
The narrative of subtle long-term shifts in constitutional politics, state structure and 
state-society dialectics along the lines articulated above will enable us to evaluate how 
and why the courts have fashioned their judicial review practices during Pakistan’s 
history.  Before embarking on such a granular analysis, it may be helpful to identify 
certain overarching developments that are often occluded by the focus on more 
immediate controversies. Firstly, Pakistan’s legal and judicial histories are often written 
through the lens of 'constitutional law' and read like speculative lines connecting the 
dots of notable cases and major crises. While these constitutional cases and crises are 
important, an exclusive focus on this domain of judicial action hides the more 
significant and consistent developments that have taken place in the sphere of 
'administrative law'. It is through the consistent development of the judicial review of 
administrative action, even under military rule, that Pakistan’s superior courts 
progressively carved an expansive institutional role for themselves. It is principally 
through the judicial review of executive action – or the Writ jurisdiction – that the courts 
acquired the power to mediate intra-state tensions and ultimately aggrandized 
themselves to the status of the regulator of the state.  
 
Secondly, the courts’ increasing capacity to mediate state-society dialectics – arising 
out of the demands of various groups and classes on the periphery of the state – also 
had much of its basis in the judicial review of executive action. The first significant 
movement in the Writ jurisdiction’s development in the 1950s and 1960s resulted from 
the efforts of the lower cadres of the bureaucracy to safeguard their interests by 
challenging discretionary appointments, transfers, dismissals and disciplinary 
practices. In this process, the courts not only developed the doctrinal foundations of the 
Writ jurisdiction but also cultivated important constituencies in the educated urban 
middle classes from which the bureaucracy and much of the bar arose. The second 
significant movement in the development of judicial review, the explosion of Public 
Interest Litigation in the 1990s, was mostly pushed by the urban upper-middle and 
  21
professional classes, often valorised as the civil society, seeking to protect their 
economic interests from state action. The third significant movement, that of the 
Chaudhry Court, was predicated on the support of the urban and peri-urban middle and 
lower-middle classes that were marginal to the electoral calculus of the political elites 
while also being deprived of a due share in economic opportunities by the urban upper 
and professional classes. In between these movements the courts strove hard to 
consolidate and safeguard their terrain from intrusion by military regimes and elected 
governments alike, and occasionally provided a platform to political oppositions and 
other marginal interests to air their demands and grievances without effectively 
pressuring the state to accommodate them. 
 
Thirdly, while the courts’ pronouncements were articulated in the language of liberal 
constitutionalism, the construction of public law doctrines and rule of law theory can 
also be explained in the context of altering intra-state dynamics and state-society 
dialectics. The courts did not define their role in accordance with certain abstract 
theories of constitutionalism, rule of law and separation of powers that had been deeply 
imbricated in the post-colonial state’s judicial structures. Rather, these courts re-
situated themselves from time to time and re-fashioned their role in accordance with 
the fundamental shifts in constitutional politics, state structure and state-society 
dialectics charted in this thesis. In the process, these courts re-cast the theoretical 
conceptualizations of constitutionalism, rule of law, and separation of powers and the 
doctrinal pillars of their jurisprudence to legitimise and better reflect their evolving role. 
This is only to argue that theory and doctrine are not determinative of outcomes, but 
not that they are irrelevant. Doctrines and theoretical conceptions serve very important 
functions in transmitting the policies of superior courts through the judicial hierarchy 
and across the legal complex; codifying these policies to build institutional memory 
across relatively short judicial tenures; and articulating avowedly apolitical self-
justifications to mask the strategic and interest-driven aspects of judicial action to the 
broader publics.  
 
Fourthly, before proceeding with a historical and contextualized account of public law 
and judicial review, it may be worthwhile to highlight once again how this project 
departs from and challenges the more traditional liberal histories of public law and 
constitutional politics in Pakistan. A history of public law which grounds the 
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explanation of judicial action and articulations in changing forms of governance, state-
structures and class dynamic challenges the teleology of liberal historiography and its 
underlying assumptions of inevitable and inherently valuable progression towards 
constitutionalism, democracy and rule of law. Such a deeply contextualised analysis of 
public law reveals the contingency of such progression, to the extent one exists, and 
reveals that in any given period the state and it superior courts are responsive largely to 
shifting configurations of dominant classes and elite interests. Further, any advances 
towards democratization or mass empowerment are at best contingent and reversible.   
 
While the ambitions of this thesis are by and large descriptive and localized – to explain 
the historical evolution of public law and judicial review in Pakistan – it is hoped that 
such a grounded description will also provide an insight into the emergent theorization 
of the judicialization of politics worldwide. The increasing judicialization of politics is 
a global phenomenon.6 Over the last few decades even courts in Asia have joined the 
trend.7  The literature describing and analysing the judicialization of politics generally 
attributes three categories of explanations that are be relied upon to analyse the 
expansion of judicial power in a given polity.8 The first, a liberal framework, traces the 
judicialization of politics as a consequence of the global rise in the significance of 
human rights and rule of law in the later decades of the last century.9 While the 
prominence of rights discourse and the constitutionalizing of rights may explain the 
empowering of courts elsewhere, it seems to shed little light on the expansion of judicial 
power in Pakistan.  As noted in this thesis, Pakistan’s courts have failed to develop a 
coherent rights jurisprudence and have essentially used their fundamental rights 
jurisdiction to vindicate their administrative and governance directives. 
 
                                                 
6 See generally N C Tate et al (eds), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York University 
Press, 1995); Martin Shapiro et al (eds), On Law, Politics and Judicialization (Oxford University Press, 
2002); Tom Ginsburg et al (eds), Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
7 See generally Björn Dressel (ed), The Judicialization of Politics in Asia (Routledge, 2012); Andrew 
Harding et al (eds), New Courts in Asia (Routledge, 2010); Tom Ginsburg et al (eds), Administrative 
Law and Governance in Asia (Routledge, 2009). 
8 Björn Dressel, ‘The Judicialization of Politics in Asia: Towards a Framework of Analysis’ in Björn 
Dressel (ed), The Judicialization of Politics in Asia (Routledge, 2012) 4-5. 
9 C R Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective 
(University of Chicago Press, 1998); Anne Mary Slaughter, ‘Judicial Globalization’ (2000) 40 
Virginia Journal of International Law 1103. 
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Unlike liberal proponents, Ran Hirschl’s influential account questions the celebration 
of rights-based constitutionalism and offers a critical class-based analysis of 
judicialization that may have greater explanatory power in the Pakistan context.10  
According to Hirschl, the judicialization of politics results from the strategic alignment 
of various elites who are on the verge of losing power – 'departing hegemons' – who 
seek to shield their interests and policies from the vagaries of electoral politics. Such 
elites find it useful to empower not only courts but also other semi-autonomous and 
professional institutions with which they share ideological commitments.  As a result, 
judicialization and bureaucratization of policymaking is often conservative and tends 
to undermine the attempts of elected governments to redistribute resources and power. 
Hirschl’s framework resonates with recent criticisms of the judicialization of politics in 
Pakistan and helps explain the assertiveness of courts especially in times of transition 
from military regimes to civilian governments when the judiciary imposed serious 
constraints on social and economic policymaking by elected governments. Judicial 
review in the immediate aftermath of the exit of the Zia regime in the early 1990s, for 
example, enabled the military and the presidency to retain a foothold in the political 
system and shielded the Islamization policies of the Zia era from being rapidly 
overturned. However, whilst Hirschl’s analytical framework enables us to unpack 
aspects of judicialization in Pakistan at moments of transition from military to civil rule, 
it does not account for the progressive expansion of the Writ jurisdiction, especially the 
development of administrative law, even during military rule.  
 
A ‘functionalist’ explanatory framework which focuses on the strategic motivations and 
institutional incentives of judiciaries may provide the missing pieces that help us better 
understand the judicialization of politics in Pakistan.11 In particular, Ginsburg and 
Moustafa’s analysis of courts under authoritarian regimes may help explain the 
judicialization of administrative governance which has arguably been the most 
consistent if not the most visible domain of judicial action in Pakistan.12 According to 
                                                 
10 See R Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 
(Harvard University Press, 2004) 218. 
11 See Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behaviour (Princeton 
University Press, 2006); Robert H Bork, Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of judges (American 
Enterprise Institute, 2003); John Ferejohn, ‘Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law’ (2002) 65 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 41; Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution away from the Courts (Princeton 
University Press, 1999); Shapiro and Sweet, On Law, politics and Judicialization, above n 6. 
12 See Ginsburg and Moustafa, above n 6. 
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this framework of analysis, judicialization is strategically driven first and foremost by 
the courts themselves who align with and hence enlist the support of various elite 
groups and institutional complexes at different times and over different sets of issues. 
This form of judicialization happens most noticeably in fragmented and highly 
contentious polities where no one institution or class is able to dominate the state and 
the political system. As a result, a range of highly political and deeply contested issues 
end up before the courts, giving the judiciary the space to strategically expand the role 
of the courts in mediating issues of high politics as well as socio-economic policy. 
Furthermore, given the unstable and fragmented distribution of powers no adversely 
affected party is able to effectively push back at the expanding judicial domain while 
there are always important constituencies that support the courts’ decisions.  
 
Ultimately, however, this thesis argues that a deeply descriptive account of the non-
linear expansion of judicial power in Pakistan may help highlight how fluid and 
dynamic the process of judicialization can be. Furthermore, at any given time a range 
of factors and players may contribute to the expansion of and/or resistance to a more 
assertive judicial role. Therefore, this thesis represents a call to eschew over-reliance 
on global frameworks to explain and evaluate the increasing significance of courts 
anywhere and everywhere, but instead to situate the politics of particular courts in 





COLONIAL STATE-FORMATION  
 
FIGMENTS AND FRAGMENTS OF THE RULE OF LAW 
 
[E]qual and impartial justice is one of the main foundations on which British rule in India 
rests; it brought new ideas and prospects of peace, contentment and good government in 
a country where the administration of Justice had hitherto been impeded by tyranny and 
gross corruption; and it affects the life and well-being of every villager and townsman in 
India. It can be said that, whatever constitutional changes may ensue in the Government 
of India, the aims and methods of British courts of justice will survive, at any rate in their 
main features. 
 
Sir Charles Fawcett, THE FIRST CENTURY OF BRITISH JUSTICE IN INDIA 2 (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford: 1934) 
 
Any historical account of law in Pakistan must begin with the colonial era. Seven 
decades after independence from British rule Pakistan retains a postcolonial legal 
system – most of the codes and the structural features of the colonial legal system 
remain intact. While it is customary to describe the legal systems of former colonies as 
postcolonial, often the usage of this descriptor lacks critical value.  For the assertion of 
postcoloniality to be analytically meaningful, one must go beyond a mere declaration 
of the fact of an operative colonial legacy and provide a deeper description of how and 
why colonial laws and legal structures persist despite the passage of time, intervening 
political and social disruptions. Equally significantly, one must describe the extent to 
which that legacy has been jettisoned and explain how and why such change occurred. 
It is the dialectic of continuity (-colonial) and change (post-) which makes the lens of 
postcolonial legality a useful framework for a historical account of a legal system such 
as Pakistan’s.  
 
The longevity of colonial laws and legal structures in Pakistan can be explained by the 
interplay of several important political and social dynamics in the colonial and 
postcolonial eras. First, colonial law was embedded in a coherent ensemble of state 
institutions – the bureaucracy, the police, the courts, the military and the political 
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service – which evolved to define and enforce the political rationalities of colonial rule. 
Any change in the basic structures of the colonial legal system even after the end of 
colonial rule could not be made in isolation and required foundational changes in a 
powerful and integrated state structure. Second, this state structure was built with the 
assistance of and relied on significant cooperation from existing and emergent native 
elites. If colonial rule remained explicitly coercive, it would not have lasted as long as 
it did. The establishment and entrenchment of colonial rule thus necessitated the 
cooptation of diverse elites, often with conflicting interests and demands, through the 
creation of intricate webs of patronage and inter-dependencies. While this was 
principally achieved through recruitment into the military, police and lower rungs of 
the civil bureaucracy, it also involved the use of legitimating ideas and idioms to create 
conditions in which important segments of the native elites identified their interests 
with the colonial state.13 These native elites formed the ruling classes of postcolonial 
South Asian states including Pakistan whose interests and ideologies were thus invested 
in the extension of the colonial state structure. 
 
The cooptation of the native elites, however, carried the risk that these classes would 
progressively demand a greater share of power and resources from the colonial state by 
employing the same idioms of equality, democracy and rule of law. The colonial state 
thus evolved a complex and sophisticated technique of dispersal and rule whereby the 
various elites, networks, and localized centres of authority and influence were kept 
fragmented and in competition with each other. Several distinctions and stratifications 
of the native elites – along class, religious, regional and ethno-linguistic lines – were 
employed to pre-empt the emergence of cross-cutting coalitions of groups and classes 
and that may challenge colonial rule. This also enabled the colonial state to project itself 
as being above petty local squabbles – with its foreignness and an aura of racial 
superiority being useful in this respect – and assume the role of an independent and 
impartial arbiter of native social struggles. While the colonial state successfully 
managed such competition amongst various groups and classes until its bitter end, it 
did leave a legacy of centrifugal struggles along class, ethno-linguistic nationalism and 
                                                 
13 As Nicholas Dirks noted: ‘Colonialism was made possible, and then sustained and strengthened, as 
much by cultural technologies of rule as it was by the more obvious and brutal modes of conquest.’ 
Nicholas Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India (Princeton University 
Press, 2001) 9. 
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religious fault lines that postcolonial nation states in South Asia found difficult to 
contain. It is the challenge from ethno-linguistic, religious and regional dissidents 
which created pressures for change as well as new forms of resistance to such demands 
for structural transformation in the postcolonial state.  
 
Law occupied a central place in colonial rule in British India along the three axis of 
state-formation, elite cooptation and ideological hegemony. Law was used to 
effectively institutionalise the administrative state. Legal accountability and rule-
boundedness were used as means to maintain the efficiency and command structure of 
the bureaucracy and police, especially at the lower rungs which were staffed largely by 
the natives. Law was also used as an important technology for the maintenance of social 
control. The criminal justice system was used in ways that enhanced and magnified the 
state’s police powers and minimized the resort to military force. Law was also an 
important tool to dispense patronage and co-opt Indian elites in multiple ways. De jure 
and de facto preferences in access to courts and legal processes remained a structural 
feature of the colonial legal system until the very end. A plurality of norm systems – 
religious and customary – was initially tolerated and then regulated to create native 
investment in and allegiance to the colonial legal order. Law also had a prominent role 
in regulating the political economy. Property relations and entitlements were 
reconfigured from time to time to promote social and economic arrangements that best 
suited the priorities of the colonial state and co-opted elites.14  
 
Most notably, while colonial rule was structured on a bureaucratic authoritarianism 
permeated with the need to maintain racial difference and superiority of the colonialists, 
the rule of law, laden with abstract promises of equality, was employed as the primary 
legitimating idiom.15 The rule of law was not pure rhetoric, however. Such heavy 
reliance on legal processes for structuring colonial rule resulted in fragments of the rule 
of law being imbricated in state-formation in ways that not only served the political 
rationalities of colonialism but also offered opportunities for some interstitial resistance 
to it.  It is the limited availability and partial success of the rule of law in moderating 
                                                 
14 See D A Washbrook, ‘Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India’ (1981) 15:3 Modern Asian 
Studies 649. 
15 See Nasser Hussain, The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law (University 
of Michigan Press, 2003). 
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the authoritarianism of the colonial state, despite its larger failures, that account both 
for its lasting resonance amongst segments of the colonized elites as well as its utility 
in legitimizing colonial rule. It is also this dialectic of fragmentary presence but ultimate 
frustration that underpinned the protracted nationalist struggle for independence from 
colonial rule – a struggle waged mostly in the form and language of constitutionalism 
and rule of law. As a result, there was considerable faith in the inchoate ideas of rule of 
law and democracy on the part of postcolonial elites which continued the struggle for 
and with these grand ideals long after the end of colonial rule. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF COLONIAL RULE  
 
From the East India Company to the British Raj 
 
The colonial state evolved from the Presidency towns of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras 
– enclaves of trading privileges extended to the East India Company in the 17th century 
– to the establishment of Crown rule or the British Raj over the entire Indian 
Subcontinent by mid-19th century. The British East India Company, established in 1600 
by royal charter as a private trading corporation, was granted a monopoly on the trade 
with India and the East Indies by the Crown. It was not until 1618 when it received 
permission for the Mughal Empire to lease its first trading facilities that the Company’s 
aspirations of Indian trade became a viable prospect. The Company gradually secured 
trading posts on both the eastern and western coasts of India, established a fortified 
factory (warehouse) at Fort St. George in 1640 around which the town of Madras later 
grew, and acquired Bombay in 1668. With the completion of Fort William at Calcutta 
in 1715, the Company secured trading bases, essentially city states, across India.16 
 
As the Mughal Empire weakened in the 18th century, resulting in the incremental 
‘relocation’ of power from the ‘supra-local state’ to local powers centres,17 the 
Company’s opportunities to expand commerce and territory in the hinterland of its 
                                                 
16 See generally, Bhawani Sankar Chowdhury, Studies in Judicial History of British India, Books I and 
II (Eastern Law House Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta, 1972). 
17 See Jon E Wilson, ‘Early Colonial India Beyond Empire’ (2007) 50 The Historical Journal 951, 955-
6.  
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Presidency towns grew dramatically.18 The acquisition of the Diwani (revenue 
administration) of Bengal, the richest province of the Mughal Empire and subsequently 
of British India, laid the foundations of the political economy of colonialism in India. 
The Company’s ascendancy in Bengal also provided the blueprint for its territorial 
expansion. The Company had secured valid trading privileges for itself and private 
persons trading under its banner from the Mughal emperor but its operations were under 
constant pressures from successive nawabs, nominally vice regents but de facto rulers 
of Bengal. In 1756, the young nawab attempted to evict the Company from Bengal. 
This precipitated a military campaign that would firmly establish the Company’s 
dominance over Bengal and north-eastern India within a decade. In 1765 the Company 
formally acquired the Diwani (revenue administration) as well as informally the 
Nizamat (law, order and policing) of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in return for maintaining 
hand-picked nawabs on the symbolic throne. 
 
In the aftermath of its ascendancy in Bengal the Company progressively transformed 
itself from a trading corporation to a colonial instrument of the British Empire through 
a steady campaign of territorial expansion. Prior to the acquisition of Diwani the 
Company had constantly laboured under an imbalance of trade and payments. The 
Indian trade largely comprised the importation of goods into Britain in return for 
transfer of payments in bullion to India. This rendered the maintenance of troops and 
prosecution of wars justifiable only as a commercial necessity. With the acquisition of 
revenue administration the Company gained access to vital resources and an economic 
rationale to expand its territory in India.19  From 1765 onwards the Company embarked 
on a sustained program of territorial aggrandizement. In 1803, when the Company 
successfully concluded a protracted campaign against the confederacy of Maratha 
states, the last bastion of native power in north-central India, it finally had the Mughal 
                                                 
18 See P J Marshall, ‘The British in Asia: Trade to Dominion, 1700-1765’ in P J Marshall (ed), The 
Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume II: The Eighteenth Century (Oxford University Press, 
1998); R K Ray, ‘Indian Society and the Establishment of British Supremacy, 1765-1818’ in P J 
Marshall (ed), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume II: The Eighteenth Century (Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
19 In 1801 the annual exports from Bengal approximated £2.5 million. In comparison, the revenue 
collected from the territory under the Company’s control amounted to £6.9 million. By 1807 the 
revenue collection rose to £14.5 million. See Kaushik Roy, ‘The Armed Expansion of the English East 
India Company’ in Daniel Marston and Chandar Sundram (eds), A Military History of India and South 
Asia (Pentagon Press, 2007) 3. 
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throne at Delhi in its grasp. The nominal Mughal emperor, then a blind old man, came 
under the Company’s protection and north India was securely within British control.   
 
Towards the end of the first century of the Company’s rule in India its dominion was 
finally extended to Sindh, Punjab and the north-west frontier regions.  As such, colonial 
state and legal institutions were introduced to the territories of present-day Pakistan 
much later than in Bengal and north-central India. The rulers of Sind were forced into 
a subsidiary alliance in 1839.20 An inevitable rebellion and justification for annexation 
were ‘deliberately manufactured’ with the imposition of a more demanding subsidiary 
treaty in 1843.21  In Punjab, a war broke out with the Sikh rulers in 1845 which, while 
ending in British victory, revealed the mettle of the Sikh forces.22 By a treaty in 1846 
the Sikhs were compelled to cede Kashmir to the local regent as a reward for his 
neutrality and restrict the size of the Sikh army. The foreseeable Sikh rebellion 
materialized and was suppressed in 1848-49. The Company’s last Governor-General in 
India, Lord Dalhousie assumed office in 1848 and embarked on an aggressive campaign 
of formal annexation of territory, often in clear violation of the earlier subsidiary 
treaties. Through the annexation of Punjab and Hyderabad amongst other states, the 
Company consolidated British dominion all the way from Burma in the east to the base 
of Afghan ranges in the west, from the Himalayas in the north to the tip of the Indian 
peninsula in the south. 
 
After a century of territorial expansion under the East India Company, however, the 
colonial state suffered a major disruption. A ‘Mutiny’ in 1857 by the sepoys of the 
Company’s Bengal army shook British rule in India to its very foundations and for a 
short while even threatened to uproot it permanently. The Mutiny, which quickly 
transformed into a broader conflagration in north-central India,23 resolved longstanding 
debates about the future of the Company and its governance structures in India. The 
Company shouldered much of the blame for precipitating and mishandling the Mutiny. 
                                                 
20 See P E Roberts, A Historical Geography of the British Dominions, Vol. VII Part I (Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1924) 326-27. Also, see G Anderson and M Subedar, The Expansion of British India 
(1818-1858) (G. Bell & Sons Ltd., London, 1918) 26. 
21 See Roberts, above n 20, 329. 
22 See Roy, above n 19, 14-5. 
23 See D A Low, ‘Pakistan and India: Political Legacies from the Colonial Past’ (2002) 25:2 South Asia 
257, 262; Raymond Callahan, ‘The Great Sepoy Mutiny’ in Daniel Marston and Chandar Sundram 
(eds), A Military History of India and South Asia (Pentagon Press, 2007) 18; Sugata Bose and Ayesha 
Jalal, Modern South Asia (Routledge, 3rd ed, 2011) 77-8.  
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The Government of India Act passed in 1858 ended Company rule and substituted it by 
direct Crown rule or the British Raj. The office of the Secretary of State for India, an 
important cabinet position, replaced the Company’s Board of Control. The Governor-
General of India also became the Viceroy of the Queen and was directly responsible to 
the Secretary of State for India.24  
 
With direct Crown rule thus established in India, the Raj immediately began the task of 
restructuring the colonial state on firmer footings than had been the case before the 
Mutiny. The army, which had continued to play a significant role in governance under 
the Company’s aegis, was relegated to the task of fighting regional campaigns and 
managing the tribal borderlands on the north-western frontiers. Civil ascendancy was 
firmly established except in the Punjab and other parts that form present-day Pakistan.  
Here the demands of governance were entrusted to military men who better understood 
the 'martial races' which would henceforth provide the Raj with a bulk of its recruits.25  
Elsewhere the Raj was built on the 'steel frame' of the civil bureaucracy whose top rungs 
staffed almost exclusively by British officials enjoyed vast discretionary powers, while 
the lower cadres of Indian officials were controlled by elaborate laws, regulations and 
bureaucratic procedures. The bureaucratization of the state, a grand project of the 
codification of Indian laws and the cooptation of various elites into the government 
arrangement gave rise to a form of colonial governance that enabled the Raj to magnify 
and project its regulatory powers much deeper into Indian society.   
 
The Raj initially focussed disproportionately on the traditional elites, and foremost 
amongst them were the rulers of the princely states under its dominion, large 
landholders and tribal chiefs. Its’ preoccupation with these classes was rooted in a 
particular understanding of the basis of disaffection with Company rule leading up to 
the Mutiny. Various causes were attributed to the Mutiny,26 but the explanation that 
resonated with the Raj was that the rebellion was propelled by the displacement of 
native elites and the undermining of native social structures by a Company 
                                                 
24 The Charter Act of 1833 had already established a unified Government of India and a Legislative 
Council. See Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford University Press, 1959) 169.  
25 On the 'martial races' of India, see Douglas M Peers, ‘The Martial Races and the Indian Army in the 
Victorian Era’ in Daniel Marston and Chandar Sundram (eds), A Military History of India and South 
Asia (Pentagon Press, 2007) 34-52. 
26 See Callahan, above n 23, 24-6; Bose and Jalal, above n 23, 72-3. 
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administration supposedly gripped by the zeal of reform.27 This was considered 
unmistakable evidence of the need to maintain and co-opt the native elites into the 
governance scheme more deeply than the Company had done. Amongst other things, 
the Raj promised the creation of nominally representative institutions at the municipal 
and provincial levels, staffed through nomination or elections based on limited 
franchise, to secure the cooperation of those the British thought were ‘natural leaders’ 
of their groups and communities and who invariably had old wealth and traditional 
status.28 The expansion in the colonial bureaucracy, police and judicial services also 
provided an opportunity to ‘enlist on our side, and to employ in our service, those 
natives who have, from their birth or position, a natural influence in the country’ 
including new classes of prosperous, English-educated, urban professionals and 
businessmen that grew in the post-Mutiny era.29 
 
Indian Nationalism, Civil Disobedience and Communal Politics  
 
At the dawn of the 20th century, the Raj appeared to be secure in the support of a huge 
army of ‘collaborators’ it had built through its post-Mutiny policies.30 The princes, large 
landlords, soldiers of the Indian Army, settlers of new canal irrigated lands, native 
policemen, and the rank and file of the bureaucracy stood firmly behind the imperial 
ruler when the first Great War erupted in Europe. The Raj also had the support of the 
Indian nationalist parties which had recently emerged as vehicles of petitioning for a 
greater role in statecraft. As their demands for political inclusion gained momentum, 
the Raj progressively moved from balancing various class or group interests to playing 
them off against each other in order to delay the emergence of a coherent and concerted 
political campaign for dominion status. One dimension of Indian politics which 
increasingly enabled the Raj to position itself as a supposedly impartial arbiter, but 
which soon acquired a life of its own, was the communal division between the Hindu 
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majority and religious minorities. Such was the configuration of constitutional politics 
in India as the nationalist struggle unfolded.  
 
The two most significant political players to emerge at the national level at the turn of 
the century were the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League. The 
Congress, formed in 1885, was an avowedly non-communal organization. It reflected 
the perceived need of Indian intelligentsia and new urban, educated, nationalist classes 
to mobilise in order to press their demands on the Raj. The Congress was, at least in its 
first generation, essentially loyal and elitist. The Muslim League founded in 1906 to 
purportedly give a voice to more than 60 million Muslims, who were under-represented 
in the civil service and over-represented in police and army, was also fundamentally 
loyal to the Raj. The Muslim League was even more elitist as it was essentially a party 
of the old Muslim aristocracy, the princes and emerging urban upper classes of Bengal 
and north-central India.31 The leadership cadres of both the Congress and the Muslim 
League initially subscribed to the Raj’s mythology of rule of law, democracy and 
development.32 As such, the nationalist movement and its associated classes adopted 
constitutionalist methods to press their call of inclusion within the colonial state and 
consideration within its political, economic and social rationalities.  
 
The Raj reciprocated these demands at the end of the First World War in the form of 
the Montagu-Chelmsford reform proposals of 1918, which culminated in the 
Government of India Act, 1919.33 These constitutional changes created two levels of 
elected government: a provincial tier with Indian ministers responsible for education, 
agriculture, health and finance in the provinces of British India; and a Viceregal 
legislative assembly with a largely advisory role. This system of limited representation 
was not a step towards a ‘progressive realization of responsible government,’34 but a 
mere compromise to delay it.35 It was also contrived to fragment and provincialize 
Indian politics. The opposition of the government of India to oversight by elected 
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representatives ensured the continued ascendancy of the executive.36 As a result, 
colonial bureaucracy remained largely insulated from Indian public opinion and 
political oversight until the end of imperial rule, except to the extent to which actions 
could be pressured by civil disobedience or violent resistance.37 
 
The First World War precipitated other changes in Indian society that imposed 
challenging demands on the Raj. By 1918 the Indian Army had expanded to half a 
million and gave Indian Muslims (who formed a third of soldiers) and Punjab (which 
provided almost half of the recruits) enhanced significance in the Raj’s priorities.38 As 
de-commissioned soldiers returned from African and Middle-eastern campaigns, there 
was a sense of discontent and restlessness all over India, especially in the Punjab. War-
time taxes and high inflation had alienated the urban and mercantile classes.39 Increased 
debt burden had also crippled the peasantry when Mohandas Gandhi emerged as the 
leader of a mass movement under the banner of the Congress in 1919. Gandhi’s 
Satyagraha (non-violent civil disobedience) movement was launched in protest over 
the Rowlatt Acts of 1919 which had extended the life of war-time measures for quelling 
dissent and prosecuting political offences. The Satyagraha coincided with the Khilafat 
movement of conservative Indian Muslims protesting the dismemberment of the 
Ottoman Empire and the imminent end of the Caliphate.40 Indian public opinion thus 
unified against the Raj.  
 
Fortunately for the Raj, some of its strategies of co-opting various segments of Indian 
elite and middle classes enabled it to survive the immediate post-war turmoil. The non-
cooperation movement was noticeably weak in the princely states. The limited 
democracy introduced by the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and the support of rural 
landed classes that it solidified also helped the Raj weather the storm of protest. Support 
for the civil disobedience movement fragmented when in 1922 Gandhi suddenly and 
unilaterally called off the non-violent movement after a mob set fire to a police station.41 
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The leaders of the Khilafat movement considered this a betrayal of their cause. Jinnah, 
a brilliant Muslim barrister who ‘was uniquely admired, respected and coveted by the 
leadership of both political parties’42 and had been dubbed the ‘Ambassador of Hindu-
Muslim Unity’43 was alienated by Gandhi's ‘capture’ of Congress and parted ways with 
the party in 1920.44 With Jinnah at the helm, the constitutional position of the Muslim 
League crystallized around constitutional safeguards for the Muslims in the future 
dispensation of India – separate electorates, guaranteed one-third representation in the 
central legislature and in the central and provincial governments.  
 
Congress stated its firm opposition to these demands through the Nehru Report of 1928. 
With discussions on the future constitutional scheme for India thus deadlocked, 
Congress began its second civil disobedience campaign in 1930-31.45 Indian Muslims 
by and large stayed away from the Congress campaign. From 1930-32 the Raj 
organized a series of Round Table Conferences in London to discuss a negotiated 
settlement on the future constitution of India as a step towards dominion status. 
Congress was persuaded to join the second session in 1931 after its anti-colonial 
campaign ran out of steam. Parties at the conference included, in addition to the 
Congress and the Muslim League, the representatives of other religious communities 
and of the 560 or so princely states. The Raj sat at the head of the table comfortable in 
the assurance that communal divides and the loyalty of the princes would prevent 
consensus, and any constitutional scheme that might be devised would leave it as the 
ultimate arbiter of communal, class and provincial divisions.  
 
The Government of India Act, 1935 which reflected the agreement reached at the 
Round Table Conference fulfilled these expectations.46 Under the new constitutional 
arrangement a weak federation between the provinces of British India and the princely 
states was proposed at the center, but only if a certain number of states agreed to join it 
on their own terms.47 It was hoped by the Crown that such a federation would 
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materialize and would be a weak one as the princes were given significant 
representation in the federal legislature as well as the option of imposing limitations on 
federal legislative and executive powers in their states.48 The grant of greater self-
government at the provincial level was also expected to placate the Indian nationalists, 
at least for a while. At the same time it was hoped that a greater provincialization of 
politics fostered by the Act would also undermine the prospects of a strong political 
center. It was envisioned that such a feeble federation would subsequently agree to a 
nominal dominion status with considerable British influence and oversight. As such, 
the Act was designed to perpetuate the Raj rather than terminate British rule.  
 
Unfortunately for the Raj the princes did not display sufficient solidarity, and the 
federation never materialized. The Act also failed to satisfy Indian nationalists. While 
considerable powers were transferred to elected provincial governments, the spirit of 
executive domination visibly permeated the new governance arrangement at the central 
level. The Act gave the Governor-General and the provincial Governors a wide array 
of discretionary and special powers,49 including complete control over the military,50 
foreign affairs,51 maintenance of order,52 taxation,53 and spending.54 The Governor-
General and the Governors had the capacity to limit or prohibit discussions on a range 
of matters before the legislatures,55 and were also granted the power to dissolve 
legislatures and assume all power in cases of declared emergencies.56 The exercise of 
the discretionary powers and special responsibilities were not justiciable before the 
courts, including the newly-created Federal Court. Nonetheless, the 1935 Act calmed 
the political atmosphere in India somewhat, and appeared to provide a pathway to a 
peaceful even if tortuous transition to dominion status. 
  
                                                 
48 §§6(2) and 18(2). 
49 §§12 and 52. 
50 §§8 and 11. 
51 §11. 
52 §§56, 57 and 58. 
53 §37. 
54 §§33, 34 and 35. 
55 §§38, 40 and 86. 
56 §§19, 32, 45, 62 and 93. 
  37
The Twilight of the Raj: Constitutional Deadlock and Partition 
 
In the elections for the provincial legislatures held in 1937 roughly half of the electorate, 
then expanded to 35 million, voted Congress ministries into power in most provinces.57 
The Congress’ overwhelming electoral success appeared to be disastrous for the 
Muslim League. The League failed miserably even in the Muslim-majority provinces 
of Punjab, Sind and N.W.F.P., and only managed to form an unstable coalition ministry 
in Bengal. It was shown to be a party of Muslim aristocracy and urban professionals 
with limited public support. This electoral loss, however, also founded the Muslim 
League’s renaissance. The actions of Congress ministries in several Hindu-majority 
provinces dramatically aggravated Muslim grievances and convinced many that 
uncontrolled majoritarian democracy, without the kinds of constitutional safeguards 
that Jinnah had been advocating, would prove ruinous for the Muslim middle classes in 
an independent India.  
 
The short-lived political equilibrium suddenly shattered when in 1939 the Viceroy 
declared India’s participation in the Second World War without any consultation and 
the Congress ministries in the provinces resigned in protest. The Muslim League 
celebrated a ‘Day of Deliverance’ which marked the beginning of its notable rise in 
popularity amongst Indian Muslims and the transformation of its leader from Mr. Jinnah 
to ‘Quaid-e-Azam’ (the Great Leader). Historically, the League had a presence in the 
provinces of north-central India, where Muslims were a numerical minority, and to a 
lesser extent in Bengal. The League now also found traction in the Muslim-majority 
provinces in the west. At its annual session in Lahore in March 1940 the Muslim League 
adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of Pakistan – independent ‘states’ for 
the Muslims of India. There is considerable evidence that the Pakistan that Jinnah 
demanded at this stage was a constitutional space rather than a nation-state with 
delineated geographical boundaries.58 It was essentially a bargaining chip that Jinnah 
could use to negotiate a confederal arrangement whereby Muslim-majority provinces 
would achieve the greatest possible autonomy within a future Indian union to be created 
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at the end of the Raj, as well as to win constitutional safeguards for Muslims as 
minorities in the other provinces.  
 
In order to pursue this strategy Jinnah was required to leave the Pakistan demand as 
vague as possible while attempting to enlist sufficient support in the Muslim-majority 
provinces to claim for himself the status of being the ‘sole spokesman’ of the Muslims 
of India. The difficulty for Jinnah in the Punjab was that the large landholders and 
chiefs, whose Unionist party remained loyal to the Raj, resented the Muslim League’s 
intrusion into their support base. The Muslim League’s organizational structure and 
support amongst the landed elites in the other western provinces also remained weak. 
Jinnah was left with the difficult choice whether to undertake a genuine mass 
mobilization and party organization in the Muslim-majority provinces or to build a 
party structure by orchestrating defections to the Muslim League from the Unionists 
and other local power-brokers. The latter strategy carried the risk of destabilizing 
factionalism in the party’s burgeoning provincial cadres. The choice was made for 
Jinnah by the rapid decline in the Raj’s fortune.  
 
By May 1942 Britain had lost Singapore, and with the Japanese invasion of Burma also 
its remaining prestige and nerve. At a time when it desperately needed domestic support 
in India the Congress launched the ‘Quit India’ campaign, another wave of civil 
disobedience demanding complete independence from Britain. The Raj’s overture to 
Indian nationalists in the form of the Cripps Mission (1942) failed and although it 
managed to suppress the movement through the arrests of Congress leadership and 
thousands of its activists, its hold over India had become precarious. Fortunately for the 
Raj, Muslims and Sikhs remained detached from the Congress’ campaign, which was 
a major relief given the composition of the Indian Army and police, but this saving 
grace could not be counted on indefinitely. Furthermore, it was evident that Britain did 
not have the financial or human resources to hold on to the jewel of the Empire for long 
after the War. The civil services, by then considerably Indianized, were undermanned 
and overstretched. British soldiers would resent continued deployment in India after the 
War while decommissioned Indian soldiers would quite likely become a ferment of 
discontent. Most alarmingly, the historic balance of payments with India had been 
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reversed and Britain owed a soaring debt for wartime supplies and services. The 
prestige of holding on to its colony would come at a huge financial cost.59  
 
The Raj thus made the decision to exit India as soon as possible after the end of the 
War. Whereas hitherto a deadlock in constitutional negotiations between the Congress 
and the Muslim League suited the Raj, which had played its part in encouraging such 
an impasse, it now desperately needed a settlement which seemed exceedingly difficult 
and distant. While Congress demanded an immediate transfer of power, the Muslim 
League insisted on a negotiated resolution of the minority problem under British 
arbitration as a precondition. The 1945-46 elections, designed to create a constituent 
assembly as well as test the relative support for the major parties came at a time of post-
War economic hardship and discontent, especially in the Punjab. The Muslim League 
was poorly organized and funded, and heavily reliant on candidates with local networks 
and power bases, many of whom had recently deserted the Unionists.60 The Muslim 
League performed much better in the Punjab and the other western provinces compared 
to the 1937 elections, but its victory was far from overwhelming.61 In Bengal, where 
the Muslim League was much better organized, it won by a landslide.62 In the elections 
for the central legislature the Muslim League won all of the Muslim seats. Jinnah thus 
emerged as the legitimate spokesman of the Muslims of India, even though his party's 
electoral success in the western Muslim-majority provinces was due largely to 
defections of the landed elites.  
 
The party-political situation having thus been clarified, the Cabinet Mission to India 
(1946) pursued a constitutional compromise that would enable the Raj to make its exit. 
The Mission proposed two possible schemes: a unitary India with a weak center and 
greater provincial autonomy, or alternatively a partition of India and Pakistan – as well 
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as Punjab and Bengal – along communal lines. It expected the Congress to resist the 
partition of India and the Muslim League to oppose the dismemberment of the Muslim-
majority provinces, thereby rendering both amenable to accepting a weak federation 
with constitutional protections for the minority communities. As anticipated, the 
Congress initially opposed the first option and Muslim League the second. Jinnah, 
despite his reputation for inflexibility and hard negotiations was very much open to a 
compromise. In contrast, the Congress leadership remained insistent on a strong center 
and even indicated its willingness to accept a partition of the Subcontinent. Jinnah, with 
his carefully structured gambit having failed, was pushed into a corner from which only 
the British could extricate him. However, by now the Raj had lost its capacity to resist 
or pressurize Congress any longer. In essence, the partition of India was thus thrust 
upon Jinnah.63  
 
By December 1946 the Raj had set the date for its exit when Lord Mountbatten was 
appointed as the last Viceroy of India with the mandate to accomplish a transfer of 
power by mid-1948. However, Lord Mountbatten was determined to complete the 
hazardous task of demarcating the borders of the new nation states and of achieving a 
difficult division of assets in the least possible time.  In pursuit of this goal, the Raj 
disregarded predictions of disastrous consequences in case of the partition of Punjab.64 
Independence was brought forward by nearly a year and on the midnight of 14 and 15 
August when the nation states of India and Pakistan were created none of the challenges 
of border demarcation, division of assets, allocation of administrative personnel, etc. 
had been satisfactorily resolved. Punjab had already begun its descent into communal 
violence which would ultimately claim hundreds of thousands of lives.65 Mass 
migrations between east and west Bengal and east and west Punjab had begun with 
millions of people displaced on both sides of the new borders.66 While the seeds of 
long-standing hatred, future wars and chronic under-development were thus planted in 
the Indian Subcontinent, the Raj had already made its ‘shameful flight.’ 
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THE COLONIAL STATE AND LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
The Indian Civil Service and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism  
 
The foundations of the colonial state and legal system were laid in the land revenue 
settlements of Bengal and north-central India by the East India Company.  Upon the 
acquisition of the Diwani of Bengal, the Company largely saw and portrayed its 
administrative arrangement as an extension of the authoritarian tradition of Mughal 
government. It initially retained the Mughal revenue structure, except to the extent of 
appointing its own Collectors to oversee revenue administration. The Company also 
continued to use the titles, styles, processes and personnel of Mughal administration in 
the transitional period before it began to gradually mould its own administrative 
structure. The perpetuation of the Mughal tax farming structure in the interregnum 
enabled the Company to collect revenue without interfering with the native social 
structures and thus furthered the goals of maintaining order and the agrarian base for 
revenue harvesting.67 However, increasing revenue often required the administration to 
loosen the hold of the jagirdars (holders of Mughal-era revenue estates) and local elites 
over land. This had to be counter-balanced by concerns that a rapid displacement of the 
jagirdars and other groups with local authority and influence could destabilise 
Company rule. 
 
The bureaucratic structure that evolved during the next decades of Company rule was 
designed principally to serve the interests of revenue extraction. The Company 
developed a state structure in which the bureaucracy had unassailable ascendancy and 
combined executive, judicial, and revenue-collecting powers in the same officials.68 
Such concentration of discretionary power in a handful of superior officers remained 
the core administrative principle in British India. A major transformation in the civil 
administrative structure of the Company began at the turn of the 19th century. Under 
the reforms undertaken pursuant to the Charter Act of 1793 the Company's commercial 
bureaucracy evolved into a professional civil service.  All important positions in the 
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Company's service became the preserve of British Covenanted Civil Servants who had 
long-term contracts with the Company. Only inferior positions were open to native 
Uncovenanted Civil Servants who were employed on short-term contracts or specific 
commissions. A culture of rule-boundedness was aggressively introduced within the 
Covenanted cadre starting with the Charter Act of 1793 which incorporated a manual 
of civil service rules and regulations. Induction and training processes for Covenanted 
servants improved considerably with the establishment of the Fort William College in 
Calcutta in 1800 and the East India College at Haileybury in England in 1806, where 
candidates for Covenanted positions were required to undertake professional study for 
three years. The salary structures were also improved and private trading was strictly 
prohibited.  
 
Further restructuring of the civil service began in the last days of the Company. 
Competitive examinations for the Covenanted positions were held in England in 1853. 
With the displacement of the Company in the aftermath of the Mutiny, the Raj replaced 
the Covenanted officials with exclusive corps of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and the 
Indian Political Service (IPS) below which there were hierarchical layers of generalist 
and specialist bureaucracy. The IPS officers were the 'super-elite' who served in the 
frontier regions and princely states, and effectively ruled these regions and managed 
their political affairs. Roughly two-third of its members came from the army and one-
third from the ICS.69 ICS officers were generalists who not only commanded the 
administrative structure, police and the judiciary in the districts but all superior 
positions in the provincial and central administration were reserved for them. The ICS 
officers were by and large the product of English public schools and belonged to British 
upper-middle class. From 1878 onwards successful candidates underwent a two-year 
course at Balliol College in Oxford and were imbued with the traditions of Oxbridge as 
much as with knowledge of Indian languages and culture. The remuneration of the ICS 
was high, even by comparison with the bureaucracy in England.70  
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The ICS was bolstered ‘with the prestige of race’ and despite the frequent promises of 
Indian access to ICS recruitment it remained overwhelmingly white.71 While the ICS 
was reserved for British officers, the opportunities for native employment in the junior 
rungs of the bureaucracy and police were dramatically expanded. An elaborate civil 
service structure not only magnified the Raj’s presence in Indian society but native 
employment in its lower cadres also served to align the interests of old and new elites 
with colonial imperatives. As noted in the Parliament, the employment of Indians 
‘would afford the best security for the permanence of our rule, for it would make the 
highest class of natives, as well as those of low degree, feel that their own good was 
bound up in the continuance of our sway.’72 The composition and ethos of the ICS, and 
the nativization of an enlarged bureaucratic apparatus under it, was bound to enhance 
the sense of racial superiority in the ICS and a distrust of the native servants working 
under it. Narratives of the venality, incompetence and cowardice of native officials 
became an essential part of the official folklore. Native officials were the other of the 
ICS and gave context to the courage, competence and uprightness of the British officials 
at the helm of Indian destiny.  
 
The burgeoning ranks of educated, professional, English-speaking, English-mannered 
urban elites placed challenging demands on the Raj to harness their intellectual 
resources through employment in the upper cadres of bureaucracy, police, judiciary and 
military as well.73 The pressure to extend the 'Indianization' of the state to the top, and 
with it the diffusion of the Raj’s coloniality, thus grew with the expansion of these new 
urban classes.74 The question of the Indianization of the bureaucracy explicitly 
remained on the Raj’s agenda throughout its existence. The Aitchison Commission 
Report (1886-87), the Islingtom Commission Report (1915), the Lee Commission 
Report (1924) and the Simon Commission Report (1930) present a record of the 
colonial state’s continuing difficulties and anxieties with Indianization. The Raj was 
amenable to the large scale employment of Indians in the lower cadres of the civil 
service and police which were mostly Indianized by the beginning of the 20th century.75 
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The ICS, however, was jealously guarded as the bastion of white privilege with a 
majority of posts remaining in the hands of English Oxbridge-trained bureaucrats. As 
late as 1909 only 65 out of 1,244 ICS officers were natives. It is partly the failure to 
meet the demands for the Indianization of the apex state structure that provided the 
impetus for the self-government movement in India.76  
 
Foundations of the Anglo-Indian Legal System 
 
The primary purpose of the creation of a legal system by the East India Company was 
to bolster revenue administration.77 Initially the Company retained much of the idiom 
and many of the structures of the pre-colonial legal system.78 In 1772 it created 
appellate courts to deal with matters arising in the mofussil (hinterland of the Bengal 
Presidency).79 Despite the nomenclature which signified a continuation of indigenous 
legal forms, these courts were new institutions. Nonetheless, by entrusting the 
Governor-General, his Council and Collectors with the most significant judicial offices, 
the ‘Mughal tradition’ of intertwining judicial authority with executive offices had been 
continued.80 A non-colonial rule of law demanded, amongst other things, a judiciary 
independent of the executive and somewhat capable of shielding its Indian subjects 
from arbitrary action. These were not features of the Company’s legal system. 
Furthermore, in recognition of the primacy of the revenue demands, jagirdars and 
intermediate level landlords and tax farmers were generally exempted from the 
jurisdiction of the courts, except with the prior permission of the Governor-General and 
Council.  
 
In the Presidencies where British citizens resided, however, core principles of the rule 
of law were put to the test. The Regulating Act of 1773 created a Supreme Court of 
Judicature at Calcutta, a Crown court vested with civil and criminal jurisdiction in the 
Presidencies and essentially over all matters relating to the Company's British and 
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native servants. Unlike the courts in the hinterland, the Supreme Court was separate 
from the executive and was responsible for protecting the rights of all residents of the 
Presidencies from the excesses of Company officials. It was even granted the power to 
issue prerogative writs. This proved to be a disastrous experiment. The Supreme Court 
ran into controversy and a visible struggle with the executive ensued over a case 
involving corruption charges against the Governor-General.81 There was considerable 
evidence suggesting that the Chief Justice was partly driven by self-interest and this 
tussle was a means to seek greater office and privileges. Whatever the causes of the 
executive-judiciary clash might have been, robust protection of the natives from 
oppression was not one of them.82 The Settlement Act of 1781 resolved the underlying 
constitutional tension by exempting the actions of the Governor-General and Council 
from the court's jurisdiction and barred it from issuing prerogative writs in revenue and 
related matters.83  
 
The Cornwallis Code of 1793, of which the Permanent Settlement of Bengal was a part, 
brought about the first significant reform in the laws and legal system of India outside 
the narrow confines of the Presidency towns.  The stated aim of the Code was to achieve 
political stability, security of property and revenue. Limited separation of judiciary 
from the executive was declared as vital to this project. A hierarchy of civil courts was 
set up in the mofussil under the Sadr (provincial) appellate courts. The district courts 
were staffed by British judges deciding cases with the aid of native ‘law officers’ who 
were Hindu or Muslim scholars tasked with guiding the courts on Islamic or Hindu law 
in personal matters.84 A parallel system of criminal circuit courts was also set up with 
in effect the same British judges and Indian law officers. District and circuit judges 
were granted a status and pay higher than the Collectors. Appeals against the decisions 
of district and circuit judges’ decisions lay to the Sadr courts. Sadr courts could also 
deal with charges of corruption against the judges. The Company and its British 
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employees, who could previously be tried only before the Supreme Court, were made 
subject to the jurisdiction of the District and Sadr courts when performing their duties 
in the hinterland.85  
 
The basic structures of the legal system created by the Cornwallis Code were extended 
to Madras and Bombay Presidencies and remained intact until the end of Company rule 
in India.86 The separation between the judiciary and the revenue administration was, 
however, constantly subject to revision. By 1807 the Governor-General and Council 
gave up ex officio judicial functions but the puisne judges appointed to the Provincial 
appellate courts were Covenanted servants of the Company. In 1811 a non-member of 
the Council was appointed as the Chief Judge of the Provincial Court in Bengal, thereby 
achieving a complete separation between the judiciary and the executive for the first 
time, an arrangement which the Court of Directors only grudgingly accepted.87 In 
additional changes to the judicial system, separate provincial courts were established 
for the Western Provinces and Bengal and the District judges were made Session judges 
in 1831. These judicial reforms also opened the judicial service to Indians. The lower 
tiers of courts were considerably expanded and staffed by native subordinate judiciary 
which henceforth did the overwhelming bulk of judicial work at the trial level.88  
 
However, the Company’s administration never reconciled itself to the Cornwallis 
doctrine of separation of judiciary and executive at least as far as revenue affairs were 
concerned. In 1831, certain judicial functions related to revenue matters were reverted 
to Collectors who were given the additional charges of the District Magistrate.89 The 
merger of administrative, judicial and police powers in the Collector was firmly re-
established and became the permanent exception to the separation of judiciary from the 
executive in British India.90 Most significantly, this model was retained in its purer form 
in Punjab and the north-western frontier region until the end of the British Raj.91 From 
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an administrative standpoint, the merger of the Collector and district magistracy was 
ultimately deemed necessary to facilitate the supervision of the police and maintenance 
of law and order. The vesting of revenue and judicial powers in the same official also 
ensured that there would be no clash between the Company’s revenue demands and the 
demands of justice.92 In addition to the separation of judicial and executive functions, 
several other aspects of the rule of law also remained aspirational or mere statements 
of intent. Except for the suppression first of thugs and later of designated criminal 
tribes, essentially mobile and marginalized groups with limited attachment to land, 
policing remained a low priority.93 Brutality, torture, extra-judicial action, indiscipline 
and low conviction rates remained characteristic features of policing throughout 
Company rule.94  
 
Apart from their utility in subjecting small occupier-cultivators to the revenue 
administration’s demands for payment of arrears, to the moneylenders’ debt collection 
claims, and to suppression by European indigo plantation owners, the courts remained 
highly inefficient. While colonial administrators frequently referred to the notorious 
litigiousness of the natives, there is considerable evidence of a lack of intent to establish 
an effective legal system that would cater to the legal disputes that even a mildly 
litigious society may be expected to generate.95 Furthermore, a bulk of litigation was 
the product exclusively of the Company’s policies. The Company’s legal system 
remained deeply embroiled in revenue administration with a great deal of litigation 
representing challenges to rent demands, moves for ejectment of tenants, claims of 
occupancy tenancy status, and other revenue related issues.96 The overwhelming 
majority of civil and even criminal cases were also related to the ownership, control 
and revenue assessments of agricultural land.97 Many cases arose out of the land sales 
and transfers compelled by failure to meet revenue assessments. Many landholders who 
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were meant to be dispossessed retained possession of the land and the failure of formal 
title to transform into effective control emerged as the source of prolonged civil suits.98  
 
Court fees remained prohibitive. No mechanism for the enforcement of court judgments 
was available to the courts and hence to those who could not rely upon their relations 
with state officials or their own private power.  Evidentiary rules were unnecessarily 
complicated and court processes were dilatory with the result that it took up to fifty 
years to decide some cases.99 There were numerous possibilities for appeal. Corruption 
was rampant, as was forgery and perjury.100 The judiciary was composed largely of 
those civil servants who were retired or incompetent and courts became the ‘resting 
places of those members of the service who were deemed unfit for higher 
responsibilities.’101 The colonial legal system failed in the aim of providing even limited 
dispute resolution as cases were litigated endlessly in overburdened courts.102 Instead 
it provided opportunities for the strategic use of litigation for ‘intimidation and 
harassment and new means for carrying on old disputes;’103 ‘to “bury” bad cases for 
years at a time, which might be lost if heard before unofficial panchayati tribunals;’104 
or as ‘fabrications to cover real disputes by those who had the requisite resources.105 
 
The Company administration was fully aware of the various issues with its legal system 
right from the outset.106 Given that over a period of more than half a century these issues 
remained unresolved, it could be argued that the legal system was designed to be 
misused precisely ‘as its institutional structure suggested it should be.’107 Nonetheless, 
by providing a mechanism whereby the institutions of the state may be moved by 
individuals, the colonial courts reinforced the impression upon the native population of 
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the colonial administration’s power and authority. They also provided Company rule 
with some degree of legitimacy in the eyes of those marginal to rural social hierarchies 
and ‘gave rise to a sense of individual right not dependent on opinion or usage and 
capable of being actively enforced by government, even in opposition to community 
opinion’.108 Occasionally, the law ended up on the side of the poor and powerless, 
providing a means to challenge the abuse of authority by a local despot (English or 
Indian) through a recourse to another institution of the colonial state, a superior 
bureaucrat or a semi-independent court, but ultimately reinforcing the power and 
authority of that very state. Even the excesses of colonial rule could seemingly be cured 
only by the colonial state. 
 
Codification of the ‘Rule of Difference’ 
 
The establishment of Raj and the restructuring of the bureaucratic steel frame were also 
concomitant with the large scale codification of laws and significant changes in the 
Indian legal system. In the immediate aftermath of the rebellion major statutory 
measures were passed within the span of a few years, including the Indian Penal Code, 
1860; the Police Act, 1861 (which introduced a uniform police system in most of India); 
the first Code of Criminal Procedure in 1861; the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859; 
Evidence Act, 1872; Customs Act, 1863; and the Contract Act, 1872; amongst others.109 
Collectively these laws were meant to be ‘one great and entire work symmetrical in all 
its parts and pervaded by one spirit.’110 While these extensive codes had been in the 
pipeline for several years, or decades in case of the Penal Code for example,111 the 
Mutiny provided the final impetus for this grand lawmaking project.112  
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The Raj also merged Company and Crown courts in one judicial hierarchy and created 
new and powerful High Courts across India.113 Only the three High Courts established 
in the Presidency towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay inherited the Crown courts’ 
power to issue prerogative writs. However, limited notions of some prerogative writs 
were incorporated in the Civil Procedure Code thereby enabling the other High Courts 
to exercise quasi-writ powers. Civil courts were also granted the power to issue ordinary 
injunctions, mandatory or prohibitory, and declarations under the Specific Relief Act, 
1877.114 The Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 granted the High Courts of Calcutta, 
Madras and Bombay the power to issue ‘directions in the nature of habeas corpus’ but 
this power was again confined to their provincial jurisdictions.115 In 1923, the other 
High Courts established at Allahabad (1886), Patna (1916) and Lahore (1919) were also 
granted the power to issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus but this excluded 
detentions under political and state security laws.116 
 
The codification of laws and restructuring of the court hierarchy opened up enormous 
opportunities for Indian lawyers. In the Company’s legal system native lawyers had 
been largely confined to business before the lower courts staffed by Indian judges, and 
enjoyed a terrible reputation as being ‘ravenous pettifoggers who fattened on the misery 
and terror of the litigants.117 A newfound opportunity to appear before the High Courts, 
often in successful competition with English barristers, enabled several Indian lawyers 
to make names and fortunes by the end of the 19th century. One-third of the 
appointments to the High Courts including that of the chief justices were initially 
reserved for British barristers. The other positions on High Court benches were divided 
equally amongst the judicial services of the ICS, and lower court judges or Indian 
lawyers practising in the High Courts.118 The appointment of native judges to the 
highest courts in the land and opening prestigious practice avenues to them allowed 
Indian lawyers to develop professional equivalence with English barristers. This helped 
to enhance the public perception and reputations of both the bench and the native bar. 
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The codification of laws and restructuring of court system was accompanied by a 
heightened rhetorical usage of the rule of law, legitimizing colonial rule as benevolent, 
constrained and committed to fostering equality between the colonialists and the 
natives. However, colonial law was permeated through and through by the ‘Rule of 
Colonial Difference’.119 Driven by the need to maintain some separation between the 
rulers and the ruled and an aura of the superiority of the colonialists, various statutes 
made exemptions and distinctions favourable to the English. The Rule of Colonial 
Difference was evident most notably in the very structure and service regulations of the 
bureaucracy which represented a systematic attempt to keep Indians out of the more 
significant positions of power.120 An equally glaring manifestation of the Rule of 
Colonial Difference was in the codification of the criminal procedure laws which 
required that white defendants could only be tried before English judges.121 Courteney 
Ilbert’s Bill of 1883 for amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code would have finally 
ended the preferential treatment of Europeans by providing for trial before native 
Magistrates and judges. However, the bill was vehemently opposed not only by non-
official Europeans but was also resisted by British officials and judges. The 
continuation of special exemptions for Europeans in criminal procedure presented a 
sharp and disillusioning contrast to the rhetoric of rule of law and equality that 
accompanied the codification of laws in India. 
 
In addition to such de jure exemptions, the colonialists enjoyed de facto preference in 
all facets of the legal system, including in the prosecution and sentencing for violent 
crimes committed against Indians.122 ‘Despite contemporary claims that colonial justice 
grew more effective over time, sentences for British attacks on Indians were harsher at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century than at the end... Unequal sentencing for Indians 
and Europeans was always the norm.’123 Furthermore, distinctions had to be instituted 
even amongst the colonialists in the form of preferences in favour of the official 
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Englishmen, especially bureaucrats, when compared to the non-official expatriates, the 
planters and the tradesmen.124 Crimes by non-official expatriates were seen as a threat 
to the Raj since it tended to undermine the authority of the bureaucracy and made 
colonial difference explicit.125 Official attempts to curb violence by Britons against 
Indians could be described as a way of ‘preserving the doctrine of racial superiority 
through humanism… Thus, the notion that the civil service enjoyed a more 
humanitarian relationship with indigenes was preserved in the public record.’126 
Violence by military personnel, however, was treated even more strictly since it was 
often seen as breakdown of discipline.127  
 
The stratification of access to the law based on social status – which might be termed 
as the 'Rule of Social Difference' – was extended even more comprehensively to the 
natives. The Raj’s political rationalities mandated that the Indian elites co-opted into 
the colonial governance scheme may also be allowed differential treatment. The Rule 
of Social Difference necessitated the maintenance of the plurality and privatization of 
law that had become deeply embedded during the Company’s reign. Thus formal 
accommodations for customary and religious practices continued despite the mass 
codification of India’s law. Another level at which privatization was furthered was 
through the devolution of some administration of law to local arbitration mechanisms 
such as the panchayats and the jirgas. While ‘unofficial and informal arbitrational 
procedures had always existed in rural society’ the key difference in this movement of 
extending the Rule of Social Difference was that these mechanisms were now being 
‘drawn up into the structure of the state and given a full legitimation.’128  
 
The Rule of Social Difference was not only confined to those areas of law that were 
privatized but was also extended to the formal court system. Avenues were created even 
within criminal procedure for the exercise of differential power such that criminal law 
became an instrument of social hierarchy. A prime example of this phenomenon was 
the statutory framework for the ‘compoundability’ of cases in the Criminal Procedure 
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Code.129 This granted judges the discretion to accept a compromise between the 
complainant and the accused – even if the compromise had effectively been achieved 
through coercion – in a range of serious criminal cases. This shielded native elites from 
criminal prosecution except for the most significant criminal offences such as homicide. 
On the converse, the threat of formal legal process became an instrument of harassment 
available almost exclusively to those with disproportionate social, economic and 
political power. Formal criminal process and legal institutions were used for 
intimidation and as a pressurizing tactic to compel abandonment or settlement of civil 
disputes. The codes of Indian law thus not only codified procedural laws and 
substantive rights but also social relations and power hierarchies, thereby imparting 
them a longevity they may not have otherwise had. 
 
FIGMENTS AND FRAGMENTS OF THE RULE OF LAW 
 
Systemic Corruption and Rule of Administrative Law 
 
As noted earlier, despite its core authoritarianism colonial rule was steeped in claims of 
the implantation of a rule of law such as the East had never experienced.130 Rights and 
rule of law talk served important ideological ends at various stages of colonial rule. For 
instance, the belief in a universal and natural right to free trade coupled with the notion 
that the rights of Englishmen travel with them legitimized the Company's initial 
confrontations with native powers in India, especially in Bengal. The inviolability of 
private property rights also formed the lynchpin of the Company's resistance against 
expanding parliamentary and cabinet regulation at home. Even more significantly, the 
Company administration’s rule of law claims served to legitimate the ‘paternal 
despotism’ of the early colonial state by distinguishing it from real and imagined 
‘Oriental despotism’ that India had previously labored under.131   
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The implantation of rule of law was also increasingly seen as serving, even if 
incidentally, the Company's governance needs.132 Lord Cornwallis, arguably the chief 
architect of the colonial legal system, thus dilated upon the benefits to the Company of 
codifying laws and implanting a culture of legality in India: 
The proposed arrangements only aim at insuring a general obedience to the 
regulations, which we may institute; and at the same time impose some check 
upon ourselves against passing such as may ultimately prove detrimental to our 
own interests, as well as the prosperity of the country. The natives have been 
accustomed to despotic rule from time immemorial, and are well-acquainted with 
the miseries of their own tyrannic administrations. When they have experienced 
the blessings of good government there can be no doubt to which of the two they 
will give the preference. We may therefore be assured that the happiness of the 
people, and the prosperity of the country, is the firmest basis on which we can 
build our political security.133 
On the flip side, as the Company's administration noted, ‘whenever the English in India 
descend to the ordinary level of political morality among Asian potentates they lose all 
the advantages of the contrast.’134  
 
There was an undeniable contradiction between the very nature of colonialism and the 
ideological and rhetorical usage of rule of law, Common Law rights and liberties that 
saturated discourses on the legitimacy of Company rule in India. Nonetheless, not all 
talk of the rule of law was completely instrumental or merely transparent rhetoric. 
Strands of rule of law discourse reflected genuine aspirations on the part of the 
colonizers, and fragments of the rule of law materialized in ways which cultivated loyal 
and long-lasting allegiance to it amongst important segments of the native elites. One 
strand of rule of law discourse can be traced most directly to the desire of the 
Company’s administration to curb corruption amongst the English and native officials 
in India. Such was the genesis of much of the rule of law talk that permeated the internal 
discourses of the Company throughout the century of its rule in India.  
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From the outset, the Company faced considerable challenges in maintaining order and 
discipline amongst its ranks in the Presidency towns and forts. Delinquency was rife 
amongst the Company’s employees, especially the younger British staff. An even 
bigger concern was the extent of private trading, pilfering, and misuse of Company 
resources by the senior officials in the Presidencies and the hinterland. Corruption 
invariably led to a weakening in the Company's administrative cohesion. ‘There was a 
general contempt of superiors’ and ‘a total contempt of public orders whenever 
obedience was found incompatible with private interests.’135 Corruption was also the 
primary cause of the Company's troubles with native rulers during its early expansion 
was the extent of private trading being undertaken by the Company’s officials who 
behaved as predator entrepreneurs and claimed tariff exemptions for their commercial 
activities in addition to the Company's goods.136 The abuse of trading privileges secured 
by the Company were compounded by a host of native intermediaries and agents who 
not only acted on behalf of the Company and its officials but sought tariff exemptions 
for their private trade with the approval and connivance of Company officials. A ‘spirit 
of plunder’ and a ‘passion for the rapid accumulation of wealth’ thus pervaded the rank 
and file of the Company during the first years of its rule in Bengal.137 The situation was 
equally ‘pestilential’ in the other Presidencies.138  
 
The Court of Directors in London was dismayed by ‘the most fatal examples of 
corruption, licentiousness and total want of public spirit.’139 While Company officials 
prospered, the Company did not. It labored under a serious threat of insolvency and the 
stockholders clamored for a share of the profit to come to them rather than Company 
officials. Meanwhile, Company officials who returned to England with new money, 
derisively referred to as the 'nabobs', sought matching social status to the chagrin of 
established aristocracy. The cherished route to such status was through the acquisition 
of a seat in Parliament.140 The dialectics of corruption and rule of law played themselves 
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out in a protracted tussle between the British Parliament and the Company over the 
regulation of Indian affairs. The Company pleaded inherent rights to property, free trade 
and reform of the civil service in defence against increasing Crown regulation. 
Understandably, the Company administration’s attempts at rule of law indoctrination 
became correspondingly prominent.  
 
The roots of British India’s first significant attempt at constitutionalizing colonialism 
also lay in this anti-corruption strand of the rule of law. The Company's weak financial 
position and a parliamentary inquiry into its operations in Bengal paved the way for the 
Regulating Act of 1773. The Act, dubbed as India's first constitution, brought the 
Company's affairs under Cabinet oversight.141 It also brought the three Presidencies of 
Bengal, Madras and Bombay under a centralized administration based in Calcutta. The 
Regulating Act of 1773 also provided for the creation of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature at Calcutta, whose initial purpose was to control Company officials. The 
India Act of 1784 further strengthened governmental oversight through the creation of 
a Board of Control, through which the Chancellor of Exchequer began to exercise 
executive control over the Company's operations in India. The acceptance of 
governmental oversight and the legal reforms undertaken by the Company were part of 
the consideration in return for extensions in the Company's charter and trade privileges 
in 1781 and 1793.  
 
With the restructuring of the bureaucracy into Covenanted and Uncovenanted cadres, 
the rhetoric of rule of law acquired an increasingly racial dimension. As Company 
service became the vocation of a British elite, an overwhelming sense of superiority 
came to be deeply embedded within the Company Covenanted officials’ cultural and 
ideological milieu.142 ‘[T]he psychological need of a conquering minority to preserve 
social distance; and that potent mixture of suppressed fear and open arrogance, which 
makes up racialism, gained firm ascendancy.’143 Uncovenanted native officials were 
increasingly seen as incorrigibly corrupt and untrustworthy. Rule of law talk became 
progressively racialized during the Company's rule in the first half of the 19th century: 
a constant reminder to superior British officials to maintain their discipline, dignity and 
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racial superiority; and of the need to enforce discipline and hold to account the 
burgeoning hosts of native servants, inferior in rank and character.  Rule of law 
discourses thus evolved in the first century of colonial rule primarily in the context of 
the Company's internal corruption.  
 
As the Raj displaced the Company, it substituted the Covenanted cadre with the ICS 
and greatly expanded its administrative structure, especially through the mass 
recruitment of Indians at the lower rungs of the technical services. Just as under the 
Company, the roots of rule of law talk lay first and foremost in the need to control the 
subordinate bureaucracy. The perceived defects of native officials demanded the 
elaboration of rules, regulations and procedures that would minimize the scope for their 
corruption and ineptitude. The control of the bureaucracy through elaborate service 
regulations became an integral priority. Furthermore, the codification of laws enabled 
not only a more streamlined administration but the elaboration of legal processes and 
rights provided opportunities for some classes of colonial subjects to move the courts 
against improper administrative action at the lower levels. Punjab, for example, 
experienced not only a relatively more authoritarian form of paternalistic despotism but 
also one of the most elaborate exercises in land revenue surveys and the ‘recording of 
rights.’144 The roots of the rule of law in Punjab and elsewhere thus lay in courts having 
the capacity to rule against administrative action on the basis of these recorded rights. 
This explains the faith in the rule of law amongst important segments of the native 
elites, especially those classes that were beneficiaries of employment in the colonial 
bureaucracy and who were subject to the rule of administrative law.  
 
Colonial Courts, Rule of Law and Indian Nationalism 
 
Another noticeable factor propelling a faith in the rule of law and resultantly a largely 
constitutionalist mode of the nationalist struggle against colonial rule was the 
prominent role that lawyers had come to acquire in Indian politics. Native lawyers had 
been the most vocal and influential group amongst the urban educated classes from the 
late 19th century onwards. Law had been the chosen profession for educated Indians, 
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second only to the civil service.145 Unlike the native civil servants whose role was vital 
in the furtherance of the colonial enterprise, Indian lawyers were often seen as a 
hindrance to administrative expediency. The apex bureaucracy were not enamoured of 
native lawyers who wielded colonial law and used the courts to challenge the actions 
of the administration. The influence of the native bar was frequently denounced as 
'vakil-raj' in the Anglo-Indian circles which regarded it as ‘power which undermines 
the prestige and diminishes the beneficience of British rule.’146 By early 20th century 
the more successful amongst the native lawyers had achieved parity in professional 
standing and reputation with the best of the English barristers in India.147 As lawyers 
began to play a prominent role in Indian nationalist movement, and in the leaderships 
of both the Congress and the Muslim League,148 a constitutionalist framing of the 
nationalist struggle as well as communal politics was bound to emerge.  
 
A certain degree of alignment in ideology between the leaderships of the nationalist 
parties and the bench also began to materialise as the nationalist struggle gained 
momentum and several prominent Indian lawyers were appointed to the highest judicial 
offices. The Raj had been amenable to much greater Indianization of the judiciary, even 
at the highest rungs, when compared to the ICS. The High Courts established in 
Calcutta, Madras and Bombay were from an early stage opened to Indian lawyers for 
practice as well as appointment to the bench. By 1929, when Congress’ second civil 
disobedience movement was in full swing, roughly half of the High Courts’ and a 
majority of District and Sessions judges were Indian.149 The emerging nexus between 
an Indianized judiciary and activist lawyers can be partially credited with a rise in the 
prestige of both the bench and bar in the eyes of the native population. Punjab provides 
the quintessential case-study of the role played by the Indianized courts in mediating 
between the nationalist opposition and the Raj. As inter-War unrest and the civil 
disobedience movement in the Punjab led to large scale arrests of political activists and 
prosecutions for sedition, the High Courts emerged as a significant site of resistance to 
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the Raj’s authoritarianism. In return the courts defined the limits of legally permissible 
opposition to the Raj. 
 
The Raj’s anxieties were particularly acute in the Punjab and its reaction to unrest 
especially harsh. Whereas the Raj could negotiate the constitutional demands of the 
nationalist parties and even weather Gandhi’s non-violent civil disobedience movement 
with a degree of equanimity, violent protests in the Punjab, hitherto the strongest 
bastion of colonial rule, evoked the specter of another Mutiny. The Raj also realized 
the weaknesses in its coercive powers, especially the police, with the result that in cases 
of widespread protests or other domestic emergency it had to rely on the Indian army.150 
The prospect of using the army in the Punjab, where roughly half of its soldiers had 
roots, was thus the ultimate nightmare and elicited panicked overreactions. An 
exemplary instance was that of the Jallianwala Bagh 'massacre' in 1919 where facing 
an unauthorized protest gathering in an enclosed ground in Amritsar Brigadier-General 
Dyer commanded his troops to open indiscriminate fire without warning.151 To many, 
the incident marked the beginning of the end for the Raj.152 Humiliating punishments 
meant to reinforce the racial superiority of the British, widespread publication of the 
details of the incident, repression during the martial law elsewhere in the Punjab, and 
Dyer’s unrepentant testimony at a subsequent judicial inquiry collectively dealt a 
significant blow to faith in British law and justice. 
 
In the following decade the Raj anxiously kept an eye on dissidence in the Punjab, 
attempting to clamp down on any hint of dangerous disaffection.153 As the Congress 
threatened another Satyagraha or non-violent civil disobedience movement in 1928, the 
Raj tried to prevent the spread of discontent through a heavy-handed use of the sedition 
provision in the Indian Penal Code.154 A study of the sedition cases decided by the 
Lahore High Court in this period presents a fascinating account of the role of colonial 
courts in negotiating the boundaries between legitimate political opposition to the Raj 
and seditious threats to bring down a ‘Government established by law.’ While the High 
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Court was tolerant of political criticism even if made in angry or intemperate language, 
and did not deem it seditious so long as the ultimate goal was to petition the government 
for redress,155 it writhed at calls for Swaraj (self-rule) or overthrow of the British Raj.156 
The court struggled hard to contain dissent from overflowing the embankments of 
constitutional negotiations being channeled by the Simon Commission (1928) to the 
Round Table Conference in London (1930-32). The court also exhorted Congress 
workers to abide by their non-violence creed and was apprehensive of the slightest hint 
of violent resistance.157 Denigrations of the impartiality and efficacy of British law and 
justice were taken as a direct affront.158 Revolutionary and leftist calls for the overthrow 
of the system were seen as particularly threatening. 
 
While the Lahore High Court occasionally overturned convictions for sedition on 
technical grounds,159 in the overwhelming majority of cases it found the impugned 
speech and conduct seditious. And yet, in case after case native High Court judges 
reduced the sentence, most often to time already served, thereby effectively providing 
relief to the appellants.160 The court found grounds for mitigation in the personal 
circumstances of the accused, the misreading of evidence by the trial judge or 
Magistrate, or their failure to abide by procedural requirements. There was always an 
undercurrent of lack of complete faith in native policemen and other petty officials who 
prepared the notes of seditious speeches and appeared as witnesses.161 The native High 
Court judges had a soft spot for dissident lawyers whether appearing as appellants or 
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on behalf of them.162 They allowed revision petitions filed by activist lawyers to be 
heard and disposed of when the defendants themselves were unable to appeal or refused 
to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts.163 In notable contrast, in the odd case in which 
the appeal lay before an English judge of the Lahore High Court, the tendency towards 
leniency was likely to be jettisoned in favor of the demands for strict deterrence.164  
 
These cases of sedition arising in the Punjab and Delhi also present a revealing picture 
of the threat perception of the Raj as well as a catalogue of grievances it was struggling 
to contain through a negotiated constitutional dispensation for India in the form of a 
new Government of India Act. These ranged from injury to communal sentiment – 
police attacks on Sikh temples in Punjab, or religious violence against Muslims in 
Kashmir – to secular concerns with the fomenting of communal violence blamed 
squarely on the Raj’s policy of ‘divide and rule.’165 There were pamphlets, poems, 
books and magazine articles referring to the ‘War of Independence’ of 1857 and the 
Jallianwala Bagh, sketches of the lives and struggles of martyrs who had engaged in 
armed resistance, and glorification of the killing of English officials and resistance of 
arrest.166 There were exhortations to merchants and consumers to boycott English 
goods.167 There were celebrations of revolutionary figures such as Lenin, Bose and 
Bhagat Singh, tirades against the inherent racism and inequity of colonial rule, and calls 
for the overthrow of the political and economic system of exploitation in its entirety.168 
However, most noticeable for their absence were activists and lawyer members of the 
Muslim League. The Muslim League had clearly decided to play by the rules of 
constitutional negotiation to further its demands of nascent Muslim nationhood. 
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As the Second World War began, an overstretched Raj, lacking the patience and 
wherewithal to manage prosecutions for sedition, relied on preventive detentions of 
Congress workers under the Defence of India Act, 1939 and the Defence of India Rules 
framed thereunder. Throughout the War the Lahore and other High Courts continued to 
perform a role similar to the one they had performed a decade earlier – recognizing the 
executive’s power but insisting on strict interpretations of the laws authorizing 
preventive detention.169 However, the newly-created Federal Court, the first all-India 
level court established under colonial rule, pushed the envelope through an 
unexpectedly robust exercise of the writ of habeas corpus.170 The Federal Court equated 
the definition of a prejudicial act under the Defence of India Rules with sedition, and 
defined it narrowly to exclude criticism of the government even if made in abusive 
language. In a subsequent case the court went one step further and declared Rule 26, 
under which preventive detentions were affected, to be ultra vires the Defence of India 
Act, 1939 as it did not require reasonable suspicion.171 Concerned by the Federal 
Court’s action and fearing a flood of habeas corpus petitions across India, the 
Governor-General promulgated an Ordinance retroactively amending the Defence of 
India Act and shielding detentions under Rule 26 from challenge.172 While the court 
validated the amendment, it demanded that the provincial Governors should personally 
exercise the judgment that the detentions were necessary and could not delegate this 
function to subordinate officials.173  
 
The Federal Court, and before it the High Courts, thus demonstrated a commitment to 
procedural legality and compelled both the nationalist leadership and the Raj to choose 
a constitutional method to resolve their political impasse. The courts’ role in mediating 
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the political struggle for self-rule and their limited success in tempering the Raj’s 
authoritarianism in its challenging final years provided grounds for continuing faith in 
the rule of law especially on the part of the nationalist elites that would soon displace 
the Raj. In turn, the native judges who would staff the highest courts of new nation 
states of South Asia learnt not only the techniques of mediating political conflicts but 
also developed lasting relationships and commonalities in outlook with the nationalist 
elites that took over the responsibilities of postcolonial governance from the Raj. 
 
THE COLONIAL INHERITANCE OF PAKISTAN 
 
The purpose of this brief historiography was to unveil the nature and the structural 
foundations of the colonial state and legal system that Pakistan inherited upon its 
independence. The legacy of colonial state-formation processes was of a deeply 
authoritarian civil state structure with uncontrolled discretionary power vested in a 
narrow elite cadre of the bureaucracy. Pakistan also inherited the legal system of the 
British Empire in India which, contrary to frequent use of rule of law rhetoric, was not 
the Law’s Empire.174 This was a coercive legal system, designed to maintain order 
through the command of habitual obedience to this political dispensation. It was riven 
with the rule of difference – de jure and de facto distinctions, exemptions and 
preferences were made in favour of the colonialists and those co-opted into the colonial 
administration’s disciplinary project. The courts had a subsidiary role confined to 
policing the legality of executive action at the lower levels of the bureaucracy but were 
disabled from checking the uses and abuses of power at the higher levels of the 
executive. In the territories that became West Pakistan, the most blatant kind of 
exceptionalism to the rule of law in the forms of martial law and tribal regulations were 
prevalent throughout. Pakistan thus inherited conditions suitable for the emergence of 
a lasting military-bureaucratic authoritarianism unless this tendency was thwarted 
through the emergence of a stable constitutional arrangement and the institution of 
legitimate electoral governance.  
 
The promise for democratic constitutionalism had, nonetheless, been created by the 
manner in which the Muslim League had waged its struggle for nationhood, its 
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longstanding demands for devolution of power from the centre and constitutional 
safeguards for minorities. The Muslim League leadership’s avowed commitment to the 
ideals of British rule of law – strengthened by its experience to a successful 
constitutional struggle for nationhood and having witnessed the tentative advances 
made by the courts in the late colonial period from the sidelines – also foreshadowed 
an ideological alignment between the political executive and the judiciary. However, 
apart from the apex leadership of the League, the new nation-state’s political classes 
generally lacked democratic credentials and the experience to manage the delicate 
balancing that postcolonial governance required. The central leadership of the Muslim 
League that took over the reins of Pakistan on independence arose mostly from the 
Muslim-minority provinces of north-central India who, as migrants to the Muslim-
majority parts that formed Pakistan, lacked a strong political constituency in the new 
nation. The party’s provincial leadership cadres, especially in the West Pakistan 
provinces, were recent converts to its causes, belonged mostly to the landed elites and 
would invariably pose a challenge to the central leadership. In turn, this created the 
conditions for potentially destabilizing competition over and around the governance 
arrangement between the dominant political classes. 
 
Another significant challenge for the emergence of constitutionalism and stable 
electoral democracy in the post-colonial state arose out of provincial and ethno-
linguistic divisions. While colonial rule generally left behind circumstances of socio-
political and economic underdevelopment, there were vital differences between the 
parts of Bengal that became East Pakistan and the provinces that emerged as West 
Pakistan on independence. The western wing of Pakistan, which had been belatedly 
subdued by the East India Company and which had largely been ruled by the Raj along 
the governance prerogatives of an earlier era, had a relatively more militaristic and 
hierarchical socio-political culture. The eastern wing, which had remained the agrarian 
backwaters of Calcutta throughout colonial rule, nonetheless had relatively more 
egalitarian social structure produced through the breakup of landholdings in the 
aftermath of the Bengal Settlement and a stronger civil-political culture developed 
through two centuries of colonial governance. This East-West faultline when super-
imposed on the tendency towards military-bureaucratic authoritarianism and fractious 






TRANSITIONAL STATE-BUILDING SANS CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
Despite the glorious language of independence and the pageantry of the transfer of 
power, 14th August, 1947 only marked the beginning rather than the achievement of 
decolonization. As Dipesh Chakraborty notes, decolonization is a:  
historical process that looks necessarily clumsy, complicated, and inherently 
incomplete (that is, fragmentary)… Becoming postcolonial is a process, and not a 
state of being ever achieved with any degree of finality. To be sure, societies and 
polities in India and Pakistan today are very significantly different from what they 
were like under British rule. But the changes have come slowly and never through 
a wholesale rejection of what political and social thought in the subcontinent owed 
to the Raj.175  
As such, the new nation-state of Pakistan embarked on a process of transitional state-
building that was necessarily tentative and, for the most part, the nature and forms of 
postcolonial governance could barely be distinguished from colonial rule except only 
in the racial identity of the new rulers. 
 
An important factor, that reflected as well as contributed to a tortuous transition were 
the juridical mechanics of independence. While the legal instrument which formalized 
the end of the Raj and the transfer of powers was titled the India Independence Act, 
both the successor states of India and Pakistan became self-governing Dominions in the 
British Commonwealth rather than free republics.176  With the grant of Dominion status, 
the Government of India Act became the transitional constitution of Pakistan. The 1935 
                                                 
175 See Dipesh Chakraborty, ‘Introduction’ in Dipesh Chakraborty, Rochana Majumdar and Andrew 
Sartor (eds), From the Colonial to the Postcolonial: India and Pakistan in Transition (Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 3-4.  
176 If the Congress grudgingly agreed to Dominion status, the Muslim League did so willingly. For the 
Muslim League leadership Dominion status was necessary in order to retain British personnel, who 
occupied most of the top civil and military positions upon partition; ensure that Pakistan may get its 
fair share in the division of assets and resources; and continuing British role in mediating potential 
conflict between the two new nation states. See Harshan Kumarasingham, ‘The ‘Tropical Dominions’: 
The Appeal of Dominion Status in the Decolonisation of India, Pakistan and Ceylon’ (2013) 23 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 223, 232-40. 
  66
Act, with 321 sections and 10 Schedules, was the longest statute passed by the British 
Parliament. It only formalized the reality of executive domination but, nonetheless, 
created the possibility that those rules may be enforced through the courts to exercise 
some constraints on the executive. The members of the Constituent Assembly indirectly 
elected through the 1946 elections who wanted to join Pakistan formed the first 
Constituent Assembly. Jinnah became the country’s first Governor-General and 
presided over the new state ‘unquestionably as the supreme political authority … and 
not as a ceremonial figurehead.’177 A Federal Court of Pakistan was established, staffed 
mostly by the Muslim judges of the colonial High Courts.178  
 
While India managed to frame a new constitution in 1952, Pakistan struggled with 
constitution-formation for a painfully protracted period.  With Jinnah’s death in 
September 1948, barely a year after partition, the prospects of constitution-making 
became progressively bleak. With delayed constitution-making, the contradictions 
bequeathed by colonial rule – the dialectics of authoritarianism and rule of law; of elite 
cooptation by and ethno-linguistic competition for control over the state – became 
glaring. New challenges of state-building after a violent partition and in the absence of 
adequate resources imposed impossible demands on the state. Divisions quickly 
emerged between the Bengali-majority East Pakistan and the Punjabi-dominated West 
Pakistan as to the nature of federalism and division of powers between the centre and 
the federating units. The usage of Muslim-nationalism to structure the demand for 
Pakistan during the late colonial period had unleashed difficult questions about the 
Islamic nature of the state and society, which needed to be resolved through a delicate 
constitutional balancing. A central bureaucratic structure had to be resurrected out of 
the ashes of partition with a limited human resource base comprising a few remaining 
British officials and a handful of Muslim superior services staff. These contradictions 
and challenges could only be contained through inclusive constitution-making, but 
these were also the biggest impediment to the framing of a republican constitution. 
 
With the continuation of a colonial form of governance, Pakistan’s superior courts were 
cast in the roles of safeguarding the democratic-constitutional aspirations in the new 
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nation while being fully implicated in the construction of the postcolonial state. On the 
one hand, partly as a consequence of the continued reliance on legal instruments to 
effectuate the state’s authoritarianism, the courts were called upon to resolve the 
tensions between rule by law and the rule of law, a role they had embraced in the late 
colonial period.  At the same time the courts found the space and the impetus to extend 
their administrative law jurisdiction over the bureaucracy that was in the process of 
reconstruction and were increasingly involved in state-building in this function. Most 
notably, the courts were thrust into the role of mediating the processes of constitution-
formation between the political elites that came to dominate the new state and the ethno-
linguistic and provincial elites that found themselves at the margins. With increasing 
political instability the framing of a republican constitution, that guaranteed an 
inclusive federalism and enshrined fundamental rights, became the ultimate goal of the 
new nation’s political imagination. The 'Writ jurisdiction' of the superior courts 
emerged as the primary site for militating for that goal and challenging the executive 
that resisted such demands. 
 
THE RESURRECTION OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM 
 
Fragmentation of the Muslim League and Centralization of Power 
 
Pakistan was born in a state of crisis – a failed state, to use more contemporary parlance. 
As millions of refugees migrated across the newly demarcated borders in Punjab and 
Bengal amidst spiraling violence, the need to care for the victims of this partition 
‘fractured Pakistan’s already feeble economy, strained its meagre resources, and 
imposed an impossible burden upon its administrative structure.’179 The limited 
financial resources allocated to Pakistan under the partition plan were initially withheld 
by the government of India.180 The economic burden of disproportionately large armed 
forces was exacerbated when the Indian government also reneged on its commitment 
to transfer Pakistan’s share of military assets. Pakistan’s first few budgets were thus 
‘defence budgets.’181 The central government was forced to appropriate a greater 
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portion of provincial taxes and it was not until 1950 that even a pittance was allocated 
for development.182  
 
The first significant challenge for the new nation was to create a central government 
and its administrative structure.183  The state structure suffered from multiple crises at 
inception including loss of records, lack of equipment and infrastructure. The biggest 
challenge, however, was an acute shortage of personnel, especially at the top of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy.184 As the seceding state from the Indian union Pakistan had to 
create a central state apparatus from scratch, to be cobbled together from remnants of 
the Indian Civil Service. The provincial bureaucracy, technical services and the police 
had also been badly disrupted by the partition. While the civil administration and 
military were far from ‘overdeveloped’ pillars of the state at independence,185 
colonialism had bequeathed a structural design and the ideological foundations for state 
aggrandizement. In the following decade as Pakistan resurrected a central state structure 
dominated by the new Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) – an elite cadre of generalist 
bureaucracy that traced its lineage and ethos directly to the ICS-IPS – the bureaucracy 
became the most significant locus of state power just as during the Raj.  
 
The CSP was able to progressively play a prominent role in formulating policy and 
effectively implement it largely independent of political constraints or direction. A 
prime example of this was the creation of the post of the Secretary-General of the 
Government of Pakistan, an apex bureaucratic office whose holder could co-ordinate 
the actions of all the departments of the bureaucracy cutting across lines of 
responsibility and accountability to individual ministers.186 The elite bureaucracy 
gained an expertise in national governance which empowered it to wrest the initiative 
from the Muslim League leadership and relegate the political classes to a subsidiary 
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role in statecraft within a few years of independence. Arguably, the foundations for the 
resurrection of bureaucratic authoritarianism in the new state were laid by Jinnah 
himself. When the Quaid-e-Azam decided to assume the office of the first Governor-
General of Pakistan in preference to that of the Prime Minister, he appeared to validate 
and legitimize the tradition of executive domination deeply embedded in the 
Government of India Act 1935, Pakistan’s interim constitution.187  
 
Under Jinnah virtually all prominent bureaucratic positions were the preserve of British 
officers who remained answerable solely to the Governor-General. Of particular 
significance was his decision to use the constitution-making powers of the Governor-
General to insert §92-A in the 1935 Act which empowered his office to declare a state 
of emergency, dismiss a provincial government and transfer its powers to the 
Governor.188 Jinnah used this power twice in his brief tenure as Governor-General. The 
first precedent was set when he authorized the Governor of Sindh to dismiss the Chief 
Minister for insubordination and impose Governor’s rule.189 Again in 1948, in the face 
of an inability to constrain the infighting amongst the Unionist-turned-Leaguers in the 
Punjab, Jinnah authorized the Governor to take charge. The Governor utilized §92-A 
powers to impose a state of emergency and not only dismissed the government but also 
dissolved the provincial assembly.190  
 
Jinnah, mindful of his impending death, saw himself as fulfilling a transitional role in 
guiding the new state through its formative crises. He was also compelled to rely on the 
apex bureaucracy who resultantly had near-complete control of day to day governance. 
Thus, ‘a demotion of the political leadership in favour of the bureaucracy’ was ‘Jinnah’s 
unintended contribution to the future of Pakistan.’191 Nonetheless, attributing the 
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genesis of civil authoritarianism to the founder of the nation may be unduly 
uncharitable.  In appointing his foremost political successor Liaquat Ali Khan as the 
Prime Minister Jinnah had created viable prospects for transition to more democratic 
forms of governance. Upon Jinnah’s death in September 1948 power naturally shifted 
towards the office of the Prime Minister and the new Governor-General maintained a 
weak and largely ceremonial position. Liaquat Ali Khan’s dictatorial style of 
governance, however, provides vital clues to the structural as opposed to the personal 
foundations of civil authoritarianism in postcolonial Pakistan.  
 
Liaquat presided over a party that had been in disarray virtually from the outset. Its 
long-standing and leading members at the centre were migrants to the new nation-state 
and lacked a constituency in the parts that formed Pakistan, especially in the western 
wing. Refugee settlers in the urban areas of West Pakistan became the central Muslim 
League’s prime constituencies. This was bound to be a weak political base. The central 
bureaucracy was also dominated by migrant officials from north-central India, and with 
preferential recruitment in the highest cadres of the bureaucracy from amongst the 
relatively better-educated migrants, the central political leadership of the Muslim 
League and the apex bureaucracy developed mutual dependencies. An increasing 
disconnect from the provincial cadres and democratic politics, which would have 
weakened both the central political leadership and the bureaucracy’s ascendant 
position, was thus inevitable.192 As the migrants settled mostly in the new capital at 
Karachi and in the urban areas of Punjab,193 politics and state structure began to develop 
an ethnic-regional configuration. Thus, a vital factor propelling Pakistan on the 
trajectory of state aggrandizement and autonomy from public opinion, the ‘tragedy’ of 
its politics, was that its new rulers were almost as much a minority in postcolonial 
Pakistan as the British were in colonial India.194  
 
As power began to consolidate in a central leadership and bureaucracy based in West 
Pakistan, a corresponding sense of discrimination and disempowerment began to brew 
in East Bengal (which later became East Pakistan). The two wings of the new nation-
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state were not only separated by thousands of miles of distance across the Indian 
landmass, but also by significant cultural difference. East Bengal was more populous, 
more densely populated, less urban, but more literate.195 East Bengal was also more 
religiously diverse but ethnically and linguistically homogenous. Most significantly, 
East Bengal was relatively poorer and its economic situation continued to decline 
throughout the 1950s.196 There were also vital differences in political culture and social 
structures, a direct legacy of the differential impact of colonial rule. East Bengal had 
relatively more egalitarian social structures; progressive politics and democratic 
impulses had deeper foundations. Bureaucratic authoritarianism had weakened over 
two centuries of stable colonial rule and religious tolerance was deeply embedded.197 
West Pakistan areas, on the other hand, had a closer experience of more militarized 
forms of authoritarianism that were reminiscent of the zenith of the Raj in the 19th 
century.198  
 
These differences of physical and cultural space were compounded by Bengali under-
representation in the central government, apex bureaucracy and military.199 With the 
perceived and actual absence of any direct or indirect say in the policymaking of the 
rapidly centralizing and aggrandizing state, the severance of central Muslim League 
leadership from the politics of East Bengal accelerated. Large swathes of West Pakistan 
were similarly beyond the horizons of the central political leadership. In the NWFP the 
Muslim League had lost out to the Congress in the 1946 elections and its position was 
thus interminably weak. The tribal areas adjoining NWFP and Balochistan were the 
most under-developed parts of Pakistan.200 Low population density, harsh landscape, 
and backward economy all militated for continuing political neglect.  The postcolonial 
state made little effort to assimilate them into the nation-building project.201 The central 
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Muslim League leadership had no political links in these parts of West Pakistan and 
abandoned their governance to the co-operative enterprise of bureaucracy and the local 
tribal chiefs or sardars just as under the Raj. East Bengal and large parts of West 
Pakistan thus emerged as the periphery of the rapidly consolidating postcolonial state.  
 
The Muslim League’s position in the core of the new state – the politically and 
economically relevant provinces of Punjab and Sindh – also lay on major fault-lines. 
The provincial Muslim League leaderships constituted mostly of large landowners and 
old Unionist party stalwarts who had belatedly converted to its cause on the eve of the 
partition.202 Recalcitrant provincial leadership cadres of the party emerged as the most 
significant political opposition to the central government. The failure of the central 
leadership to curtail such provincialization of politics had initially compelled Jinnah to 
resort to the inherently and overtly viceregal constitutional device of §92-A. Prime 
Minister Liaquat, however, sought seemingly democratic but covertly authoritarian 
means to reel in recalcitrant provincial leaders.203 The Public and Representative 
Offices (Disqualification) Act passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1949, known 
popularly as PRODA, set an institutional pattern for successive anti-corruption statutes 
in Pakistan’s history whose acronyms were short-hands for political machinations by 
the state. It provided for the disqualification of any politician found guilty of 
misconduct, which was vaguely defined, and was manifestly used as a tool to discipline 
politicians until its repeal in 1954.204 The threat of chastisement was matched by 
patronage through grant of portfolios, business licenses, permits, and other 
institutionalized forms of corruption.205 
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With Prime Minister Liaquat’s assassination in 1951 the brief ascendancy of 
parliamentary politics, even if in form rather than substance, came to an end. Khawaja 
Nazimuddin, a Bengali politician of softer political and personal disposition, succeeded 
Liaquat Ali Khan as Prime Minister while Ghulam Mohammad, one of Pakistan’s most 
experienced bureaucrats, became the Governor-General. This set the stage for 
bureaucratic domination of politics.206 Violent anti-Ahmadi protests in 1953 resulted 
not only in the resignation of the Chief Minister of Punjab, but also the dismissal of 
Prime Minister Nazimuddin and his Cabinet by the Governor-General. The legal and 
political legitimacy of this dismissal of government was reinforced when the 
Constituent Assembly quiescently elected a successor Prime Minister.207 Broader 
support of the Governor-General's decision was seen in the absence of protest, which 
became the measure of proto-democratic legitimacy.208 In a short span of six years the 
Muslim League, the founding party of Pakistan, had all but crumbled. Bureaucratic 
authoritarianism and centralization of policymaking had been entrenched in the design 
of the postcolonial state. The failure of democratic politics enabled the bureaucracy to 
transform postcolonial Pakistan into a ‘virtual administrative state, less a representative 
expression and more the recrudescence of a familiar but palatable, if not benign, 
authoritarianism’ – all within a few years of independence.209 
 
The Struggles over Constitution-making 
 
A key contributor to the Muslim League’s fragmentation and displacement to the 
margins of power politics was its inability to negotiate a stable constitutional 
arrangement that would devolve some power to the provinces, provide mechanisms for 
holding elections, and ensure smooth transitions of government at both central and 
provincial levels. While the colonial legacy was one of authoritarianism, independence 
had created a short window of opportunity for democratic politics and generated the 
optimism that the metropolitan’s tradition of parliamentary supremacy and rule of law 
would become the dominant constitutional doctrines of the new republic. The prospects 
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of democratic constitution-making were, however, precarious from the very beginning 
and became inevitably doomed with the political ascendancy of the bureaucratic 
oligarchy.  
 
The first Constituent Assembly tasked with the formation of the permanent constitution 
of the new republic represented narrow political elites.210 The Constituent Assembly 
was composed of members indirectly elected by provincial assemblies, which had 
themselves been elected under limited franchise with approximately fifteen per cent of 
the population as the electorate. During its’ seven years of existence from 1947 to 1954, 
the Constituent Assembly convened on only 116 days for constitution-making and 
failed spectacularly in that task. Its efforts at achieving a consensus constitution of 
Pakistan quickly got bogged down in two major controversies – the place of Islam in 
the political system and the representation of East Bengal, whose population 
outnumbered the combined populations of all of the West Pakistan provinces. The 
Objectives Resolution of 1949, passed after considerable discussion and not without 
controversy, laid down the basic principles of the future constitutional scheme and was 
destined to become the preamble to Pakistan’s several constitutions.  While it 
categorically identified democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as 
the fundamental principles of state, several ambiguous references to Islam left open the 
possibility of these principles being subjected to certain orthodox interpretations of 
Islamic doctrines.211   
 
A Basic Principles Committee of the Constituent Assembly was established to delineate 
the key features of the constitution in accordance with the Objectives Resolution. Its 
Interim Report of 1950, however, provoked criticism for not giving Islam a central 
place in the constitutional scheme. More significantly, it was also controversial as it 
was perceived to be undermining East Bengal’s electoral representation. The 
Committee had recommended the creation of a bi-cameral legislature with equal powers 
in both houses and in which the upper house would have equal representation from all 
the constituent units, giving the four provinces of West Pakistan an overwhelming 
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majority.212  In response, a constitutional convention of prominent politicians, lawyers 
and journalists was assembled in East Bengal which proposed a confederal arrangement 
in which East Bengal and the West Pakistan provinces would have autonomous 
governments with a weak centre only responsible for currency, foreign affairs and 
defence. The Second Draft Report of the Basic Principles Committee in 1952 again 
proposed a bi-cameral legislature but with greater powers vested in the House of the 
People and ‘parity’ or equal representation for both East Bengal and the West Pakistan 
provinces in both houses.213 This time greater opposition emerged in the Punjab along 
with demands for the vesting of equal powers in both houses of the legislature.214  
 
By the end of 1953 the Constituent Assembly had failed to develop agreement on 
Pakistan’s first constitution and had thus failed in its primary task. Its performance as 
the interim legislature also left much to be desired, as it had effectively abdicated that 
domain to the executive which legislated through Ordinances.215 Provincial elections 
of East Bengal, belatedly held in March 1954, resulted in a humiliating defeat for the 
Muslim League at the hands of left-leaning opposition parties.216 The election result 
effectively delegitimized Muslim League members of the Constituent Assembly from 
East Bengal and highlighted how unrepresentative that body had become over the 
course of its existence. Reacting to labour unrest, the rising opposition in East Bengal 
toward a budding alliance with the United States and growing secessionist sentiment, 
Governor Iskander Mirza imposed Governor’s Rule, suspended the government and 
effectively annulled the elections. With the subsequent dismissal of Nazimuddin as 
Prime Minister by the Governor-General in 1954 and the Constituent Assembly’s 
decision to stamp its approval on this action, all power effectively shifted to the 
bureaucracy-dominated executive. The Constituent Assembly had thus become rather 
irrelevant to Pakistan’s governance; bureaucratic authoritarianism had become 
Pakistan’s de facto constitution. 
 
                                                 
212 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, above n 46, 64-6. In addition, the 
Report stirred the hornets’ nest of national language by proposing to make Urdu the national language 
thereby further alienating the aspirations of the Bengali-speaking majority that lived in the eastern 
wing. Ziring, above n 31, 109. 
213 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, above n 46, 68-71. 
214 Ziring, above n 31, 133. 
215 From 1947-1958 the Assembly met for an average of 30 days per year and passed 160 laws. In 
comparison the executive issued 376 ordinances. Kochanek, above n 181, 59. 
216 Ziring, above n 31, 155; Alavi, above n 183, 81. 
  76
Arguably, the realization of its predicament motivated the Constituent Assembly’s 
unexpected agreement on a constitutional arrangement. A new proposal on the 
distribution of seats in a federal bi-cameral legislature received widespread support 
within and outside the Constituent Assembly. According to this arrangement, seats in 
the lower house were to be distributed amongst the provinces on the basis of population 
with East Bengal getting 165 out of the total of 300 seats. Seats in an upper house with 
a total strength of 50 would be distributed equally amongst all the provinces such that 
the four West Pakistan provinces would get an overwhelming majority. However, as 
both houses of the legislature were to have equal powers with any disagreements to be 
settled in a joint sitting, both the wings of the country would effectively have parity.217 
With the resolution of these major stumbling blocks the Constituent Assembly 
adjourned in September 1954 for the Constitution Bill to be drafted by a committee of 
draftsmen. The Constituent Assembly anticipated and attempted to pre-empt any 
interference from the Governor-General by amending several provisions of the 1935 
Act, thereby reducing the Governor-General’s powers.218 It also inserted §223-A in the 
1935 Act giving the superior courts the powers to issue prerogative writs against 
executive action for the first time in the country’s history, and repealed the notorious 
PRODA.219  
 
Pakistan was thus on the verge of constitutionalizing, al beit belatedly, the aspirations 
of independence and jettisoning the legacy of bureaucratic authoritarianism when in 
October 1954 Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad imposed a state of emergency, 
dismissed the Prime Minister and dissolved the Constituent Assembly a mere three days 
before it were to reconvene. In issuing the Proclamation of Emergency the Governor-
General claimed that the Constituent Assembly had failed in its primary task of 
constitution-making and had begun to act as a permanent legislature. It had thus become 
an unrepresentative and undemocratic institution. The Governor-General further 
claimed an inherent prerogative power, as the juridical successor of the King in 
Parliament, to dissolve the Assembly. This was in effect a West Pakistani ‘bureaucratic-
military coup.’220 A ‘Cabinet of Talents’ was appointed which included General Ayub 
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Khan, the serving Army Chief, as the Defence Minister and Iskander Mirza amongst 
others.221 There was no Bengali representation in the new cabinet.  
 
Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, the President of the Constituent Assembly and the successor 
to Jinnah in that office, challenged the proclamation of emergency and the dissolution 
of the Constituent Assembly before the Sind Chief Court.222 As Pakistan stumbled 
precipitously into bureaucratic authoritarianism, the burden of staying the democratic-
constitutionalist course thus fell on the superior courts. The ensuing legal battle turned 
on the juridical significance of independence from colonial rule as manifested in the 
Indian Independence Act, 1947. The Independence Act had not imposed any time limit 
on the existence of the Constituent Assembly presumably because it was anticipated 
that it would frame a constitution within a few years and reach its natural end in the 
process. The Act also appeared to envisage two distinct roles for the Constituent 
Assembly – as the constitution-making body and as the interim legislature. In the seven 
years of its existence it had come to be recognized that while framing laws of a 
constitutional import the Constituent Assembly was a sovereign body and its Acts did 
not need the assent of the Governor-General.223 In contrast, while passing ordinary 
legislation the Constituent Assembly was deemed to be acting as a legislature under the 
Government of India Act, 1935 and the validity of such Acts required the assent of the 
Governor-General. The Independence Act had also specifically repealed the provision 
of the 1935 Act which had hitherto empowered the Governor-General to dissolve the 
Constituent Assembly.  
 
The Sind Chief Court rejected the Governor-General’s assertion of prerogative power 
and unanimously found that the Constituent Assembly was a sovereign body with no 
legal limits on either its life or constitution-making powers.224 The court’s decision thus 
appeared to signify that, as flawed as the Constituent Assembly’s democratic 
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credentials might have been, the moment of independence marked the substitution of 
the colonial tradition of executive prerogative with the metropolitan tradition of 
parliamentary supremacy and rule of law. The Governor-General appealed to the 
Federal Court in Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan focusing on a technical challenge to the 
jurisdiction of the High Court to issue prerogative writs on the basis that §223-A, passed 
by the Constituent Assembly on the eve of its dissolution, was itself not valid legislation 
as it had not received the Governor-General’s assent.225 Justice Cornelius was the lone 
dissenter in the Federal Court and supported the Sind Chief Court’s position. In his 
view, the Indian Independence Act, 1947 marked a break with royal prerogative and 
parliamentary supremacy was thus Pakistan’s over-arching constitutional doctrine.226 
Chief Justice Munir and the majority on the bench, however, upheld the challenge as 
they saw Pakistan’s interim constitutional scheme to be an extension of the colonial 
tradition. The majority envisaged the Governor-General’s role as similar to that in other 
Dominion constitutions and found not only that he had the prerogative power to 
dissolve the Constituent Assembly but also that all Acts of the Constituent Assembly, 
whether of a constitutional nature or in furtherance of ordinary legislation, required 
assent.  
 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE WRIT JURISDICTION IN POSTCOLONIAL 
LEGALITY 
 
Continuation of Colonial Legality under the Government of India Act 
 
The Federal Court’s decision in Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan has often been seen as the 
genesis of Pakistan’s constitutional courts’ subservience to authoritarian regimes and 
complicity in the perpetual undermining of democratic aspirations. However, it is 
unhelpful to see these significant constitutional moments as exclusively political 
decisions out of their jurisprudential context. Pakistan’s courts had continued to display 
a deep entrenchment in the tradition of colonial legality since independence. After all, 
most of the judges serving on the superior courts had been recruited during the colonial 
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era through the judicial branch of the ICS and had served as judges in the High Courts. 
The Government of India Act had remained, with little modification, the constitutional 
framework of the dominion of Pakistan, and the precedents of the colonial courts were 
thus fully applicable. Constitutionalism sans a constitution required a break with their 
intellectual and juridical tradition of restraint, positivism and a procedural rule of law 
that the courts were not yet equipped to make.  
 
The few constitutional decisions of the superior courts prior to the Maulvi Tamizuddin 
Khan reveal how the judiciary disavowed any power to extend the scope of judicial 
review beyond the scrutiny of the vires of legislative and executive action. For example, 
in an early case involving the detention of a student leader the Dacca High Court held 
that the life of the East Bengal Preventive Detention Ordinance could not be extended 
through another Ordinance as §88(2) of the Government of India Act, which served as 
Pakistan’s interim constitutional framework, did not explicitly grant the Governor such 
a power.227 Nonetheless, the court upheld the detention as a subsequent order issued 
under the Criminal Procedure Code, while the proceedings were pending, was valid on 
its face. Likewise, in a case challenging the disqualification of the former Chief 
Minister of Sind by a tribunal established under PRODA, the Federal Court refused to 
recognize a general principle creating a right to appeal.228 The court held that such 
tribunals were the creation of special laws and if the legislature did not expressly 
provide for an appeal then no such right could be inferred. In a challenge to the legality 
of §92-A, the Lahore High Court denied the contention that the enactment was against 
the democratic spirit of independence as the petitioner could not point to any ‘specific 
words to that effect in the Indian Independence Act.’229  
As Pakistan became an insecure state in its early years – fearful of external aggression 
from India and internal implosion from ethno-linguistic division – the use of emergency 
and state security legislation dating back to the late colonial period persisted. Early 
decisions under the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 heralded the continuation of 
judicial mediation of security laws similar to the Lahore High Court’s decisions in 
sedition cases during the Raj. Cornelius J equated the language in the Press (Emergency 
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Powers) Act with the definition of sedition under the penal code and held that 
describing the Punjab Safety Act as a ‘lawless law’ did not amount to bringing the 
government into contempt.230 In another case Cornelius J found references to 
oppressive actions of Pakistan Army against citizens in the frontier lands as genuine 
criticism of military personnel’s actions and thus not tantamount to bringing the 
institution of the Army into hatred or contempt.231 The Lahore High Court noted in 
another instance that the definition of sedition had changed over time and that the press 
deserved greater latitude in criticism of government policies and actions.232 At the same 
time, reminiscent of the colonial era, the courts also drew the limits of permissible 
criticism and dissent.  Critique of the rationale of partition and the raison d'être of the 
Pakistani state were not acceptable forms of expressing dissent.233 This was particularly 
the case when the criticism was made by the religious right, describing the state as an 
‘enemy of Islam’ and labelling it as ‘irreligious.’234  
 
Where the language of new security and detention laws was modeled on colonial era 
legislation, the courts read the text literally and demanded strict compliance with the 
formalities laid down in the statute. For example, the Sind Chief Court declared that 
mere membership of a political party (in this case the Communist party) did not provide 
sufficient grounds for preventive detention under the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952.235 
Further, the court held that the grounds of detention must be disclosed with requisite 
specificity to enable the detenu to make representations to the government that the 
detention was not merited as required by the Act.236 The Sind Maintenance of Public 
Safety Act, 1948 and the Sind Public Order Act, 1952 also provided similar procedural 
protections which the court assiduously policed. While the Sind Chief Court recognized 
the legislative competence of the provincial legislature to promulgate security and 
public order laws under the Government of India Act,237 in appropriate cases the court 
held detentions to be illegal when the grounds for the detention were not communicated 
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or were too general and vague for the detenu to challenge them.238 Similarly, the court 
held that the requirement of a review after six months as provided in the statute was 
mandatory and any detention which was not reviewed would become illegal at the 
expiry of that period.239 
 
The Frontier Crimes Legislation, 1901 (FCR) operative in the Tribal Areas adjoining 
NWFP and Balochistan, however, provided an altogether different model for state 
security legislation. It enabled the executive to commit anyone to trial before a jirga 
without the possibility of judicial review through a habeas corpus petition under §491 
of the Criminal Procedure Code.240 It was the FCR model of legal impunity which was 
followed in the state security legislation in Balochistan and the settled areas of NWFP 
provinces. The absence of any procedural protections here gave the courts very little 
room to scrutinize detention orders.  For instance, when scrutinizing the preventive 
detention on the suspicion of anti-state activities of Khan Abdul Wali Khan, which had 
lasted almost five years, the Peshawar Judicial Commissioner’s Court found that the 
NWFP Public Safety Act, 1948 imposed no limit on the duration of the detention.241 
While the courts ruefully noted the expanded use of security legislation in the western 
provinces, even when compared to the Raj’s reliance on the Defence of India Act and 
Rules during the Second World War, and chafed at the use of secret evidence in 
justifying detentions of political dissidents, they could provide little relief except when 
even the most basic formalities had not been adhered to.242 
 
This design of the frontier legislation was enlarged to the Punjab through the public 
safety acts promulgated in 1947 and 1951 in that province. Here, the tussle between 
impunity and legality played out in the Lahore High Court, which had greater standing 
and a longer history of exercising limited review powers through the habeas corpus 
jurisdiction under the Criminal Procedure Code. In a couple of early cases the High 
Court assumed the power to scrutinize the basis of detentions relying upon the 
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information provided by government and police officials.243 However, in a case 
challenging the detention of Maulana Maudoodi, the head of the Jamaat-i-Islami which 
had emerged as the preeminent Islamist opposition to the governmment, the Federal 
Court held that so long as a detention order complied with the requisite formalities the 
court could not investigate the basis of the detention.244  The onus was on the detenu to 
bring evidence to show that no legitimate grounds for the detention existed. Learning 
from this litigation, the executive quickly adopted the practice of refusing to volunteer 
any evidence of the grounds of detention and claiming a public interest privilege when 
faced with an inquiry by the courts. The High Court lamented this practice, and noticing 
with some dismay that unlike the Sind legislation the Punjab public safety law had done 
away with all procedural protections, found no scope to exercise meaningful judicial 
review in such cases.245 While the Federal Court attempted to whittle down the public 
interest privilege against disclosing the grounds of detention – leaving it to the High 
Court to decide such claims in individual cases – it also noted that the term ‘reasonably’ 
had specifically been omitted from the Punjab legislation leaving the courts with no 
objective basis to test the ‘satisfaction’ of the detaining authority that the detenu was 
likely to engage in prejudicial conduct.246  
 
Doctrine of State Necessity: Learning to Mediate Constitutional 
Crises  
 
The Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan decision must thus be seen in the light of a continuing 
colonial legacy of formal legality despite the courts’ new Writ jurisdiction created 
through the insertion of §223-A.  At the same time, the case must also be judged in the 
light of the subsequent decisions of the Federal Court which dealt with a continuing 
constitutional crisis, and through which the courts attempted to define the scope of their 
expanding role in statecraft. While there is considerable basis for the accusation that 
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the Federal Court facilitated the descent into authoritarianism, given particularly the 
subsequent iterations of the doctrine of state necessity, such an analysis fails to 
appreciate the complex nature and forms of postcolonial governance and the courts’ 
nuanced role in mediating its inherent contradictions. The superior courts saw 
themselves, perhaps justifiably, as fully implicated in the task of nation-building in the 
new republic.247 However, instead of articulating and insisting upon broad structural 
principles on which the republic and its constitutional politics ought to be framed, an 
approach manifested by the Sind Chief Court and Justice Cornelius in the apex court, 
the majority of the Federal Court chose to mediate between the various political actors 
with the aim of steering them towards specific political outcomes.248  
 
Pakistan’s superior courts would manifest this approach time and again through 
subsequent constitutional crises achieving limited short-term gains in terms of avoiding 
greater crises, but invariably giving much space and a veneer of legitimacy to the 
authoritarian structures of Pakistan’s emergent postcolonial governance. This pattern 
fully characterized the subsequent decisions of the Federal Court in the dissolution of 
the Constituent Assembly saga. While the majority’s decision in Maulvi Tamizuddin 
Khan validated the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, it did not give the 
Governor-General a free reign. The very argument on the basis of which the Governor-
General’s appeal succeeded also created the imperative of constituting a new 
Constituent Assembly and furthering the constitution-formation process. As per the 
Federal Court’s decision not only was the insertion of §223-A , which granted the High 
Courts the power to issue prerogative writs, into the Government of India Act 1935 
invalid but the legality of all legislation passed by the Constituent Assembly which had 
not received the Governor-General’s assent was also suspect.249 Such legislation 
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included forty-four statutes, several of them of a constitutional nature, thereby 
threatening an extensive legal crisis.  
 
The Governor-General initially refused to acknowledge the double-edged nature of the 
outcome in Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan and attempted to overcome the legal difficulties 
by promulgating an Ordinance which purported to give retroactive assent to a majority 
of those statutes that would have been invalidated in accordance with the Federal 
Court’s decision.250 The Ordinance also amalgamated the West Pakistan provinces into 
a single administrative scheme or ‘One Unit’ so as to effectively achieve parity between 
Punjab, which would dominate West Pakistan, and East Bengal which was renamed as 
East Pakistan. This neat stratagem did not resolve the underlying legal crisis, however. 
In Usif Patel v. Crown the Federal Court took up the broader implications of the Maulvi 
Tamizuddin Khan decision.251 This time around, the court pressed the strict 
consequences of the Governor-General’s logic in dissolving the Constituent Assembly 
and forced him to face the constitutional crisis of his own making. The court held that 
while the Governor-General may have had the prerogative to dissolve the Constituent 
Assembly he did not have any power to assume its functions and legislate upon 
constitutional matters through Ordinances. The court also reminded the Governor-
General of his counsel’s representation during the hearings in Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan 
that a new Constituent Assembly would be constituted as soon as possible and indicated 
that only such a representative body could retroactively validate laws of a constitutional 
nature.252  
 
The Governor-General again resisted by summoning a Constituent Convention, a 
portion of whose members would be nominated by him, and issued a Proclamation 
claiming emergency powers to retroactively validate constitutional laws in order to 
prevent a breakdown.253 The Governor-General also filed a reference before the Federal 
Court seeking its advisory opinion on the constitutionality of these measures.254 The 
Federal Court declared that the Governor-General had no mandate to convene a 
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Constituent Convention. He was obligated to create a representative Constituent 
Assembly on the same principles as the original one had been constituted and hence 
could not nominate any members either. However, whereas Justices Cornelius and 
Sharif adhered to the stance adopted in Usif Patel by holding that only the new 
Constituent Assembly could retroactively validate constitutional laws, the majority led 
by Chief Justice Munir allowed the Governor-General to temporarily extend the life of 
the impugned statutes until the new Constituent Assembly had an opportunity to deal 
with that issue.255 The legal doctrine relied upon to reach this result was that of ‘civil 
or State necessity’ which granted a head of state emergency powers analogous to those 
of a military commander during martial law.256 Notably, even according to the 
majority’s view the doctrine of state necessity did not enable the Governor-General to 
affect any changes in the constitutional scheme.257  
 
Through its decisions in the Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan line of cases the Federal Court 
mediated the Governor-General’s grand claims of inherent prerogative, almost 
sovereign powers, and paved the way for the renewal of democratic constitution-
making processes through the creation of a new Constituent Assembly. Even the 
invocation of the doctrine of state necessity in the Special Reference came at 
considerable cost to the Governor-General’s authority by compelling him to proceed 
with the constitution-making process that would invariably undermine his powers. A 
new Constituent Assembly was thus assembled in 1955 which managed to agree on the 
country’s first constitution. While the 1956 Constitution bore the legacy of executive 
dominance and vested powers which had previously been enjoyed by the Governor-
General in an unaccountable President, it had nonetheless adopted a parliamentary form 
of government. It envisaged a uni-cameral legislature with parity between East Pakistan 
and West Pakistan, thus accepting the One Unit scheme. The courts were granted a 
constitutional Writ jurisdiction and fundamental rights were enshrined.258 When the 
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Governor-General stepped down and Iskander Mirza replaced him as the first President 
of the country it appeared that the crises-ridden decade of constitution-making was 
finally nearing an end.  
 
Writ Jurisdiction and the Foundations of Administrative Law  
 
The belated framing of the constitution was an achievement in itself, but several 
important issues had remained unresolved and the constitution-making process had 
created further conflicts.259 The new Constituent Assembly had lacked sufficient 
democratic legitimacy and had been indirectly elected by the provincial assemblies that 
were themselves the product of rigged elections.260 As it began working as the interim 
legislature political pressures were mounting. Amidst the emergence of new party 
configurations and shifting loyalties, the central government experienced 
unprecedented instability – four different Prime Ministers rotated through that office in 
a span of less than two years.261 General elections were meant to be held soon after the 
framing of the 1956 Constitution but were delayed until February 1959.262 With 
increasingly impatient demands for elections under the new Constitution, the 
bureaucratic executive and the entrenched political class faced an existential threat.263 
The dilemma for Pakistan’s ruling elites was how ‘to hold elections that would 
legitimate but not change the status quo.’264 
 
As the pre-constitutional governance arrangement persisted despite the framing of the 
1956 Constitution, the apex bureaucracy retained its preeminent position within the 
postcolonial state. The dominance of the senior CSP was bound to raise tensions not 
only with the central, provincial or regional politicians, but also with the lower cadres 
of the bureaucracy. The Provincial Civil Services (PCS) had also suffered from 
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dislocation and disruption during the partition process, and suffered from shortages of 
qualified personnel at the higher levels.265 It was initially expected that officers from 
the higher rungs of provincial services would be recruited to the CSP, and the elite 
central and provincial cadres might even be merged into a uniform service structure. 
However, the CSP succeeded in maintaining their corporate identity and monopoly over 
central policymaking posts, as well as a spatial and social aloofness from the PCS, 
various technical groups, the lower strata of public services and the general public.266 
Marked differences in pay structure and privileges, delays in payment of salaries to 
lower cadres, and the exclusion of the technical services and PCS from central 
policymaking posts bred friction between the CSP and the rest of the public services.  
 
The lowest cadres of the public services became the ferment of discontent. As more 
poorly educated and poorly paid officials were recruited en masse in the lower levels 
of the public services, turning government employment into a quasi-welfare system, 
Pakistan’s bureaucracy transformed rapidly into a highly inefficient leviathan.267 A 
contrast with the dilapidation of the lower strata of the administrative pyramid justified 
the CSP’s insistence on maintaining their elite status, further fuelling a vicious cycle of 
resentment and demoralization at the lower levels. Even the CSP cadre began to show 
signs of stress at the junior levels. Concerns over the rapidly deteriorating condition of 
the higher education system and a lack of extended experience in the districts due to 
rapid promotions began to cast a shadow on the prestige of the recent inductees in the 
CSP. The security of tenure, as well as the morale, of the CSP was also under a sustained 
attack from government politicians seeking to rely on the bureaucracy to achieve local 
political advantages.268 Factionalism along ethnic-regional-linguistic, caste-tribe and 
religious-sectarian lines began to emerge.269  
 
Accusations of corruption, nepotism and political leanings began to plague the 
bureaucracy all the way to the top. The bureaucracy’s control over land registration and 
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allocation over refugee property provided an opportunity for corruption that lasted for 
decades. Hindu and Sikh migrants from West Pakistan areas had left behind highly 
valuable urban and rural property which was meant to be allocated to refugees from 
India. Since this was to be done often in the absence of detailed records of property that 
the refugees had abandoned in India, the bureaucracy had extensive discretion in 
refugee property settlement and was presented with many avenues for profiteering. In 
addition to such direct pecuniary corruption the bureaucracy, especially the highest 
rungs occupied by the CSP, abused public resources in a manner that constituted more 
subtle and institutionalized forms of corruption.270 While corruption was widespread, 
accountability was weak.271 As a result, the grievances within the public services, 
especially the middle and lower strata of bureaucracy, ensured that the superior courts 
were involved as the arbitrators of administrative wrongdoing. In the absence of 
suitable internal mechanisms, such as effective public service commissions or tribunals, 
the newly-established Writ jurisdiction of the superior courts was invoked to resolve 
disputes over appointments, dismissals, transfers, temporary postings, reversions, and 
seniority issues. 
 
While the governance scheme of the 1956 Constitution remained effectively in ethereal 
suspension, the superior judiciary was the only beneficiary and the sole operational 
sphere of the new constitutional scheme in the interim. The 1956 Constitution enshrined 
an impressive array of fundamental rights and empowered the reconstituted Supreme 
Court to issue ‘directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas 
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari … for the enforcement of 
any of the rights conferred.’272 Article 170 vested a more extensive Writ jurisdiction in 
the High Courts of West and East Pakistan – the power to issue writs for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights as well as ‘for any other purpose.’273 While the 
Supreme Court remained reluctant to directly exercise its fundamental rights 
jurisdiction, the High Courts began to lay down solid foundations of administrative law. 
This was enabled by the design of the 1956 Constitution, Part 10 of which, following 
the Government of India Act model in this regard, prescribed extensive rules and 
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safeguards concerning the appointment, transfer, termination and alteration of the terms 
of employment of civil servants.274 Resultantly, many of the challenges to the legality 
of administrative action came from within the bureaucracy itself as much as from the 
affected public.275 This deeply involved the High Courts in understanding and 
determining the rules that governed the administration. 
 
The Lahore High Court, the oldest High Court in West Pakistan, began to push the 
boundaries of judicial review right from the outset. The first conceptual challenge for 
the court in the absence of an indigenous jurisprudence was to determine to what extent 
it was bound by the restrictions on the named writs in English law. For example, the 
court initially grappled with the principle that the writ of certiorari was traditionally 
available only against judicial and quasi-judicial decisions,276 or that the writ of 
mandamus was strictly controlled and may not be issued for the vindication of personal 
contractual rights.277 However, relying on the permissive language in Article 177 – 
whereby the courts were empowered to issue directions, orders or writs, including writs 
in the nature of the named writs –the courts held that they were not bound by the limits 
on the issuance of writs in English law and extended the purview of judicial review to 
purely administrative acts.278 In Hadi Ali the court held that the petitioner should have 
been issued a show cause notice and provided an opportunity for a fair hearing even 
though the governing statute did not mandate such a requirement.279 In Hussain Haji 
Ahmed the court held that the Writ jurisdiction was not barred even if an alternate 
remedy existed if availing such a remedy was too costly, not expeditious or the 
proceedings were against the principles of natural justice.280 In Afzal Baig the High 
Court held that a competent authority must apply its’ own mind to the decision and 
cannot merely approve the decision effectively made by a subordinate official.281 
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In a technique of expanding their jurisdiction that Pakistan’s superior courts would 
come to perfect in due course, the High Court adopted a three-step process. First, the 
court assumed its jurisdiction to review certain administrative actions and expounded 
the jurisprudential basis, but denied relief in the instant cases.282 Second, the court 
expanded its judicial review powers by invalidating administrative action of relatively 
minor significance and granting relief in cases involving low grade employees of the 
civil services. For instance, Muhammad Nawaz Khan, a case in which the court asserted 
its authority to quash delegated legislation, involved the reinstatement of a minor 
employee of the Punjab Transport Board.283 Likewise, Salamat Ali Jafri, wherein the 
court established its power to determine the seniority of public servants involved a 
minor official.284 This ensured that there was less cause and motivation for the 
executive to push back against judicial review. Having proclaimed its jurisdiction, 
however, in the third step the court began to extend its reach to the upper cadres of the 
bureaucracy. Even such tentative early attempts at establishing administrative law and 
entrenching principles of natural justice attracted resistance from an apex bureaucracy 
determined to retain its hold on the state apparatus. The elite bureaucracy saw the 
courts’ Writ jurisdiction as undermining the discipline of the lower services and as 
wastage of vital resources in litigation.285 
 
Perceiving the likelihood of an increasing pushback from the bureaucracy, the Supreme 
Court urged caution in the exercise of the Writ jurisdiction. In Hikmat Hussain the 
Supreme Court reversed the High Court and held that the respondent who had served 
as the Post Master General in an officiating capacity could be reverted to his original 
post without being ‘given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action 
proposed to be taken in regard to him’ – such a requirement laid down in Article 181 
applied to tenured posts only.286 Likewise, in Moazzam Hussain Khan the Supreme 
Court again overruled the High Court and held that the Director of the Intelligence 
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Bureau did not enjoy a security of tenure and the government had complete discretion 
in making high level postings and transfers.287 It cautioned the High Courts that 
exercising the Writ jurisdiction in such instances would undermine the separation of 
powers. 
 
In the seminal case of Tariq Transport Company the Supreme Court consolidated the 
foundations and jurisdictional boundaries of the Writ jurisdiction under the 1956 
Constitution.288 The Supreme Court read a range of requirements, imported from 
English administrative law, into the general and permissive language of Article 170. 
Unlike the High Courts, the apex court interpreted the phrase ‘writs in the nature of’ to 
mean that the restrictions and requirements traditionally associated with the issuance of 
the prerogative writs were applicable to the Writ jurisdiction of the High Courts. As 
such, where a suitable alternate remedy was available to the petitioner the High Courts 
should resile from exercising the Writ jurisdiction.  The court also held that the test of 
locus standi, a direct personal interest in the matter as opposed to a general or public 
interest, must be satisfied by the petitioner. The court highlighted the extraordinary 
nature of the Writ jurisdiction and asserted that the High Courts should intervene only 
when there was an error of law or a clear beach of procedural requirements laid down 
in legislation. A focus on legality as opposed to administrative propriety meant that the 
High Courts should avoid getting involved in factual inquiries. These limits on the Writ 
jurisdiction would hereafter remain the key principles defining the exercise of the High 
Courts’ powers and would find explicit mention in the subsequent constitutions of 
Pakistan. The Supreme Court’s assertion that ‘any encroachment by the High Court in 
a field reserved for the executive would amount to judicial invasion’ and violation of 
the separation of powers would become a recurring theme defining the battle lines 
around judicial review. 
 
THE END OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERLUDE 
 
Despite the political instability since the promulgation of the 1956 Constitution, 
Pakistan appeared to be slowly progressing towards a stable constitutionalism. 
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Preparations were underway for the first general elections held on the basis of universal 
franchise when President Iskander Mirza imposed Martial Law and abrogated the 
Constitution in October 1958.289 The primary justification for the Martial Law 
advanced by President Mirza was the unworkability of the 1956 Constitution and the 
political instability it had engendered. This assertion occluded the fact that the political 
problems he cited were a product of the old arrangement and the soundness or otherwise 
of the constitutional scheme adopted in 1956 could only be gauged after elections had 
been held. President Mirza assumed the office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator 
(CMLA) and appointed a twelve-member cabinet including General Ayub Khan, the 
long-serving Commander-in-Chief of the military. A mere two days later, the Supreme 
Court delivered its judgment in State v. Dosso, validating the imposition of Martial Law 
and the abrogation of the constitution.290 That very night General Ayub Khan pressured 
President Mirza to resign and emerged as Pakistan's first military ruler. 
 
Barely a decade since its emergence as an independent nation state Pakistan had 
reverted from a one-party dominated state to bureaucratic authoritarianism reminiscent 
of colonial rule. For the next decade Pakistan would have its first experience of direct 
military rule under the Ayub regime. Nonetheless, the demand for a stable and inclusive 
constitutional scheme had not been fully extinguished, especially in East Pakistan and 
in the smaller provinces of West Pakistan. In the brief constitutional interlude the courts 
had justified the promise of constitutionalism through the exercise of the Writ 
jurisdiction. At his inaugural address as the Chief Justice of the West Pakistan High 
Court Justice M. R. Kiyani, under whose leadership the High Court laid the foundations 
of a more robust form of judicial review and whose reputation was ‘widespread among 
the masses,’291 described the writs as ‘flowers of paradise … the modern manifestation 
of God’s pleasure … [which] dwells in the High Court.’292 While such celebration of 
judicial review may have been over-effusive, the courts had nonetheless demonstrated 
a capacity to exert limited restrain on the authoritarianism of a fearful state and impose 
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some semblance of administrative propriety on a powerful executive through their 






MILITARY-BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM AND ‘BASIC’ 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
With the abrogation of the 1956 Constitution, Pakistan descended into a prolonged 
period of military-bureaucratic authoritarianism. During the first nationwide Martial 
Law, the Ayub regime developed the blueprint for military rule that would be adopted 
by successor military regimes in Pakistan. This technology of martial rule included a 
validation of the coup by the Supreme Court; a quasi-presidential constitutional 
scheme; a controlled form of democracy reminiscent of late colonialism; a local 
government system that would provide minimal democratic cover; an accountability 
drive essentially designed to discipline political elites and senior bureaucrats; and minor 
administrative reforms to reign in the civil bureaucracy. Contradictorily, however, with 
the framing of the 1962 Constitution the country experienced governance under a post-
independence constitution, albeit short-lived, for the first time. The 1962 Constitution, 
which paved the way for the end of Martial Law, provided for a most basic form of 
democracy which, nonetheless, gave some space for political dissent to be expressed 
through the parliamentary and electoral processes. More significantly, it enshrined 
fundamental rights and enabled the political opposition to challenge arbitrary 
government action through the courts. 
 
In addition to the technology of military rule, another lasting legacy of the Ayub regime 
was the exacerbation of ethno-linguistic and regional fault lines in the postcolonial 
nation. A strong central government based in West Pakistan which dominated national 
policymaking heightened the marginalization of East Pakistan. The Ayub era was 
dubbed the ‘Great Decade’ of development as a program of state-led industrialization, 
agrarian reform and large-scale infrastructure development financed through 
international borrowing led to notable macro-economic growth. However, the benefits 
of such development were inequitably distributed, with the political and economic elites 
of West Pakistan prospering to the exclusion of all. As most of the military command 
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and many of the senior bureaucrats who occupied key positions belonged to north-
central Punjab and the settled areas of the NWFP, the sense of exclusion and 
disadvantage amongst the peripheral regions of West Pakistan also increased. A 
pervasive sense of socio-political and economic inequality, and the continuing failure 
to create a democratic and inclusive constitutional system, gave rise to widespread 
protests that led to the end of the Ayub regime, and created the conditions for 
secessionism in East Pakistan leading to the bloody dismemberment of the nation-state 
that followed. 
 
Despite the military-bureaucratic authoritarianism of the Ayub era, the courts were able 
to consolidate their judicial review powers. During the years of Martial Law, despite 
the judicial validation of untrammelled powers vested in the military regime, the courts 
managed to continue a low key form of judicial review of bureaucratic action. The 
exercise of the Writ jurisdiction aligned with the priorities of a Martial Law regime that 
was attempting to subdue and co-opt a hitherto powerful bureaucracy. In the second 
phase, the promulgation of the 1962 Constitution which provided the courts extensive 
judicial review powers and belatedly enshrined fundamental rights, the courts pushed 
the envelope further and embraced a robust administrative law jurisprudence along the 
lines that an eager West Pakistan High Court had done in its short period of activism 
under the 1956 Constitution. 
 
In the aftermath of the 1965 war between India and Pakistan a beleaguered Ayub 
presidency, whose economic agenda and international standing had suffered a major 
setback, also faced a domestic political crisis. The 1965 presidential elections ensured 
the continuity of the regime but at the cost of a significant loss of legitimacy. As the 
opposition to the regime gained strength, the restrained constitutionalism of the 
previous years gave way to a state of emergency and increasing reliance on public order 
and state security laws to suppress dissent. It is in these circumstances that the superior 
courts found themselves once again at the centre of a crucial political struggle with 
opposition politicians and dissidents challenging the repressive use of these laws with 
some success. The consolidation of the judicial review jurisdiction of the courts along 
three axes – formal constitutionalism, administrative law, and procedural safeguards 
against the abuse of public order and state security laws – which have remained at the 
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core of the superior courts’ definition of rule of law in the decades hence, is a significant 
legacy of the Ayub era.  
 
‘REVOLUTIONARY LEGALITY’ AND ‘REFORM’ 
 
The First Martial Law 
 
Pakistan’s first nationwide Martial Law preceded its first military regime by twenty-
one days. On 6 October 1958, Iskander Mirza, the President and a former Major-
General, imposed Martial Law, dismissed the federal and provincial governments and 
dissolved the legislatures after the successive failures of four Prime Ministers to form 
stable ministries. On 10 October 1958, the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 
was passed to fill the legal void created by the abrogation of the 1956 Constitution. 
There were notable personal-political factors at play in the imposition of the Martial 
Law. President Mirza was a likely loser in the forthcoming transition if elections had 
been held in February 1959 as planned. General Ayub Khan was also in the midst of 
his second five-year term as Commander-in-Chief, which was unlikely to be extended 
any further. On 27 October 1958, General Ayub Khan, who had been appointed as 
Prime Minister in the interim, secured President Mirza’s resignation and sent him into 
exile. The ease with which this transition was affected revealed what a lame duck 
president Mirza had become in the absence of any meaningful public or political 
support, and that power had already gravitated towards the military.293  
 
More significantly, however, there were important institutional factors that heralded the 
military’s rise to preeminence within the state structure long before the advent of the 
Martial Law regime. Like the bureaucracy, the military was in disarray at the time of 
partition and was immediately subjected to great stresses.294 The Army had to undergo 
a rapid program of restructuring at considerable national expense and as such was part 
                                                 
293 See Newberg, Judging the State, above n 5, 71-72; Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political 
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294 Pakistan inherited a disproportionately large Army, a legacy of the colonial policy of large-scale 
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appointed the Army Chief. See Kochanek, above n 181, 46. The military was denied its share of 
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of the early stages of state-building. From the outset the military was involved in law 
and order functions in support of the civil government and bureaucracy. The Army was 
called upon to aid in maintaining order during the refugee crisis, garnering widespread 
public support in the process. As Pakistan underwent multiple crises in subsequent 
years the military was frequently dragged into maintaining law and order in aid of civil 
government.295 In 1954, when the Governor-General dismissed the Constituent 
Assembly General Ayub Khan, a serving Army Chief, was appointed as the Defence 
Minister in the so-called ‘Cabinet of Talents’ providing an indication of the extent to 
which the military had been imbricated with the executive.296  
 
During these various encounters over the first decade the military developed a sense of 
the workings of politics and bureaucracy, and increasing disdain for both. This sense 
had come to be widely shared by the general public and the imposition of Martial Law 
was greeted with acquiescence or quiet approval.297 The absence of public dissent was 
part of the Supreme Court’s justification for the validation of Martial Law and the 
abrogation of the 1956 Constitution in State v. Dosso.298 Notably, State v. Dosso was 
decided before General Ayub Khan displaced Iskander Mirza as the Chief martial law 
Administrator (CMLA) and was neither a direct legal challenge to the imposition of 
Martial Law or to military rule. In an appeal against decisions of the High Court which 
had declared the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) to be in violation of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed under the 1956 Constitution,299 a majority in the 
Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Munir held that the case could not be decided 
without a pronouncement on the legal status of the fundamental rights provisions as 
well as the 1956 Constitution, and hence of the Martial Law Proclamation that had 
abrogated it. Justice Cornelius was the lone dissenter to the extent that he refused to 
engage with that issue. Taking a naturalistic position he opined that fundamental rights 
did not derive their validity from a formal constitution, which merely provided a 
restatement of these norms, and hence existed even when such a constitution had been 
abrogated. 
                                                 
295 See Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, above n 204, 38-43; Oldenburg, above n 187, 47. 
296 Ziring, above n 31, 169; Oldenburg, above n 187, 38. 
297 Notably, even Fatima Jinnah, who emerged as the main opposition contender against Ayub Khan in 
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299 See Malik Toti Khan v. District Magistrate, Sibi and Ziarat, PLD 1957 (WP) Quetta 1; Dosso v. 
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Chief Justice Munir and the majority of the bench, however, pushed the ‘legal 
positivism’ displayed in Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan to radical extremes. Relying on its 
interpretation of Hans Kelsen’s theory of the law and state,300 the court held that the 
coup d’état was in fact a Grundnorm-creating revolution and its validity could only be 
determined as a matter of social fact. The factual evidence relied upon by the court to 
establish the efficacy of revolutionary change included the acquiescence of the state 
structure and the silent majority which had refused to protest. The court ignored the 
likely impact of 29 Martial Law Regulations issued in the very first days after the coup. 
In a series of populist measures designed to shore up public support the Martial Law 
authorities had cracked down on smuggling and hoarding of goods, leading to a 
dramatic reduction in the prices of basic commodities.301 The regime also imposed a 
ban on the trading of import licenses, which in the public eye were a key source of 
political corruption, and compelled the payment of back and under-reported taxes.302 
These measures were, however, accompanied by the threat of serious prosecutions 
before Martial Law tribunals for dissent or disobedience to the regime, including 
mandatory capital punishment for assisting the ‘recalcitrants’ – rebels or rioters – and 
for protest in the streets.303 The absence of dissent was as manufactured as it was a 
manifestation of public support.  
 
By ruling on the validity of the coup the court granted the regime a veneer of legal and 
proto-democratic legitimacy. It rendered the Martial Law Proclamation into the 
‘shortest Constitution in the world’ by granting the regime the power to create any laws 
and even frame a new constitution.304 In accordance with its proclaimed judicial and 
perceived public mandate the Martial Law regime proceeded to cure the ailments of 
Pakistan’s politics and state structure. The reform agenda was designed as much to 
undermine the power of interest groups which may offer resistance to the regime, such 
as large landowners and the bureaucracy, and secure their cooptation as it was to garner 
public support and legitimacy.305 One such program, larger in rhetoric but less so in 
                                                 
300 The court cited Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Anders Wahlberg trans, Cambridge, 
1945). 
301 See Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, above n 204, 6-8. 
302 Ibid, 54-7. 
303 Ibid, 5. 
304 Newberg, Judging the State, above n 5, 87. 
305 Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, above n 193, 4. 
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impact, was the Land Reform in West Pakistan in early 1959 in which the regime 
imposed ownership ceilings and proceeded to resume excess land.306 However, even 
after the reforms the average landholding remained high, much of the land acquired by 
the government was of poor agricultural quality and the regime issued compensation 
bonds for its acquisition.307 While the resumed land was first offered for sale to poor 
tenant farmers and serfs, most of them could not afford it and more than half of it 
remained unsold.308 Most of the resumed land was then re-sold to military officials and 
bureaucrats at discounted prices in order to redeem the compensation bonds, effectively 
instituting a subtle form of institutionalized corruption, creating new wealth and 
bolstering a new institutional middle class.309  
 
While the land reforms had very limited redistributive impact they indicated the risks 
of resistance to large landowners and feudal politicians.310 Consistent with this agenda, 
the regime also employed overtly coercive means to reign in opposition politicians. The 
Public Offices (Disqualification) Order, 1959 and its substitute, the Elective Bodies 
(Disqualification) Order, 1959 (EBDO), essentially followed the PRODA model.311 
Anybody found guilty under EBDO would automatically stand disqualified from 
politics until 1966. Given the timings of future elections this would effectively lead to 
a decade-long disqualification, hence incentivizing the majority of likely defendants to 
choose voluntary retirements. Nearly 6,000 politicians were ‘Ebdoed’ – that is retired 
or were disqualified.312 
 
The administrative reforms of the Martial Law regime followed a similar design. The 
complicity of the apex bureaucracy was vital to the Ayub regime as even at its peak it 
                                                 
306 West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959 (Martial Law Regulation No. 64). Approximately 
2.5 million acres of land were surrendered by 902 landowners, barely a third of the projected estimates. 
Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, above n 204, 64. That West Pakistan, especially Punjab, badly 
needed land reforms is reflected in the average size of landholding of each declarant. Jalal, Democracy 
and Authoritarianism, above n 182, 146. The East Bengal provincial government had implemented 
land reforms as far back as 1950. Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, above n 204, 61. 
307 Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism, above n 182, 146. 
308 Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, above n 204, 64-5. 
309 Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism, above n 182, 146; Mazari, above n 194, 98. 
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311 Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order, 1959 [President's Order No. 13 of 1959]. 
312 Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, above n 204, 89. Nearly 40 per cent of those affected were large 
landowners, most of who were threatened or charged with misappropriating a higher than allocated 
share of water or causing irrigation schemes to be altered for their benefit. Burki, Pakistan Under 
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‘was not essentially military in character’ and bureaucrats continued to occupy key 
positions.313 While the regime did not countenance structural change in the state, it 
claimed to undertake a comprehensive scrutiny of bureaucrats in order to weed out 
corrupt or incompetent officials. Historically, apex bureaucracy had enjoyed a security 
of tenure but these protections were whittled down making it relatively easier to dismiss 
bureaucrats through the mechanism of Scrutiny Committees.314 Despite the claims of 
endemic corruption, only a small number of senior officials were found guilty of serious 
misconduct or corruption and removed from office.315 The results of the scrutiny 
process thus did not match either the public perception or the regime’s claims of 
tackling widespread corruption in the bureaucracy. As with the campaign against 
corruption, the regime’s plans for improvement in the service structure also bore the 
hallmarks of a design to undermine potential resistance by the apex bureaucracy rather 
than a serious intent to reform. The regime unleashed a program for the study and 
analysis of bureaucratic malaise, in partnership with American public and private aid 
agencies.316 However, reports which characterized the bureaucracy, especially the CSP, 
as ‘over-centralized, over-coordinated, under-supervised and under-propelled’ or were 
mildly critical of defense-related matters were either delayed on never published.317 As 
a result, despite a lot of intellectual activity there was very little structural change in the 
bureaucracy. The CSP continued to maintain the cohesive, elitist, corporate tradition of 
the colonial ICS better than the bureaucracy of any other postcolonial state with which 
it shared that legacy.318  
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Writ Jurisdiction: The Bridge Across the Chasm of Martial Law 
 
State v. Dosso has achieved notoriety as the quintessential example of judicial servility 
and of creative jurisprudence – a form of negative judicial activism – to validate 
military rule, not without justification. Chief Justice Munir, however, later justified the 
court’s decision in State v. Dosso as a pragmatic choice, arguing that challenging the 
Martial Law would not only have been futile but would also have resulted in the 
permanent curtailment of the court’s jurisdiction.319 Therefore, he saw the survival and 
long-term interest of the judiciary in conceding the constitutional sway of the Martial 
Law regime while preserving a limited administrative and civil law jurisdiction until a 
new constitution was promulgated. This compromise appeared to be reflected in the 
Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 as well which did not suspend the courts’ 
Writ jurisdiction but only barred them from questioning the actions of Martial Law 
authorities.320 During the nearly four years of the Martial Law, from October 1958 to 
July 1962, the court stood by its pronouncements in State v. Dosso and continued to 
vest extra-constitutional powers in the regime. In Mehdi Ali Khan the Supreme Court 
refused to review its decision in State v. Dosso and the majority and Justice Cornelius 
reiterated their positions on fundamental rights.321 In Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, the court 
upheld amendments to the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952, pursuant to which the regime 
confiscated newspapers which had been critical of it, thereby disavowing any legal or 
supra-constitutional constraint on the regime’s capacity to promulgate coercive laws.322  
 
The court, however, did attempt some tentative formal restrictions on subordinate 
Martial Law authorities by relying on narrow interpretation of ouster clauses and self-
defined distinctions between the various types of legal instruments used by the 
regime.323 In Muhammad Ayub Khuhro, for example, the Court refused to accept a 
blanket ouster of the Writ jurisdiction of the High Courts from reviewing proceedings 
of summary military tribunals and demanded specific clauses in each applicable 
regulation.324 While this enabled the court to grant relief to an opposition politician in 
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320 Laws (Continuance in Force) Order [President’s Order (Post Proclamation) No. 1 of 1958]. 
321 The Province of East Pakistan v. Mehdi Ali Khan, PLD 1959 Supreme Court (Pak) 387.  
322 Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din v. Muhammed Sarfraz, PLD 1961 Supreme Court 585. 
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this case, it imposed minimal formal constraints on the regime’s future actions. It was 
only after the Martial Law had formally ended that the Supreme Court provided a 
concrete analysis of its review powers over the actions of Martial Law authorities by 
citing a distinction between actions and enactments of the CMLA which had supremacy 
pursuant to State v. Dosso, and the actions and orders of subordinate and local Martial 
Law authorities that were bound to comply with the provisions of the 1956 Constitution 
and civil laws to the extent those had been left intact.325 While this was an exercise in 
post hoc rationalization it, nonetheless, set the tone for the courts’ engagement with the 
regime’s actions in the subsequent period of constitutional rule. It also set a precedent 
for later periods of Martial Law. 
 
As noted earlier, while the courts avoided reviewing the legislative, judicial and 
executive actions of Martial Law authorities they nonetheless utilized the Writ 
jurisdiction to review the actions of the civil bureaucracy. In the absence of fundamental 
change in the administrative structure, the courts continued to address both the external 
grievances against the bureaucracy as well as the internal tensions between the CSP and 
the lower cadres of the bureaucracy. While the courts’ nascent fundamental rights 
jurisprudence under the 1956 Constitution had been disabled by State v. Dosso, their 
administrative law jurisdiction had remained by and large intact.  The Laws 
(Continuance in Force) Order had denuded the Writ jurisdiction by withdrawing the 
broader power to issues ‘orders and directions … to any government’ thereby excluding 
the actions of the Martial law authorities from review. However, the actions of the civil 
administration remained subject to challenge through writs, and the West Pakistan High 
Court in particular continued to adopt a relatively more activist bent even during the 
Martial Law.326 The Supreme Court, in contrast, had been generally more conservative 
and as the more significant of the state’s appeals questioning the expansion of the High 
Courts’ review powers began to reach the Supreme Court during the Martial Law 
period, tensions over the definition of the Writ jurisdiction were inevitable.  
                                                 
example, in Gulab Din v. Major A. T. Shaukat, PLD 1961 (WP) Lahore 952, the High Court ruled that 
its jurisdiction was ousted only with regard to actions taken by the CMLA himself.  
325 Muhammad Afzal v. Commissioner, Lahore Division, PLD 1963 Supreme Court 401. 
326 As Chief Justice Kayani saw it, ‘certiorari varie[d] with the imaginative consciousness of the 
judicial mind’ and there was ‘plenty of it in the High Court.’ The West Pakistan High Court issued 
nearly 15,000 writs from 1955 to 1962, of which approximately 3,000 dealt with service matters 




Consistent with its understanding of a limited judicial role that the Supreme Court had 
espoused even before the Martial Law, the Court urged restraint in the exercise of the 
Writ jurisdiction and advised deference to the executive.327 The Supreme Court 
confined the Writ jurisdiction to the five named writs,328 and directed adherence to the 
parameters of English law ‘in all essential respects.’329 At the same time, however, the 
court resisted attempts at the ouster of its review powers over the actions of civil 
administration much more robustly than it did in the case of the military courts and 
Martial Law authorities. In Zafar Ahsan, the Supreme Court accepted that the actions 
of a Scrutiny Committee may be excluded from review, but imposed five conditions for 
the ouster to be effective.330 These conditions closely matched the traditional grounds 
of judicial review and thus enabled the courts to exercise review powers in appropriate 
cases in much the same way as if their jurisdiction had not been ousted.331 Through the 
continued exercise of the Writ jurisdiction against civil administration the courts thus 
created a bridge across the discontinuity of the Martial Law. The regime had also come 
to accept the Writ jurisdiction, within the confines self-defined by the Supreme Court, 
as it did not undermine its core interests. In fact, the Writ jurisdiction aligned with the 
regime’s aims by keeping the bureaucracy under some checks and improving its 
procedures without compelling any structural alterations.  
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The gradually expanding Writ jurisdiction had subtly begun a fundamental change in 
the postcolonial state’s structure. The once powerful CSP, which had been pushed into 
submission by the military, was now subjected to ever-increasing scrutiny by the 
superior courts. It also found itself increasingly discredited and weakened by friction 
with the provincial services and the lower rungs of the bureaucracy. In comparison, the 
superior courts had gained notable credibility and prestige through their visible judicial 
review actions. They were also being seen by the lower bureaucracy as the only avenue 
for the resolution of their grievances.332  One case, in particular, marked the different 
institutional trajectories and symbolized the contrasting public perceptions of an 
‘arrogant bureaucracy dominated by martial law and a sympathetic judiciary.’333 Sir 
Edward Snelson, Secretary of the Law Ministry and one of two remaining British ICS 
officers, was charged with and convicted of contempt by a unanimous High Court of 
West Pakistan.334 The Secretary had commented that the High Court had established a 
Writ jurisdiction ‘without reference to the strictly defined frontiers of the prerogative 
writs’ thereby interfering with and even usurping executive functions.335 There was 
some basis for this assertion as the Supreme Court had overruled attempts by the High 
Court to expand its jurisdiction on at least twelve different occasions, as noted earlier.336 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court also maintained the conviction thereby marking the 
contours of the Writ jurisdiction as the sole preserve of the superior judiciary.337   
 
Despite the Supreme Court’s role in validating the Martial Law, the Writ jurisdiction 
enabled the courts to forge ideological alignments with two important segments of the 
society which offered the greatest opposition to the Martial Law regime: lawyers and 
students. Not only were lawyers a powerful non-state group, law students formed the 
most significant section of public university students as well as the intake into the 
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bureaucracy.338 The lawyers partly derived their political clout from their sheer 
numbers and partly from the existence of cohesive bar associations capable of 
nationwide action.339 The bar associations consistently urged the courts to constrain the 
lawlessness of the executive and provided organized backing to this end. What made 
the lawyers such a powerful opposition group was that their influence was not restricted 
to the urban areas. Lawyers had always been important mediators between the rural and 
peri-urban populations and the state, and had a long history of actively engaging in local 
politics.340 Like the lawyers, university students were another powerful group that 
tended to engage in opposition, especially of the violent kind.341 The Martial Law 
regime was sufficiently threatened by student politics to bring amendments to the Penal 
Code making it a crime to incite students to political activity, and issued Ordinances 
that enhanced the disciplinary powers of university administrations over students and 
staff.342 A range of student grievances, including against disciplinary action, came to 
be raised in Writs before the West Pakistan High Court in particular.343 Given the 
courts’ involvement in matters of vital interest to lawyers and students through the Writ 
jurisdiction, it was not surprising that the post-Martial Law opposition politics had a 
highly legalistic tone. The demands for the rule of law – defined as guarantees for the 
independence of judiciary, the expansion of the Writ jurisdiction and repeal of 
authoritarian statutes – thus figured prominently in the opposition to the Ayub regime. 
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CONSOLIDATION OF THE WRIT JURISDICTION UNDER THE 1962 
CONSTITUTION 
 
‘Basic Democracy’ and Formal Constitutionalism 
 
Prior to lifting the Martial Law in July 1962 and substituting it with a constitutional 
framework, General Ayub Khan constructed the political framework necessary to 
manage a transition to controlled democracy. The Basic Democracies Order, 1959 
created a system of local government easily managed by an authoritarian regime.344  It 
also enabled the regime to claim that it was introducing grassroots level democracy to 
Pakistan, which would cure the ills of its parliamentary politics in the long run. In some 
sense ‘all democracies are basic but some are more basic than others.’345 The Basic 
Democracy design envisaged four tiers of local government in which only a majority 
of the representatives at the lowest rung, that of Union Councils, would be directly 
elected.346 These local bodies had significant functions but the controlling authority was 
vested in senior bureaucrats who exercised enormous and unchecked control over the 
fiscal and administrative powers of the councils, could review and overturn their 
decisions, remove elected officials, or even supersede entire councils if they deemed 
fit.347 More than the regime’s stated goals, the effective use of the Basic Democracy 
system revealed the real intent behind its design. In 1960 General Ayub held a 
referendum in which an overwhelming majority of the electoral college, comprising 
80,000 Basic Democrats or Union Council members, voted him the President for the 
next five years. The same group then served as the electorate for indirect elections to 
the National Assembly.  The composition of the National Assembly, dominated as it 
was by large landholders and traditional political classes, revealed the extent to which 
the regime needed and sought to co-opt these classes despite simultaneously threatening 
their traditional power bases.348  
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The 1962 Constitution, which replaced the Martial Law framework, represented the 
most significant ‘achievement’ of the regime, reflected the key ideas of the military 
rulers and their proclaimed solutions to Pakistan’s political ailments. The Constitution 
was dictatorial in form and spirit and sanctioned a ‘government of the President, by the 
President, and for the President’ according to its critics.349 Former Chief Justice Munir, 
who served briefly as the first Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs under the 
1962 Constitution, argued that the ‘constitution conform[ed] neither to the 
Parliamentary nor the Presidential pattern’ as the President was accountable to neither 
the legislature nor the people.350 Even the Chairman of the Constitution Commission 
set up by the regime disapproved of the document and disavowed any responsibility for 
its creation.351 The Commission had recommended a presidential constitution, but its 
recommendation for direct elections and the inclusion of fundamental rights had been 
disregarded.352 The Law Reform Commission’s recommendations on the separation of 
the lower judiciary and the executive in the districts had also been rejected.353 Its 
recommendations on the Writ jurisdiction of the High Court were, however, accepted 
with the inclusion of Article 98.  
 
Nominally, the 1962 Constitution transferred greater subject-powers to the provincial 
legislatures as the National Assembly only had enumerated powers with the residuary 
powers vested in the provinces, and had made political and economic parity a stated 
aim.354 However, Article 131 reserved special powers to the National Assembly to meet 
the demands of national interest, security or economic stability. Executive authority in 
the provinces was vested in the governors, who were appointed by and acted under the 
President and could be removed at will.355 The National Assembly had very limited 
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financial powers and could only comment on but not refuse the budget.356 The President 
could dissolve the National Assembly and could veto its legislation, which could only 
be over-ridden by a two-third majority in the National Assembly.357 Even in that case 
the President could refer the bill to a referendum by Basic Democrats.358  
 
Despite the highly authoritarian nature of the 1962 Constitution, its short life provided 
some cause for belief in the capacity of formal constitutionalism to impose minimal 
restraints on arbitrary power. Within four days of the Constitution’s date of effect 
President Ayub flouted it. Article 103 required federal and provincial ministers to 
relinquish membership of the National Assembly. However, President Ayub passed an 
Order patently made pursuant to Article 224, a transitional provision designed to 
remove difficulties in bringing the Constitution into effect, exempting ministers from 
that demand.359 The Order was challenged before the East Pakistan High Court which 
declared it to be unconstitutional.360 In dismissing the appeal against the High Court's 
decision the Supreme Court asserted the pre-eminence of the Constitution as the 
‘master-law’ and signalled that the President would hereafter have to abide by the terms 
of his own Constitution.361 This was arguably a high point in the postcolonial state’s 
turbulent constitutional history, a Marbury v Madison moment that established the 
courts’ powers of the constitutional review of legislation.362 This could result in some 
effective checks on the President’s capacity of action so long as he did not have the 
requisite majority in the National Assembly to amend the Constitution, which he 
initially did not.  
 
Within a fortnight of the Constitution coming into effect groupings resembling political 
parties had formed in the National Assembly.363 Soon thereafter legislation formally 
recognized political parties despite the regime’s earlier denunciations of party 
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politics.364 While the President’s Convention Muslim League had a simple majority, 
the opposition commanded the support of approximately 65 members in a house of 156. 
This had no impact on legislation or government business, the National Assembly was 
largely irrelevant in these regards anyway. However, making amendments to the 
Constitution became a challenge for the President as the Convention Muslim League 
lacked a two-third majority.365 As the regime resorted to more overtly authoritarian 
ways to pressurize opposition members into submission, through the detention of 
opposition politicians under a wide array of security and public order statutes, its efforts 
were undermined by the courts. Most notably, when the regime banned the Jamaat-i-
Islami and detained its founder Maudoodi along with a number of party leaders its 
actions were challenged. While the West Pakistan High Court dismissed the petition, 
the East Pakistan High Court declared them unconstitutional.366 In appeals against both 
decisions, the Supreme Court sided with the East Pakistan High Court and held that the 
ban violated the freedom of association provision of the bill of rights recently inserted 
by the First Amendment to the 1962 Constitution.367  
 
The First Amendment, moved merely five months after the Constitution came into 
effect, was passed with the consent of the opposition and elevated non-justiciable 
‘Principles of Lawmaking’ into justiciable Fundamental Rights under an amended 
Article 98.368 It also restored the ‘Islamic Principles’ which had been incorporated in 
the 1956 Constitution but had initially been omitted from the 1962 text.  The 
amendment had been initiated in response to public opinion and presumably with an 
eye to the 1965 presidential elections. The Second Amendment to the Constitution was 
not, however, supported by the opposition as it enabled the President to continue in 
office after the expiry of his term until a successor had been elected.369 It could also 
allow him to reverse the order of the presidential and National Assembly elections 
through a strategically timed dissolution of the legislature. The debate on the 
amendment bill was acrimonious and the Second Amendment was only passed after the 
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defection of four opposition members, some under immense pressure and one 
incentivized through an appointment to the West Pakistan High Court. The defections 
were exempted from the operation of provisions of the Political Parties Act which 
barred floor-crossing and required a member changing parties to resign and seek re-
election.370 Even this reduced form of parliamentary politics thus re-affirmed the 
regime’s distaste for parliamentary democracy. 
 
Having carefully managed another round of Basic Democracy elections in end 1964, 
President Ayub sought re-election for a second five-year term in January 1965. By that 
stage the combined opposition had managed to rally around a single candidate, Fatima 
Jinnah, the highly esteemed sister and close companion of the Quaid-e-Azam. With 
immense powers of patronage wielded as the incumbent, President Ayub managed a 
slim majority in East Pakistan and a substantial one in West Pakistan.371 A subsequent 
constitutional challenge to the Basic Democracy system and the Electoral College Act 
of 1965 succinctly marked the divergent paths of the two wings of the nation. In 
response to the Writ petitions, the High Court of East Pakistan declared the Act to be 
unconstitutional for impermissible delegation of legislative powers, and for violating 
the separation of executive and legislative powers.372 More significantly, it found the 
Basic Democracy system to be in contravention of the provincial autonomy guarantees 
in the 1962 Constitution. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s 
decision and even chided it for its strongly worded criticism of the state structure.373 
Chief Justice Cornelius and the court declared that the Basic Democracy system was 
formally legal and it was not the courts’ purpose to question its underlying political 
theory. The Supreme Court, which thus reposed its confidence in formal 
constitutionalism, was once again on the wrong side of history as political 
developments would soon render the 1962 Constitution and its governance structure 
into a nullity.  
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In the elections for the National Assembly held in March 1965 the Basic Democrats 
secured Ayub’s Convention Muslim League 126 out of 156 seats in that house. Having 
gained the necessary supra-majority in the National Assembly, the regime proceeded 
to make five additional amendments to the 1962 Constitution designed to strengthen 
the presidency’s hold over the political system even further. The Third Amendment 
altered the disqualification provisions of Article 103(2) exempting several categories 
of persons from disability to contest National Assembly elections for holding offices 
for profit in the service of Pakistan.374 The exemptions indicated the regime’s intent to 
co-opt rural middle classes and petty landlords, and thereby also threaten the power 
bases of the large landowners.375 The Fourth and the Sixth Amendments revealed even 
more starkly the regime’s compulsions of simultaneously co-opting and undermining 
another powerful segment. At independence the mandatory retirement age of the Civil 
Service was 55 years of age and remained thus until 1960 when the Martial Law regime 
raised it to 60 years. The Fourth and Sixth Amendments, passed a few months after the 
Presidential election of 1965, reduced the retirement age again to 55 years, enabled the 
President to retire any official with more than 25 years of service, but also granted the 
President and provincial Governors the discretion to extend service beyond the 
retirement age.376 The timings of these changes reveal the regime’s heavy reliance on 
the bureaucracy to systematically rig the sensitive transition from the first to the second 
presidential term under the 1962 Constitution.377  
 
In September 1965 Pakistan and India went to the second war over Kashmir which 
resulted in a military stalemate, but led to disastrous diplomatic and domestic political 
consequences for the Ayub regime. The much-vaunted economic development of the 
previous seven years and the regime’s credibility plummeted. President Ayub imposed 
a state of emergency under Article 30, and the Fifth Amendment passed in the aftermath 
of the 1965 war suspended Fundamental Rights during the continuance of the 
emergency.378 The Seventh Amendment further simplified the procedure whereby 
national and provincial legislatures could rubberstamp and convert ordinances into Acts 
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of the legislatures.379 With these five amendments and the imposition of emergency the 
Constitution effectively reverted to Martial Law in substance, if not in form. The 
amendments to the 1962 Constitution ‘led to popular belief that the Constitution … was 
simply a plastic instrument … to be shaped and moulded … as circumstances and 
convenience might dictate.’380 The only strand of constitutionalism that survived during 
the emergency period was the relatively more robust Writ jurisdiction of the superior 
courts and the brand of procedural legality that they wielded.  
 
The Expansion of Judicial Review under Military Rule 
 
Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution, which provided the High Courts’ Writ and 
fundamental rights jurisdictions, had adopted the Martial Law device of specifying 
particular writs without any reference to the possibility of other kinds of orders or 
directions.381 The new constitution also excluded the military and confined Writs in 
service matters of the civil bureaucracy within enumerated grounds.382 Article 98 also 
specified the various Writs without using the Latin phraseology, subjected the 
availability of all the writs to the absence of an adequate remedy, and writs in the nature 
of certiorari and mandamus (but not habeas corpus and quo warranto) to the additional 
requirement of locus standi. This initially encouraged the courts to continue showing 
fidelity to the more restrictive strands of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. The 
availability of Writs thus continued to be subjected to the requirement of the absence 
of a suitable alternate administrative remedy.383 In case of a procedural failure the 
substantive decision was to be referred back to the administration, lower court or 
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tribunal.384 Courts were not to strike down bureaucratic determinations on the basis of 
errors of fact.385  
 
Nonetheless, the courts gradually built on the foundations of the Writ jurisdiction which 
had been preserved through the Martial Law and extended their reach over executive 
action in the post-Martial Law years of the regime. Certiorari was expanded to include 
purely administrative actions, in addition to judicial and quasi-judicial determinations 
as the High Court of West Pakistan had done under the 1956 Constitution.386 The 
requirements of natural justice were deemed applicable even where a governing statute 
did not expressly provide for them.387 The actions of the bureaucracy could be reviewed 
for reliance on extraneous factors.388 Legislative powers could not be delegated to 
executive authorities unless concrete guidance and limits were provided.389 Likewise, 
in service matters the requirement of a hearing before termination was made applicable 
in cases of contractual employees as well.390 The courts also began to scrutinize 
promotions, transfers, and service structures of the bureaucracy much more readily than 
they had historically done.391 Within a decade of the establishment of the Writ 
jurisdiction it could be stated that the extent of the courts’ involvement in scrutinizing 
executive action and laying the parameters of executive power were greater in Pakistan 
than in any other developing country.392 
 
In the post-1965 war years of the Ayub regime the superior courts found themselves 
once again in the midst of political controversy as they were called upon to impede the 
regime’s reliance on coercive laws to undermine and control opposition political parties 
and recalcitrant groups. The Ayub administration had been an essentially authoritarian 
regime even prior to the emergency, despite the constitutional veneer and form under 
which it formally operated in the post-Martial Law years. This is evidenced by the 
historically unprecedented use of coercive colonial-era statutes even more so than in 
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the last decades of the Raj.393 A range of new legal instruments such as the Maintenance 
of Public Order Ordinances of 1960 (MPO) were added to the coercive armoury of the 
postcolonial state. In the aftermath of the war, the regime’s authoritarian tendencies 
were exacerbated by the perceived and real regional, linguistic and sectarian tensions 
as much as by the rising political opposition to the regime. Given the centralization of 
power in the Presidency, these two diverse strands of concerns inevitably coalesced and 
the regime in turn saw and dealt both with political opposition and demands for 
provincial or regional autonomy as national security threats. The press, as much as 
opposition politicians most of whom belonged to East Pakistan or the marginalized 
regions of West Pakistan, were systematically subjected to legalized harassment. In 
adjudicating challenges to the operation of these laws the courts largely confined 
themselves to ultra vires review and the demands of procedural legality. Nonetheless, 
the strict observance of principles of legality constrained the executive in some ways. 
The rules had to be laid down in advance and adhered to. In the least, the manipulations 
of law had to be blatant rather than secretive or subtle.  
 
The courts’ insistence upon legality and the positives of its positivist approach can also 
be witnessed in a number of cases challenging preventive detention. As the regime 
became more overtly coercive in its last few years,394 the standard of review exercised 
by the courts also became more stringent. In Maulvi Farid Ahmad, for example, the 
West Pakistan High Court held that detention could be challenged through a writ of 
habeas corpus and, while the sufficiency of the grounds of detention was not justiciable, 
the court could determine whether the power was being exercised in accordance with 
the terms and purposes of the statute.395 In Abuzar, the detained students had distributed 
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posters appealing to Basic Democracy’s electoral college members not to vote in favor 
of a government candidate.396 The court held that the purpose being electioneering, 
there was no visible threat to public order and the detention was illegal in such 
circumstances. By 1968 when the protest movement against Ayub’s rule was reaching 
a crescendo and the tide was visibly turning, the courts pushed the envelope a little 
further. In Hakim Muhammad Anwar Babri, the District Magistrate had issued a 
preventive detention order on the basis of a speech in which the orator had allegedly 
‘brought into contempt the lofty personality of the Head of State.’ The court invalidated 
the detention on the basis that preventive detention must relate to future rather than past 
acts.397 The Supreme Court finally held, towards the end of the Ayub era, that the 
grounds for preventive detention relied upon by the executive were not subjective but 
were rather conditions that had to be objectively verified to the satisfaction not only of 
the executive official who had been granted the discretion but also that of the court.398  
 
Despite the limited success that the courts achieved in curbing the illegality of the 
executive, the essentially positivistic approach of the courts had its constraints. 
Whenever the state had the will and the wherewithal to create a repressive law it faced 
little resistance from the courts that continued to be bounded by the text of the law. A 
positivist jurisprudence of rights did not provide for much constraint on the executive’s 
actions when untrammeled powers were vested in it and the goal posts may be easily 
shifted. For example, in Rowshan Bijaya Shaukat Ali Khan the Supreme Court faced a 
challenge to the vires of a preventive detention order issued under a provision of the 
East Pakistan MPO Ordinance which empowered the executive to effect preventive 
detention if there were reasonable suspicions of the person ‘having earlier committed 
or having been seen to be committing, or to be about to commit’ a prejudicial act.399 
The court had little choice but to validate ‘preliminary precautionary preventive 
detention’ (per Cornelius J). In another notable case, that of Malik Ghulam Jilani, a 
similar decision was reached despite the Supreme Court affirming the need to establish 
for itself that reasonable grounds existed for ordering preventive detention as per the 
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terms of the statute.400 What were the court to do when the terms of the statute, in this 
case §3 of the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, were so broad.401 In the final analysis, 
the courts’ continuing acceptance of the over-arching constitutional framework and 
their positivism ultimately undermined their capacity to check the arbitrary exercise of 
powers by the regime through the Writ jurisdiction.402 
 
The coerciveness of the Ayub regime, despite the veil of constitutionalism and the 
efforts of the courts to impose the constraints of formal legality, only exacerbated the 
regional and ethno-linguistic tensions that its ideation of nationalism and national 
security were patently meant to address. As East Pakistan’s politics became 
increasingly radicalized and demands for greater autonomy became vociferous, the 
regime became disproportionately coercive. When Mujibur Rahman, leader of the 
Awami League, championed a six-point formula for the resolution of East Pakistan’s 
grievances – which included the demands for a confederal constitution and fiscal 
autonomy, including separate currencies, control over taxation and foreign exchange 
by both wings – this was seen as a step towards secession. Mujibur Rahman was 
arrested in April 1966. When a court granted him bail, he was re-arrested under the 
Defence of Pakistan Rules and the East Pakistan Safety Ordinance pursuant to a non-
bailable warrant for a total duration of two years. In a quintessential example of the 
regime’s use of coercive laws and legal processes, a Special Tribunal was set up under 
a new Ordinance to try him for sedition in what gained notoriety as the Agartala 
Conspiracy Case.403 Just as in East Pakistan, demands for provincial autonomy and the 
break-up of the One Unit became the rallying point of oppositional politics in the 
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marginalized regions of West Pakistan. Again, the regime responded with repression of 
the opposition through the detention of critics and institution of false cases.  
 
THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL END OF THE ‘GREAT DECADE’  
 
There were distinct economic undertones to the demands of provincial autonomy in 
both East and West Pakistan, as it was fuelled by resentment at the domination of 
Punjab and the settled parts of the NWFP in recruitment in the military and bureaucratic 
services, and in the distribution of economic patronage through industrial permits, trade 
licences and barrage lands, etc. The Ayub regime had received much acclaim for its 
economic development initiatives but these had in fact generated grave distortions in 
policymaking and multiple dimensions of inequity. Compared to the first decade of 
Pakistan’s independent existence there was indeed considerable growth in some 
segments of the economy, especially in the large-scale industrial sector.404 However, 
much of the Ayub era’s celebrated economic reforms focused on West Pakistan.405 The 
acute centralization of power in the Presidency and in an apex bureaucracy directly 
responsible to him meant that Bengali influence in these power centers was minimal.406 
Furthermore, it was mostly the industrialists, large landowners and the upper military-
bureaucratic cadres based in West Pakistan that prospered.407  Masses of peasants, 
industrial labour and the lower strata of government employees languished just above 
or below the poverty line.408  
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Much of the industrial growth had been subsidized through foreign loans, and the 
growing debt-burden and rising indirect taxation placed undue burdens on the general 
population.409 Inflation, rural and urban unemployment, and neglect of basic education 
and health services, rendered the regime’s development achievement ‘really quite 
trifling [and] the spectre of poverty [remained] as haunting and as ominous as ever.’410 
As the ‘regime became more oppressive and more corrupt without providing any 
material benefits to the deprived masses,’ discontent seethed.411 Ironically, within days 
of the official celebration of the ‘Great Decade’ of development in October 1968 
protests broke out. The movement which began amongst the rural and peri-urban 
middle classes soon attracted industrial labour, students and opposition political 
parties.412 The regime responded with characteristic repression: opposition politicians 
were detained and protests were brutally suppressed.413 However, as the protest 
movement gathered strength cracks began to appear within the bureaucracy.  Most 
importantly, the extent and violence of the protests necessitated the use of military to 
quell unrest which caused discontent in the ranks.414 This was a constituency that even 
the President could not ignore.  
 
As belated attempts to pacify the opposition through promises to lift the emergency and 
suspension of security laws failed, General-President Ayub Khan relinquished power 
on 25 March, 1969. Instead of affecting a transition under the 1962 Constitution, Ayub 
Khan handed over the reins to General Yahya Khan, the chief of the military. Pakistan’s 
brief constitutional interregnum thus ended in yet another Martial Law. Nonetheless, 
this limited experience of governance under the 1962 Constitution may be seen as 
having strengthened the aspirations for constitutionalism in postcolonial Pakistan.  
Despite its noted defects, the capacity for the opposition to rely on the Constitution and 
the courts to constrain an otherwise all-powerful presidency and the success of the 
protest movement invigorated the promise of democratic politics and rule of law.  
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More importantly, structural shifts had begun taking place in the institutional balance 
of powers within the state. Although the bureaucracy remained a prominent player in 
the postcolonial state’s structure, its powers and insularity had been denuded by the 
military regime. The sustained erosion in the power and the prestige of bureaucracy 
was accompanied by a corresponding rise in that of the judiciary. While the superior 
judiciary appeared to comply with the demands of the executive in constitutional cases, 
it appeared to subtly undermine the executive’s control over the bureaucracy. The grant 
of powers of the judicial review of executive action through the Writ jurisdiction 
empowered the superior judiciary to interstitially curb, at least to some extent, the 
illegality of the executive. A most remarkable aspect of the development of the Writ 
jurisdiction arose from cases in which bureaucrats were the petitioners: cases where 
civil servants challenged the terms of their service, promotions, transfers, dismissals, 
disciplinary proceedings and other service matters.  The High Courts’ decisions in these 
cases gave bureaucrats some room to maneuver, delay or out rightly refuse unpalatable 
directives of the higher executive. Furthermore, the decisions of the superior courts in 
services cases began to embed notions of the superiority and respect of the judiciary 
not only in the eyes of the general public but also the bureaucrats who increasingly 
brought their grievances to these courts. These shifts in the state structure would in time 
enable the courts to offer greater resistance to authoritarianism, and highlight the 
demands for democratic constitutionalism at the behest of increasingly politicized and 







SOCIALIST POPULISM AND THE MYTH OF A CONSENSUS CONSTITUTION 
 
Pakistan’s early constitutional woes have been recorded in detail.  
No other new nation attaining post-colonial independence after 1947 suffered the 
institutional discontinuities or the shredding of the social fabric which Pakistan 
experienced. It took longer than any other new nation to approve a constitution in 
1956 – fully nine years after establishment.415   
That constitution lasted a mere two years and was abrogated even before the first 
national elections could be held on the basis of universal franchise. The Ayub regime, 
and periods of Martial Law that bookended it, entrenched military-bureaucratic 
authoritarianism.416 Judicial capitulation in the face of the military takeover and the 
continued weakness of political parties, especially the founding Muslim League, meant 
that the aspiration of achieving a democratic constitutional system of government 
remained a distant mirage even two decades after the end of colonial rule. 
 
Nonetheless, Pakistan’s brief experience under the 1962 Constitution had offered a 
fleeting glimpse of the promise of constitutionalism and rule of law. The populism of 
the anti-Ayub movement and its eventual success in bringing about the downfall of a 
powerful military dictator indicated that the country might finally be able to hold 
nationwide elections and begin a democratic process of constitution-making. The 
military regime of General Yahya Khan appeared willing to hold relatively free and fair 
elections and allow a transfer of power to an elected government. An inclusive 
constitution-making process – which negotiated the demands for confederalism that had 
gained a foothold in East Pakistan while the West Pakistan political, military and 
bureaucratic elites insisted on a strong central government based in the new capital of 
Islamabad – was vital for the survival of the country as a unified entity. The emergence 
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of two popular political parties with progressive agendas in both East and West 
Pakistan, but neither of which had much support in the other wing of the country, 
created both opportunities as well as challenges for the impending constitutional 
negotiations. Ultimately, it is the failure of the postcolonial elites to reach a 
constitutional settlement at that crucial historical juncture which led to a bloody civil 
war in the east and the dismemberment of Pakistan. 
 
A truncated Pakistan – comprising the West Pakistan territories – that emerged out of 
the ashes of the 1971 civil war finally had a popularly elected government and 
legislature dominated by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. A strong and populist government under 
Bhutto steered the country through this existential crisis and even succeeded in 
promulgating the country’s first politically negotiated constitution in 1973. Given the 
previous failures in constitution-making and its tragic consequences, the 1973 
Constitution acquired the mythical status of being the manifestation of a historic 
democratic consensus. This perception has been heightened in the political imagination 
by the constitutional mayhem perpetrated by the later military regimes of General Zia 
ul Haq (1977-1988) and General Parvez Musharraf (1999-2008), which while 
nominally recognizing the continuity of the 1973 Constitution sought to alter its basic 
framework from a parliamentary to quasi-presidential scheme. A closer scrutiny of the 
founding of the 1973 Constitution shows, however, that far from being the glorious 
culmination of a belated national consensus it was a product of messy political 
bargaining which resulted in a constitutional design and text riven with glaring 
contradictions. It is the failures of the original 1973 design, as much as the subsequent 
machinations that contributed to the perpetuation of military and civilian 
authoritarianism in the subsequent decades.  
 
Having achieved a constitutional cover an insecure Bhutto government continued the 
state of emergency that had been imposed during the civil war throughout its tenure, 
with the result that the fundamental rights provisions of the new constitution remained 
in suspended animation, and continued the abuse of state security and public order laws 
even more blatantly to suppress the opposition than had been the case in the last years 
of the Ayub regime. Within the first few years of the 1973 Constitution’s promulgation, 
the Bhutto government brought several amendments designed to curtail the Writ 
jurisdiction and undermine the independence of the superior judiciary. The Supreme 
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Court had been instrumental in urging the Bhutto government to move towards, and 
defining, some of the contours of a democratic constitution in the early years. However, 
despite the promulgation of a democratic constitution, Pakistan’s superior courts found 
themselves once again in the difficult role of having to mediate the authoritarianism of 
the postcolonial state with a minimalist constitutional apparatus. Writ jurisdiction was 
again the only mode available to the opposition, which mostly belonged to the smaller 
provinces of NWFP and Balochistan, to challenge arbitrary detentions and politically-
motivated prosecutions before military courts and tribunals.  This was as much a matter 
of survival for the courts as for the political opposition, who found themselves in a 
prolonged resistance to preserve the basic structures of judicial review erected during 
the Ayub years, and which the judiciary had salvaged through yet another Martial Law. 
 
CIVIL WAR AND THE TRANSITION TO ‘CIVIL’ AUTHORITARIANISM  
 
Failure in Constitution-making and Secession 
 
There were several notable differences between the Yahya and Ayub Martial Law 
regimes. First, this was a purer form of military rule: all key policymaking positions 
were held or dominated by military men, and the bureaucracy was relegated to 
secondary administrative functions.417 Second, the regime appeared willing to 
relinquish political power after stabilizing the country as extended military rule had 
become untenable after a decade of Ayub Khan. It also seemed ready to hold relatively 
free elections, the first on the basis of universal franchise in the country’s history. This 
was despite the regime’s deeply entrenched suspicion of Mujibur Rahman’s Awami 
League which would have sought normalization of ties with India, significant reduction 
in military spending, greater Bengali representation in the bureaucracy and military, 
and taxation of agricultural income if it gained power.418 In contrast, the military junta 
was relatively more comfortable, both politically and personally, with Zulfiqar Bhutto 
and his new party, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).419 Bhutto had been part of Ayub’s 
cabinets from the beginning of the Martial Law regime until 1966 when he resigned as 
Foreign Minister over a public disagreement on the post-war settlement with India. 
                                                 
417 Mazari, above n 194, 156. 
418 Alavi, above n 183, 88. 
419 Ziring, above n 31, 329. 
  123
Thereafter, he had emerged as the most prominent politician in West Pakistan in the 
last years of Ayub.  
 
The Yahya regime was prepared to risk relatively free elections because it anticipated 
a hung parliament and a fragmented political scene, especially in East Pakistan, leaving 
the military with a significant role as the king-maker and the wielder of real power.420 
Judging by the regime’s post-election interventions, it would not have allowed free 
elections if the results had been accurately predicted.421 The Legal Framework Order 
provided for elections which were initially scheduled for October 1970.422 The elected 
National Assembly would have 120 days within which to frame a new constitution. The 
regime disbanded the One Unit scheme restoring the four provinces in the western 
wing.423 A series of natural disasters in East Pakistan led to a delay in the elections. The 
regime’s slow relief response to the disaster further fuelled a feeling of neglect and 
resentment against a West Pakistan dominated state.424 In elections held in December 
1970 the Awami League won a landslide victory.425 Bhutto’s PPP also achieved an 
overwhelming electoral success in West Pakistan despite polling less than half the votes 
cast. Nonetheless, its 81 seats in the National Assembly would leave it far behind the 
Awami League and out of power.  
 
The Awami League could not only form a government without the support of any other 
party but could also frame a new constitution, which under the terms of the LFO 
required a simple majority. Further, the Awami League could also count on the support 
of minor parties from West Pakistan’s NWFP and Balochistan provinces where the PPP 
had gained little or no electoral support, and which parties supported the Awami 
League’s demand of greater devolution of powers to the provinces. Despite the clear 
electoral success of the Awami League, Bhutto nonetheless demanded an equal role in 
negotiations over the future constitution as the sole representative of West Pakistan. 
General Yahya called the National Assembly’s inaugural session in March 1971 to be 
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held in Dhaka but constitutional negotiations between the PPP and Awami League 
remained deadlocked. Yahya postponed the National Assembly session indefinitely 
under pressure from his military junta a mere two days before the scheduled date and 
even as the members had arrived in Dhaka. This was to be the final betrayal of East 
Pakistani expectations, the moment of irreparable break when demands for provincial 
autonomy transformed into a call for secession.426 Widespread protests in East Pakistan 
paralysed the civil administration and the Awami League effectively took over control 
of the province.  
 
In response, the Yahya regime launched a pre-planned military operation on 25 March 
1971 with an attack on Dhaka University and the massacre of Bengali intellectuals, 
professors and professionals ensued.427 This marked the dark beginning of a civil war, 
with an attritional guerrilla campaign by Mukti Bahini (the militia wing of the Awami 
League) in the hinterland’s tough terrain in which the West Pakistan dominated military 
effectively became an occupying force. As the guerrilla campaign reached a military 
stalemate in the monsoons and the junta refused to seek a political settlement, India 
militarily intervened citing the refugee influx from East Pakistan as justification. On 5 
December Indian troops crossed the border in a concerted campaign in East as well as 
West Pakistan. On 16 December 1971 the Pakistan Army humiliatingly surrendered 
93,000 soldiers and the control of East Pakistan to India. The surrender paved the way 
for the secession of East Pakistan and the emergence of the independent state of 
Bangladesh. A near-rebellion in the middle and junior officer ranks of the army in West 
Pakistan, who held the high command as responsible not only for the military debacle 
in the 1971 war but also the political situation which led to the dismemberment of 
Pakistan, compelled General Yahya to step down and hand over power to Bhutto. On 
20t December Bhutto was sworn in as President and the first civilian Chief Martial Law 
Administrator (CMLA) of what was left of Pakistan.  
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A Civilian Martial Law 
 
Bhutto not only inherited a military, diplomatic and political catastrophe – in some 
measure of his own making – but also an acute economic crisis.428 The PPP had been 
elected on the basis of a pro-poor manifesto and a socialist populism that had spread 
across Pakistan. As national growth plummeted, the PPP government embarked on a 
program of structural reforms in accordance with its socialist manifesto. Bhutto 
unleashed the first of several waves of nationalization of industry in 1972 and abolished 
the managing agency system that had enabled business families to become large 
conglomerates. Rather ingeniously, it was management that was taken over rather than 
assets and no compensation was paid.429 Foreign investment was, however, exempted 
from nationalization in this phase in the first of many difficult compromises with global 
capital. Labour reforms of 1972 also extended rights to workers in small scale industry 
even if at the cost of hurting an influential constituency in the Punjab.430 These 
measures were of immense symbolic significance as they indicated the new 
government’s resolve to act on its socialist program. In the longer term these measures 
were also necessary for the development of more efficient and egalitarian economic 
arrangements.  
 
However, the timing and manner of these reforms was problematic. The success of the 
nationalization program was over-estimated as several of the nationalized units were 
already suffering from losses and many had been stripped of assets in anticipation.431 
The resulting loss in investor confidence and flight of capital abroad undermined the 
prospects of economic stabilization.432 It appeared that the government suffered from 
some insecurity and was determined to push through as much of its agenda as possible 
in the Martial Law period when it had untrammelled power. Careful planning was thus 
foregone in the design and implementation of these challenging reforms.433 The lasting 
political legacy of these and further rounds of nationalization during Bhutto's tenure 
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was that Pakistan’s mercantile and industrial classes consolidated in opposition to the 
PPP government and played an important role both politically and financially in the 
protest movement that ultimately spelled its doom.434 
 
Bhutto’s much vaunted land reforms of 1972 followed a very different trajectory from 
the nationalization program.435 Despite reaping considerable political benefits for the 
populist government, they affected only nominal changes in ownership patterns and 
rural landlord-tenant relations.436 Extending the pattern of Ayub’s land reforms, the 
PPP government reduced ownership ceilings, provided greater protection to tenants, 
and transferred the liability for revenue payments and water rates to the landlord.437 
While some land in excess of the ceilings was taken over without compensation and 
visibly redistributed amongst landless tenants, large landlords mostly evaded land 
reforms by nominally transferring excess land in the name of multiple family members. 
Likewise, while the tenants got greater de jure rights and security from eviction, the 
landlords retained their influence over the revenue bureaucracy and police and hence 
de facto control over the land. The inability of land reforms to fundamentally alter 
agrarian relations is evidenced by and explains why, contrary to popular myths, PPP’s 
power throughout its tenure in the 1970s was rooted in alliances with large 
landowners.438 While the regime’s policies largely favored landowning classes, the 
economic condition of the poor also improved under Bhutto, even if not to the extent 
of the public perception that the government’s propaganda successfully cultivated.439 
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The middle classes were more often the losers, and this manifested in the middle class 
resentment against Bhutto and the PPP government.440  
 
The predominance of landed classes was not the only respect in which the basic 
structures of postcolonial politics remained intact despite the populist politics of the 
1970s. As Jalal notes, ‘the post-1971 Pakistani state structure was only marginally 
different from the one preceding it. The institutional imbalance within the state 
remained substantially unchanged despite the assumption of presidential office by an 
elected leader.’441 While Bhutto was nervous about the machinations of the military and 
the bureaucracy, he did not strive for parliamentary and judicial checks but instead 
sought to strengthen his own power as a civilian dictator.442 The virtual collapse of the 
army’s structure and morale in the 1971 war gave Bhutto a position of unprecedented 
power.443 The military command which still envisioned a political role for itself despite 
the East Pakistan debacle was quickly subdued through changes in the command 
structure, dismissal of army and air chiefs and purges of both opponents and former 
patrons in the military command.444 Substantial military expenditure, the recognition of 
Bangladesh, and the successful negotiation of the Simla Agreement with India, 
resulting amongst other things in the return of the prisoners of war, yielded Bhutto 
considerable leverage with and support within the military.445  
 
The other potential source of resistance to the government’s agenda, the bureaucracy, 
had its powers whittled down permanently in the Bhutto years. The bureaucracy also 
underwent purges designed to inculcate loyalty. In March 1972, soon after taking over 
as CMLA, Bhutto compulsorily retired 1,303 bureaucrats including a number of senior 
officials.446 Bhutto also appointed several retired bureaucrats and police officials of the 
Ayub-era, with whom he had developed personal ties, to key positions.447 
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Administrative reforms in 1973 made several far-reaching changes in the service 
structure of the bureaucracy that were long overdue.448 The CSP was finally abolished 
and all cadres of the public services were merged into the All Pak Unified Grades, 
allowing for movement of personnel between the different service groups.449 In another 
significant measure, lateral entry into the services was opened up for the first time. The 
1973 Constitution withdrew protections and security of tenure that had historically been 
granted the civil service. Officers of any rank could be retired at the government’s 
discretion after 25 years of service. The increase in recruitment to the public services, 
lateral entry, and the ease of dismissal or transfers to undesired postings made the 
bureaucracy susceptible to political influence at all levels.450 However, Bhutto’s 
administrative reforms were also contradictory in that while they undermined the power 
of specific bureaucratic offices they increased the corporate and collective power of 
bureaucracy as the public economic sector expanded dramatically.451 Nationalization 
and the resulting bureaucratic management of state run corporations increased the space 
for political patronage of the bureaucracy.452 
 
Having undercut potential threats from the military and the bureaucracy, Bhutto 
focused on the political opposition and dissension within his own party. The political 
opposition was fragmented and had limited presence within the legislature. However, 
there were a number of ideological and regional factions in the PPP which could 
possibly lead to a break-up of the party and the loss of Bhutto’s control over the 
National Assembly.453 Bhutto created a new paramilitary organization, the Federal 
Security Force (FSF), which was designed to curb unrest and minimize the need to call 
in the army in aid of civil powers.454 The FSF was used to not only harass the opposition 
but also to quell dissent within Bhutto’s own party. Political violence, murders, and 
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detentions became a regular feature of the PPP’s tenure from its very inception.455 By 
1972, when the Martial Law period of Bhutto’s rule neared an end and the promise of 
a political constitution finally dawned in a re-configured and dismembered Pakistan, 
Bhutto had reinforced the structures of postcolonial authoritarianism in a manner that 
would endure, despite the parliamentary and democratic form of the future constitution. 
 
THE FRAMING OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION AND THE MYTHOLOGY 
OF CONSENSUS  
 
Constitutionalizing Elective Dictatorship 
 
Bhutto preferred a presidential constitution and could have framed one.456 The PPP had 
a substantial majority in the National Assembly, the powers of a Martial Law, and a 
democratic mandate to promulgate a constitution on its own. The left wing of the PPP 
that held greater influence in the Martial Law years also pushed for a centralization of 
powers that was needed to effectively implement its progressive socio-economic 
agenda. Such a presidential constitution would have better reflected the realities of 
political power in the postcolonial state and, like Ayub's 1962 Constitution, would have 
at least had the virtue of transparency. However, Bhutto desired the legitimacy of a 
consensus constitution and correctly anticipated that the opposition would insist on a 
parliamentary framework. Initial negotiations with the opposition were promising as a 
compromise on an interim constitution was reached in March 1972. In a display of 
accommodation, the PPP acknowledged the right of opposition parties, the National 
Awami Party (NAP) and the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), to form provincial 
governments in Balochistan and the NWFP. The PPP also agreed to consult with the 
provincial governments on the appointment of governors in these provinces and 
promised to hold local government elections to replace the disbanded Basic Democracy 
scheme. 
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The Interim Constitution was passed by the National Assembly in April 1972 and paved 
the way for the lifting of the Martial Law.  In a surreal acknowledgement of the 
continuing structures of authoritarianism, the Interim Constitution was based on the 
Government of India Act, 1935 model with presidential form in the centre and a 
parliamentary form in the provinces. Bhutto had successfully used the threat of the 
indefinite continuation of Martial Law to cajole the opposition into accepting an 
authoritarian Interim Constitution. The National Assembly would act as the constituent 
assembly and set up a committee to draft the permanent constitution. Despite the 
relatively smooth beginnings of constitutional negotiations, disagreement and distrust 
began to appear. Negotiations over the permanent constitution broke down as Bhutto 
insisted on a more authoritarian framework that would ensure the continued 
centralization of power. Not only did the opposition insist on parliamentary form and 
provincial autonomy, even Bhutto’s own law minister broke ranks and resigned. Bhutto 
had genuine if not necessarily legitimate concerns with regard to provincial autonomy 
and the weakening of the central government. Firstly, there was a concern that Punjab 
would undermine central authority given the relative size of its population and 
economy.457 Secondly, Bhutto feared that in the absence of a strong central government 
the military would reassert its political power.  
 
An accord on the future constitution was reached between the PPP and the opposition 
parties in October 1972 when Bhutto relented and conceded in principle on a 
parliamentary form, a bi-cameral legislature, provincial autonomy and Islamic 
provisions in return for some personal safeguards to ensure against a rebellion within 
his own party.458 As the constitution committee began giving concrete shape to the 
accord a number of disagreements on the specifics persisted. The passage of a 
consensus constitution became an even more distant possibility when in February 1973 
Bhutto replaced the opposition-nominated Governors of Balochistan and NWFP, 
dismissed the NAP-JUI government in Balochistan, imprisoned the opposition’s 
provincial leaders and began a military operation that at its peak would involve the 
deployment of more than a hundred thousand troops against the sparse population of 
that province.459 The NAP-JUI government of NWFP resigned in solidarity, the united 
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opposition proposed a host of amendments to the Constitution Bill in the National 
Assembly and threatened to boycott proceedings until these were conceded. And yet, 
rather surprisingly, the opposition soon reached a settlement on the constitution giving 
up most of its demands.  
 
On 12 April 1973 the Constitution passed the National Assembly with the support of 
125 out of its 133 members. The absence of dissent in parliament would lead to the 
mythology of a consensus constitution. The reality was one of an opposition showing 
remarkable pragmatism. The opposition saw the 1973 Constitution, despite its defects, 
as the preferable means of somewhat reducing Bhutto’s power with the hope that in the 
long run defections within his own party would undermine his authoritarian rule.460 
Bhutto, the master tactician that he was, had again used threat of the indefinite operation 
of the Interim Constitution in the Government of India Act mould to persuade the 
opposition into accepting a permanent Constitution that was parliamentary in form 
only, and vague in its assurances of provincial autonomy and rights guarantees. 
However, despite its defects, for the first time Pakistan had a constitution framed by a 
directly-elected assembly which provided for parliamentary governance through a bi-
cameral legislature with a popularly elected lower house and an upper house with equal 
representation of the federating units. The Prime Minister was the head of the executive 
in the new constitutional scheme and Bhutto occupied that office after relinquishing the 
presidency. The President was a mere figurehead bound to act solely on the advice of 
the Prime Minister.461  
 
During the constitutional negotiations Bhutto had demanded a provision ensuring that 
the Prime Minister may be removed only by a two-third majority in a vote of no-
confidence. While the opposition refused that demand, as a compromise it had agreed 
that for a period of 10 years or two parliamentary terms the vote of a member cast 
against the majority of his/her party would be disregarded.462 This shielded Bhutto from 
a rebellion within his own party and made him practically irremovable until the next 
elections.463 Provincial autonomy provisions were included in the Constitution but were 
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weak and were honoured more in their breach than in their observance.464 The 
opposition had grudgingly accepted a wide concurrent list of subject matters on which 
both the federal and provincial legislatures could legislate, with the former having 
precedence in case of a clash.465 A Council of Common Interests (CCI) was envisaged 
to decide upon matters of inter-provincial concern, especially the historically 
contentious allocation of water resources between the provinces.466 However, only one 
meeting of the CCI was held throughout the PPP’s tenure indicating that Bhutto had 
nominally agreed to its creation in order to reach an agreement on the Constitution 
without any intent to implement the relevant provisions.467 The central government and 
provincial governors also had vast emergency powers.468  
 
The Constitution entrenched justiciable fundamental rights and any laws inconsistent 
with or in derogation of these rights were to be void.469 While the 1973 Constitution 
expanded the rights guarantees provided in the previous constitutions, these remained 
subject to broad restrictions. There was no provision guaranteeing due process of law 
or natural justice. The assurance that no one ‘shall be deprived of life or liberty save in 
accordance with law’ hinted at the minimalist condition that legal rather than extra-
legal means were to be adopted for such deprivation.470 Understandably the PPP 
government sought to protect its land reforms and nationalization programs, and 
property rights had to be diluted to that extent.471 However, the text of other rights 
provisions also explicitly permitted curtailment.  Most notable was the allowance for 
preventive detention of ‘persons acting in a manner prejudicial to the integrity, security 
or defence of Pakistan ... or public order’ for an initial period of one month.472 Reasons 
for the detention were required to be furnished to the detained within a week, and the 
continuation of the detention beyond the one-month period could only be sanctioned by 
a Review Board appointed by and consisting of superior court judges. Important civil 
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and political rights including freedom of assembly and association were similarly 
subject to ‘reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of public order.’473 
The freedom of speech was subject to the broadest possible restrictions ‘imposed by 
law in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan 
or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or 
morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.’474 
 
In recognition of the well-established Writ jurisdiction, and arguably assured by the 
courts’ historical and contemporaneous promise of restraint, the Constitution used 
dramatically expansive language in defining the judicial review jurisdictions of the 
superior courts. By and large the text of precedent provisions in the 1956 and 1962 
Constitutions was retained. The High Courts were granted the power to make orders in 
the nature of the prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus 
and quo warranto without using the Latin phraseology, as in the 1962 Constitution.475 
The High Courts were also given a residuary power to ‘make an order giving such 
directions to any person or authority, including any Government ... as may be 
appropriate for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights.’476 Likewise, the 
1973 Constitution followed the earlier constitutional texts in retaining the Supreme 
Court’s 'Original jurisdiction' – under which cases could be heard directly by the 
Supreme Court rather than on appeal – to pass declaratory judgments in inter-
governmental disputes.477 The court was also granted a residuary power to ‘issue such 
directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice.’478 
However, it also dramatically expanded the Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
by granting it the power to directly issue orders or directions of the kind that the High 
Courts may issue in exercise of their Writ jurisdiction, if it considered that ‘a question 
of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental 
Rights’ had arisen.479  
                                                 
473 Articles 16, 17, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. 
474 Article 19, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan 
475 Article 199, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. Article 98, 1962 Constitution of Pakistan, had defined 
the Writ Jurisdiction in very similar terms.  
476 Article 22, 1956 Constitution of Pakistan, had granted the courts powers to ‘issue directions, orders 
or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and 
certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights.’ 
477 Article 184(1), (2), 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. 
478 Article 187(1), 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. 
479 Article 184(3), 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. 
  134
 
While conceptually the judicial review jurisdictions of the superior courts had been 
expanded, the Constitution simultaneously sought to exclude an historically important 
subject matter from the courts’ review.  Unlike the previous constitutions, the 1973 text 
did not include any protections for the security of tenure and conditions of service of 
the bureaucracy. This was in line with the government’s intent to undermine the 
insularity and independence of the CSP, and hence it was also necessary to exclude 
service matters from the purview of the superior courts. This was achieved by 
empowering the legislature to create administrative courts or tribunals with exclusive 
jurisdiction over these matters.480 Acts of parliament immediately provided for the 
creation of services tribunals at the federal and provincial levels, thereby excluding the 
High Courts from reviewing matters related to the appointment, transfers, disciplining 
and terms of employment of civil servants.481 
 
Judicial Opposition and the Contestation over Judicial Review 
 
Having successfully achieved a constitutional cover, the PPP government focused on 
potential challenges to its rule that could arise from the opposition political parties and 
the press.482 The Constitution and the command of an over-whelming majority in the 
National Assembly enabled Bhutto to neutralize resistance from the opposition and the 
press. It ingeniously used patently legal processes and the Constitution to achieve these 
ends.483 On the very day after the promulgation of the constitution Bhutto, now Prime 
Minister, obtained an order from a compliant president which continued the state of 
emergency that had been imposed in 1971 at the peak of the civil war in East Pakistan. 
The extension of emergency ensured that the fundamental rights provisions of the new 
constitution remained in suspension until the end of the Bhutto government.484  
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The government’s relationship with the judiciary had been fractious from the outset 
even though the courts appeared to subscribe to its claims of democratic legitimacy. In 
Asma Jilani the Supreme Court faced questions similar to ones it had cognizance of in 
the Dosso case.485 In addressing the validity of Martial Law instruments of the Yahya 
regime the court also pronounced upon the legality of the regime itself.486 While it did 
not formally reverse Dosso, the court jettisoned the doctrine of revolutionary legality 
and declared General Yahya Khan a usurper. In dismantling revolutionary legality, 
however, the court did not completely undo the theoretical groundings of the juridical 
recognition of de facto power. It whittled revolutionary legality down to a narrower 
doctrine of state necessity and created a distinction between validity and legitimacy. 
For a regime to be valid it must have effective control over power as well as legitimacy. 
The Yahya regime had efficacy but not legitimacy and was hence illegal according to 
the Supreme Court. Yahya Khan had stepped down before the Supreme Court’s 
decision, but the legality of the Martial Law was by no means a dead issue. Bhutto’s 
Martial Law regime and the Interim Constitution arrangement were direct successors 
of Yahya’s Martial Law regime and the government perceived the case as a challenge 
to its own legality. It was Bhutto’s Attorney-General who defended Yahya’s Martial 
Law in proceedings before the Supreme Court, at the same time as the administration 
was engaged in heated negotiations with the opposition over the permanent 
constitution.487 The court found that Bhutto's administration, in notable contrast to 
Yahya's, had democratic legitimacy and its actions including the adoption of the Interim 
Constitution, were thus held to be valid. 
 
Another key issue in Asma Jilani and the subsequent case of Zia-ur-Rahman was the 
role of the court and its place in the state structure. As in earlier eras of transition, the 
courts appeared to be negotiating their position in postcolonial governance. While 
granting claims of validity and legitimacy, and in return for avowing a confinement to 
procedural legality, the courts demanded the preservation of their core jurisdiction. In 
Zia-ur-Rahman, when the courts dealt with another challenge to detentions under 
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Martial Law regulations dating back to the Yahya regime, the Lahore High Court 
bravely pronounced that there was no basis for substituting ‘civilian laws and Courts 
by military orders and Courts’ ‘when the courts are open and functioning effectively.’488 
On appeal, the Supreme Court effectively weighed in on constitution-formation, which 
was simultaneously being negotiated, and defined its role in terms of formal rule of 
law.489 It disavowed any stake in regulating politics or policy, again acknowledged the 
democratic legitimacy of Bhutto’s interim administration, and heralded the 
preeminence of an elected legislature under the future constitutional scheme. The court, 
nonetheless, narrowly read Article 281 of the Interim Constitution, which purported to 
validate all actions of the Yahya Martial Law regime, and held detentions under Martial 
Law regulations and the decisions of military courts to be reviewable. This was not 
merely a rhetorical pronouncement. In several cases in the first years of the new 
Constitution the superior courts tried to use procedural legality to challenge the use of 
coercive laws and special tribunals, just as they had done in the constitutional interlude 
of the Ayub era.  
 
However, the courts were fighting a lost cause as the government used its claim to 
democratic legitimacy and a supra-majority in the National Assembly to achieve 
precisely what the High Court in Zia-ur-Rahman had hoped would not be done: the 
substitution of civilian law and courts by security laws and tribunals. Seven 
amendments to the Constitution, made between May 1974 and May 1977, progressively 
curtailed the Writ jurisdiction, undermined the superior courts’ authority and 
independence, and whittled the already weak rights guarantees of the Constitution. The 
First Amendment allowed the government to ban political parties ‘operating in a 
manner prejudicial to the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan’ subject to the review of 
the Supreme Court, and excluded the cases of civilians prosecuted under the Army Act 
and other military laws from the Writ jurisdiction.490 The Second Amendment, the only 
one supported by the opposition, declared Ahmadis to be non-Muslims.491 The Third 
Amendment enlarged the executive’s powers by expanding the grounds of preventive 
detention and increased the initial term to three months.492 The Fourth Amendment 
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curtailed the Writ jurisdiction in cases of preventive detention and disabled the courts 
from granting bail or prohibiting such detention.493 The Fifth Amendment further 
denuded the judicial review powers of the courts by ousting additional matters related 
to preventive detention from their jurisdiction, removed their power to punish for 
contempt and fixed the tenures of the Chief Justices of the superior courts, presumably 
with the intent to remove the Chief Justice of a High Court.494 The Sixth Amendment, 
which extended the terms of Chief Justices of the superior courts beyond the retirement 
age if their fixed tenures had not been completed, was designed to extend the term of 
the incumbent Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.495 This was the first instance of a 
government, military or civilian, directly interfering with tenures of Chief Justices. 
 
The scope of security laws put in place during military rule was expanded even further 
under Bhutto.  The Defence of Pak Rules (DPR), enforced during the 1969-1971 
national crisis, were not only retained throughout the PPP government’s tenure but were 
amended by the National Assembly in 1976 to grant the special tribunals constituted 
under this law exclusive jurisdiction to try cases.496 In addition, a number of new laws 
were enacted to enhance the government’s capacity to coercively suppress ethno-
regional dissidence, particularly in Balochistan.497 The enforcement of these security 
laws against political opponents and dissidents dragged the courts into political 
wranglings they had sought to avoid. Whereas the government used prosecution under 
the security laws in an unprecedented number of cases to suppress political dissent, the 
opposition increasingly relied on habeas corpus and other writ petitions to challenge 
the use of these laws. The balance of power between the executive and the petitioners 
was unambiguously and disproportionately unequal.  
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Having already defined their role in terms of positivist-procedural legality and having 
recognized the primacy of the elected government and legislature in the new 
constitutional scheme, all the courts could initially offer were rhetorical cautions 
against the arbitrary exercise of governmental power and occasional relief when the 
executive had not even bothered to comply with highly permissive statutes.498 In F.B. 
Ali, the Supreme Court refused to question the trial of civilians under the Army Act, 
acknowledged the power of the legislature to exempt emergency laws from compliance 
with fundamental rights, and accepted the ouster of the courts’ jurisdiction under the 
First Amendment.499 In a characteristic display of positivist jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court disavowed any principle or source of power beyond the text of the constitution 
to strike down a validly enacted provision. Nonetheless, in Habiba Jilani, a petition 
challenging the detention of an opposition member of a provincial assembly, the High 
Court did not invalidate the detention but held that the procedural safeguards as to arrest 
and detention provided by Article 10 could not be suspended by an emergency 
proclamation.500 In Manzoor Elahi the Supreme Court affirmed the position that 
Articles 4 and 9 of the Constitution – providing for deprivation of liberty in accordance 
with law – also remained in operation during a state of emergency.501 As such, the 
Supreme Court consolidated a minimal rule of law and procedural review jurisdiction 
even when substantive fundamental rights provisions were under suspension.502  
 
In the next stage, the courts pushed at the boundaries between procedural and 
substantive review. In several cases the High Courts began to closely examine the 
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grounds of detention and not just the manner of it.503 Faced with such resistance from 
the courts, the state was forced to find more innovative and nuanced legal strategies for 
incarcerating opponents rather than merely relying on preventive detention orders. 
Essentially the old technique of instituting fabricated criminal charges, overlaying them 
with detention orders under multiple security laws, and fastidiously meeting the 
procedural formalities proved successful. In Ghulam Jilani for example, the 
government successfully detained leading Baluch opposition figures for more than 
three years during the pendency of a Writ petition.504 This brought the courts to a hard 
choice between questioning the validity of security laws on some supra-constitutional 
grounds, or retreat.  Having already defined their role in terms of positivist-procedural 
legality and having recognized the primacy of the elected government and legislature 
in the new constitutional scheme, substantive review of security legislations was a step 
too far. All the courts could thus demand was ‘the strict performance of all functions 
and duties laid down by law’ and offer occasional relief when the executive had not 
even bothered to comply with basic procedural formalities.505 While this set up some 
obstacles before an oppressive rule by law under an elected dictatorship, ultimately it 
only ensured the deprivation of ‘liberty ... in accordance with law.’  
 
The courts’ role in this formally democratic but substantively authoritarian form of 
postcolonial governance went beyond a mere inability to challenge the abuse of the 
coercive powers of the state. At particular moments the courts also betrayed a certain 
degree of complicity in the hegemonic ideation of the nation-state that perceived any 
demands of decentralization and devolution of political and economic powers as 
seditious and anti-state. To this extent, the lessons of the East Pakistan debacle had been 
equally lost on the judiciary, the elected executive and the military. Given that political 
opposition to the central government overwhelmingly came from political parties and 
movements that were demanding provincial autonomy and decentralization of state 
power, the courts’ commitment to formal rule of law was further tested. This complicity 
in the structuring of the postcolonial state became explicit when in 1975 the government 
banned the NAP and filed a reference before the Supreme Court seeking the dissolution 
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of the opposition party in accordance with the First Amendment. Despite the absence 
of concrete evidence of a secessionist agenda, the court granted a declaration of 
dissolution.506 What was even more problematic was that rather than merely confining 
itself to questions regarding the capacity of the government to effect such a dissolution 
and the requisite evidentiary thresholds, the court assumed for itself the power to decide 
the merits of the dissolution.  
 
This decision was thus very much in continuation of the tradition of Maulvi Tamizuddin 
Khan, the Governor-General’s Reference and Dosso: the court acquiesced in the 
demands of the authoritarian executive while simultaneously reinforcing its own 
jurisdiction. In the immediate aftermath of the Reference decision and relying upon it, 
the government created a special tribunal to prosecute NAP leaders as well as some 
PPP dissidents in the Hyderabad Conspiracy Case.507 The Hyderabad Conspiracy 
Case, just as the Agartala Conspiracy Case, remained inconclusive until the tribunal 
was disbanded by the successor regime but, nonetheless, symbolized the notable failure 
of the superior courts’ half-hearted attempt at diminishing the reliance on coercive 
security laws and special or military tribunals.508 It also signaled the ultimate denial of 
participatory politics, and inevitably pushed the opposition towards violent protest. The 
protests and Bhutto’s downfall came surprisingly swiftly.  
 
POSTCOLONIAL PAKISTAN: A REGIME OF COERCIVE LAWS 
 
When in January 1977 the PPP government announced elections to be held in March, 
it remained sufficiently popular to retain power. The government announced further 
land reforms in early 1977 in an effort to appeal to its core constituency amongst the 
rural poor while simultaneously giving party tickets to a relatively higher number of 
traditional candidates and large landowners than it had in the 1970 elections. The 
economy had begun to improve in the preceding year even though structural problems 
and the shadow of nationalization remained. Bhutto had also attempted to re-energize 
his constituencies in the urban areas through a visible appeal to Islam in 1976, or at 
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least had blunted the most vicious criticism of him by the religious right. All these 
factors contributed to a prevalent sense that the PPP would secure a majority in the 
National Assembly, even if somewhat reduced when compared to the party’s first 
tenure, despite the emergence of a unified opposition front. However, it was also 
evident that Bhutto again sought a supra-majority and campaigned for a change in the 
constitution that was his greatest political legacy to-date. Bhutto thus sought a mandate 
for a presidential constitution with a greater concentration of power in the central 
executive than the 1973 Constitutional had formally enabled.509  
 
The results of the 1977 election took everyone by surprise – the PPP was declared to 
have won a clear majority of the popular vote, and 155 out of the 200 seats in the 
National Assembly.510 This would have given Bhutto the power to reshape the 
Constitution as he desired. However, the PPP’s success had clearly been exaggerated 
through electoral malpractices and rigging.511 The opposition refused to accept the 
election results and large scale protests broke out in April 1977. While the PPP still 
retained the support of both urban poor and large landowners, it had alienated the urban 
middle and lower classes, which exhibited a disproportionate power to destabilize the 
government.512 On 5 July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of the Army Staff, affected 
a military coup citing the breakdown in law and order as justification, and promised the 
holding of free and fair elections within ninety days. The ease with which the military 
took over power once again, and retained its control of the state for another eleven years 
under Zia, revealed the extent to which the structures of postcolonial governance had 
remained intact despite the intervening period of civilian rule under Bhutto’s elective 
dictatorship. 
 
In the absence of democratic constitutionalism in the first three decades of Pakistan’s 
existence military and civilian governments had continued to use law for control, 
coercion and centralization of power. Martial Law regulations banned protests and 
demonstrations under threat of serious criminal penalties had been retained. Several 
draconian statutes passed during this phase of Pakistan’s history empowered the 
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executive to suppress dissent and ruthlessly crush opposition, even enabling 
discretionary detention for prolonged periods. The thana (police station), patwar (land 
registration and revenue administration) and kutchehri (lower courts) were utilized in a 
fashion similar to the techniques of control and cooptation refined during colonial rule: 
little effort was made at structural reforms beyond attempts at being seen to be reform-
oriented. Even the adoption of a constitution by a popularly elected assembly – after a 
period of tragic political turmoil, civil unrest, war and the dismemberment of Pakistan 
– did not fundamentally alter the nature and forms of postcolonial governance and the 
place of law therein. The elected Prime Minister ruled with an increasingly heavy hand, 
employing all of the tactics used previously by the country’s military rulers: Martial 
Law powers; emergency regulations empowering detention and harassment of 
dissenters; and the strategic use of criminal prosecutions as a means to suppress the 
opposition. ‘Although its ideological moorings’ and democratic credentials ‘might have 
suggested an attempt to triumph over the military state it inherited, the People’s Party 
government transformed itself instead, taking on the attributes of its martial law 
predecessors rather than changing the state structure.’513  
 
As the judiciary offered intermittent resistance, a malleable constitution and repression 
sanctioned by legislation provided the court with a weak playing field. While the 1973 
Constitution again entrenched justiciable fundamental rights, the very first amendments 
were designed to undermine the independence of the judiciary and to curtail its 
emerging rights jurisprudence. Every notable judicial decision on individual rights was 
met with accusations that the judiciary was overstepping its bounds and was anti-
democratic. Judicial resistance gradually whittled away in the face emergency laws and 
security tribunals. This was the proof of positivism – of the jurisprudence of legality 
sans legitimacy; constitutional law sans constitutionalism; insistence on procedural rule 
of law sans substantive rights – that the law itself was used to rule arbitrarily and 
ruthlessly. Such was the political and legal landscape when Zia took over power in 1977 




                                                 





ISLAMIZATION OF LAWS AND THE GENESIS OF SUBSTANTIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
With General Zia-ul-Haq’s coup d’état in July 1977 began another period of direct 
military rule in Pakistan. While many would trace the roots of praetorianism to General 
Ayub Khan’s martial law regime or even earlier,514 the military’s penetration into the 
state and society had remained limited to the vindication of its core corporate interests. 
The Ayub regime had controlled a bureaucratic state from the top, leaving its structures 
and powers intact. General Zia’s regime was fundamentally different and more martial 
in nature. Zia inherited an administrative state that was structurally weakened by the 
reforms of the Bhutto era, but at the same time functionally empowered by the large-
scale bureaucratization of the economy through nationalization. The military reinforced 
the cadres of the apex bureaucracy, inducting Army personnel in unprecedented 
numbers into the civil state structure, and fostered deep commonalities in training and 
outlook of the military and bureaucracy. A military-bureaucratic complex, in which the 
bureaucracy emerged as the junior but respectable partner, not only bolstered military 
rule but also remained an important source of the military’s continuing influence over 
foreign and national security domains long after the end of the Zia era.   
 
Despite excessive coercion in the early years of Martial Law, the regime could not fully 
suppress the political energy unleashed by the populism of the Bhutto era. The military 
relied upon a hegemonic ideation of religion – principally through the Islamization of 
laws – to curtail the space for political dissent.  It has become almost customary to 
describe the Zia regime’s political usage of Islam as a transparent ploy to win public 
legitimacy and support for military rule. The Islamization of state and laws did in fact 
legitimize the regime to the limited extent that broad segments of the population 
subscribed to the underlying impulse. However, this was not likely to translate into 
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active political backing for the regime. More directly, Islamization was used as a means 
to co-opt the conservative political parties that had been part of the movement against 
Bhutto and bring them within the government fold, thereby delaying the demand for 
new elections. At a deeper level, in a technique reminiscent of early colonial rule in 
India, Islamization was designed to disperse political energy through the privatization 
and localization of politics, and through the creation of new networks of influence that 
the regime could employ against its opponents.  Islamization was remarkably successful 
in achieving the regime’s purposes and, along with the holding of local government and 
parliamentary elections on a non-party basis, ensured that dissent and opposition never 
consolidated into a nationwide regime-threatening movement. The resulting re-
entrenchment of patronage-based politics was another lasting legacy of the Zia regime. 
 
Islam was also used to bolster a nationalist discourse addressed to the problem of 
regionalism.515 However, in this respect Islamization achieved only partial success. 
Whereas previously the provincialization of politics in Pakistan could be analysed in 
terms of conflicts between the elites of various regions – between Bengali and Punjabi 
elites, for example –516 the conflicts now transformed into population-level ethno-
linguistic and regional faultlines. Rural Sindh and southern Punjab, which remained the 
core constituency of Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) throughout the Zia era, 
were specifically marginalized. Balochistan and the tribal areas of the north-west had 
never been incorporated into the nation state’s design. Islamization, in fact, super-
imposed further sectarian tensions on these ethnic and regional faultlines.  However, 
large segments of the populations of north-central Punjab and the settled parts of 
NWFP, and not merely the elites, increasingly bought into to this religio-nationalist 
ideology.  Arguably this was more a consequence of unintended shifts in the political 
economy which resulted in the trickling down of greater benefits to these ethnic groups. 
Nonetheless, the support of broad sections of Punjabi and Pashtun society bolstered the 
praetorian state.  It is this confluence of deep-state, hegemonic ideology and cooptation 
of important segments of society that defined praetorian governmentality as distinct 
from the forms of postcolonial governance that preceded it.517 
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The consolidation of praetorian governmentality not only ravaged Pakistan’s socio-
political landscapes but also provided the impetus for a fundamental restructuring of 
the foundations of law.  Islamization in particular compelled the superior courts to re-
orient their public law jurisprudence in ways that have not been fully appreciated even 
now. The unsettling consequences of Islamization were felt most directly in Pakistan’s 
out-dated criminal justice system.  Islamization exacerbated the rule of difference 
embedded in the postcolonial legal system and opened up new possibilities for the abuse 
of law for coercion and harassment not only by the state but also local elites, especially 
in the rural hinterlands. Islamization also created tensions between the different parts 
of the legal system by creating jurisdictional conflicts and doctrinal confusion – 
between the lower court hierarchy and the superior courts; between the old appellate 
courts and the new Shariat courts. However, Islamization also enabled the superior 
courts to re-orient their public law jurisprudence and utilize Islamic legality to bolster 
their legitimacy. Pakistan’s appellate courts learnt to capitalize on this new rhetoric and 
indigenized mode of thinking about law to challenge the ideas of procedural legality 
that had continued to constrain them. In Islam the superior courts found the normative 
grounding for a substantive constitutionalism and due process beyond the text of the de 
jure Constitution. This was a discourse which even a military regime was forced to 
grudgingly respect and provided the superior courts with the anchoring to affect gradual 
but fundamental changes in the institutional balance of powers within the state.   
 
ISLAMIZATION AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF PRAETORIAN 
GOVERNMENTALITY 
 
State Necessity and Judicial Review 
 
At the time of the military takeover, General Zia-ul-Haq initially appeared to be a 
‘reluctant coup-maker’ whose hand had been forced by the protest movement as well 
                                                 
statecraft which involve the use of legitimating idioms, rhetoric and discourses, and not just 
governmental institutions – bureaucracy, military, police and law – to create conditions in which the 
‘identification of interests’ and ideologies operate ‘to ensure that the new rights-bearing and self-
governing subjects do as they ought.’ It creates altered relations between the rulers and the ruled in 
which the focus is relatively less on coercion and law, and more on ‘the emergence of a new field for 
producing effects of power – the new, self-regulating field of the social.’ See David Scott, ‘Colonial 
Governmentality’ (1995) 43 Social Text 191, 203. 
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as pressure from the officer cadres of the military.518 Prime Minister Bhutto, who had 
been placed under 'protective custody' on 5 July 1977, was released two weeks later 
and fresh general elections were scheduled for October.  Bhutto announced that the PPP 
would contest these elections and held large public rallies upon his release from 
custody, demonstrating his continuing popularity. Election preparations were 
underway, electoral rolls and nomination of candidates had proceeded smoothly, but 
General Zia announced the postponement of elections in order to hold the Bhutto 
government 'accountable' for its actions. The postponement of elections was supported 
by the anti-PPP coalition, which foresaw the likelihood of Bhutto’s return to power and 
a consequent backlash against the opposition parties, and the classes from which they 
derived their support.519 The promise of elections bought the military regime vital space 
in its early days as even the PPP was lured by this tactic and avoided outright 
confrontation with the regime.520 Soon after the postponement of the elections, 
however, the regime issued Martial Law regulations banning all political activity and 
imposed serious penalties for dissent.521 Exemplary punishments such as public 
hangings and lashings were thus introduced long before the Islamization agenda 
unfolded.522 
 
Having effectively managed the early and most precarious phase of military rule 
through the promise of elections and strategic repression, the Martial Law regime began 
consolidating its hold on power. The first step was by then a familiar one. The Laws 
(Continuance in Force) Order, issued concurrently with the proclamation of Martial 
Law, placed the 1973 Constitution in abeyance and stated that the country would be 
governed as nearly as possible under the provisions of the suspended Constitution. In 
Nusrat Bhutto, the Supreme Court refused to entertain a petition challenging the 
                                                 
518 Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan’s Politics: The Zia Years (Konark Publishers, 1991) 111. Contra 
Noman, above n 185, 118. 
519 Craig Baxter, ‘Restructuring the political System’ in Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter (eds), 
Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia-ul-Haq (Westview Press, 1991) 31.  
520 Noman, above n 185, 120. 
521 Baxter, above n 518, 32; Noman, above n 185, 122. 
522 Noman, above n 185, 122-4. Also, see Mushahid Hussain, above n 517, 113; Shahid Javed Burki, 
‘Zia’s Eleven Years’ in Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter (eds), Pakistan under the Military: 
Eleven Years of Zia-ul-Haq (Westview Press, 1991) 2. Notably, however, the Martial Law regime of 
General Zia not only used state apparatuses to quell dissent but also employed the political opposition 
to the PPP, in particular the student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, to counter anti-regime protests. Saeed 
Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto (Westview 
Press, 1997) 196-97.  
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promulgation of Martial Law and subversion of the constitution under its Original 
jurisdiction.523 In its decision against the maintainability of the petition the court gave 
credence to the fact that the Constitution had only been placed in abeyance and had not 
been abrogated. While the court refused to resurrect the Dosso case and the doctrine of 
revolutionary legality, which would have granted the military regime unfettered 
capacity to engineer a new governance arrangement, it also distinguished the Asma 
Jilani case on facts.  
 
The court invoked an expanded version of the doctrine of state necessity to grant the 
military regime the authority to promulgate any laws that could be passed by a 
legislature under the 1973 Constitution and to undertake executive measures necessary 
to achieve the ‘declared objectives of the proclamation of Martial Law, namely, 
restoration of law and order, and … the earliest possible holding of free and fair 
elections.’524 It found that protests against rigged elections had in fact created a scenario 
in which the military was compelled to take over power for a limited duration in order 
to restore order and hold fresh elections. The court also held that the superior courts 
would ‘continue to have the power of judicial review to judge the validity of any 
[legislative] act or [executive] action of the Martial Law Authorities, if challenged, in 
the light of the principle underlying the law of necessity.’525 The Supreme Court thus 
provided the military regime of General Zia with conditional authority to govern the 
country so long as the declared state of necessity persisted. While the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Nusrat Bhutto was generally seen as validation of Martial Law, it was also 
a partial setback for the military regime as the court claimed the jurisdiction to decide 
whether an action was within the ‘law of necessity’ or not.526  
 
                                                 
523 Begum Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of the Army Staff and federation of Pakistan, PLD 1977 Supreme 
Court 657. 
524 Ibid. 
525 It is notable that the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977 had in fact expanded the writ 
jurisdiction by nullifying all changes to Article 199 made by the Bhutto-led parliament, with the 
exception of the First Amendment’s prohibition on review of matters related to military personnel 
which was retained. See Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977, Clause 2(1)(b). 
526 Baxter, above n 518, 34. Sheikh Anwarul Haq, former Chief Justice who headed the Supreme Court 
bench in Nusrat Bhutto, denounced the subsequent constitutional changes made in 1985 and stated that 
the court had thought that martial law would be a temporary arrangement designed to restore law, order 
and democracy. See Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making (Oxford University Press, 
1986) 91.  
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It was not so much the Nusrat Bhutto decision but the subsequent trial of Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto that gave the military regime the political space to entrench praetorian rule. 
Bhutto’s conviction in March 1978 for conspiracy to murder an opposition politician, 
in a failed attempt that led instead to the killing of his father, was exceptional on several 
counts. The trial was held directly before the Lahore High Court whose Chief Justice 
was widely perceived as antagonistic to the former prime minister. Principal evidence 
against Bhutto consisted of 'approver testimony' by Federal Security Force (FSF) 
officials which was likely to have been coerced.  The High Court not only convicted 
Bhutto for conspiracy to commit murder based on such questionable evidence but, in 
clear disregard of established precedent and judicial norms, sentenced him to death.527 
The Lahore High Court’s decision was widely seen as problematic and it was expected 
that the Supreme Court would either overturn the conviction or, in the least, reduce the 
sentence to life imprisonment. In February 1979, however, the Supreme Court denied 
Bhutto’s appeal after a prolonged and fractious trial which also suffered from notable 
procedural impropriety. The court not only upheld the conviction but also the sentence 
of capital punishment.528 On 4 April 1979, Bhutto was hung in Rawalpindi jail. The 
ethnic make-up of the Supreme Court (four out of the seven members of the bench that 
decided to maintain capital punishment were Punjabi) and its decision along ethno-
linguistic lines cast a long and dark shadow over Pakistan’s legal and political terrain. 
 
By end 1979 the Zia regime began consolidating praetorian governmentality. Zia had 
again announced general elections scheduled for November 1979 immediately after 
Bhutto’s hanging, but these too were cancelled at the last moment.529 The Martial Law 
regime began directly incorporating the political opposition to the PPP into the 
governance arrangement through minor ministerial appointments and advisory 
positions in the federal and provincial governments. Without the support of the political 
right the Zia regime would have remained on thin ice. Unlike General Ayub Khan, Zia 
had taken power from a popularly elected government and the military had lost much 
of its prestige and public support in the process. However, the cooptation of the political 
                                                 
527 State v Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, PLD 1978 Lahore 523. 
528 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto v State, PLD 1979 Supreme Court 53. The court subsequently unanimously 
dismissed a review petition on the basis that the sentence could not be altered upon review. Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto v State, PLD 1979 Supreme Court 741. See Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History 
of Pakistan, above n 46, 336-40. 
529 Baxter, above n 518, 33.  
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right was bound to be an interim arrangement as the demands for holding general 
elections and relinquishing power to elected politicians persisted. The military regime 
adopted a technique from the Ayub era of diffusing some of this political pressure and 
undermining both the PPP and the anti-PPP political parties. The local government 
system of the Ayub regime was resurrected with significant modifications in an attempt 
to further fragment the political sphere as well create a new breed of loyal politicians 
through direct patronage. While the creation of local government structures 
necessitated the devolution of some functions and limited powers to this level, real 
control of local bodies remained with the district bureaucracy which, like in the Ayub 
era, acted as ‘a surrogate political party.’530 Many of the new local body members had 
little or no prior political experience and remained dependent on access to the military 
regime and the bureaucracy to secure benefits and services for their constituents.531 
Nonetheless, the results of the local body elections in September 1979 confirmed 
continuing support for the PPP despite Bhutto’s execution, which was disconcerting 
both for the military regime as well as the coalition of conservative and religious 
political parties which had opposed Bhutto. 
 
Unlike the Ayub regime, Zia did not distance the military from the executive and 
continued to involve military personnel in regular governance functions. This created 
unprecedented strains, especially as charges of misconduct, abuse of authority and 
corruption against Martial Law authorities began to appear before the courts. During 
their first experience of Martial Law from 1958-1962, the superior courts had navigated 
the treacherous transition from direct to indirect military rule by relying on a clear 
distinction between constitutional and administrative law. Whereas the courts had 
enabled the Ayub regime to create a new constitutional arrangement and desisted from 
judicial review of legislation, they had retained the Writ jurisdiction and the capacity 
to undertake judicial review of executive action. This had avoided a direct confrontation 
between the courts and the military. However, the much greater involvement of the 
military in executive and judicial functions of the Martial Law regime under Zia, 
                                                 
530 Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, above n 528, 99. 
531 Robert LaPorte Jr, ‘Administrative Restructuring During the Zia Period’ in Shahid Javed Burki and 
Craig Baxter (eds), Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia-ul-Haq (Westview Press, 1991) 
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especially extensive use of Martial Law regulations and military tribunals, rendered 
even the writ jurisdiction a contested terrain.  
 
It was arguably the courts’ extended interaction with the Bhutto government’s heavy 
handed use of security and detention laws that contributed at least partially to the lack 
of sympathy they displayed to the overthrow of the Bhutto government by General Zia. 
However, the blatant abuse of Martial Law regulations to suppress political dissent 
caused dismay amongst the courts which had sanctioned the military takeover on the 
grounds of state necessity. The unprecedented level of involvement of the military in 
the administration of justice through the extensive use of military courts and tribunals 
caused direct tensions with the judiciary. The Writ jurisdiction of the High Courts 
emerged as a site of low level judicial resistance to Martial Law.532 The difficulty for 
the court was that the proclamation of Martial Law had suspended all Fundamental 
Rights, including Article 10, which provided safeguards against arrest and detention.533  
The court, nonetheless, examined the grounds on which the detainees had been held 
and found their continuing incarceration to be unwarranted. In several cases the High 
Court then invoked their precedents on the application of the Security of Pakistan Acts 
to bear on preventive detentions under Martial Law and found the detentions to be 
unmerited.534 Furthermore, the courts also challenged the use of Army Act to try 
civilians for protesting against the Martial Law regime, refusing to equate such actions 
                                                 
532 In Mumtaz Ali Bhutto a larger bench of the Sindh High Court examined the petition of two PPP 
stalwarts who had been in near-continuous detention since the proclamation of Martial Law and noted 
that preventive detention was ‘an issue of gravest constitutional importance.’ Mumtaz Ali Bhutto v. 
Deputy Martial Law Administrator, Sector 1, Karachi, PLD 1979 Karachi 307. Earlier, in Mumtaz Ali 
Bhutto v. Deputy Martial Law Administrator, PLD 1979 Karachi 125, the court had asserted its 
jurisdiction to review preventive detentions but had validated the detention order.  
533 Martial Law Order No. 12, 1977, provided for the detention of a person in order to prevent them 
‘from acting in any manner prejudicial to the purposes for which the Martial Law was proclaimed, and 
the maintenance of peaceful conditions in Pakistan.’ Initially only the CMLA could authorize such 
detention. Martial Law Order No. 24, 1977 empowered any martial law Administrator to issue a 
detention order. Martial Law Order No. 55, 1977, restricted the maximum term of a detention order to 
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extended the maximum term of successive orders to 2 years. 
534 See, eg, Akhtar v. Deputy Martial Law Administrator, Sector 2, Hyderabad, PLD 1979 Karachi 680 
[boycotting of classes by students not prejudicial conduct]; Mahmood Alam Khan v. Chief Martial Law 
Administrator, PLD 1979 Lahore 53 [absence of objective grounds of detention];  Nasreen Rao Abdul 
Rashid v. District Magistrate, Rawalpindi, PLD 1979 Lahore 923 [second detention order not based on 
new grounds]; Kishwar Sultana v. Chief Martial Law Administrator, 1979 PCrLJ 757 [absence of 
objective grounds of detention]; Abdul Rashid v. Sub-Martial Law Administrator, Sector 2, 
Rawalpindi, PLD 1980 Lahore 356 [detention punitive, not preventative]; Ali Ahmed v. Deputy Martial 
Law Administrator, Sector 2, Hyderabad, 1980 PCrLJ 609 [grounds of detention vague and 
insufficient]. 
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with bringing the armed forces into hatred or contempt, or exciting disaffection towards 
them.535 
 
By 1979, the High Courts also appeared to have become uneasy with the extensive use 
of military courts and tribunals to try ordinary criminal offences, and began to question 
the legality of convictions on procedural and jurisdictional basis.536 The courts’ 
legitimacy had suffered a serious setback as a result of the Nusrat Bhutto case and 
Bhutto’s trial, and perhaps it was also in an effort to salvage some of their independence 
and authority that the superior courts gradually began to challenge the actions of Martial 
Law courts and tribunals.537 Furthermore, with relative political calm and absence of 
major threats to the regime, the justification of stringent Martial Law measures had 
begun to wear thin. A full bench of the Peshawar High Court thus lamented that while 
‘the ordinary Courts of the land were properly functioning and were allowed to function 
there were no imperative reasons for the creation of parallel Courts to try civilians.’538 
The High Courts looked to reassert their control over the administration of criminal 
justice and clawed back jurisdiction from the military courts and tribunals.539 Increasing 
references and attempts to tentatively test Martial Law regulations and orders on the 
touchstone of the doctrine of state necessity, however, caused strains with the military 
regime because this doctrine could provide the jurisprudential basis for a more 
significant challenge to the legality of the regime at some stage.540  
                                                 
535 See, eg, Muhammad Akram Beg v. State, PLD 1979 Lahore 935; Saleh Muhammad v. Presiding 
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536 See, eg, Essa Noori v. Deputy Commissioner Turbat, PLD 1979 Quetta 188 [conviction overturned 
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540 The Baluchistan High Court was particularly assertive in the judicial review of military courts and 
tribunals and went further than any other superior court in challenging the Martial Law. See, eg,  
Muhammad Akbar Bugti v. Chief Secrtetary, Baluchistan, PLD 1979 Quetta 233. Also see Hamid 
Khan, A History of the Judiciary in Pakistan , above n 178, 210-11. In another case the court laid down 
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The hanging of a student leader in direct violation of an interim injunction issued by 
the Baluchistan High Court brought the tussle over the Writ jurisdiction to a head. In 
Suleman v President Special Military Court, the petitioner had challenged his trial by a 
military court.541 While the case was pending, a Presidential Order sought to provide 
constitutional cover to the military tribunals and barred the courts from reviewing their 
decisions.542 Another Presidential Order amended Article 199 to further restrict the 
High Courts from judging the validity of Martial Law Regulations or Orders as well as 
questioning the jurisdictions of military courts.543 The Baluchistan High Court, 
questioned the validity of these Presidential Orders and found the amendments to the 
Constitution to be ultra vires the powers of the Chief Martial Law Administrator 
(CMLA) for violating the test of necessity laid down in Nusrat Bhutto.544 This decision 
was potentially deeply destabilizing for the military regime which responded by issuing 
a Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) in 1981, effectively a new constitutional 
dispensation.545 The PCO retroactively invalidated all the adverse decisions of the High 
Courts, restricted the judicial review jurisdictions of the courts and empowered the 
CMLA to dismiss any judge. The regime also required the judges to take a new oath 
under the PCO. Several judges of the superior courts either declined to take the oath or 
were not invited to do so.546 This was the first purge of the superior judiciary in 
Pakistan’s history.  
                                                 
the most restrictive interpretation of the jurisdiction of military courts and tribunals and held that the 
ttrial of citizens for offences, other than the offences created by martial Law Regulations or Martial 
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541 Suleman v. President Special Military Court, NLR 1980 (Civil) Q 873. 
542 Constitution (Second Amendment) Order, 1979 (President’s Order No. 21 of 1979) which inserted 
Article 212-A in the Constitution. 
543 Constitution (Amendment) Order, 1980 (President’s Order No. 1 of 1980). Abdullah v. Presiding 
Officer, Summary Military Court, PLD 1980 Karachi 499, a full bench of the Sindh High Court 
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544 See Tayyab Mahmud, ‘Jurisprudence of Successful Treason: Coup D’ Etat and Common Law’ 
(1994) 27 Cornell International Law Journal 49, 81. 
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Judging the State, above n 5, 180; Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 
above n 46, 358-9. 
546 See Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, above n 46, 217-8. 
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Islamization of Law, State and Politics 
 
Concurrently with the suppression of a tentative judicial resistance and the cooptation 
of the right of the political spectrum, the military regime adopted the strategy of 
Islamization of the law and state policies in Pakistan.547 The Islamization program also 
coincided with Bhutto’s trial and execution, and thus partially reflected the regime’s 
attempt at deflecting attention away from that saga. There were also regional and 
international dimensions to the saga. The Islamic revolution in Iran had emboldened 
the religious right across the Muslim world, and the Zia regime was forced to placate 
the Islamist parties at a time when their patience with the regime was running low. With 
Bhutto’s execution the threat of a resurgent PPP winning the elections, and the 
justification for postponing them was beginning to wear thin. The Zia regime had been 
under American sanctions because of the coup and for human rights violations. 
However, the American position on the disruption of democracy in Pakistan 
dramatically changed when in December 1979 Russian troops invaded Afghanistan. 
Pakistan’s resulting involvement with the Afghan mujahideen’s resistance to the 
Russian occupation in partnership with the US gave a further impetus to state-sponsored 
Islamization, given the military’s need to cultivate a favourable political environment 
and popular backing for the jihad. The free flow of Saudi money and Arab volunteers 
in aid of the Afghan jihad also brought with it patronage of a particular shade of 
orthodoxy, namely Wahabbism,548 which did not fit too comfortably either with the 
Barelvi-Sunni tradition dominant in most of Pakistan or the minority Shias.549 
 
The Islamization program unfolded with the promulgation of the Hudood laws which 
introduced Islamic criminal laws related to adultery and fornication, theft, highway 
                                                 
547 See Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, ‘The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of 
Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics’ (2000) 34:1 Modern Asian Studies 139.  
548 The spread of Wahabbism-driven orthodoxy with Saudi backing, the patronage of militant outfits for 
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549 See generally, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, ‘International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity 
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Muhammad Qasim Zaman, ‘Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni Identities’ 
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robbery and consumption of alcohol.550 These laws also provided for supposedly 
Islamic punishments of stoning to death for adultery, amputation of limbs for theft and 
injury to person, and whipping for various crimes.551 These laws included evidentiary 
standards that were overtly discriminatory against women and religious minorities. 
Within the first few years of their enforcement it was evident that the Hudood laws had 
opened up avenues of abuse and harassment at an unprecedented level, particularly 
against women and men who dared to defy conservative norms of gender interaction.552 
While the Islamization of law remained the centrepiece of the regime’s program, 
Islamization was also extended to various facets of state policy and social life, and was 
thus hegemonic. The Islamization program included such measures as the state 
enforcement of fasting, appointment of prayer wardens to ensure that government 
officials prayed at the prescribed times, and dress codes for women in public life.553 
The curricula of public schools were also Islamized, and madrassahs and mosque 
schools were formally recognized.554 History was re-cast to project an Islamic hue on 
nationalism and included the transformation of the founding fathers, including Jinnah, 
into religious ideologues.555 Armed forces were re-indoctrinated as soldiers of Islam, 
converting military men into the guardians of Pakistan’s geographical as well as 
religiously-reinforced ideological frontiers.556  
 
An even more significant structural change in the legal system that Islamization 
wrought was the creation of separate appellate Shariat courts. Initially the regime 
created Shariat benches at the provincial High Courts in 1979.557 Within a year, the 
Shariat Benches were dissolved and a separate and an independent Federal Shariat 
                                                 
550 Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 (Ordinance VII of 1979); Offence of 
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Court (FSC) was created through the insertion of new Chapter 3-A into the 1973 
Constitution. The creation of the FSC, as well as the Shariat Appellate Bench of the 
Supreme Court (SAB), provoked constitutional controversy as it was achieved through 
constitutional amendments made in pursuance of self-assumed powers by General Zia, 
which was difficult to justify under the doctrine of state necessity.558 Furthermore, the 
creation of a separate Shariat court coincided with the regime’s tussle with the appellate 
judiciary and appeared to further undermine the judicial review jurisdictions of the High 
Courts as the FSC was placed above them in the judicial hierarchy, and its decisions 
were held binding upon the High Courts and the lower judiciary.559 Transfers to the 
FSC were used as a means to sideline recalcitrant High Court judges, and any judge 
who refused appointment to the FSC was deemed to have retired.560 The appointment 
of religious scholars (ulema) to the Shariat courts and the grant of wide powers of 
judicial review of legislation on the grounds of repugnancy to the injunctions of Islam 
raised fears of the reign of an orthodox and anti-democratic Islamist judiciary.561   
 
Despite the rhetoric and visibility of these Islamization measures, there appeared to be 
lack of broader vision, and arguably even commitment to bring about a deeper 
Islamization and/or indigenization of the postcolonial legal system.562 The FSC was 
created with considerable limitations on its jurisdiction and was barred from taking up 
matters of Muslim personal law, fiscal laws, taxation, banking and insurance. A 
majority of the appointees to the FSC were regular judges of the High Court who were 
‘Islamic moderates,’ and the classically-trained ulema invariably remained in the 
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minority on the Shariat courts.563 Even the notorious Hudood laws appeared to have 
been designed as purely symbolic measures intended to exist solely on the books and, 
with the exception of the provisions relating to sexual crimes which acquired a tragic 
dynamic of their own, the other laws had little practical relevance or impact. From the 
outset the FSC also pressured the Zia regime to bring about more significant 
Islamization of the criminal laws, but that was resisted. In as many as eleven petitions 
the FSC took up challenges to the legality of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) provisions 
relating to homicides and offences against the person on the bases that these provisions 
violated the Islamic principles of qisas and diyat.564 No progress, however, was made 
on this front during the existence of the Zia regime, providing strong evidence that the 
regime had intended the Islamization of laws to be of symbolic significance only. As a 
consequence, the alliance between the military regime and the religious right became 
progressively strained.565 
 
Furthermore, the military regime had failed to grasp the complexity of the postcolonial 
legal system; and its faulty assumption, that the entire legal system would fall in line 
with military-style command and discipline exercised through the appellate courts and 
new substantive laws, was quickly exposed.566  The regime’s inability to fully reign in 
the courts, and control the interpretation and enforcement Islamic legality, became 
embarrassingly evident in the very first case the FSC adjudicated. In Hazoor Bakhsh, 
the FSC decided by a narrow majority that the punishment of stoning to death for zina 
(adultery or fornication) was not the prescribed hadd (i.e. mandatory) punishment under 
Islamic law, but was rather a tazir (i.e. discretionary) penalty.567  This decision 
undermined the Islamic credentials of the Hudood laws which had already engendered 
vociferous protests from human rights and women’s rights activists.  The regime was 
compelled to amend the Constitution and grant the FSC the power to review its own 
decisions, even though the avenue of an appeal to the SAB already existed. In a blatant 
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intervention in judicial process, the regime filed a review petition before the FSC and 
removed the three judges who had formed the majority in the first Hazoor Bakhsh case. 
Although, the reconstituted FSC overturned its earlier decision and unanimously upheld 
stoning to death as the valid hadd punishment for adultery/fornication, the damage to 
the credibility of the Islamization program was evident.568  
 
In another bold move in 1983, even the reconstituted FSC nullified the President’s 
authority to dismiss senior bureaucrats without cause or retire them after twenty-five 
years of service at his discretion.569 In 1979, Zia had retired several senior bureaucrats 
who had been appointed or promoted by the Bhutto government. The FSC held that 
Islamic law principles required that the civil servants subject to compulsory retirement 
be provided with due process, and invalidated the relevant statutory provisions for 
failure in this regard. The FSC’s decision did not pose a direct challenge to the military 
regime’s control over the bureaucracy as it did not direct the reinstatement of these 
bureaucrats. However, the court did set prospective limitations which even the military 
regime would be forced to countenance as the court had re-styled Common Law 
principles of natural justice as core principles of Islamic legality. This decision was by 
no means exceptional: around the same time, the FSC had reviewed a range of statutes 
on its own accord (suo motu) and had consistently found issues with those statutes that 
did not provide for fair hearings prior to the taking of any disciplinary or adverse action 
against a party.570 As such, the FSC performed a similar role as the High Courts during 
Pakistan’s first Martial Law interregnum by constructing a basis for the continuity of 
judicial review powers even when the Constitution, the High Courts’ judicial review 
powers and fundamental rights were formally suspended.  
 
It would be incorrect to claim that the Shariat courts mounted a serious challenge to the 
Zia regime or its Islamization program for these courts continued to accord a certain 
degree of respect and deference to the regime, and considerable fidelity to the basic 
structures of the Islamization program, throughout the 1980s. Nonetheless, the policy 
conundrums thrown up by the hasty and ill-considered implantation of Islamized laws, 
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570 In re: Islamization of Laws, PLD 1985 Federal Shariat Court 193; In re: Islamization of Laws, PLD 
1986 Federal Shariat Court 29. 
  158
the strains imposed by the vocal and visible opponents of Islamization, and the demands 
of the internal logics of Islamic legal discourse compelled the Shariat courts to chart an 
increasingly independent course, particularly in the later years of the Zia regime. 
Islamization had legitimized and empowered a new discourse on public power that 
could not be controlled but only contained so long as the institutions of the state and 
the channels of public communication were strictly regulated. As the regime’s control 
over the state and the polity began to falter during the transitional period to limited 
democracy (1985-1988), the superior courts increasingly used Islamic legality to 
expand their powers of judicial review. In adjudicating upon the validity of legislation 
for repugnancy to the injunctions of Islam the FSC and the SAB acquired and learnt to 
use the power to review legislation, a hitherto largely unfamiliar experience for 
Pakistan’s courts. In exercising its suo motu powers of review, the FSC gave the courts 
their first taste of novel and imaginative adjudicative methodologies.  
 
However, while the FSC managed to salvage a new kind of public law jurisdiction, 
Islamization entrenched and formalized the rule of difference as explicit differentiations 
and discriminations were legalized, particularly against women and religious 
minorities. More significantly, Islamization reinforced implicit and de facto biases in 
favour of the privileged and the powerful by further empowering the police and courts 
with greater discretion through law as well as morality. The defiance of social norms 
was disciplined through the Hudood laws, and not only jirgas and panchayats but also 
lower courts and military tribunals were empowered to wield cultural understandings 
backed up by a particular brand of religion. Not only the technology of law but also the 
normative vocabulary of Islam were used to re-crystallize social stratifications that had 
been shaken up by the populism and the idealism of the early Bhutto years, which was 
the late Prime Minister’s most significant political legacy.571 In essence, this was less a 
strategy to legitimize military rule, as often speculated, and more an effort to reinforce 
the status quo by licensing a new breed of power brokers – dependent upon the state 
for patronage and wielding limited influence and moral authority at the local level – in 
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order to keep the attention away from the larger political struggles.572 As such, 
Islamization did not legitimize the military regime but nonetheless provided it with 
space through the fragmentation and dispersal of political energy.  
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF INDIRECT PRAETORIANISM 
 
The Eighth Amendment and a Civilian Façade 
 
By 1983 the various strategies for exerting political and social control, such as the 
cooptation of the political right and Islamization, had begun to run their course without 
building the regime a broader support base beyond its prime constituencies in the 
military, bureaucracy and coopted political classes. In 1983, the PPP finally launched a 
robust protest program under the banner of the Movement for the Restoration of 
Democracy (MRD), which had been created in 1981 as a coalition of anti-regime 
political parties. While the MRD remained essentially a PPP-led grouping and was 
largely confined to Sindh,573 even the religious parties that had backed the Zia regime 
supported the demand of transition to civilian rule. In August 1983, coinciding with the 
launch of MRD protests, and clearly designed as an effort to wean support away from 
it, General Zia announced plans for an eventual transition to civilian rule. Zia 
announced a referendum to elect a President in December 1984 in which he was the 
sole candidate and, in a Kafkaesque move, the referendum question asked the public to 
decide whether it endorsed the Islamization program. A ‘yes’ vote on the referendum 
ensured that General Zia would become the President for a 5-year term,574 while he also 
remained the chief of the armed forces as unlike General Ayub he did not contemplate 
giving up the command of the military.  
 
The decision to hold the referendum and secure the presidency before parliamentary 
elections indicated that the regime could not count on sufficient political support in the 
                                                 
572 See Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism, above n 182, who asserts that this was a variant of the 
colonial strategy of ‘divide and rule’ based upon the creation of newer rival classes of collaborative local-
level politicians. 
573 Talbot, above n 202, 252-3. 
574 According to the official results, 98 per cent of the 34 million registered voters who cast their votes 
supported General Zia’s policies. The opposition claimed that these were mostly ghost ballots and the 
real voter turnout was no more than 10 per cent. Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, above n 528, 
86-7. 
  160
general elections.575 The voter turnout in the parliamentary elections held in February 
1985 was much higher than in the referendum, even though the PPP boycotted the 
elections in the hope that a low turnout would undermine their credibility.576 The 
elections were held on a non-party basis and the campaigns were thus essentially 
conducted around kinship networks and local issues.577 The elections invariably 
privileged dominant landholders and local power brokers in the rural constituencies, 
and the composition of the assemblies reflected the resurgence of these classes in 
Pakistan’s electoral politics.578 As in the Ayub era, the primary organizing principle of 
federal politics was ‘proximity to power’ and influence over bureaucracy, police, and 
licensing regimes.579 A majority of the parliamentarians were a product of the Zia era, 
especially the local body system, and in the absence of the PPP were by and large pro-
regime in their ideological and political outlook. Nonetheless, a protracted tussle 
between the military regime and its coopted political classes was inevitable as the 
politicians demanded a greater share of power. In contrast, the military regime’s 
principal aim was to retard the seepage of power to the extent manageable.580  
 
As in the Ayub era, the military regime sought a constitutional mechanism to achieve 
such a balancing of power. Since the Zia regime had not formally abrogated the 
constitution in order to avoid a charge of high treason for its subversion, it had to 
construct a new governance arrangement while nominally remaining within the 1973 
framework. The Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order, 1985 (RCO), while 
purporting to resurrect the original constitution, amended it out of recognition. It 
effectively created a semi-presidential constitution and dampened hopes of a swift and 
genuine transfer of power to elected politicians.581 In a two-step process reminiscent of 
Bhutto’s strategy in constitutional negotiations, the RCO provided the backdrop to the 
Eighth Amendment to the constitution passed by the new parliament. The Eighth 
Amendment validated all actions of the Martial Law regime and enabled General Zia 
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to simultaneously remain the president and the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS).582 The 
Amendment formally vested executive authority of the federal government in the 
President,583 and gave him non-reviewable discretionary authority to appoint the 
caretaker cabinet, the Chief Election Commissioner, and the services chiefs.584 It also 
retained a new Article 58(2)(b) inserted by the RCO, which enabled the president to 
dismiss the parliament if in his opinion ‘a situation has arisen in which the Government 
of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary.’585  
 
However, the Eighth Amendment also significantly toned down several provisions of 
the RCO. The RCO had removed the original requirement that the president be bound 
by the advice of the prime minister, and had substituted it with the condition that he 
merely consult the prime minister, the cabinet or just the ‘appropriate minister.’ 
Furthermore, the consultation would have been privileged, and the entirety of the 
president’s powers would have been deemed discretionary and unjusticiable. the eighth 
amendment removed the possibility of consulting just the appropriate minister and 
omitted Article 48(3) inserted by the RCO which gave the president blanket cover in 
the exercise of his discretionary powers. The Amendment also attempted to whittle 
down Article 58(2)(b) powers by adding the requirement of breakdown of 
constitutional governance, and added a non obstante clause which implicitly rendered 
the exercise of the dissolution power potentially amenable to judicial review. Thus, 
while the Eighth Amendment retroactively provided constitutional cover to Martial 
Law era actions and transferred considerable constitutional power to the President, it 
appeared tolerable in comparison to the RCO. 
 
Although political parties were banned and the elections had been conducted on a non-
party basis, an ‘official group’ nonetheless emerged in the National Assembly under 
Prime Minister Junejo’s leadership.586 In addition to re-negotiating the constitutional 
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arrangement through the Eighth Amendment, the new government displayed 
unanticipated independence on several issues.587 Prime Minister Junejo immediately 
revived political parties and announced the lifting of Martial Law. The third Martial 
Law in Pakistan’s history, and the longest, thus ended in December 1985. As the 
government exercised its fiscal powers and control over the appointment and transfers 
of bureaucrats, tensions with the presidency emerged.588 The government’s move to 
return military officers appointed on deputation in the civil bureaucracy caused further 
friction.589 Differences also appeared between the prime minister and president over the 
appointment of the chief of the Intelligence Bureau,590 and the removal of ministers 
who had been appointed by President Zia.  
 
The emergence of two power-centres in the post-1985 framework was not tenable so 
long as General Zia remained on the political scene. As an increasingly strident Prime 
Minister Junejo insisted on having a role not only in bureaucratic but also in military 
appointments, extensions and promotions, tensions threatened to boil over.591 The 
tussle between the prime minister and president over military appointments exposed the 
glaring absurdity of General Zia’s constitutional architecture – General Zia as CoAS 
was formally responsible to Prime Minister Junejo, who also held the portfolio of 
defence minister; Prime Minister Junejo was in turn answerable to General Zia as 
president.592 In May 1988, General Zia suddenly dismissed the Junejo government and 
dissolved the National Assembly in the first ever exercise of Article 58(2)(b) powers. 
Although fresh elections were scheduled for November, to be held again on a non-party 
basis, it is highly likely that General Zia would have reneged on that promise and 
reverted to an overtly presidential system.593 General Zia’s continuing hold over the 
military and the absence of broad-based popular support for a civilian government that 
had been elected on a non-party basis appeared to suggest that the Zia regime would be 
able to manage yet another term in power. However, in August 1988 General Zia died 
in a plane crash in mysterious circumstances, his demise unexpectedly opening up the 
space for a more genuine transition to democratic governance.  
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In order to understand how the space for civil democracy was significantly constrained 
by indirect praetorianism in the following decade, one must deconstruct General Zia’s 
lasting political legacy. Important clues can be found in the reasons why the Zia regime 
survived as long as it did, despite having limited proactive political support throughout 
his rule. An important contributor to the regime’s longevity was a fundamental shift in 
governance that the Zia regime engineered, giving the military significant inroads in 
the state structure and economy.594 The regime made an unprecedented number of 
appointments of serving and retired military personnel at all levels in the civilian 
bureaucracy.595 The Zia regime also transformed the bureaucracy into a junior but 
respectable partner in praetorian governmentality.596 While it did not formally 
reconstitute the CSP, it implicitly resurrected an elite cadre by placing former CSPs in 
key positions.597 Contrary to expectations, the Zia regime effected only limited de-
nationalization and reverted instead to the bureaucratic model of economic 
policymaking like that employed by the Ayub regime in the 1960s.598 Such heavy 
involvement of the military in administrative and economic management also enabled 
it to forge lasting alliances with the mercantile classes of north-central Punjab and the 
settled parts of the NWFP.599  
 
Another significant contributor was the growth in the economy in aggregate terms.600 
More importantly, while redistribution of resources along class and regional lines was 
never on the agenda, the middle and lower-middle classes of Pakistan also expanded 
considerably.601 This was largely the fallout of a key element of Bhutto’s economic and 
social policies, which only began to bear fruit in the 1980s. In the aftermath of the 1971 
war, Bhutto had specifically realigned what remained of a dismembered Pakistan with 
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oil-rich Muslim-majority states in Middle East. The migration of Pakistani workers in 
large numbers provided Pakistan with vital capital inflows in the form of remittances.602 
Migrant workers mostly belonged to the peri-urban and rural middle and lower-middle 
classes, and remittances thus resulted in positive wealth distribution outcomes without 
the praetorian state having to undertake tough policy decisions regarding capital 
reallocation, land reforms, human and infrastructure development.603 In addition to 
these belated consequences of Bhutto era policies, Pakistan’s involvement in the US-
backed Afghan jihad resulted in the dramatic growth of an informal economy. The 
Afghan war left a lasting legacy not only of undocumented procurement and 
distribution of weaponry, but also of related networks of goods smuggling and narcotics 
trade.604 The expansion of the informal economy generated by the Afghan war led to 
conspicuous consumption, the import of luxury goods and a real estate boom.605  
 
While Pakistan’s middle classes benefited, the distribution of economic outcomes was 
not uniform. This was partially a consequence of the labour migratory patterns – such 
that migrants from north-central Punjab and the settled parts of the NWFP were 
disproportionately represented while those from rural Sindh in particular were grossly 
underrepresented. The positive wealth distribution effects of remittances undermined 
the opposition in the heartlands of north-central Punjab.606 The elites and middle classes 
of the NWFP were also historically much better integrated in the power structures, with 
the Pashtuns having a significant representation in the army and the bureaucracy. The 
benefits of labour migration and the formal and informal economies related to the 
Afghan war brought the settled parts of the NWFP firmly within the core of the 
Pakistani state.607 The Zia regime even brought Baluchistan temporarily in from the 
periphery, and the successful pacification of the Baloch elites was one of its significant 
political achievements.608 However, while the military regime ended the military 
operation in Baluchistan and successfully appeased the Baloch political leadership, 
which had suffered immensely under Bhutto, longstanding causes of Baloch resentment 
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remained unresolved.609 It were the rural areas of Sindh and southern Punjab which 
faced the greatest marginalization under Zia, enhancing the sense of alienation from the 
Pakistani state.610  
 
The exacerbation of the ethno-linguistic fault-lines in Pakistan and the resulting 
exacerbation of provincialization left a legacy of fractious politics in the decade 
following Zia’s death.  The Punjab had been the PPP’s most significant support base in 
the 1970 elections, and the Zia regime worked hard to forge a coalition of mercantile, 
feudal and religious classes that would significantly dilute the support for the PPP in 
that province.611 The regime had deliberately cultivated various factions of the Muslim 
League, especially the PML (N) led by a young Nawaz Sharif. The scion of a middling 
industrial family of the Punjab, Nawaz Sharif served as the finance minister and the 
chief minister of Punjab during the Zia era, and successfully formed an extensive 
patronage network within the provincial bureaucracy and police. This set the stage for 
fierce electoral competition between PML (N) and the PPP led by Benazir Bhutto, the 
strong and politically refined daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. In the following decade, 
the fractious political landscape ensured that incumbent governments would face 
violent opposition both in the legislatures as well as on the streets. The resulting 
political instability and a constitutionally empowered presidency thus enabled a still 
powerful military to exert indirect influence from behind the scenes in the post-Zia 
years. Such indirect praetorianism was the most significant legacy of the Zia era. 
 
The Contours of an Islamic Judicial Review 
 
It is during the period of tension between the civilian government of Prime Minister 
Junejo and the Zia presidency that the superior courts most forcefully reasserted their 
administrative law powers, especially as regards bureaucratic appointments, transfers 
and dismissals. As Martial Law had been lifted, the Writ and fundamental rights 
jurisdictions of the courts stood restored. However, it was the Shariat Courts, in 
particular the SAB, which drove this judicial agenda. An important factor which 
emboldened the Shariat Courts to assert Islamic legality was the incorporation of the 
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Objectives Resolution as a substantive part of the Constitution in the form of Article 2-
A in 1985.612  The Objectives Resolution of 1949, Pakistan’s first text of constitutional 
import which had been the Preamble to the 1973 Constitution, opened with the grand 
assertion, ‘sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone’ and 
that authority were to be exercised by the people of Pakistan ‘within the limits 
prescribed by Him.’ Its incorporation as a substantive and enforceable provision of the 
Constitution caused alarm amongst the critics of Islamization who feared that it may be 
used by the Shariat courts as a supra-constitutional provision (or grundnorm in Kelsen’s 
terminology) to re-interpret the entire constitutional framework in an Islamic light. The 
provincial High Courts dangerously flirted with the possibilities inherent in the 
incorporation of the Objectives Resolution and began to question the validity of 
legislative measures, at times even constitutional provisions, for lack of conformity 
with Islamic law.613 Such reliance on Article 2-A deeply divided the appellate courts 
and shook ‘the very Constitutional foundations of the country.’614 Contrary to 
expectations, the Shariat courts largely stayed away from this particular source of 
controversy until it came to rest in 1992 with the settlement that conflicting 
constitutional provisions must be read in harmony with each other, and no part of the 
Constitution (such as Article 2-A) was superior to the other parts.615 In the process, the 
courts imperceptibly affirmed and solemnized the Constitution with the legitimacy of 
Islamic legality.  
 
The Shariat courts’ use of the Objectives Resolution, now Article 2-A, was not to re-
interpret other constitutional provisions but to assert that the executive did not enjoy 
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unlimited prerogative powers, but only limited powers that were to be exercised as a 
sacred trust in public interest. Furthermore, the Shariat courts opened the doors for a 
wider permeation of Islamic legality into Pakistan’s legal system by interpreting the 
term ‘injunctions of Islam’ in an expansive fashion.616 The SAB ruled that repugnancy 
to the injunctions of Islam did not only entail a violation of direct and explicit rulings 
found in the Qur’an and the Sunnah, but also included violation of broader principles 
that may be derived from these sources as well as Islamic history. One remarkable 
example in this regard was the development of the principles of natural justice. In 1987 
the SAB decided several consolidated appeals filed by the Government of Pakistan 
against the 1983 decision of the FSC in Pakistan v. People at Large.617 This case 
stemmed from the compulsory retirement of several senior bureaucrats by the Zia 
regime in 1979.618 The SAB held that Islamic law principles required that the civil 
servants subject to compulsory retirement be provided notice and opportunity for a fair 
hearing and directed that the impugned statutory provisions be repealed.619  
 
The SAB’s 1987 decision in Pakistan v People at Large was not unanimous; the bench 
was split with three judges supporting the majority opinion while two forcefully 
dissented. Interestingly, the two ulema members of the bench disagreed with each other. 
The disagreement between the majority and minority on the bench was not only over 
the interpretation of the textual sources of Islamic governance principles, but extended 
also to policy implications. The majority was in favour of protecting the bureaucracy, 
to some extent at least, from the pressures exerted on the senior bureaucrats, often 
unduly and for improper purposes, by the politicians heading their departments. The 
goal was to restore to the bureaucracy some of its old status as an independent pillar of 
the state by effectively reading the safeguards of tenure – that had been a part of the 
1956 and 1962 constitutions – implicitly into the 1973 framework under the guise of 
Islamic legality.  The minority judges, on the other hand, were of the opinion that a 
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civilian government ought to exercise greater control over the bureaucracy, and that the 
bureaucracy ought not to be allowed to become a strong part of the 'establishment' 
which remains largely impervious to political accountability even during times of 
elected rule. Despite the doctrinal divisions in the 1987 case, the SAB quickly closed 
ranks. Less than a year later, the same bench decided that the chairman of a semi-
autonomous public authority could not be removed without first being granted a 
hearing.620 Not only were due process requirements made applicable to public 
authorities of all kind, including statutory bodies and public corporations, but their 
reach was extended to a whole range of governmental actions as well. In Province of 
Sind v. Public at Large, the SAB extended the right to hearing to a co-operative society 
facing adverse action by the government for failure to perform its responsibilities. 
Justice Nasim Hasan Shah observed that ‘this Court has now made it quite clear that 
any provision of law whereunder someone can be harmed or condemned without 
affording such person an opportunity of defence against the said action, is against the 
Quranic Commands as supplemented and interpreted by the Sunnah of the Holy 
Prophet.’621  
 
This particular line of cases is by no means a unique aspect of the Shariat courts’ 
jurisprudence. In one line of cases the FSC and the SAB steadfastly held that the 
exemption granted to members of legislatures from appearance before courts during 
sessions of legislatures could effectively result in immunity from prosecution and 
declared it to be repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.622 The Shariat courts made 
several references to instances in Muslim history to demonstrate that the rulers were 
subject to the law and answerable to the courts.623 In one case the FSC stated obiter that 
even the ‘head of state cannot claim any immunity from prosecution or from appearance 
in a court during the tenure of his office.’624 In another case, the SAB invalidated 
provisions of the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance, 1963, which were 
designed to maintain a strict control over the licensing of publications on the basis of 
                                                 
620 See Pakistan v. Public at Large, 1989 SCMR 1690. 
621 Province of Sind v. Public at Large, PLD 1988 Supreme Court 138. 
622 In re: Islamization of Laws, PLD 1985 Federal Shariat Court 193, 199-200; In re: Members of the 
National Assembly (Exemption from Preventive Detention and Personal Appearance) Ordinance IX of 
1963, PLD 1989 Federal Shariat Court 3; In re: Members of the National Assembly (Exemption from 
Preventive Detention and Personal Appearance) Ordinance IX of 1963, PLD 1989 Federal Shariat Court 
8. 
623 In re: Islamization of Laws, PLD 1984 Federal Shariat Court 40, 53. 
624 In re: The Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973), PLD 1984 Federal Shariat Court 34, 37. 
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an Islamic right to freedom of expression. The court noted that ‘propagating virtue and 
righteousness is not only a right in Islam but also an obligation,’ and that the ruler who 
‘tries to deny this right to his people is openly at war with God.’625 The Shariat courts 
also found various statutory provisions under scrutiny to be in violation of the Islamic 
principle of equality, holding that while ‘classification’ or discrimination between 
similarly situated people or groups was not forbidden per se, it was nonetheless subject 
to a test of ‘reasonableness and intelligibility’ and ‘must have a reasonable relation to 
the object or the purpose sought to be achieved’ by the legislation.626  
 
The Shariat courts’ emergent jurisprudence on Islamic rule of law and political rights 
appeared to be rooted in an intellectual milieu of a distrust of power, ‘a presumption 
that those authorized to exercise discretion are unlikely to carry out their discretionary 
powers fairly and equally.’627 In a 1984 decision reviewing the Contempt of Court Act, 
the FSC had also defined the independence of the judiciary as a fundamental principle 
highlighted by the prestige and prominence of judges in the Islamic legal tradition.628 
Building on this principle, the Shariat courts insisted upon the granting of a right to 
appeal against executive decisions, and challenged the ouster of the courts’ 
jurisdiction.629 In a most remarkable extension of Islamic due process rights, the FSC 
held that the Islamic right to a hearing mandated the existence of an independent 
judiciary and the judicial review of administrative action.630 ‘It is thus a guarantee of 
the rule of law … that … every person has the right to get his dispute decided … by a 
body which is not only not (sic) the executive authority but is independent of it.’631 In 
other words, review and appeal processes within the executive were not sufficient, and 
an opportunity for a hearing before an independent and impartial court or tribunal was 
a fundamental Islamic requirement.  The Shariat courts even found the statutes 
governing military court martials wanting, because they did not provide for a 
                                                 
625 Federation of Pakistan v. Public at Large, PLD 1988 Supreme Court 202, 209. 
626 See Muhammad Ramzan Qureshi v. Federal Government, PLD 1986 Federal Shariat Court 200, 228-
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General Public, PLD 1988 Supreme Court 645.  
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meaningful review or appeal.632 These decisions, though handed out towards the end of 
the Zia regime, were nonetheless particularly significant given that Islamic legality 
would not be suspended even in periods of Martial Law or emergency, even when 
fundamental rights and the Writ jurisdiction of the courts were taken away. As the SAB 
reiterated, limitations imposed on fundamental rights were themselves ‘subordinated to 
the most fundamental of all human rights in Islam, the one which cannot at all be 
abridged by any limitation … namely, [the] right to justice.’633  
 
As such, during this brief period of controlled democracy, the Shariat courts laid a more 
solid groundwork for judicial review. Through Islamic legality the courts achieved what 
Justice Cornelius had sought to do in Dosso, that is ground fundamental rights and the 
Writ jurisdiction of the courts in a form of natural law that existed beyond a written 
constitution. However, the courts were able to get away with this assertion of judicial 
review powers not only because they successfully coopted the dominant Islamic 
rhetoric pushed by the regime. They also found the political space to assert a greater 
role because of the friction between the Zia presidency and the Junejo government. The 
courts’ decisions had ambivalent outcomes for both General Zia and the government, 
and thus provided less reason for either the presidency or the government to push back. 
The Shariat courts reviewed, and in many cases overturned the actions of the civilian 
government, which helped the Zia presidency develop its narrative of an inept civilian 
government. However, such judicial review did not directly benefit the Zia regime as 
the courts left the decision-making power in the hands of the civilian government, 
merely requiring better or more transparent administrative procedures. The only 
institution that was a clear beneficiary of this Islamic brand of judicial review was the 
judiciary itself. 
 
 JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS UNDER INDIRECT PRAETORIANISM 
 
In Pakistan’s first four decades the courts had found themselves repeatedly under 
pressure at moments of extra-constitutional regime change and were compelled to 
                                                 
632 Pakistan v. General Public, PLD 1989 Supreme Court 6. In another instance, the Shariat courts ruled 
that martial law regulations were subject to review for repugnancy to the injunctions of Islam and did 
not enjoy any special status or constitutional protection. Nusrat Baig Mirza v. Government of Pakistan, 
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validate such naked exercises of power through creative constitutional law. However, 
they had succeeded in preserving their judicial review jurisdiction and had learnt to 
mediate between the dominant executive and political opposition to push for a 
minimalist form of constitutionalism and rule of law even during periods of Martial 
Law. The courts’ efforts in this domain were ultimately feeble and fruitless as 
successive military and civilian governments commanded the power to amend the 
constitutional and legislative frameworks at will. Nonetheless, the courts had managed 
to win occasional concessions for political opposition creating expectations of more 
robust forms of constitutionalism in favourable times. More significantly, the courts 
had progressively expanded the judicial review of bureaucratic action under the Writ 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the courts were also able to preserve procedural review of 
security and preventive detention laws, even in the face of executive defiance through 
the first few decades of postcolonial existence. 
 
Under Zia the courts had followed the blue print of validating extra-constitutional 
takeover, and were even complicit in the execution of the first popularly elected prime 
minister of the country. However, the courts had also attempted to exercise their review 
powers quite robustly when faced with an unprecedented number of detentions and 
trials before military courts and tribunals. As a result, they had forced the regime to 
curtail their judicial review powers and effect the first ever purge of the superior 
judiciary. Nonetheless, through the transition to a controlled democratic façade and 
subsequent tensions with the civilian government, the Islamization of laws provided the 
courts with a normative bedrock within which to ground a more substantive brand of 
constitutionalism and rule of law. The courts used the dominant narrative of Islamic 
law and political morality to rebrand the existing constitutional framework, judicial 
independence, and judicial review of executive action as being compliant with 
fundamental Islamic precepts. Such was the historical and jurisprudential backdrop to 
the first significant expansion of judicial power that unfolded in the 1990s. In the decade 
post-Zia the courts encountered for the first time in Pakistan’s tortuous history a highly 








‘PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION’ AND THE FIRST WAVE OF JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM 
 
The Zia era gave rise to fundamental contradictions in the Pakistani state and society. 
On the one hand the Pakistani state transformed into a truly over-developed military-
bureaucratic complex with coercive capacity as well as deeper penetration into the 
political economy and society. The military’s relationship with the bureaucracy, 
strengthened during the Zia regime, enabled it to exert immense influence over foreign 
policy and national security in the decade of civilian rule that followed General Zia’s 
sudden death in August 1988.  The military’s continuing covert power was strengthened 
further by the permeation of the religious-nationalist idiom amongst the majority 
Punjabi-Pushtun population. Punjab came to dominate electoral politics like never 
before in Pakistan’s history; and as large segments of the middle and lower-middle 
classes of north-central Pakistan bought into the military’s narrative of nationhood, it 
became increasingly difficult for any of the major political parties to deviate from the 
hegemonic definition of national interest.634 This in turn fuelled ethno-linguistic 
resentment in the smaller provinces and the regional periphery of the state. With the 
balkanization of politics along provincial and ethno-linguistic faultlines, the military-
bureaucratic complex took on the mantle of the guarantor of the nation state’s existence. 
Pakistan transformed into a ‘fearful state’ in which pluralism equated with weakness.635  
 
Another contradiction of the Zia era that left an indelible imprint on the constitutional 
politics in the following decade was the consolidation of civilian elites.  Like other 
postcolonial states Pakistan too was not only caught up in this core-periphery or power-
                                                 
634 However, one must avoid a simplistic notion of ‘Punjabization’ of politics. The demographic 
significance of Punjab and the size of its economy does not simplistically translate into a dominance of 
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2002) 59-61. 
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fragility dynamic, but was also characterized by a ‘sharp dichotomy between the 
political cultures of elites and that of masses.’636 While the populace fragmented along 
ethno-linguistic, regional and sectarian faultlines, the elites consolidated. Pakistan’s 
feudal-political, military-bureaucratic, religious, industrial and urban professional 
classes began to transform into a ‘trans-regional elitist alliance.’637 Economic 
associations established through industrialization, state licensing regimes, urban real 
estate, loan write-offs by public banks, and tax evasion were reinforced by cultural 
commonalities cultivated through private schooling at elite institutions, foreign 
education, inter-marriages, etc. Although large segments of these elites, especially in 
the Punjab and NWFP, were the product or beneficiaries of Zia era economic policies, 
they would in time seek to assert their influence over the aggrandized state, thereby 
challenging the military’s influence. The state and the bureaucratic apparatus thus 
became a site of fierce elite competition over resources, and the various modes of 
institutionalized corruption between the military and Pakistan’s political classes. 
 
These contradictions were contained so long as a powerful military-bureaucratic 
complex remained at the helm of affairs during the Zia regime. General Zia’s 
unexpected demise not only opened up greater space for democratic politics but also 
for these contradictions to be played out in bitter political contestations. A decade of 
political turmoil followed; successive elected governments found themselves locked in 
power struggles not only with political opposition, but also a presidency backed by the 
military-bureaucratic complex. Four civilian governments, alternatively formed by the 
PPP and the PML (N), were elected and dismissed from power – the first three by the 
use of Article 58(2)(b) powers by the presidency and the fourth through a military coup. 
All three dissolutions under Article 58(2)(b), and a range of other issues of pure politics, 
were vindicated before the courts The referral of recurrent political disputes by the 
superior judiciary brought the courts to the center of political action. By the end of the 
decade, no consistent constitutional logic or doctrine rationalizing the political cases 
was discernible, as the Supreme Court appeared to be relying on changing 
interpretations of various constitutional provisions at stake. The only consistent 
progression during this extended saga of political instability was in the power of the 
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superior judiciary, which had become a key player in the constitutional politics it was 
mediating.   
 
Strengthened by their moorings in a widely shared Islamist public morality, which at 
least rhetorically demanded the accountability of the executive and justice for all, the 
courts engineered a dramatic expansion in public law and carved a role for themselves 
as the third most significant institution of the state, in addition to the political executive 
and the military. The Supreme Court began to use its Original jurisdiction for the first 
time, and developed the framework of ‘Public Interest Litigation’ following the model 
of the Indian judiciary. This rise to unprecedented prominence was not an unqualified 
good, however. The adjudication of governmental change took its toll as by the end of 
the 1990s the courts laboured under a perception of politicization. More significantly, 
the rhetoric of rights, rule of law and judicial independence rooted in an Islamic public 
morality created expectations the courts had no capacity to meet: while they could 
obstruct executive fiat through judicial review, their ability to compel the state to 
deliver tangible outcomes remained negligible. Even more debilitating was the superior 
courts’ inability to compel the reform of the lower judiciary, which remained fully 




THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF INDIRECT PRAETORIANISM  
 
Judicial Review of Government Dissolutions 
 
With General Zia’s sudden death in a plane crash in 1988, Pakistan’s political forces 
found unexpected space to push for a return to democracy. However, the prospects of 
meaningful electoral politics were overshadowed by the legacy bequeathed by the Zia 
era: a deeply entrenched civil-military imbalance in national politics; a state structure 
built around a military-bureaucratic nexus and shared Islamo-nationalist ideology; re-
emergence of patronage-based electoral politics focused on provincial, local, kinship 
and class interests; and a political economy suffering the blowbacks of the Afghan jihad 
in the form of an expanding informal economy, rampant corruption, weaponization of 
society and heightened sectarianism. It is these dynamics which played out most visibly 
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in the constitutional politics of Pakistan in the decade of instability that followed the 
end of the Zia regime. The undercurrents of praetorianism were evident in the very 
process of transition after General Zia’s death as Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a seasoned 
bureaucrat who played a pivotal role in the economic management of the Zia regime, 
became acting president.  
 
In a significant move, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan announced fresh elections to be 
held in November 1988, instead of restoring the Junejo government. The decision not 
to restore the Junejo-led assembly was challenged before the Lahore and Sindh High 
Courts, casting the superior judiciary into a central role in fashioning and legitimizing 
the difficult transition process. Such a role for the superior courts in mediating issues 
of pure politics – governmental change, transfer of power and electoral processes – 
would be a hallmark of the constitutional politics of the following decade. Both the 
Lahore and Sindh High Courts dismissed the petitions challenging the dissolution and 
refused to restore the assemblies.638  In Muhammad Saifullah, a twelve-member bench 
of the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeals against the High Court 
decisions.639 The court interpreted Article 58(2)(b) to hold that there must first be an 
objective basis for findings to the effect that constitutional machinery had broken down, 
or that there was a stalemate or a deadlock, in which case the President would have the 
discretion to either dissolve the assemblies or choose some other means of resolving 
the crisis. While the court found no objective basis for such a finding, it questioned the 
constitutional and democratic credentials of the Junejo-led assembly. Echoing the 
sentiments raised in the High Court decisions, the Supreme Court noted the delay in 
approaching the court, the fact that the dismissed Prime Minister Junejo had not filed 
the petition, and that fresh elections were imminent. This decision was thus 
quintessentially reminiscent of Maulvi Tamizuddin – the court simultaneously sought 
to draw a constitutional redline under presidential exercise of discretion while 
facilitating what it saw as a move towards greater democratization.  
 
The 1988 elections were essentially a two-party contest along distinct ideological lines 
between the PPP, which still avowed its leftist leanings, and the Islami Jumhoori Ittehad 
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(IJI), a coalition of right-leaning Muslim League factions and religious parties. The IJI 
leadership had been initiated in politics and governance in the 1980s, had roots in 
landowning and mercantile classes that had benefited immensely under Zia, and had 
also developed familial and social links with military and bureaucracy through 
marriages, working cooperation and other interactions.640 The most significant 
opposition to the PPP, however, came from the military which had been indoctrinated 
in the Zia years to see it as a threat to national interest and security.641 The military had 
been instrumental in cobbling together the various factions and parties of the IJI, and 
reportedly provided funding and other support to various candidates.642 Other forms of 
pre-election rigging against the PPP included the abuse of office and public funds by 
the caretaker Chief Minister of Punjab, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif, 
who as the head of the IJI was also a prime contender for the office of Prime Minister, 
fully leveraged his control over the provincial bureaucracy and monetary resources.  
 
Despite a low turnout, various forms of pre-election rigging and military support for 
the rightist coalition,643 the PPP emerged as the largest single party in the National 
Assembly. However, the PPP was allowed to form the government only after a tacit 
deal to share power, especially as regards national security and foreign affairs, with the 
military. Another challenge for the Benazir Bhutto led PPP’s federal government was 
the emergence of a hostile provincial government in the Punjab, where the opposition 
had managed to win the largest number of seats. For the first time in Pakistan’s history 
Punjab was in confrontation with the federation.644 These tensions quickly transformed 
into open hostility with failed attempts by the PPP and the IJI to engineer reciprocal 
votes of no-confidence against the prime minister and the Punjab chief minister.645 Talk 
of 'horse-trading' – purchasing the loyalty of independent members of legislatures or 
those belonging to another political party – entered Pakistan’s political lexicon. With 
the persisting political instability at the centre and in the Punjab, the PPP’s 
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accommodation with the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM),646 an important ally in the 
Sindh province, also began to unravel. The PPP government in Sindh had failed to 
reconcile itself with the MQM’s emergence as the leading political player in the urban 
areas of the province. The law and order situation in urban Sindh deteriorated 
dramatically and much of the blame was placed on the MQM. The MQM sided with 
the IJI in the no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto marking a 
complete breakdown in their alliance, and even though the PPP government managed 
to survive it was exceedingly vulnerable without the MQM’s support. 
 
The fatal strike against the PPP government, however, came from the military-backed 
president who prematurely terminated Benazir Bhutto’s first stint in power in August 
1990 through another exercise of Article 58(2)(b) powers. Tensions between the elected 
government and the presidency were inevitable in a hybrid presidential-parliamentary 
system that was the bequest of the Zia era. Differences of opinion had emerged over 
foreign policy, particularly relations with India.647 Bhutto also challenged the 
appointment of judges appointed by Ghulam Ishaq Khan as interim president prior to 
the elections. The Lahore High Court upheld such appointments as valid, but the 
confrontation continued until the federation withdrew its appeal before the Supreme 
Court.648 The biggest point of contention between the prime minister and the president 
was over appointments and promotions in the military. Bhutto asserted a right to have 
the final say on the appointment of the services chiefs, which was vociferously resisted 
until she backed down.649 The prime minister did succeed in appointing a retired army 
officer to replace the outgoing Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence, the 
military’s premier intelligence agency. The prime minister’s perceived intrusion into 
the domain that the military had marked for itself became the ultimate cause of her 
downfall.   
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In issuing the order of the dissolution of parliament under Article 58(2)(b), President 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan presented a detailed charge sheet against the PPP government. The 
order cited lack of legislation in parliament; failure to convene the Council of Common 
Interests (CCI) and formulate the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award;650 
confrontations with provincial governments, the Senate and the judiciary; improper 
appointments in the bureaucracy and public corporations; and law and order breakdown 
in Sindh, amongst other grounds.651 This second exercise of Article 58(2)(b) powers 
was challenged again before the Lahore and Sindh High Courts under the Writ 
jurisdiction. Both High Courts upheld the dissolution and in doing so appeared to have 
expanded the discretion available to the President, contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
earlier decision.652 In Khawaja Ahmad Tariq Rahim, a twelve-member bench of the 
Supreme Court refused to even grant a leave to appeal.653 The majority provided an 
expanded interpretation of Article 58(2)(b), which empowered the president to dissolve 
the assembly not only in case of a constitutional deadlock but also ‘extensive, continued 
and pervasive failure to observe not one but several provisions of the Constitution.’654 
The majority found two of the grounds cited in the dissolution order to have been 
substantiated – namely the failure to legislate in parliament and confrontation with the 
provinces, which resulted in a failure to convene the CCI and formulate the NFC 
Award. The court also held that while the other charges were not sufficient by 
themselves, they nonetheless buttressed the president’s exercise of his discretion. 
 
This, however, was not a unanimous decision, and the two dissenting opinions provided 
the first indications of the emergent politicization of the court. In his dissent A S Salam, 
J argued that the Eighth Amendment was personal to General Zia, and expired naturally 
with his demise. As a result, the constitution should revert to its original form without 
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Article 58(2)(b). Another notable argument in this dissenting opinion was that if the 
president was not a neutral party, and had a role in creating the constitutional deadlock 
in the first place, Article 58(2)(b) powers should not be available to him. Nonetheless, 
even Salam, J refused to grant relief in this case as fresh elections were imminent. The 
time it took for a petition to make its way as an appeal before the Supreme Court, after 
the case had first been heard by the High Courts under the Writ jurisdiction, meant that 
the chances of successfully challenging an exercise of Article 58(2)(b) powers would 
be slim even if a majority of the court were thus inclined. The second dissent by Sajjad 
Ali Shah, J was even stronger. He found the grounds of dissolution to be weak on the 
merits, and indicated that the president did not have to resort to such a catastrophic 
measure as there were several other options of resolving a constitutional deadlock. Most 
remarkably, in a telling sign of the times to come, Shah, J openly voiced concerns that 
even the court was acting politically and victimizing the PPP.655  
 
The 1990 elections were blatantly rigged, fueling cynicism about electoral politics in 
Pakistan. With a low voter turnout disadvantaging the PPP, the Nawaz Sharif led 
coalition won a clear majority in the National Assembly.656 Given the rightist 
coalition’s ties with the military-bureaucratic establishment, the government was 
expected to continue to cede space to the military, but soon began to assert itself.657 
With emerging differences with the military leadership the coalition began to fragment, 
and even several members of Nawaz Sharif’s own faction of the Muslim League also 
defected or resigned. However, just as with Benazir Bhutto’s first government, it was 
not the loss of parliamentary support but a confrontation with the president over the 
appointment of the army chief which ended Nawaz Sharif’s first tenure as prime 
minister.658 It is intriguing that despite a clear post-Zia constitutional configuration, 
whereby the president was the ultimate decider, both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif 
chose to fight disastrous battles over the appointment of army chiefs. This reflected the 
continuing political importance of the top military post. The resulting conflicts between 
the apex civilian offices, in turn, made the CoAS even more powerful as the arbiter of 
the tussle.659  
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In April 1993, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan exercised Article 58(2)(b) powers for the 
second time in his tenure to dismiss the Nawaz Sharif government. While the charges 
in this instance were similar to those made earlier against Benazir Bhutto’s government, 
the dissolution order seemed to have been put together somewhat hurriedly. The Prime 
Minister had made a defiant speech to the nation the evening before the dissolution of 
his government, which may have precipitated the final action. Nawaz Sharif 
immediately challenged the dissolution of parliament and, unlike the previous 
instances, moved the Supreme Court directly through its Original jurisdiction under 
Article 184(3). In Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Supreme Court not only admitted the 
petition for hearing but also overturned the dissolution of the government by an 
overwhelming majority.660 The majority reviewed the grounds for dissolution on their 
merits, and held that that the breakdown of the relationship between the president and 
the prime minister could not be a basis of dissolution of parliament as the prime minister 
was not constitutionally accountable to the president. Sajjad Ali Shah, J again dissented, 
citing the discrepancy in the majority’s present stance and the Khawaja Ahmad Tariq 
Rahim decision. However, he appeared to have reversed his own position, as he argued 
that the dissolution of parliament was warranted in both cases.661  
 
Despite the Supreme Court’s intervention, the Nawaz Sharif government did not last. 
The tussle between the restored prime minister and the president shifted to the 
provincial government in Punjab. The PML (N) government in Punjab had also fallen 
apart during the period when Nawaz Sharif’s federal government was in dissolution, 
and the president’s camp was able to engineer a sufficient number of defections to form 
a coalition government. With the restoration of the federal government, Nawaz Sharif’s 
party was able to win back the allegiance of several defectors in the Punjab Assembly.  
As the PML (N) tabled a motion of no-confidence against the interim chief minister, 
the governor dissolved the provincial assembly. A full bench of the Lahore High Court 
found the dissolution of the provincial assembly to be mala fide, as it was intended to 
defeat the no confidence motion and frustrate the Supreme Court’s decision to restore 
                                                 
660 Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1993 Supreme Court 473. 
661 Another judge who appeared to have flipped his position was Rafiq Tarar, J. In Khawaja Tariq 
Rahim, then CJ of Lahore High Court, he had supported a generous reading of presidential discretion. 
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Nawaz Sharif’s federal government.662 The crisis escalated as within hours of the High 
Court decision the governor dissolved the provincial assembly for the second time, 
pursuant to the advice of the chief minister. In retaliation, the prime minister attempted 
to impose federal rule in the province without the approval of the president.663 This 
constitutional deadlock was only broken when the CoAS intervened and secured the 
resignations of both the prime minister and the president in July 1993.664  
 
Public Interest Litigation and a Dramatic Expansion in Judicial Review 
 
The Supreme Court decisions in the first three dissolution cases cannot be seen in 
isolation. These cases were adjudicated during a brief period of intense activism during 
which the Supreme Court laid the foundations of ‘Public Interest Litigation’ under its 
Original jurisdiction.665 In a landmark decision delivered in the lead up to the 1988 
election, the court allowed unregistered political parties to contest the forthcoming 
elections and held that elections based on non-party basis violated the fundamental 
rights provisions of the Constitution.666 The petition, brought by Benazir Bhutto, gave 
substance to the freedom of association provided in Article 17, and paved the way for 
the PPP’s return to electoral politics. An elaborate judgment by Haleem, CJ in the 
Benazir Bhutto case is seen as the genesis of Public Interest Litigation in Pakistan.  The 
court loosened the requirement of locus standi, and held that any individual with a bona 
fide interest in challenging a law or executive fiat could bring a petition. In another 
petition brought by Benazir Bhutto, the Supreme Court further paved the way for party-
based elections. It held that electoral symbols had to be allotted to political parties and 
                                                 
662 Parvez Elahi v. Province of Punjab, PLD 1993 Lahore 518. 
663 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, above n 46, 422. 
664 Talbot, above n 202, 328-9. 
665 For example, in what was by then a rather typical post-dictatorship reclamation of jurisdiction, the 
Supreme Court held Martial Law authorities’ actions and sentences of military tribunals to be 
reviewable despite Article 270-A, inserted by the Eighth Amendment, which had sought to 
retrospectively validate and shield such actions from judicial review. See Federation of Pakistan v. 
Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar, PLD 1988 Supreme Court 26. Also see Muhammad Bachal Memon v 
Government of Sindh, PLD 1987 Karachi 296; Ghulam Mustafa Khar v Pakistan, PLD 1988 Lahore 
49. 
666 See Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1988 Supreme Court 416. Although 
provisions comparable to Article 184(3) existed in the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions, there was only one 
notable case in which the courts considered their original jurisdiction. See Begum Zabunnisa 
Hamidullah v Pakistan, PLD 1958 Supreme Court (Pak) 35. The first notable case under Article 184(3) 
of 1975 Constitution was Manzoor Elahi v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1975 Supreme Court 66, but 
even there it was stated that normally the High Courts should be made recourse to first. 
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not to individual candidates, as General Zia’s amendments to the Representation of the 
People Act, 1976 required.667  
 
As the polity emerged from the shadows of the Zia regime, and while the Supreme 
Court made the first tentative strides in developing Public Interest Litigation, it was the 
Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court (SAB) which displayed the most potent 
form of judicial activism.  In a spate of decisions the SAB threatened to dramatically 
alter Pakistan’s legal landscape declaring land reforms, interest-based financial 
instruments, and customary and statutory laws providing for pre-emption to be un-
Islamic.668 The most significant change brought about by the SAB, however, was in 
criminal law. In Gul Hassan, the SAB finally decided on the fate of the Pakistan Penal 
Code (PPC) provisions relating to homicide and hurt, declaring the entire chapter of the 
PPC to be in violation of the injunctions of Islam.669 In a remarkable exercise of judicial 
power the court not only declared the concerned provisions to be null and void, but also 
outlined in considerable detail the key parameters of the legislation that must replace 
the voided provisions.  As noted earlier, Islamization of law had left a tragic of rule of 
difference, which was further exacerbated by the new qisas and diyat laws – Islamic 
provisions concerning homicides and other offences against the person which provided 
for strict retribution and pardon in lieu of compensation.670  
 
While many of the SAB’s decisions tended to curtail individual rights, the use of 
Islamic legality had also expanded the domain of public rights. The SAB built upon the 
earlier jurisprudence of the Shariat courts concerning the development of public law in 
the 1980s. During its period of intense post-Zia activism, the SAB furthered the 
particular strand of Islamic jurisprudence that extended due process requirements. The 
Shariat courts bolstered the legitimacy of judicial review of executive action, and 
declared that an opportunity for a hearing before an impartial court or tribunal was not 
only a ‘guarantee of the rule of law’ but also a fundamental requirement of Islamic 
                                                 
667 See Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1989 Supreme Court 66. 
668 For a summary of some of the leading cases, see Nasim Hasan Shah, ‘Islamisation of Law in Pakistan’ 
(1995) PLD 1995 Journal 37. 
669 Federation of Pakistan v. Gul Hasan Khan, PLD 1989 Supreme Court 633. Appeals from 11 petitions 
had been pending since as early as 1980. 
670 See Moeen Cheema, ‘Beyond Beliefs’, above n 4, 892-900.. 
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injunctions concerning due process.671 The SAB reinforced the right to equality,672 
demanded the accountability of government officials, access to justice and 
independence of judiciary.673 For example, the SAB held that requiring prior sanction 
of government to prosecute civil servants was contrary to the Islamic principles of the 
accountability of the executive.674 Amidst the political turmoil of the early 1990s, and 
widespread allegations of political corruption, the Shariat courts extended the demands 
of accountability to the political executive.675 Even the Shariat courts’ conservative 
property rights jurisprudence emerged as a meaningful safeguard against the abuse of 
executive powers in several cases of land acquisition.676 For instance, the SAB declared 
un-Islamic the practice of requisitioning private property for use by bureaucrats as 
official residences. 
 
By early 1990s, when successive PPP and PML-N governments had begun to 
successfully dismantle the independence and the integrity of the bureaucracy and police 
to develop their own patronage networks in the cadres, the High Courts and the 
Supreme Court picked up the mantle of administrative law from the Shariat Courts.677 
At the same time the Shariat courts had begun to disappear from the scene, ceding the 
expanded terrain of judicial power to the High Courts and the Supreme Court. This 
transition happened in contradictory, though related ways. The displacement of the 
                                                 
671 Zafar Awan v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, PLD 1989 Federal Shariat Court 84, 88. 
672 See, eg, Government of N.W.F.P. v. I. A. Sherwani, PLD 1994 Supreme Court 72.  
673 See, eg, Akbar Ali v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi, 1991 SCMR 2114; Nusrat Baig 
Mirza v. Government of Pakistan, PLD 1991 Supreme Court 509. 
674 Federation of Pakistan v. Zafar Awan, PLD 1992 Supreme Court 72.  
675 See Federation of Pakistan v. Public at Large, PLD 1991 Supreme Court 459. Also see In re: 
N.W.F.P. Provincial Assembly, PLD 1991 Federal Shariat Court 283; In re: Members of the National 
Assembly (Exemption from Preventive Detention and Personal Appearance) Ordinance IX of 1963, PLD 
1989 Federal Shariat Court 3; In re: Members of the National Assembly (Exemption from Preventive 
Detention and Personal Appearance) Ordinance IX of 1963, PLD 1989 Federal Shariat Court 8. 
676 See Province of Punjab v. Amin Jan Naeem, PLD 1994 Supreme Court 141. Also see Nazir Ali Shah 
v. Capital Development Authority, PLD 1992 Federal Shariat Court 361; In re: Land Acquisition Act (I 
of 1894), PLD 1992 Federal Shariat Court 398.  
677 See, eg, Al-Jehad Trust v. Manzoor Ahmad Wattoo, PLD 1992 Lahore 855; Al-Jehad Trust v. Manzoor 
Ahmad Wattoo, PLD 1992 Lahore 875; Pervaiz Elahi v. Province of Punjab, PLD 1993 Lahore 595; 
Muhammad Muqeem Khoso v. President of Pakistan, PLD 1994 Supreme Court 412; Chairman, 
Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation v. Nasir Ahmad, 1995 SCMR 1593. Notably, however, in most such 
cases Islamic law arguments were used obiter, to bolster the moral foundations and the legitimacy of the 
court’s position, rather than as the core legal basis for decisions. The incorporation of Article 2-A, which 
made the Objectives Resolution a substantive part of the Constitution, also enabled the High Courts and 
the Supreme Court to interpret any legislation in the light of Islamic law principles. See Lau, above n 
565, 70-1. See, for example, Sindh High Court Bar Association, Karachi v. The Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, PLD 1991 Karachi 178; M. D. Tahir v. Federation of Pakistan, 1995 CLC 1039; Dr. Hameed 
Ahmad Ayaz v. Government of Punjab, PLD 1997 Lahore 434. 
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SAB by the regular Supreme Court was a relatively smooth process. The SAB was not 
an independent court, but only a special bench of the Supreme Court on which ad hoc 
(ulema) members sat alongside the regular Supreme Court judges. These ulema 
members often appeared to be applying standard judicial reasoning techniques on 
Islamic texts and legal materials. Emboldened by the commonalities in the judicial 
methodology, Supreme Court judges began to increasingly adopt Islamic law 
arguments not only in their judgments on the SAB but also in regular Supreme Court 
decisions. A notable example is of Justice Nasim Hasan Shah, who sat regularly on the 
SAB benches in the early 1990s – his elevation as the Chief Justice of Pakistan 
coincided with the displacement of the SAB as more and more issues of Islamic law 
began to be adjudicated by the regular benches of the Supreme Court.  
 
The displacement of the FSC by the High Court was, on the other hand, a product of 
overt jurisdictional conflict. The High Courts were embroiled in a jurisdictional tussle 
with the FSC, virtually from the outset. Many defendants in Hudood and blasphemy 
cases, who had been aggrieved by the operation of these Islamized criminal laws, 
brought procedural challenges in the High Court in preference over substantive appeals 
to the FSC.678 This forum shopping was the result of the speed with which writs were 
adjudicated, in months rather than years, and the perceived liberalism of the High 
Courts as opposed to the orthodoxy of the FSC.679 The adoption of the qisas and diyat 
laws in the early 1990s expanded the terrain of confrontation between the High Courts 
and the FSC, and empowered the High Courts to adopt Islamic legal principles 
applicable across the entire spectrum of criminal law and procedure such as grant of 
bail, police investigations, evaluation of evidence, prison conditions, and the inability 
of indigent prisoners to pay fines or diyat (compensation for victims).680 The adoption 
                                                 
678 See, eg, Muhammad Bashir v. State, 1989 PCrLJ 459; Riaz Elahi v. State, 1989 PCrLJ 1588; Ameeran 
Bibi v. Superintendent of Police, Bahawalnagar, 1989 PCrLJ 2012; Miandad Ghanghro v. S.H.O., P.S. 
Kandhra, 1989 PCrLJ 1945; State v. S.S.P. Islamabad, PLD 1993 Lahore 112; Mushtaq Raj v. Magistrate 
1st Class, 1994 PCrLJ 497; Naseer Khatoon v. S.H.O. Police Station City, Mianwali, 1994 PCrLJ 1111; 
Amer Habib v. Senior Superintendent of Police, 1995 CLC 29. 
679 See Riaz v. Station House Officer, Police Station, Jhang City, PLD 1998 Lahore 35, where it was held 
that the police had no authority to enter and search premises on the report of an informer or an anonymous 
complaint for that would violate an individual’s right to privacy under Islamic law. Also see Noor 
Muhammad v. S.H.O. Police Station Klurkot, District Bhakkar, 2000 YLR 85; Abdul Majeed v. 
Superintendent of Police, PLJ 1998 Lahore 1158; Nasreen v. Station House Officer, Police Station Batala 
Colony, Faisalabad, 2001 PCrLJ 685. 
680 The Qisas & Diyat laws not only specifically mandated the High Courts to adopt Islamic law precepts 
in writs or appeals in murder and hurt cases, but also “in respect of matters ancillary or akin thereto.” 
§338-F, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. See, eg, Niamat Ali v. State, PLD 2001 Lahore 105. 
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of Article 2-A, which made the Objectives Resolution a substantive part of the 
constitution, also enabled the High Courts and the Supreme Court to interpret any 
legislation in the light of Islamic law principles.681  
 
It was the contradictory confluence of Islamic public law and the High Courts’ 
aggressive interventions challenging the enforcement of Islamized criminal laws that 
enabled the High Courts to engineer a dramatic expansion of their Writ jurisdiction – a 
public law explosion – in the early 1990s. A range of public law matters were raised 
before the High Courts under the Writ jurisdiction, many of which ultimately ended up 
before the Supreme Court upon appeal.682 Islamic law arguments and principles began 
to increasingly feature in the decisions of the High Courts and the Supreme Court in 
matters as diverse as constitutional law, administrative law, criminal procedure, civil 
procedure, family law, taxation, contracts, torts and environmental law. Notably, 
however, in most such cases Islamic law arguments were used obiter, to bolster the 
moral foundations and the legitimacy of the court’s position, rather than as the core 
legal basis for decisions.683 The courts also sought to bolster their own independence 
as well as push for the belated separation of the lower judiciary from the bureaucracy. 
In Sharaf Faridi, the Supreme Court upheld the Sindh High Court’s earlier directions 
                                                 
681 See Lau, above n 565, 70-1. See, eg, Sindh High Court Bar Association, Karachi v. The Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, PLD 1991 Karachi 178; M. D. Tahir v. Federation of Pakistan, 1995 CLC 1039; 
Dr. Hameed Ahmad Ayaz v. Government of Punjab, PLD 1997 Lahore 434.  
682 The courts enhanced the standards of transparency and procedural fairness required of the 
bureaucracy. See, eg, Nawab Khan v. Government of Pakistan, PLD 1994 Supreme Court 222. In 
matters related to criminal process, the courts asserted wide powers of directing the registration, 
quashment and conduct of criminal cases short of active control or supervision of trials. See Shaukat 
Ali Dogar v. Ghulam Qasim, PLD 1994 Supreme Court 281. The courts also scrutinized preventive and 
illegal detentions, torture and abuse of police powers, and granted remedies such as orders for the 
disciplining, suspension and dismissal of officers or award of compensation for the victims. See, eg, 
Shazia Parveen v. District Magistrate, PLD 1988 Lahore 611; Mrs. Arshad v. Government of Punjab, 
PLJ 1994 Supreme Court 393; Mazharuddin v. State, 1998 PCrLJ 1035. 
683 See Muhammad Shabbir Ahmad Khan v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2001 Supreme Court 18 
(customary law of inheritance inapplicable); Mrs. Anjum Irfan v. LDA, PLD 2002 Lahore 555 (Islamic 
law arguments on environmental issues); M. D. Tahir v. Provincial Government, 1995 CLC 1730 
(wildlife protection); Dr. Capt. Muhammad Aslam Javed v. The Secretary, Government of Punjab Health 
Department, 1997 MLD 498 (allotment of official residence); Hussain Bakhsh Khan v. Deputy 
Commissioner, D.G. Khan, 1999 CLC 88 (liability for issuing false divorce deed); Qazi Akhtar Ali v. 
Director of Agriculture, 2000 PLC (CS) 784 (payment of back salary tantamount to forced labour 
contrary to injunctions of Islam); Abu Bakr Haider Shah v. Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue 
Punjab, 2004 CLC 834 (appointment of prayer leader in mosque); Habibullah v. The State, 2009 MLD 
1162 (right to appeal); Ch. Mubashar Hussain v. Returning Officer, Kharian, District Gujrat, PLD 2008 
Lahore 134 (disqualification from becoming a member of parliament on account of a default of bank 
loan guarantee); Anjuman Jamia Islamia, Jamia Masjid, Garden Block, New Garden Town, Lahore v. 
Lahore Development Authority, 2005 MLD 215 (payment of purchase price of land on which mosque 
had already been built). 
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to the provincial government to separate judicial magistracy from the executive and 
place judicial magistrates under the authority of the High Court.684 In Azizullah Memon, 
the courts declared the vesting of criminal trial jurisdictions in the bureaucracy 
unconstitutional.685 The High Courts also curtailed the powers of the executive to 
legislate through ordinances.686  
 
While the High Courts considerably expanded the judicial review of executive action 
with the backing of the Supreme Court, the text of Article 199 and historical practice 
imposed notable constraints. Writs could be brought only if there was no suitable 
alternate remedy and, except in cases of habeas corpus and quo warranto type writs, 
on the application of an ‘aggrieved person.’687  While the High Courts began to loosen 
both the requirements of a lack of alternate remedy and locus standi, particularly in 
cases falling under their fundamental rights jurisdiction,688 the Original jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court emerged as the more suitable avenue for a truer form of Public 
Interest Litigation. During the 1990s the Supreme Court further began to waive 
procedural requirements,689 and whittled down the criteria of standing to the point that 
any bona fide representative could bring a petition on behalf of an effected group or 
class.690  The court also adopted the practice of initiating Public Interest Litigation cases 
                                                 
684 See Government of Sindh v. Sharaf Faridi, PLD 1994 Supreme Court 105; Sharaf Faridi v. The 
Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, PLD 1989 Karachi 404. 
685 See Government of Balochistan v. Azizullah Memon, PLD 1993 Supreme Court 341. The Supreme 
Court upheld the High Court’s decision that a 1968 Ordinance was unconstitutional to the extent it 
gave powers to the bureaucracy to take cognizance of and try certain offences. 
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Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1999 Lahore 320; Government of Punjab v. Ziaullah, 1992 SCMR 602. 
687 Historically, the term ‘aggrieved person’ was understood to mean a person who had suffered a legal 
wrong or whose direct interest was involved. In Tariq Transport Company v. Sargodha-Bhera Bus 
Service, PLD 1958 Supreme Court (Pak) 437, the Supreme Court had held that a legal right was the 
requirement for standing in mandamus and a direct personal interest in other writs. In Fazal Din v. 
Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore, PLD 1969 SC 223, the court held that there was no need for a right 
in a strict juristic sense so long as there was a personal interest in the performance of a legal duty. 
However, the courts denied pro bono publico or taxpayer standing in The Province of East Pakistan v. 
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Company v. Pakistan, 1993 SCMR 1798; Muhammad Ismail v. Fazal Zada, PLD 1996 Supreme Court 
246. Contrast from Kalsoom Malik v. Assistant Commissioner, 1996 SCMR 710; Muhammad Shahbaz 
Sharif v. The State, 1997 SCMR 1361. On the relaxation of the rules of standing, see Multiline 
Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee, 1995 SCMR 362; Ardeshir Cowasjee v. Karachi Building Control 
Authority, 1999 SCMR 2883. 
689 See, eg, Ghulam Ali v. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi, PLD 1990 Supreme Court 1; Fazal Jan v. Roshan 
Din, PLD 1990 Supreme Court 661. 
690 See, eg, Shrin Munir v. Government of Punjab, PLD 1990 Supreme Court 295; and I. A. Sherwani v. 
Government of West Pakistan, 1991 SCMR 1041.  
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suo motu and the methodology of 'rolling review' – that is, supervising executive action 
on a periodic basis through interim orders rather than issuing a final decisive judgment 
– from the Indian Supreme Court.691 Furthermore, the court appointed judicial 
commissions investigating various facets of governance, and began to grant expansive 
remedies.692  
 
The broadening array of public law concerns brought to the Supreme Court in its 
appellate jurisdiction encouraged the court to take up similar matters directly under its 
Original jurisdiction as well. Given the text of Article 184(3), for any case to be brought 
under the Original jurisdiction it must raise an issue of enforcement of fundamental 
rights provisions in the constitution. The Supreme Court notably expanded the ambit of 
fundamental rights to include socio-economic rights within the umbrella of the right to 
life and scrutinized government action, regulation and increasingly even policymaking 
in areas that were hitherto considered non-justiciable.693  However, a review of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the 1990s reveals a relatively weak record on the 
substantive protection of individual and civil rights. Apart from the initial freedom of 
association decisions which paved the way for electoral politics, some notable 
pronouncements against gender discrimination represented the only other strand of 
substantive rights-advancing jurisprudence by the Supreme Court.694 Beyond that, the 
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692 See, eg, General Secretary Salt Mines Labour Union v. Director, Industries, 1994 SCMR 2061, 
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Chairman, Pakistan International Airline Corporation v. Sherin Dokht, 1996 SCMR 1520; Muhammad 
Iqbal Khan v. Chancellor, Gomal University, 1995 CLC 510; Naseem Firdous v. Punjab Small 
Industries Corporation, PLD 1995 Lahore 584. However, the Supreme Court’s record on minority 
rights generally was particularly weak and was distinctly tarnished by Zaheeruddin v. The State, 1993 
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operative parts of the cases invoking fundamental rights essentially addressed 
grievances against the administration, and scrutinized the propriety and procedural 
fairness of bureaucratic action.695 It appears that the court was utilizing the notion of 
constitutional rights principally to extend its Original jurisdiction to adjudicate matters 
of formal constitutionalism, administrative law and security laws directly rather than 
indirectly through appeals from High Courts’ decisions in Writs.  
 
However, collectively the High Courts’ Writ jurisdiction and the Supreme Court’s 
Original jurisdiction emerged as an effective avenue for challenging adverse 
government action. One key factor in the expansion of the courts’ jurisdiction was the 
increasing reliance by Pakistan’s expanding urban middle, professional and industrial 
classes on judicial review to challenge the full gamut of executive operations and 
decisions.696 The superior courts thus found their constituency expanding in these 
influential and vocal classes, beyond the traditional support base of the legal profession. 
While this provided the courts with the political capital necessary to withstand pressures 
and pushback from the executive, there was also the risk of elite capture of the Writ 
jurisdiction and Public Interest Litigation. By the end of the decade of 1990s such 
concerns were validated.697  Nonetheless, in the interim, the emergence of such robust 
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697 See Werner Menski, ‘Public Interest Litigation: A Strategy for the Future’ in W. Menski, R. Alam 
and M. Raza (eds), Public Interest Litigation in Pakistan (Pakistan Law House, 2000) 122-4.  
  189
judicial review jurisdictions positioned the superior judiciary as a key component of the 
trichotomy of state powers.  
 
JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS AND THE POLITICIZATION OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
From a Mediator to a Party in Constitutional Conflict 
 
The tenure of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan had demonstrated the unworkability of 
Zia’s constitutional bequest. However, the simultaneous dismissal of parliament and 
president, and with that the prospects of the first relatively free and fair elections post-
Zia, promised a respite from the inherent contradictions of this constitutional scheme. 
The incoming government would be able to appoint its own president, thereby assured 
of completing its term relatively safe from the harassment of an assertive presidency 
and military. The PPP re-emerged as the largest single party in the 1993 elections, 
although it again lacked a simple majority in the National Assembly. The 1993 elections 
also marked the consolidation of distinct provincial and regional divides in Pakistan’s 
electoral politics. The PPP found its support base largely reduced to the predominantly 
rural and peri-urban areas of southern Pakistan – it did not win a single seat in Punjab’s 
seven largest urban centres.698 Nonetheless, Benazir Bhutto was able to form a coalition 
government even in the Punjab and managed to elect a stalwart of the party, Farooq 
Leghari, as the president. Even the politically treacherous process of appointing a CoAS 
was successfully negotiated – the president appointed the senior-most officer upon the 
advice of the prime minister.699  
 
A new destabilizing dynamic in Bhutto’s second tenure, however, were the tensions 
with the superior judiciary over the appointment of judges. The government had 
justifiable suspicions of an anti-PPP bias in the superior judiciary, given particularly 
how the dissolution cases had been decided. Since the 1970s the party had not been in 
power long enough to have a significant say in judicial appointments. In an effort to 
counterbalance the ideological and political biases of the judiciary, the PPP government 
                                                 
698 Talbot, above n 202, 332-3. 
699 Shafqat, above n 521, 241. 
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appointed nearly forty judges in the Lahore and Sindh High Courts without consulting 
the chief justices, transferred disliked judges to the FSC, and made several ad hoc 
appointments to the Supreme Court.700  The government, violating the convention of 
elevating the senior-most judge of the Supreme Court as the Chief Justice, appointed 
Sajjad Ali Shah in that position arguably swayed by his dissenting judgments in the 
earlier dissolution cases. The appointments and transfers of High Court judges were 
challenged in the Supreme Court, leading to overt friction between the prime minister 
and Shah, CJ because of the latter’s decision to proceed with the case contrary to 
expectations and the prime minister’s wishes.701  
 
In Al-Jehad Trust (known as the Judges’ case) the Supreme Court examined a range of 
questions related to judicial appointments. The key issue was whether the president had 
unfettered discretion in appointing judges to the superior courts. The relevant 
constitutional provisions – Articles 177 and 193 – required the president to make 
appointments to the Supreme Court ‘after consultation with’ the Chief Justice of 
Pakistan, and with the concerned chief justice in case of appointments to a High Court. 
Relying upon the principle of judicial independence in Islam and Indian precedents, the 
Supreme Court held that the consultation required for appointments to the superior 
judiciary had to be effective, meaningful, purposive, and consensus-oriented.702 The 
court also held that the president could not reject a chief justice’s nomination without 
giving cogent objective reasons, nor appoint someone whose nomination had been 
rejected by the Chief Justice of Pakistan or the Chief Justice of the High Court, 
effectively giving them the final say in judicial appointments. As such, several recent 
appointees to the High Court were effectively dismissed or forced to resign. The 
Supreme Court further reduced the role of the president by holding that in making 
judicial appointments the president was also bound by the advice of the prime minister.  
 
The court also shut the door on a number of ways the executive had historically used to 
pressurize superior judiciary. Even in the absence of express constitutional text the 
court mandated fixed timeframes within which a vacancy on the bench had to be filled. 
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The court also held that the senior-most judge of a High Court had the legitimate 
expectation of being appointed as the chief justice, unless sound reasons for a contrary 
decision were recorded. An acting chief justice of the Supreme Court or a High Court 
could not be a consulted for judicial appointments. Lastly, a sitting chief justice or a 
judge of the High Court could not be transferred to the FSC without his consent. The 
decision, however, left two important issues unaddressed: whether the seniority 
principle was also applicable to the appointment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court; and whether the appointments of superior court judges after presumably notional 
consultation with acting chief justices during Zia’s Martial Law were to be similarly 
voided. The government filed a President’s Reference raising these very questions in 
an effort to embarrass Shah, CJ. When appointed as the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court in 1994, Sajjad Ali Shah had superseded two senior judges, and his initial 
appointment to the High Court in 1978 had been made after consultation with an acting 
chief justice.703   
 
Benazir Bhutto initially refused to follow the Supreme Court’s order of removing 
improper appointees and reversing the transfers, and even though ultimately relented, 
this exacerbated emergent tensions with President Leghari. Leghari filed another 
President’s Reference seeking the Supreme Court’s guidance on whether he could fill 
the existing vacancies on the bench without the advice of the prime minister.704 In 
November 1996, President Leghari dismissed his own party’s government and 
dissolved the parliament utilizing Article 58(2)(b) powers for the fourth time within a 
decade. He presented detailed grounds for the dissolution, which included confrontation 
with the judiciary over appointments and the refusal to implement its orders. In Benazir 
Bhutto v President of Pakistan, the Supreme Court faced yet another challenge to the 
dissolution of parliament under Article 58(2)(b). However, this time around the court 
itself appeared to be a concerned party in the entire episode and behaved in a patently 
partisan way.  
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An unusually small seven-member bench of the Supreme Court upheld the dissolution 
of Benazir Bhutto’s second government.705 The chief justice employed delaying tactics 
and prioritized other petitions, including an old one in which the constitutionality of the 
Eighth Amendment was ultimately upheld.706 The delay in the decision – handed 
merely four days before the elections were scheduled to be held – proved disastrous for 
the PPP’s prospects. Shah, CJ wrote the main opinion for the majority and made a futile 
attempt to rationalize the earlier dissolution cases. A close analysis of the four Supreme 
Court decisions on the exercise of Article 58(2)(b) powers reveals that any such attempt 
to find a coherent set of principles from these cases would require a flight of 
imagination.  The Supreme Court appeared to be relying not only on changing 
interpretations of Article 58(2)(b) but also differential understandings of the role of this 
provision in Pakistan’s constitutional scheme. During this extended saga of political 
instability, the superior judiciary had itself become a key player in the constitutional 
politics it was mediating, and its judgment was thus clouded by its perceived 
institutional interests.  
 
The 1997 elections, faulty as they were, again appeared to promise the end of political 
uncertainty.707  This time Nawaz Sharif’s PML (N) emerged as the clear winner with a 
two-third majority in both houses of parliament. This supra-majority enabled the 
government to make constitutional amendments. Within two months of the elections 
the parliament passed the Thirteenth Amendment which repealed Article 58(2)(b), and 
transferred the power of appointing provincial governors and services chiefs to the 
prime minister.708  Pakistan’s constitutional scheme thus reverted to a parliamentary 
system of government, as opposed to the quasi-presidential system that had been in 
place since the Eighth Amendment in 1985. The Fourteenth Amendment passed shortly 
thereafter provided for the disqualification of members of parliament who defected or 
‘committed a breach of party discipline.’709 This ended the practice of floor-crossing, 
which had dogged parliamentary politics since 1985. It also insulated Nawaz Sharif 
from a vote of no confidence during the five-year term of the parliament. Prime Minister 
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Sharif was thus firmly in charge within a few months of ascension to power, and the 
president had been reduced to an essentially ceremonial role.  
 
Despite the constitutionally secure position of the government, a fractious relationship 
with the Supreme Court dogged Nawaz Sharif’s second government as well. The first 
significant contention arose over the Fourteenth Amendment. Even though in an earlier 
case it was the Supreme Court which had recommended such measures to curb floor-
crossing, the court entertained a petition challenging the constitutionality of the 
amendment.710 A Supreme Court bench headed by Shah, CJ took the unprecedented 
step of issuing an interim order suspending the operation of the amendment.711 The 
prime minister criticized the court for suspending the amendment and was served with 
a contempt notice. While the contempt proceedings were underway, a group of PML 
(N) supporters protesting in front of the Supreme Court building broke the police 
cordon and entered the premises chanting slogans against the chief justice. This was 
seen as a deliberate ploy by the government to intimidate and humiliate the chief justice. 
The chief justice requested the Army to depute military personnel for the security of 
the court and the judges. Noticeably, the military declined to intervene. 
 
Two days before the attack on the court a split had emerged in the Supreme Court. A 
two-member bench of the court sitting in the Quetta registry admitted a petition under 
Article 184(3) challenging Shah, CJ’s ascension as the chief justice and issued an order 
for his suspension. Three such petitions had been pending at various registries of the 
court claiming that his appointment as chief justice violated the principles articulated 
in the Judges’ case. The chief justice immediately passed an administrative order 
declaring the Quetta bench’s order to be without lawful authority. Two separate benches 
of the court declared the chief justice’s administrative order to be invalid. The matter 
was taken up by a larger bench of Supreme Court led Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui, J in 
Malik Asad Ali.712 While the case was being heard, a separate three-member bench 
headed by the chief justice purportedly struck down the Thirteenth Amendment, 
thereby restoring Art 58(2)(b). It was rumoured that President Leghari would dismiss 
the government and dissolve parliament. The larger bench of the Supreme Court 
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immediately restrained Shah, CJ from performing any judicial or administrative 
functions, and appointed an acting chief justice in his place. President Leghari tendered 
his resignation citing his refusal to de-notify Sajjad Ali Shah as chief justice. 
 
In its final decision in Malik Asad Ali, the larger bench unanimously held Shah, CJ’s 
appointment as unconstitutional, extending the seniority principle laid down in the 
Judges’ case to the appointment of the Chief Justice of Pakistan as well. The court 
noted that if each judge of the court were eligible for the highest office that might create 
the possibility or perception of certain judges attempting to win the government’s 
favour through their decisions. The seniority principle was justified as necessary for 
safeguarding the independence, impartiality and the collegiality of the court. 
Nonetheless, the entire saga left the credibility and public perception of the court in 
shambles. The court quickly moved to dispose of any outstanding issues in the 
aftermath of this disaster. In Wukala Mahaz Barai Tahafuz Dastoor, the Supreme Court 
rejected the basic structure doctrine and disavowed the power to suspend or strike down 
a constitutional amendment.713 The court also vacated the contempt notice issued to the 
prime minister, holding that the contempt provision in the constitution had to be read 
harmoniously with the freedom of speech and privileges of parliamentarians in order to 
allow reasonable criticism of the court.714  
 
Elective Dictatorship and Constitutional States of Emergency 
 
As the judicial strife unfolded, Pakistan appeared to be headed towards another elective 
dictatorship. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments had given the prime minister 
unassailable sway over the parliament. Even the military appeared to have been 
considerably reduced in stature when the incumbent Chief of Army resigned over 
differences with the prime minister.715  The prime minister appointed a relatively junior 
officer of his choice, General Pervez Musharraf, as the military chief. While these 
developments were good in form, the highly personalised style of party leadership and 
patronage-based control of the bureaucracy that the PML (N) had managed to develop 
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did not augur well for the prospects of democracy and constitutionalism in the country. 
Having secured its dominance, the government turned its attention to the political 
opposition. Reminiscent of the harassment techniques of the Zia era, the PML (N) 
government used criminal prosecution as the principle means of hounding and 
discrediting the PPP.  The parliament passed a new set of accountability laws – the 
Ehtesab Act, 1997. More than a dozen cases were selectively filed against Benazir 
Bhutto and her spouse, Asif Zardari, conviction in any of which would have led to their 
disqualification from being a member of parliament. In 1999, the Lahore High Court 
found Benazir Bhutto and Zardari guilty of corrupt practices in one such accountability 
reference and sentenced them to five years’ imprisonment. 716 On appeal, the Supreme 
Court found sufficient evidence that the judges had been pressurized, and overturned 
the convictions.717 The government also displayed limited tolerance for criticism and 
was not averse to intimidating the press.718  
 
Despite its plummeting credibility and an apparent resolve to avoid political questions 
after the removal of the removal of Sajjad Ali Shah as CJ, the Supreme Court repeatedly 
found itself in confrontation with the elected government. At the core of contention was 
the government’s continuing attempts to undermine the superior courts by creating 
special courts and alternatives to regular judicial proceedings. In Nawaz Sharif’s second 
term in office his government displayed a penchant for ad hoc measures and special 
tribunals that had not been witnessed since Zia’s Martial Law. As sectarian and political 
violence reached an unparalleled level, the government sought the remedy in the 
creation of a broad range of terrorism offences and new anti-terrorism courts through 
the Anti-Terrorism Act.719 The Act made confession before police admissible in anti-
terrorism trials and provided for entry into premises and searches without warrant, 
amongst other dilutions of due process,. Judges of the anti-terrorism courts were 
appointed by the federal government and lacked tenure. In Mehram Ali, the Supreme 
Court invalidated several provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act for being in violation of 
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the Constitution.720 The court interpreted Article 203 broadly and held that the anti-
terrorism and other special courts created under Article 175(1) were subordinate courts, 
hence subject to the High Courts’ supervision.721 The Supreme Court reiterated that the 
separation and independence of judiciary from the executive were cardinal principles 
of Islamic law, and decried the tendency to create parallel court systems that were not 
subject to review. It directed the government to amend the Act in order to place the 
anti-terrorism courts under the High Courts’ supervision and provide their judges with 
security of tenure.722 
 
The use of emergency powers by the Nawaz Sharif government caused further tensions 
with the Supreme Court. In May 1998 India conducted tests for nuclear explosions, 
thereby destabilizing the military and strategic balance in South Asia. Pakistan followed 
suit despite tremendous international pressure.  Pakistan had been labouring under US 
sanctions for development of nuclear capacity for nearly a decade. The nuclear tests 
prompted further sanctions and cuts in foreign assistance taking the country to the brink 
of bankruptcy.723 The government declared a state of emergency which entailed the 
suspension of all fundamental rights, including most pertinently in the given context 
the protection of private property. The government also issued an order under Article 
233(2) for the suspension of the judicial review jurisdictions of the superior courts. 
Citing fears of large scale withdrawals from foreign currency accounts in Pakistan’s 
banks the government passed an ordinance which enabled it to confiscate all foreign 
currency accounts, and forced an exchange into Pakistan rupees at a significantly lower 
rate.724 There were widespread rumours that key government functionaries had 
liquidated their own accounts or transferred funds overseas, thereby benefitting from 
their insider knowledge of imminent nuclear tests. The ordinance was challenged and 
held to be unconstitutional by a full bench of the Supreme Court in Shaukat Ali Mian.725 
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The promulgation of emergency and suspension of fundamental rights was also 
challenged before the court by former president, Farooq Leghari. 
 
In Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari, the Supreme Court upheld the imposition of 
emergency but invalidated the suspension of fundamental rights and the courts’ judicial 
review jurisdictions.726 Relying on the 58(2)(b) cases, the court held that satisfaction of 
the President regarding the existence of a grave emergency was not purely subjective, 
and the courts could review whether the President’s judgment was perverse, absurd, 
mala fide or based on irrelevant considerations. Further, the court held that the 
purported ouster of its jurisdiction did not shield a promulgation of emergency that was 
coram non judice, mala fide or based on irrelevant considerations. As such, the court 
departed from the settled understanding that the promulgation of emergency was not 
amenable to judicial review.727 The court’s position that the suspension of fundamental 
rights jurisdictions of the courts under Article 233(2) was subject to a proportionality 
test represented an even more radical departure from precedent. It further held that the 
suspension order must have a direct nexus with the aims of the promulgation of 
emergency, and should lead to minimal interference with the citizens’ rights. Most 
significantly, as Article 233(1) already enables derogation from certain fundamental 
rights, and several of the fundamental rights provisions allow for reasonable 
restrictions, an order for the blanket suspension of rights and judicial review under 
Article 233(2) must be based on an exceptional justification, thereby effectively reading 
the provision into a nullity.  
 
In October 1998, the relations between the PML-N and the MQM reached breaking 
point. The MQM was widely blamed for mafia-style killings, extortions and 
kidnappings for ransom in Karachi during Nawaz Sharif’s second term.728 When the 
MQM was implicated in the murder of notable philanthropist and former Governor of 
Sindh, Hakim Said, the federal government imposed governor’s rule in the province 
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and began a crackdown against MQM activists.729  The government also dismissed its 
minority government, suspended the functioning of the provincial assembly, called in 
the military in aid of civil powers, and set up military courts for the trial of civilians.730 
In Jalal Mehmood Shah, the Supreme Court held that while the provincial government 
could be dismissed under Article 232, the provincial assembly could not be made non-
functional.731 In Liaquat Hussain, the Supreme Court also declared the setting up of 
military courts through this device to be unconstitutional.732 The court noted that the 
armed forces are part of the executive. The ‘creation of courts outside the control and 
supervision of Supreme Court or High Courts, therefore, not only militates against the 
independence of judiciary but it also negates the principle of trichotomy of power which 
is the basic feature of the Constitution.’733 
 
Faced with recalcitrant courts that offered the powerful elected government its only 
meaningful opposition, the government attempted to play the well-worn religious card 
from General Zia’s playbook. In August 1998, the government moved the Constitution 
(Fifteenth Amendment) Bill in the National Assembly. The bill sought to add Article 
2B to the Constitution, which would explicitly make the Qur’an and Sunnah the 
supreme law of the land. More significantly, it would empower the parliament to pass 
a constitutional amendment ‘providing for the removal of any impediment in the 
enforcement of any matter relating to Shariah and the implementation of the Injunctions 
of Islam’ by a simple majority of both houses, and thereby override several of the thorny 
decisions of the superior courts. The government presently lacked the requisite two-
third majority in the Senate to pass such a constitutional amendment bill and also faced 
vociferous criticism in the media. The constitutional amendment provision of the bill 
was removed, and only a watered down version passed by the National Assembly in 
October. Nonetheless, the government had shown the extent to which it was prepared 
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to go in the quest for power, and it was only a matter of time when it would have the 
final piece of the puzzle in place. The next round of elections for the Senate scheduled 
for March 2000 would provide the governing PML-N with a two-third majority in the 
Senate, and hence the power to amend the constitution at will.  
 
Despite such high profile interventions, by the end of the decade judicial activism, 
Public Interest Litigation and judicial review had lost much of their sheen. In the 
domain of constitutional law, the courts’ efforts at instilling the basics of formal 
constitutionalism had achieved little in terms of fostering political stability. The courts 
were seen as political an institution as any other, prone to rapidly changing and at times 
visibly self-serving positions. In administrative law, the courts’ aggressive attempts to 
instil rule-boundedness and meritocracy in bureaucratic appointments, transfers, 
disciplining and conduct had no impact in terms of impeding the progressive 
politicization of the bureaucracy and the police. The visible pronouncements 
challenging the misuse of anti-terrorism laws and military courts masked the norm of 
police brutality, impunity of the paramilitary forces during extended security 
operations, and the frequent use of staged 'encounters' or extra-judicial killings by the 
police and security forces. Public Interest Litigation was on the decline by the end of 
the decade, as a Supreme Court overburdened with pending cases deliberately scaled 
back its interventions.734  These cases cases appeared to be mere symbolic assertions of 
judicial review jurisdiction wrapped in glorious language of fundamental rights, but 
which delivered little in terms of concrete changes in state practices. Both the Original 
and Writ jurisdictions also appeared to be suffering from elite capture, as their speedier 
processes became useful avenues of vindicating private rights under the banner of 
public law by urban upper and middle class litigants who could afford the better and 
more expensive champions of access to justice.735  
 
END OF CIVILIAN RULE AND THE LEGACY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
 
In May and June 1999, Pakistan and India faced off in a localized military confrontation 
in the Kargil sector of Kashmir, which threatened to escalate into a full-fledged war 
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between the now-nuclear neighbours. Pakistan’s troops had successfully infiltrated 
across the border during the winter months, and set up ad hoc military posts that choked 
India’s only supply line to hundreds of thousands of troops stationed further north of 
the Kargil sector. India threatened an aggressive military response, not just in Kargil or 
Kashmir but across the entirety of the India-Pakistan border, and the prospects of a 
nuclear apocalypse loomed over South Asia. It appeared that Pakistan’s military had 
devised and undertaken the operation in Kargil without the knowledge or approval of 
the prime minister. On 5 July 1999, the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced the 
unilateral withdrawal of Pakistan’s troops under pressure from the US. This was seen 
as a humiliating betrayal by the military and set the stage for the inevitable civil-military 
confrontation. On 12 October 1999, the prime minister dismissed General Pervez 
Musharraf from the post of the CoAS and appointed a relatively junior officer in his 
place. General Musharraf was aboard a Pakistan International Airline flight, returning 
from an official overseas visit, when the decision to sack him was announced.  The 
military command refused to accept the dismissal of General Musharraf, took over 
Pakistan Television and other state installations, and placed the prime minister under 
house arrest. By the time military troops cleared Karachi airport for the landing of 
General Musharraf’s plane, a bloodless coup was well underway.  
 
As Pakistan entered another cycle of military rule, the ideology at the core of praetorian 
governmentality appeared to have been deeply entrenched. Nonetheless, the notable 
changes in state structure and society during a decade of civilian rule presented as much 
a challenge to direct military rule as it had been to civilian governance. The 
consolidation of Pakistan’s political and economic elites, and the expansion of urban 
and professional segments of Pakistan’s middle classes, presented a more complex and 
pluralistic social reality that military rule would have to contend with. The increasing 
radicalization of segments of Pakistan’s population, a long-term consequence of 
Islamization-related policies and the blowback of participation in the Afghan war, also 
presented mounting social and governance challenges. A more immediate obstacle to 
prolonged military rule came from within the state itself. While the bureaucracy had 
been reduced in stature and independence, the emergence of the superior courts as an 
important player in constitutional politics required accommodation. The public law 
jurisprudence of the superior courts, developed in a context of protracted engagement 
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with political controversies and increasing confrontation with the executive, imposed 
considerable constraints on unchecked military rule. 
 
In the years leading up to the Musharraf coup the superior courts had asserted their 
independence, had held military courts and specialist tribunals to be unconstitutional, 
circumscribed emergency powers, and whittled away considerable areas of executive 
prerogative. The judiciary’s role in previous eras of military rule provided sufficient 
indications that the courts would cede considerable space to the military, especially 
during the early years. However, the progressive rise in the stature and power of the 
judiciary in the post-Zia era entailed that the extent and duration of such constitutional 
space would be relatively limited. Through their Writ and Original jurisdictions, the 
courts had also cultivated a specific constituency amongst urban elite, professional and 
middle classes, who had become used to pressing their demands and interests upon the 
state through the judiciary. These classes would inevitably thrust the courts in the role 
of mediating their political, economic and governance concerns with the military-led 
state.  Public law thus emerged as the forum for prosecuting and resolving many 
political controversies at a time when the space for electoral politics was constrained 






‘MILITARY INCORPORATED’ AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAWYERS’ 
MOVEMENT 
 
Pakistan entered its third consecutive cycle of military rule with General Musharraf’s 
coup d’état in October 1999, to be followed inevitably by yet another transition to 
civilian-democratic governance. While the technology of political control and 
constitutional machinations of the Musharraf era resembled those of the Zia years, the 
state structure and social landscape that the military regime inherited had been 
fundamentally transformed in ways that demanded an altogether different mode of 
governance. The enhanced degree of elite consolidation in Pakistan, in particular, 
constrained the space for overt authoritarianism, and important sections of the dominant 
classes had to be meaningfully accommodated or coopted. Furthermore, the judiciary’s 
emergence as an important institutional player, and the public law jurisprudence of the 
1990s, also necessitated at least nominal adherence and superficial commitment to basic 
principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law. On the converse, the military’s 
deeper penetration into the state structure and political economy had also engendered 
within the officer cadres some recognition for the need to maintain a stable civil-
democratic façade. 
 
Over the decade of General Musharraf’s rule, the ‘Military Inc.’ displayed increasing 
sophistication as a key stakeholder in the political dispensation.736 Unlike previous 
military regimes, martial law was not formally imposed nor military courts created to 
suppress dissent. The Musharraf regime was successful in pacifying large segments of 
Pakistan’s urban middle and upper-middle classes through economic liberalization.  A 
program of structural change in the bureaucracy, lower judiciary and the police, as well 
as the creation of a functional local government system enabled General Musharraf to 
present himself as a reformer, both domestically and at the international stage. 
Maintaining a politically liberal stance through de-Islamization of laws, proclaiming an 
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outlook of ‘enlightened moderation’ in matters of religion, loosening state control over 
electronic media, and countering religious radicalization in Pakistan’s tribal areas also 
enabled the regime to woo the civil society. Most significantly, unlike General Zia, the 
Musharraf was successful in holding elections and managing a symbiotic relationship 
with the civilian government, whereby real power remained with the military but a 
credible semblance of transitional democratic governance could be upheld. 
 
In the decade leading up to General Musharraf’s coup the superior courts had 
dramatically expanded their role and powers.  The superior courts, which had 
experienced firsthand Nawaz Sharif’s dictatorial tendencies in his second term, 
appeared to be sympathetic to the Musharraf regime and once again validated the 
military takeover on the touchstone of the doctrine of state necessity.  This was the first 
period of military rule where the courts’ judicial review jurisdiction had not been 
suspended or formally curtailed. The continuing judicial review of executive action 
aligned with the regime’s proclaimed agenda of the structural reform of the state and 
anti-corruption drive. This accommodation between the military regime and the courts 
was, however, unlikely to last. Given the unprecedented number of serving and retired 
military personnel who were appointed to key positions in the bureaucracy, regulatory 
bodies and state corporations, the line between military and civil branches of the state 
had been blurred. Furthermore, the Musharraf regime’s close relationship with the 
civilian government operating under it meant that judicial review of the government’s 
actions increasingly got too close to the regime’s core interests. 
 
The inevitable tension over the contours of judicial review arose when Iftikhar 
Muhammad Chaudhry took over as the twentieth Chief Justice of Pakistan in June 2005. 
As per the rules of superannuation and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court 
in the Judges’ case, Justice Chaudhry was likely to become one of the longest-serving 
chief justices of the apex court, with a scheduled tenure of more than seven years. As 
Justice Chaudhry began to lead the court in a more assertive brand of judicial review, 
the contradictions between the authoritarian base and liberal façade of the military-
dominated state became more evident. Unlike General Ayub or Zia, Musharraf was 
dependent on the electoral success of political parties and groups allied with him in 
order to effect a tenuous transition to another term in office. Such robust judicial review 
in the buildup to an election, which undermined the perceptions of good governance, 
  204
thus threatened an existential crisis for the regime. In March 2007, General Musharraf 
unceremoniously dismissed Justice Chaudhry from office, precipitating a ‘Lawyers’ 
Movement’ that paved the way for more democratic forms of governance, and 
ultimately the ouster of General Musharraf. More significantly, the Lawyers’ 
Movement created the conditions precedent for the second wave of judicial assertion of 
power, as Pakistan entered yet another phase of fractious political competition. 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF MILITARY INCORPORATED  
 
Transition to Hybrid Government 
 
When Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had attempted the dismissal of General Musharraf, 
the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) was aboard a passenger aircraft returning to Pakistan 
from an official visit of Sri Lanka.  The timing of his dismissal had been orchestrated 
to ensure that General Musharraf would not be in a position to actively command a 
military coup, and a relatively junior officer who was nominated to replace him would 
have the space to affect a successful takeover of military command. However, even 
when the CoAS was thus incapacitated, soldiers of the notorious 111 Brigade stationed 
close to the nation’s capital successfully completed a bloodless overthrow of the 
civilian government, with the full support of a high command unhappy with such 
blatant intervention in its affairs.  This wasn’t a 'banana republic' military coup. 
Pakistan’s military, heir to the colonial British India Army’s structure and traditions, 
has historically displayed great discipline and coherent action in safeguarding its 
institutional interests. This was yet another occurrence that demonstrated the extent to 
which the military’s institutionalized power could dominate the state structure if its 
corporate interests were threatened. 
 
Upon taking power, the military regime began to unveil a refined version of the 
constitutional blueprint of military rule developed by Pakistan’s earlier military 
dictators. A Proclamation of Emergency was issued, the constitution was put in 
abeyance, and a Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) was promulgated to provide a 
temporary governing framework.737  However, this time around martial law was not 
                                                 
737 Provisional Constitution Order, 1999 (Order No. 1 of 1999). 
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formally declared, and General Musharraf assumed the self-styled office of the 'Chief 
Executive' of Pakistan. A spate of decisions in the late 1990s in which the Supreme 
Court had declared the setting up of military and anti-terrorism courts beyond the 
supervision of superior courts, and the suspension of fundamental rights during periods 
of emergency, to be unconstitutional constrained the space for more overt 
authoritarianism.  Requiring the Supreme Court to overturn such recent 
pronouncements would have embarrassed the court as well as undermined the image of 
a softer form of military rule that General Musharraf needed to maintain. Nonetheless, 
in January 2000, when the Supreme Court entertained a challenge to the validity of the 
military coup and the interim governance framework, the regime moved to undermine 
the independence of the judiciary. The judges of the superior courts were compelled to 
take a new oath of office pledging to serve under the PCO.738 Six out of a total of 
thirteen judges of the Supreme Court, including the incumbent chief justice, refused to 
take the oath and resigned from the bench. A reconstituted Supreme Court decided the 
case of Zafar Ali Shah in May 2000 and validated the military takeover on the basis of 
the doctrine of state necessity.739 The court granted virtually unlimited powers to the 
military regime, including the power to amend the constitution so long as its salient 
features – parliamentary form of government, federalism and the independence of the 
judiciary – were left intact. The court, however, imposed one potentially meaningful 
restriction by assigning a fixed term to the state necessity phase: the military regime 
had to hold general elections no later than three years from the date of the coup.  
 
While there was little public dissent, except for sporadic protests by the bar, the regime 
faced an adverse international environment. When General Musharraf assumed power 
in 1999, Pakistan’s macroeconomic situation was woeful and the country was on the 
verge of bankruptcy. Pakistan was also reeling from economic and military sanctions 
imposed after the nuclear weapons tests in 1998.  Diplomatically, the coup was a 
disaster and the possibilities of a thaw in relations with major Western powers, which 
had been soured by the nuclear tests, evaporated under the military regime. As such, 
the first two years were extremely perilous for the regime’s existence. Fortunately for 
the Musharraf regime, however, public exhaustion with the political instability of the 
                                                 
738 Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2000 (Order No. 1 of 2000). 
739 Zafar Ali Shah v. General Pervez Musharraf, PLD 2000 Supreme Court 869. 
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1990s, allegations of corruption and malgovernance against both major political parties, 
and economic stress had created a measure of domestic support for, or rather 
indifference towards, military rule.  It was during this early period that the regime 
undertook major initiatives designed to portray a picture of grassroots democratization 
and structural reform of the state that would appease alienated international allies, as 
well as win some political support at home.740  
 
In November 1999, barely a month after taking over, the regime created two new 
institutions designed to implement its promised structural reforms. The National 
Accountability Bureau (NAB) was tasked with the responsibilities of prosecuting 
politicians and bureaucrats for corrupt practices and wilful default of loans borrowed 
from public banks.741 Notably, serving armed forces personnel and judges were 
exempted from the jurisdiction of the NAB.742 The National Reconstruction Bureau 
(NRB) was created to recommend major reforms in the bureaucracy, police and lower 
judiciary. It fulfilled its mandate by designing and implementing long-awaited 
separation of the lower judiciary from executive magistracy.  A new Police Order also 
sought to grant the police independence from the control of the bureaucracy. In 2000, 
the NRB introduced its ‘Devolution Plan,’ and unveiled a hierarchical system of local 
government whereby officials elected on a non-party basis would be made responsible 
for many aspects of administration and service delivery. The provincial bureaucracy 
and the local police were subjected, at least formally, to the supervision of the new local 
governments. This local government structure appeared reminiscent of General Zia’s 
attempts to erect a façade of a grassroots level democratization process, and to cultivate 
a new breed of local politicians who may use their limited powers and control over 
public resources to influence a general election in favour of the regime. However, 
unlike General Zia’s local government system, the extent of fiscal powers and decision-
making capacity allowed to elected officials betrayed an appreciation of the much 
greater need to accommodate these political classes particularly in rural and peri-urban 
areas.  
 
                                                 
740 Immediately after the coup General Musharraf unveiled a seven-point agenda for the regime. See 
Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire (Free Press, 2006) 149-50. 
741 National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999 (Ordinance No. XVIII of 1999). 
742 §5(m)(iv), National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999. 
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Managing the elections for which a firm deadline had been set by the Supreme Court 
also remained a key priority, and other elements of General Zia’s legal and political 
playbook were employed to that end. In June 2001, General Musharraf dismissed the 
lame duck president and assumed that office through a decree.743 In April 2002, he held 
a stage-managed referendum claiming to win 97 per cent of the votes cast, and securing 
the presidency for a five-year term that would end in October 2007. The NAB was used 
strategically to exclude major opposition figures from forthcoming electoral processes 
under threat of prosecution and disqualification. Many first and second tier leaders 
belonging to the major political parties, the PML-N of Nawaz Sharif and PPP of Benazir 
Bhutto, were weaned over by the regime to cobble together a loyalist faction, the 
Pakistan Muslim League (Q). The PML-Q was buttressed by the inductees in the local 
government system. It was hoped that these local politicians dependent on the regime’s 
patronage would bring together vital political capital and local government resources, 
which would enable the candidates belonging to the PML-Q to win a sufficient number 
of rural constituencies. The local government system, the accountability mechanism 
and the structural reforms in the state were also used to break down the relative 
insularity of the bureaucracy from influence and control.744 In another step towards the 
subjection of the state structure, the military regime appointed an unprecedented 
number of serving and retired armed forces personnel to positions in the bureaucracy, 
state authorities and public corporations.  
 
In August 2002, just prior to holding the general elections mandated by the court, the 
Musharraf regime issued a Legal Framework Order (LFO) which consolidated a 
number of constitutional changes. The LFO revived the notorious Article 58(2)(b) to 
the constitution, empowering the president to dismiss the incoming parliament at 
will.745  The LFO also barred the leaders of PML-N and the PPP from contesting the 
elections held in October 2002. Nawaz Sharif, who had been charged with and 
convicted of terrorism and hijacking charges for directing the diversion of General 
Musharraf’s airplane at the time of the coup, had already been sent into exile in Saudi 
Arabia pursuant to a deal brokered by the Saudi royals. Benazir Bhutto and Asif Zardari 
                                                 
743 President’s Succession Order, 2001 (Chief Executive’s Order No. 3 of 2001). 
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had also been in self-imposed exile since the late 1990s in order to avoid corruption 
charges. Despite the absence of key leaders of both parties, the best efforts of the 
intelligence agencies and the use of local government resources, the PML-Q failed to 
win an outright majority in the national legislature.746 An alliance of conservative 
religious parties, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), emerged as the prime beneficiary 
of the regime’s efforts to undermine the mainstream political parties, and won a 
substantial presence in the legislatures for the first time in the country’s history.  
 
For over a year the MMA and the other opposition parties succeeded in disrupting the 
business of parliament, thereby denying the military regime the masquerade of a stable 
legislature and a popularly elected government. Questions regarding the legal validity 
of the LFO, the referendum and other actions taken during the three years of direct 
military rule continued to hound the regime in this interregnum. In December 2003, the 
regime finally reached an agreement with the MMA and with its support mustered the 
two-thirds majority in parliament necessary to pass the Seventeenth Amendment to the 
constitution.747 The Seventeenth Amendment validated almost all of the actions taken 
during the state necessity phase, including the referendum and the revival of the 
presidential power to dismiss the parliament. In return the MMA secured a promise 
from General Musharraf to give up the office of CoAS by the end of the year 2004. The 
Seventeenth Amendment formalized that understanding by making the relevant 
disqualification clause in the constitution applicable to the office of the President as of 
the first day of 2005.748 Article 63(1)(d) of the constitution mandates that a person is 
disqualified from becoming a member of parliament or president if ‘he holds an office 
of profit in the service of Pakistan other than an office declared by law not to disqualify 
its holder.’ In simpler words, it appeared that as of 1 January 2005, General Musharraf 
would be disqualified from holding the office of the president if he continued to remain 
the army chief.   
 
In November 2004, General Musharraf reneged on his promise to give up the command 
of the armed forces. Efforts to provide legal cover to the occupation of 'dual office' – 
the president and army chief – culminated in the President to Hold Another Office Act, 
                                                 
746 See Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, above n 5, 490. 
747 Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 2003. 
748 §2, Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 2003. 
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2004 (PHAOA).749 Without the support of the religious alliance of the MMA the regime 
could only muster a simple majority to pass ordinary legislation which stated that the 
office of the CoAS was, under this law, declared to be an office that did not disqualify 
its holder from assuming the office of the president. This neat piece of legalism was 
made applicable to only one person, General Musharraf, and for one term of presidential 
office only. In the Pakistan Lawyers Forum case the Supreme Court was called upon 
to judge the validity of the Seventeenth Amendment as well as the PHAOA, 2004.750 
The court validated both the Amendment and the Act on the basis of arguments which 
were essentially an extension of the doctrine of state necessity. The court refused to 
question the validity of the LFO, and other actions undertaken in the first three years of 
the regime, since these had been validated prospectively by the Supreme Court in Zafar 
Ali Shah, and retroactively by parliament via the Seventeenth Amendment. Most 
significantly, the court ruled that it would not question the Seventeenth Amendment as 
it had been passed by an elected legislature, nor would it take any measure that might 
de-track the transition to democracy in Pakistan. The court also validated the PHAOA, 
2004 and the holding of dual office on a strictly positivist and literal reading of the 
constitutional provisions in question.  
 
Political Economy of Military Incorporated 
 
Despite notable commonalities in the way constitutional cover was provided to the 
military takeover and its antecedents, the Musharraf regime was different from its 
predecessor military regimes in fundamental respects. General Ayub had used his 
military office to take over power, but gave up the command of the army upon 
becoming the CMLA. After consolidating power he distanced the army from 
governance, and in the post-martial law period essentially ruled as a civilian president 
under a presidential constitution with the backing of the military.  Unlike Ayub, General 
Zia remained the CoAS throughout his rule and needed the direct command of the 
military to stave off political challenges both from the opposition as well as the civilian 
government that he had created as a cover for military rule. General Zia’s failure to 
effectively share power with the Junejo government in the post-Eighth-Amendment 
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phase meant that the regime remained overtly military and dictatorial despite the 
holding of elections.  Unlike his predecessors, General Musharraf not only remained in 
the command of the military but was also able to develop a hybrid military-civilian 
paradigm of governance. While the military remained the ultimate source of his power, 
General Musharraf was able to forge a workable power-sharing arrangement with the 
PML-Q government that resulted from the 2002 elections.  
 
The Musharraf regime’s ability to forge a military-civil governance arrangement was 
more than a matter of pragmatic politics or effective patronage. The façade of a civilian 
government was essential to the regime’s survival in a precarious regional and 
international strategic environment as much as it was a requirement imposed by the 
Supreme Court. After the international isolation and economic difficulties of the first 
two years, the events of 11 September 2001 proved to be an unexpected windfall for 
the military regime. The attack on US soil brought Afghanistan and Pakistan from the 
periphery to the centre of world attention. As the Bush administration decided to 
unleash war on the Taleban regime in Afghanistan in retaliation for harbouring Al-
Qaeda leadership, it needed the support of the Pakistani state and national security 
organizations. The choice was reportedly presented in a rather stark manner: if Pakistan 
did not cooperate in the war in Afghanistan, and the broader 'War on Terror', the country 
would be bombed ‘into the Stone Age.’751 Cooperation in the US-Afghan war was a 
hard pill for Pakistan’s military to swallow, as it entailed the reversal of long-standing 
policies that rested on strong linkages with the Taleban government of Afghanistan.  It, 
nonetheless, brought the regime out of its international isolation and paid dividends in 
terms of the lifting of sanctions, foreign debt rescheduling and renewed military and 
development assistance.   
 
The economic benefits extended far beyond the easing of military expenditure’s burden 
on the national budget.  Policing and national security initiatives taken by the US 
government in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks sent ripples of insecurity amongst 
expatriate Pakistanis. This resulted in significant increases in foreign remittances, and 
the sudden influx of capital fuelled a boom in urban property and securities markets, as 
well as visible consumerism. Pakistan also experienced temporary reversal of a long-
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standing brain drain, as foreign educated and qualified expatriates found a suitable 
social and economic environment to return to in times of rising Islamophobia in the US 
and other western countries. The regime used the façade of seemingly functional elected 
governments at federal, provincial and local government levels to project an image of 
political liberalization to the international order. The NRB in particular generously 
employed the development sector’s lexicon of ‘good governance,’ devolution, and 
‘grassroots empowerment’ in an effort to win the support of the international 
development agencies, as well as an influential NGO sector that is tied in heavily with 
the socially cohesive conglomeration of urban civil society. The increasing support for 
state-structure reorganization was further strengthened by the military regime’s 
cooptation of the urban upper classes through the creation of opportunities for experts 
in government and the economy. A parallel program of economic liberalization through 
the facilitation of foreign investment and a friendly environment for multinational 
corporations garnered further international acceptance, and led to the creation of high-
end employment and business opportunities.  This program of bottom-up state 
restructuring and trickle-down economic reorganization bolstered the regime’s support, 
both amongst powerful rural elites and rising urban professional classes.  
 
In addition to these elite groups, the military was able to strengthen its support amongst 
its traditional constituency in rural and peri-urban middle classes of north-central 
Punjab and settled areas of NWFP. During the Musharraf era, the military was able to 
dramatically expand its already large footprint in the economy.752  The military’s 
economic interest was defined not just in terms of the defense allocation in the budget, 
but more importantly in preferential treatment in the award of state contracts, 
exemptions from regulations, and other privileges secured for an array of military-
owned engineering, defense production, banking, finance, construction, logistics, 
cement, fertilizer and other corporations. These industrial and finance units form the 
bedrock of the military’s extensive welfare system for retired military personnel and 
their families. This welfare system extends beyond the payment of generous pensions 
and benevolent funds schemes, which are far better than those provided to retirees from 
civilian public services. The military cares for more than ten million retired personnel 
and their dependents, providing for health and education facilities through profits 
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generated from its commercial ventures. The military allots agricultural land, urban 
commercial and housing plots, and constructed houses or units in its own housing 
societies, at hugely subsidized rates to its serving and retired employees. Given that the 
overwhelming majority of military personnel retire at a relatively young age and need 
second careers, the military’s welfare institutions and corporations provide re-
employment to a significant portion of its retired personnel.  
 
Military retirees, their extended families and networks thus form one of the largest 
coherent political community and voting populace with shared interests and ideological 
outlook. This is especially the case in north-central Punjab and the settled areas of 
NWFP, areas from where the military got most of its recruits. It is this constituency, as 
much as its coercive capacity and penetration into the state structure, which accounts 
for the military’s political relevance and power, especially during civilian rule.  
However, the military class is not a uniform or monolithic group. Notable differences 
in the distribution of benefits between the soldier ranks, mid-ranking officer cadres and 
the top brass of the military have progressively split the military-allied classes. While 
military service has been the vehicle of upward mobility or consolidation of the soldier 
ranks in lower-middle, and junior officer cadres into middle to upper-middle classes, 
the upper brass of the military has emerged as a distinct elite group.753  The upper cadres 
of Pakistan’s armed forces retire with considerable property and wealth, obtain 
lucrative post-retirement employment in military and public corporations or other state 
institutions, and also gain entry into electoral politics in many cases. This class has 
progressively merged with other elite groups through business partnerships, children’s 
education in elite private schools and foreign universities, and marriages. The enhanced 
visibility of this elite military class during Musharraf enabled other political and 
economic players to increasingly criticize certain actions of the military command 
group as self-serving, and driven by parochial as opposed to national interest.  
 
As long as the economic outlook remained good, the military-civilian government 
under General Musharraf remained assured of the support of a broad coalition 
representing rural elites invested in the local government system, urban middle and 
upper classes that benefited from the economic and political liberalization engineered 
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by the regime, and the military-allied classes in north-central Punjab and NWFP that 
were a direct beneficiary of the Military Inc.’s expansion. Pakistan’s sudden prosperity 
was an economic bubble, however, and a classic case of growth without development. 
While the state’s capacity to incur development expenditures increased dramatically, 
vital resources were spent on building infrastructure rather than on human development.  
With the increased circulation of capital new wealth was created, but its distribution 
was grossly unequal. The number of people below or barely above the poverty line 
increased to more than half of the population. In addition to the economic divide 
between the haves and the have-nots, social and cultural rifts also deepened during 
military rule. General Musharraf sought to play to the international gallery by 
portraying the image of a liberal military dictator. The military regime aggressively 
pursued a programme of ‘Enlightened Moderation’ designed to bring about a change in 
religious thought so that Muslims may ‘shun militancy and extremism.’754 The regime 
pushed through changes in the country’s controversial Islamic laws, and supported a 
'modernist' Islamic discourse in the print and newly-independent private electronic 
media. The success of this program was limited, however, as the regime’s support for 
the war in Afghanistan resulted in a backlash with the rise of religious sentiment and 
tacit support for the Taleban insurgents.  
 
As international pressure increased on Pakistan to curb such space for Taleban 
insurgents, who increasingly utilized Pakistan’s tribal areas to seek refuge, foreign 
military and development assistance was threatened. At the same time, increasing 
domestic terrorism and the prospects of the armed forces getting embroiled in anti-
terrorism operations in the tribal areas hounded the military regime. As the Musharraf 
regime closed in on a difficult transition, a slowdown in economic growth and 
increasing discontent with the unequal distribution of the benefits of such growth 
threatened the regime’s prospects of electoral success. Unlike previous military 
regimes, General Musharraf’s military-civil hybrid was dependent on a victory in the 
elections scheduled for end of 2007, which needed to appear a more credible exercise 
than the 2002 polls. The regime also needed to re-engineer constitutional 
accommodations for the continuing occupation of dual office by Musharraf and the 
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exclusion of the apex leadership of the opposition political parties to effect a successful 
transition to another term in power. In such circumstances, the re-emergence of an 
assertive brand of judicial review under Iftikhar Chaudhry had potentially far-reaching 
political ramifications for the Musharraf regime. 
 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE HYBRID COMPOSITE 
 
The First Tenure of Chaudhry, CJ and the Lawyers’ Movement 
 
In the first half decade of direct and indirect military rule, the superior courts 
fundamentally adhered to the blueprint of judicial review devised under the earlier 
periods of martial law. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court validated the military 
takeover, approved the LFO and Seventeenth Amendment,755 enabled General 
Musharraf to retain dual office, and denied a petition questioning the constitutionality 
of General Musharraf’s election as President through the referendum.756 The court also 
refused to brook any challenge to key policies and interests of the regime. The court 
upheld the accountability law and denied a strong challenge to several key precepts of 
the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance.757 At the same time the courts 
continued to conduct judicial review of executive action in low-key cases involving the 
junior rungs of bureaucracy, police and other state institutions. Such exercise of judicial 
review powers was tolerated by the regime, as in earlier periods of military rule. Thus, 
when Justice Chuadhry assumed the office of Chief Justice he looked set for a tenure 
of more than seven years with the Supreme Court undertaking business as usual. After 
all, Justice Chaudhry had undertaken an oath of office under the PCO, and had been a 
member of several benches which had facilitated the regime. As such, there were no 
indications of a marked shift in the court’s position. 
 
Within the first week of his ascension as Chief Justice, the Chaudhry-led court initiated 
a more aggressive brand of judicial review, calling into question actions or inactions of 
                                                 
755 Watan Party v. Chief Executive, PLD 2003 Supreme Court 74. 
756 Hussain Ahmed v. Pervez Musharraf, PLD 2002 Supreme Court 853. 
757 Khan Asfandyar Wali v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2001 Supreme Court 607. 
  215
the highest levels of bureaucracy.758 In the immediate aftermath of a devastating 
earthquake which caused widespread damage in parts of northern Pakistan, the court 
entertained a petition challenging the Capital Development Authority’s (CDA) 
complicity or negligence in the collapse of a high rise residential building complex in 
Islamabad. In the Margalla Towers case, the court conducted an investigation into the 
enforcement of regulations and construction standards by the CDA, and directed the 
authority to provide temporary accommodation and compensation to the victims.759  In 
early 2006, in another highly publicized case of Iqbal Haider,760 the Supreme Court 
nullified a lease of a public park to a private developer by the CDA on the grounds that 
it violated the guarantee of equal access to public places under the constitution.761 
Beyond this rights analysis, the court was swayed by several aspects of the transaction 
which indicated collusion and corruption between the developer and responsible 
officials of the public authority. Likewise, the Supreme Court thwarted attempts to 
convert public parks in other large cities into lucrative private development projects.762  
 
These high profile cases began to provide important evidence of the nexus of power 
and corruption between the bureaucracy, large commercial interests and the federal and 
provincial governments elected under the umbrella of the military regime.  In the Steel 
Mills case, the Supreme Court pushed the envelope further and voided the privatization 
of the Pakistan Steel Mills, to the embarrassment of the prime minister and several 
members of the cabinet.763 A finding of impropriety in the undervalued sale of this 
strategic national asset significantly undermined the government’s claims concerning 
the objectives and implementation of the privatization program as well as its economic 
policy-making in general. Most subtly, the court pushed the boundaries of judicial 
review, and developed a doctrine of transparency whereby executive action was not 
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only required to meet the criteria laid down in the governing laws and regulations, but 
could also be tested on the touchstone of openness and procedural propriety in public 
expenditure. In a number of other cases, reported with considerable excitement in the 
domestic press, the court weaved a narrative of endemic corruption and crony 
capitalism, belying the claims of good governance and accountability by the Musharraf 
regime.  
 
Through such judicial review the Supreme Court and the High Courts, which also began 
to engage in limited judicial activism upon the apex court’s cue, began to dent the image 
of political and economic liberalization that the Musharraf regime had erected. 
However, the courts had not directly challenged the military’s core interests. That 
appeared to change when the Supreme Court admitted a petition filed by the Human 
Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) challenging the enforced disappearance and 
illegal detention of hundreds of people by the country's national security and 
intelligence agencies, either in the context of the War on Terror or the separatist 
insurgency in the province of Balochistan.764 Large scale use of enforced 
disappearances by the intelligence agencies was a relatively recent phenomenon. 
Whereas historically both military and civilian governments had used state security and 
preventive detention laws or trials before military courts, that option had been curtailed 
by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mehram Ali and Liaquat Hussain in the late 1990s. 
In dealing with Taliban militants in the tribal areas and a renewed insurgency in the 
remote parts of Balochistan, the Musharraf regime had begun to dispense with legal 
process altogether. While the Supreme Court could not compel military authorities to 
account for the so-called 'missing persons', regular hearings in the HRCP case brought 
attention to the human rights violations in the military’s counter-insurgency and anti-
terrorism actions in the western parts of the country. When the court began to call high 
ranking military officers, threatening to undermine their impunity, it caused unease 
amongst the military hierarchy.  
 
As both presidential and parliamentary elections were due to be held at the end of 2007, 
such judicial activism was most unwelcome. The attention to the corruption and 
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malgovernance brought on by widely reported cases of judicial review did not augur 
well for the re-election prospects of political parties allied with the Musharraf regime. 
The courts’ actions touched an ever increasing number of raw nerves, its publicized 
decisions became regular reminders of the failure or even betrayal of the regime's 
reform agenda, and kindled growing public dissatisfaction and fatigue with military 
rule.  A number of writ petitions painted an unflattering picture of the military regime, 
and civilian governments functioning under its umbrella: a picture of corruption and 
crony capitalism; of self-serving accountability charades; of governments working for 
an elite getting ever more prosperous without a care for either the religious sentiment 
or the economic woes of the broader public; and of a regime becoming increasingly 
ruthless in its suppression of insurgency and discontent in Balochistan, and the frontier 
regions of the tribal areas. Furthermore, the court’s decisions and attendant popularity 
must have also caused some nervousness concerning the outcome of inevitable 
constitutional challenges to the regime’s efforts at engineering another transition.  One 
issue bound to resurface was the continued occupation of dual office by General 
Musharraf, as the one-off exemption granted by the PHAOA was due to expire prior to 
the elections. 
 
Concurrently with the hearings in the HRCP case, rumours of irregularities committed 
by Chaudhry, CJ in securing the appointment of his eldest son to a bureaucratic post 
began to circulate. Complaints about his aggressive judicial style and a penchant for 
garnering media attention were already rife. In March 2007, in a somewhat unexpected 
move, General Musharraf suspended Chaudhry, CJ on charges of misconduct. In his 
capacity as president, Musharraf filed a reference before the Supreme Judicial Council, 
the body mandated by the constitution to conduct the accountability of the judges of 
superior courts. A particular difficulty that the president faced arose from the text of 
Article 209 of the constitution, which required the Chief Justice of Pakistan to head the 
Supreme Judicial Council. It was in order to avoid this difficulty that the president 
rendered Chaudhry, CJ 'non-functional' and appointed an acting chief justice in his 
stead.765 The dismissal of the chief justice unleashed a wave of political dissent – 
frequently labelled as the 'Lawyers’ Movement – that quickly threatened to spin out of 
the military regime’s control.  Indeed, the fact and the manner of the dismissal brought 
                                                 
765 Moeen Cheema, ‘Justice Derailed in Pakistan: The Sacking of the CJ’, Jurist, 13 March 2007. 
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home to many the reality of military rule behind the façade of elected governments and 
transitional democratization that the Musharraf regime had successfully managed until 
this moment. 
 
At the early stages it was truly the lawyers’ movement only. Many the country’s eighty-
thousand registered lawyers held protest marches in their signature black and white 
uniforms. From the outset, the leaders of the bar associations that organized the protest 
movement insisted on an essentially apolitical agenda: restoration of the chief justice 
and securing the independence of the judiciary. Time and again the most vocal leaders 
of the movement took great pains to point out that their demands were purely legal and 
constitutional, for fear that widening the ambits of the demands or their ideological 
moorings would open the movement to both internal dissension as well as greater 
external resistance from the military regime. Broader political goals such as the 
institution of democratic governance were thus deliberately eschewed. There was 
clearly a tension inherent in the apolitical instinct of the movement. Without a broader 
political and socio-economic agenda the movement was merely a curiosity to the public 
and the media. Without the support of some segments of the broader public the 
movement had limited chances of success, as the regime could be expected to withstand 
the impact of dissent by a relatively small, even if vibrant and motivated legal 
community. 
 
Given the specific challenge of sustaining a coherent movement as well as 
simultaneously cultivating popular support, the leaders of the Lawyers’ Movement 
came up with a novel, and in many respects brilliant, strategy for social mobilization. 
Various bar associations around the country began to invite the non-functional Chief 
Justice to address their members, a task nominally within the ambit of a judge’s role 
and decorum.  As the Chief Justice travelled to address the bars, along with slow 
caravans of lawyers’ vehicles on the country’s major highways, people started turning 
up on the roadsides in increasing numbers.  Pakistan’s private television news channels, 
established during the Musharraf years, provided non-stop coverage and commentary, 
bringing unprecedented attention to these events. The Chief Justice only addressed the 
lawyers inside the premises of the courts, but many people gathered outside. Inside the 
premises cohorts of young lawyers waited for hours in rain or blazing sunshine, 
chanting slogans, singing songs, reciting revolutionary poems or listening to rowdy 
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speeches by local bar officials. While the leaders of the Lawyers’ Movement spoke 
against the military regime, and broached a wide range of subjects from the prospects 
of genuine electoral democracy to social justice, whenever the Chief Justice spoke it 
was of the rule of law and constitutionalism, thereby maintaining a notional separation 
between law and politics. 
 
With each caravan and address to the bar, the number of people lining the streets 
increased. The ever-increasing, even if limited populism of the movement, was partially 
explained by dozens of human rights cases that had been taken up suo motu by the 
Supreme Court – i.e. cases initiated by the Supreme Court itself on behalf of petitioners 
identified through a regular scrutiny of newspaper and electronic media reports by a 
human rights cell created by Chaudhry, CJ.766  There were unverified stories of entire 
villages turning up to catch a glimpse of the deposed chief justice along with a victim 
of police brutality, abuse of authority and harassment who had been saved in one such 
suo motu hearing. Not even the lawyers and their leaders had appreciated the personal 
popularity of the Chief Justice amongst segments of the country’s lower classes, 
especially in the rural areas. More significantly, the opposition political parties correctly 
saw a chink in the Musharraf regime’s grip on power, and the Lawyers’ Movement as 
an opportunity to push for greater political space. Political party activists of all 
opposition parties across the ideological spectrum began to turn up to the lawyers’ 
events in large numbers.  
 
                                                 
766 Three reported cases present a neat summary of the types of actions undertaken by the Supreme 
Court in suo motu cases pertaining to the police and the administration of the criminal justice system. 
In Human Rights Case No. 13-L of 2006, 2006 SCMR 1769, the court acted on a newspaper report on 
the kidnapping for ransom of two boys taking note of the alleged involvement of a local politician. The 
police recovered the boys, allegedly from within the territorial jurisdiction of Afghanistan after 
engaging cross-border networks, and earned the SC’s praise. In Human Rights Case No. 3062 of 2006, 
2006 SCMR 1780, acting on an anonymous application the court directed the police to register a case 
of murder and initiate an investigation into the murder of a young woman by ‘influential persons.’ In 
another suo motu case, Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 189 of 2006, 2006 SCMR 1805, the 
court directed action against police officials and a judicial magistrate responsible for the detention of 
two young boys, one of whom was kept in chains. Also see Human Rights Case No. 5091 of 2006, PLD 
2007 SC 232; Human Rights Case No. 5552 of 2006; Human Rights Case No. 5443 of 2006; Human 
Rights Case No. 5522 of 2006; Human Rights Case No. 4866 of 2006; Human Rights Case No. 4860 of 
2006; Human Rights Case No. 4787 of 2006; Human Rights Case No. 4245 of 2006; Human Rights 
Case No. 3685 of 2006; Human Rights Case No. 3406 of 2006; Human Rights Case No. 2905 of 2006; 
Human Rights Case No. 66-L of 2006; Human Rights Case No. 52-L of 2006; Human Rights Case No. 
51-L of 2006; Human Rights Case No. 43-L of 2006.  
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Before the Lawyers’ Movement could snowball into a deeper social mobilization, 
however, the Chief Justice won a vital legal battle. Chaudhry, CJ had filed a petition 
before the Supreme Court challenging his dismissal. In July 2007, a Supreme Court 
bench declared the President Musharraf’s actions to be mala fide, and restored 
Chaudhry, CJ to his office.767  With Chaudhry, CJ restored at its head, reinforced by 
the overwhelming support of the bar, and energized by the broader public support for 
its newfound stature, the Supreme Court and the High Courts began to exhibit a level 
of activism hitherto unknown to Pakistani jurisprudence.768  The courts began to venture 
beyond the traditionally restrictive boundaries between law, politics and policy. As the 
regime geared up to manage the complicated electoral transition in late 2007, the 
superior judiciary appeared to offer an even stronger impediment to its plans. 
 
The Emergency and another Democratic Transition 
 
The technical blueprint for the transition was similar to the one adopted in the lead up 
to the 2002 elections.  One key prop had already been assembled in 2005: elections for 
local governments held again on a non-party basis had yielded favourable results for 
the PML-Q and other parties allied with the military regime. As such, local government 
resources and local networks of patronage were available for utilization in the general 
elections scheduled to be held in late 2007.  Prior to the general elections, General 
Musharraf needed to secure another five-year term in that office. This time the device 
of a referendum could not be used as presidential elections had to be held under the 
constitution, with members of the National Assembly and provincial legislatures 
forming the electoral college. General Musharraf also needed to hold the presidential 
election prior to the general elections so that his supporters in the legislatures could 
                                                 
767 See Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, Chief Justice of Pakistan v. President of 
Pakistan, PLD 2007 Supreme Court 578. The detailed judgment, authored nearly two and a half years 
after the issuance of the short order due to the imposition of emergency and the removal of most of the 
judges who sat on the bench, recounts in great detail the events surrounding the first removal of the 
Chief Justice. Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. President of Pakistan, 
PLD 2010 Supreme Court 61. 
768 In one instance, the court effectively compelled the government to pass legislation regulating organ 
transplants. In another case, the courts even took up the issue of traffic congestion in the metropolis of 
Karachi. At the same time, the courts continued to take up human rights cases involving abuse of police 
powers, corruption and elite control of state apparatus, etc. See, eg, Human Rights Case No. 4095 of 
2007; Human Rights Case No. 4116 of 2007; Human Rights Case No. 2885 of 2007; Human Rights 
Case No. 2742 of 2007; Human Rights Case No. 2740 of 2007; Human Rights Case No. 2689 of 2007; 
Human Rights Case No. 1638 of 2007; Human Rights Case No. 1254 of 2007; Human Rights Case No. 
3416 of 2006; Human Rights Case No. 2783 of 2006. 
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muster the requisite votes, as well as pass legislation sanctioning another term in the 
presidency while holding dual office. There were significant legal issues 
overshadowing this strategy, however. The first question that bedevilled General 
Musharraf’s re-election was whether a parliament and provincial legislatures nearing 
the expiry of their term may elect a president for a five-year term. While the text of the 
constitution was silent on the merits of such an event, forceful arguments could be made 
that such an election would be essentially undemocratic, and thus violate the spirit of 
the constitution. More importantly, the issue of the dual office, settled temporarily in 
Pakistan Lawyers Forum, could be expected to re-emerge with a vengeance. Another 
iteration of the PHAOA would have to be engineered in order for General Musharraf 
to contest another presidential election in uniform. Both issues were bound to be raised 
before the Supreme Court. The military regime, therefore, would have liked to see a 
Supreme Court bench with a positivist and strictly literalist bent, rather than the resilient 
court that had materialized in the aftermath of the Lawyers’ Movement. 
 
Furthermore, the political energy unleashed by the Lawyers’ Movement had 
considerably complicated the transition for the regime. In the course of the Lawyers’ 
Movement the opposition political parties, which had participated actively in the 
movement, had been considerably strengthened. Accommodation with some factions 
of the opposition parties had thus become a necessity. Rumours of a political deal that 
would ensure the continuation of the military regime had become rife since the 
restoration of the Chief Justice in July. It was widely speculated that the British and 
American governments had brokered an arrangement between the Musharraf regime 
and one of the leading opposition parties, the PPP, whereby General Musharraf would 
be allowed to continue as president for another five-year term in office. In return, the 
PPP would be enabled to contest relatively free and fair general elections, and form the 
next government if successful. The perceived benefit to the brokers of this deal was the 
continuation of a government with a liberal and pro-American outlook, a supportive 
presidency, and a cooperative military that would collectively assist in the prosecution 
of the war in Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan.  
 
For this tri-partite contract to be completed, the military regime would have to allow 
Benazir Bhutto, who had been in self-enforced exile, to return to the country and 
organize her party in time to contest the impending elections. Long-standing corruption 
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charges against Ms. Bhutto and her husband (especially a case that was perilously close 
to a decision in a court in Switzerland), and those against several leading PPP figures, 
would have to be dropped to enable their political rehabilitation. Further, it was vital 
for the success of this project that the other major political player, Nawaz Sharif, should 
continue to be marginalized, and disallowed from returning to the country until after 
the elections. However, as the parliament neared the end of its term, the Supreme Court 
began to open the political space for the PML-N as well, and thus threatened the 
regime’s accommodation with the PPP.  In August 2007, the Supreme Court paved the 
way for Nawaz Sharif's return to Pakistan.769  On 5 October, on the very eve of the 
presidential election, General Musharraf passed the National Reconciliation Ordinance 
(NRO) granting immunity to Benzair Bhutto, her husband Asif Zardari, and a host of 
leading PPP leaders from pending corruption charges. The very next day, General 
Musharraf contested the election for the president, and secured more than fifty-five 
percent of the votes cast by the members of the national and provincial legislatures. 
Legislators belonging to the PPP noticeably refrained from casting their votes, thereby 
facilitating a smooth re-election for General Musharraf.  
 
General Musharraf’s grasp on power was becoming tenuous by the beginning of 
November 2007. The parliament’s term was set to expire in two weeks. Domestic and 
international pressure to allow the return of his most vocal opponent, Nawaz Sharif, 
was mounting. Within a week of the promulgation of the NRO, the Supreme Court had 
admitted a petition challenging its constitutionality, and in the process took an 
unprecedented step in granting an interim injunction against the operation of the 
ordinance.770 General Musharraf’s re-election as president had also been challenged 
before the Supreme Court.771 The court initially allowed the election to proceed subject 
to the condition that the election results may not be formally notified until the resolution 
of the controversy. The most important legal question before the court was whether a 
serving chief of the army may validly contest the election for the presidency. A decision 
by the Supreme Court invalidating the presidential election would have completely 
rocked, and possibly capsized the boat. As the hearings in the case proceeded, General 
                                                 
769 See Pakistan Muslim League (N) v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2007 Supreme Court 642.  
770 See Dr. Mubashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2008 Supreme Court 80. 
771 See Moeen Cheema, ‘Supreme Challenge: Pakistan's Presidential Election Goes to Court’, Jurist, 18 
October 2007. 
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Musharraf feared an adverse verdict and on 3 November 3 2007 imposed a state of 
emergency.772 
 
The state of emergency was deliberately imposed on a weekend in order to give the 
regime some breathing space within which to organize a crackdown on impending 
protests.  Under the constitution, the president may impose a state of emergency in case 
of external aggression or serious domestic unrest.773 This, however, was not such an 
exercise, and the misleading title of a state of emergency was a cover for what was in 
reality martial law. Much to the surprise of the regime, seven judges managed to make 
their way to the Supreme Court premises and hurriedly constituted a bench that took up 
the question of the validity of the state of emergency. The bench rightly anticipated that 
the entire legal technology of a coup was about to be unleashed, and issued an interim 
order that directed all state functionaries including judges, bureaucrats and military 
officers to disregard any extra-constitutional orders issued by the regime.774  In a 
Kafkaesque move, these Supreme Court judges were forcibly removed from the court 
premises and placed under house arrest. The inconvenient existence of the interim order 
was denied. The Musharraf regime suspended the constitution for the second time 
within a decade, and issued another Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) that 
purported to grant it the authority to rule as well as to make laws and constitutional 
amendments.775 Judges of the superior courts were asked to take a fresh oath of office 
under the PCO.776  
 
An unprecedented number of the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts 
either refused to take such an oath or were not invited to do so.777  New judges were 
appointed in their place and Chuadhry, CJ was dismissed for the second time in a year, 
                                                 
772 See Moeen Cheema, ‘Martial Law by Another Name in Pakistan’, Jurist, 3 November 2007. 
773 The President may impose a state of emergency if he is satisfied that “a grave emergency exists in 
which the security of Pakistan, or any part thereof, is threatened by war or external aggression, or by 
internal disturbance beyond the power of a Provincial Government to control.” Article 232 cl. 1, 1973 
Constitution of Pakistan. 
774 Wajihuddin Ahmad v. Chief Election Commissioner, PLD 2008 Supreme Court 25. Also see Hamid 
Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, above n 5, 522. 
775 Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 2007. 
776 Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2007. 
777 See Moeen Cheema, ‘Pakistan: Mock Trials, Kangaroo Courts and Court Jesters’, Jurist, 9 
November 2007. In total 61 judges of the superior courts were thus deposed: 13 out of 18 (17 
permanent and one ad-hoc) Supreme Court judges, including the Chief Justice; 18 out of 31 judges of 
the Lahore High Court; 24 out of 28 judges of Sindh High Court, including the Chief Justice; and 6 out 
of 13 judges of Peshawar High Court, including the Chief Justice. 
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to be replaced by Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar as the Chief Justice. After all, this was 
a unique coup intended, as it was, primarily to undermine the independence of the 
judiciary and reconstitute a subservient judicial organ.778 Bracing itself for the 
inevitable storm of protests and condemnation, the military regime forced private news 
channels off air and issued an ordinance to censor electronic media. Criticism of the 
president or of the regime’s actions was forbidden. The lawyers’ and the civil society 
activists’ protests were brutally suppressed.  Hundreds of lawyers found themselves on 
the other side of prison bars, now themselves the victims of Pakistan’s repressive public 
order and anti-terrorism laws.779 Even the nation’s deeply depoliticized student 
population showed sporadic but intense flashes of incandescence.  The military regime 
was, however, intent on maintaining control and succeeded in suppressing the 
spontaneous protest movement, at least for the time it took to implement its immediate 
plans of achieving a legal cover for its actions.  
 
Nonetheless, the sharp decline in popular support for the regime and the unwanted 
coverage of the protests by the international media took its toll, especially in terms of 
limiting General Musharraf's options. From the outset, therefore, the regime declared 
that the state of emergency would be imposed for a short duration only. It needed little 
time within which to obtain the necessary protection for its actions from an acquiescent 
judiciary, as well as to offer sufficient political incentives to take the edge off the 
opposition political parties’ role in the protest movement. Thus, within a week of 
imposing the state of emergency General Musharraf announced that general elections 
would be held in early 2008. The presidential and parliamentary term expired on 15 
November, and a caretaker government was immediately appointed.  The reconstituted 
Supreme Court rejected the constitutional challenges to General Musharraf's re-election 
                                                 
778 The Proclamation of Emergency made for an interesting reading. It accused ‘some members of the 
judiciary’ of ‘working at cross purposes with the executive and legislature in the fight against terrorism 
and extremism’ in an effort to pander to the regime’s international backers. It charged the deposed 
judges with ‘constant interference in executive functions, including but not limited to the control of 
terrorist activity, economic policy, price controls, downsizing of corporations and urban planning’ 
which ‘weakened the writ of the government.’ It indicted the dismissed judges for overstepping the 
limits of judicial authority and taking over the executive and legislative functions, asserting that it was 
a matter ‘of paramount importance that the honourable judges confine the scope of their activity to the 
judicial function and not assume charge of administration.’  
779 See Moeen Cheema, ‘Musharraf's Real 'War on Terror' in Pakistan’, Jurist, 6 November 2007. 
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as president on 23 November,780 and validated the state of emergency.781  On 28 
November, feeling somewhat confident in the prospects of another term in the 
presidency, Musharraf reluctantly relinquished the command of the armed forces to 
assuage domestic and international anxieties. On 29 November, General (retired) 
Pervez Musharraf was sworn in as the president of Pakistan, and announced that the 
state of emergency would be lifted in a fortnight.  
 
Prior to ending the emergency on 15 December, President Musharraf exercised the self-
granted powers of constitutional amendment to validate the actions undertaken during 
the emergency period, as well as to grant constitutional cover to the forthcoming 
elections.782 A presidential order purported to add article 270AAA to the 1973 
Constitution. The numbering of the article, and its placement within the chapter of the 
constitution allocated to ‘transitional’ provisions was steeped in the symbolism of a 
constitutional text ravaged by modification at the hands of successive military regimes, 
as well as the never-ending transition towards meaningful democracy in Pakistan.  This 
presidential order also sought to give permanent constitutional cover to the removal of 
superior court judges. Further, it declared that all orders, ordinances and other laws 
passed during the emergency period would be considered as having been validly 
enacted, and would continue to remain in force until repealed or amended. The language 
of the relevant clause was such that it appeared to give indefinite life even to those 
presidential ordinances which had been passed prior to the imposition of emergency, 
even though the normal term of such ordinances under the constitution is four months. 
This would essentially resurrect the NRO and give it the status of regular legislation. 
 
The promise of relatively free and fair general elections, the weakened hold of 
Musharraf over power on account of his retirement from the command of the army, and 
the revival of the NRO ensured Benazir Bhutto’s reluctant acquiescence to the strategy 
                                                 
780 See Wajihuddin Ahmed v. Chief Election Commissioner, Islamabad, PLD 2008 Supreme Court 13. 
781 See Tikka Iqbal Muhammad Khan v. General Pervez Musharaf, PLD 2008 Supreme Court 178. The 
court accepted on face value the two major factual claims made by the government, namely that the 
country was in a state of crisis due to terrorism and that the courts under Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary had 
undermined the executive’s efficacy in fighting against such terrorism. In agreeing with the latter 
assertion the court noted the inappropriate usage of powers under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, 
which grants an original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to take up any matter of public interest 
concerning enforcement of fundamental rights and which has been interpreted as empowering the court 
to initiate cases suo motu. Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary was seen as the main culprit in this regard. 
782 Constitution (Amendment) Order, 2007 [President's Order No. 5 of 2007]. 
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of transition from a stronger form of military rule to a power-sharing arrangement with 
an elected government.  A number of minor opposition parties, including most notably 
former cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI), and 
the leaders of the Lawyers’ Movement discounted the possibility of fair polls under 
President Musharraf, and decided to boycott the elections.  Nawaz Sharif, who had been 
allowed to return to the country during the emergency, initially contemplated joining 
the boycott movement but later agreed to contest, thereby enabling the forthcoming 
elections to have the credibility they would have otherwise lacked. However, on 27 
December 2007, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto while attending a rally in 
Rawalpindi plunged the nation into confusion and utter grief.  The assassination was 
immediately blamed on the Pakistani Taleban by the Musharraf administration, but the 
mysterious circumstances of her death gave rise to rumours of a conspiracy involving 
elements of the regime. Bhutto’s death brought a dark cloud of doubt over the 
impending elections and planned transition to civilian rule.  
 
Within days of Benazir Bhutto’s burial, the PPP’s executive committee named her son 
and her widower, Asif Zardari, as the co-chairpersons of the party in accordance with 
a hand-written will produced by her husband.  This was not surprising as Pakistan’s 
largest political parties have historically been subject to dynastic control. It was Mr. 
Zardari – notorious for graft in Benazir Bhutto’s two terms as prime minister, and 
nicknamed ‘Mr. Ten Per Cent’ by the opposition on this count – who would lead the 
party in the general elections. The elections for the National Assembly and provincial 
legislatures were held in February 2008. Contrary to the fears of widespread rigging in 
favour of candidates belonging to the pro-Musharraf PML-Q, the elections were 
acknowledged as being by and large fair. Credit for this was given to the new army 
chief, who reportedly had distanced the military from close involvement in electoral 
politics. The PML-Q lost ground everywhere and the two largest opposition parties, the 
PPP and PML-N, emerged as the biggest winners. While the PPP emerged as the largest 
single party in the National Assembly, it once again failed to command an outright 
majority. Likewise, the PML-N emerged as the dominant party in the provincial 
legislature of the Punjab, but fell short of achieving a simple majority.  This electoral 
result essentially transformed General Musharraf into a weak president whose grip on 
power was bound to progressively slip, even though the coup de grace would take 
another few months. 
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A PRAETORIAN MODEL OF CORPORATIST GOVERNANCE 
 
By 2007, when the Musharraf regime faced the challenging task of engineering a 
transition to a third term in power, something no previous military ruler had 
successfully managed, the institutional balance representing the political settlement 
amongst the elites had begun to fracture. Pakistan’s political elites represented in the 
large national and regional political parties had also assimilated the model of corporate 
action that the military had established, and reached an agreement to contain political 
disagreement up to a certain limit in order to constrain the political space available to 
the military. A ‘Charter of Democracy’, negotiated amongst the major political parties 
during the first phase of the Lawyers’ Movement in May 2007, outlined a range of 
constitutional and political measures to stabilize a future civil-democratic dispensation. 
More significantly, the underlying spirit was one of a minimum level of accommodation 
and toleration between a future elected government and opposition parties, in order to 
ensure that the system was never so unstable as to justify military intervention. The 
Charter of Democracy also laid the foundations for the ultimate obliteration of left-right 
distinction in Pakistan’s electoral politics. The continuation of formal democracy 
became the common and over-arching ideological platform on which the most 
significant players in electoral politics achieved a consensus.  
 
As the military regime gave way under sustained pressure to elected governments of 
different political parties and coalitions at federal and provincial levels, the corporatist 
settlement amongst the political elites ensured the distribution of power such that most 
political parties benefited from access to government and resources. Political parties in 
opposition generally tolerated the governments’ patronage-oriented distribution of 
development and public services, corruption and crony capitalism. Furthermore, a style 
of politicking referred to as ‘friendly opposition’ by its critics ensured that political 
disagreement rarely reached the kind of breakdown or boiling point which had enabled 
the military to play the role of arbiter and regain political space in the 1990s. It was this 
corporatist settlement amongst the political elites which ensured a somewhat stable 
transition to civil-democratic dispensation post-Musharraf, such that 2013 was the first 
time in Pakistan’s history that an elected government completed its tenure and 
peacefully transferred power to its successor. 
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The real political opposition to elected governments in the immediate post-Musharraf 
era came not from other political contenders but the superior judiciary. Chief Justice 
Chaudhry, whose restoration was resisted by the incoming PPP government for more 
than a year, was ultimately brought back into office after a second wave of the Lawyers’ 
Movement and led a Supreme Court that could claim a proto-democratic mandate and 
popular legitimacy. The courts had experienced extra-constitutional upheaval and 
blatant intervention into the judicial domain, and sought security of tenure in public 
support. The ‘Chaudhry Court’ thus engaged in a kind of judicial activism (or rather 
proactivism) under the banner of constitutionalism and rule of law that was designed to 
cultivate a constituency beyond the lawyers, urban professional and upper-middle 
classes.  The court consistently championed causes that resonated with the urban and 
peri-urban middle classes and elements of the dominant Islamic nationalist ideology to 
broaden its support base. Noticeably, the court consistently took up issues of corruption, 
crony capitalism and abuse of public authority highlighted in private electronic media 
that appealed to the middle classes. The court used the popular support that it garnered 
through this brand of judicial review of executive action to expand its institutional turf 
as well as fend off any challenges from the political executive.  
 
Expansionist judicial review inevitably led to a protracted tussle between the judiciary 
and the elected executive. The narrative of corruption and malgovernance progressively 
constructed by the judiciary, particularly through the Supreme Court’s use of self-styled 
powers to initiate suo motu actions based on media reports of governmental corruption, 
undermined the elected government and raised concerns that a destabilized civilian 
government would be forced to cede greater space to the military in order to avert the 
possibility of a direct intervention. While there was some justification for such 
concerns, the judiciary also took some political space from the military, making it a 
three-way jostling for institutional power. Charges of bad governance and corruption 
have historically provided the military with the basis of undermining elected 
governments; and by claiming the role of the accountability arm of the state the court 
in fact deprived the military of its strongest justification for covert or overt intervention 
in politics. Furthermore, by holding certain matters of national security justiciable, the 
court also mounted a direct, even if somewhat limited, challenge to the military’s 
prerogative in this domain. The emergent era of corporatist governance would thus be 
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characterized by an evolving and fluid balancing of institutional interests. While the 
articulations of nationalism, rule of law and democracy all hark to greater public good, 
these would essentially become legitimating idioms of different institutional and elite 
group interests. A closer analysis of the class and corporatist dimensions of governance 







THE ‘CHAUDHRY COURT’ AND ‘JUDICIAL PROACTIVISM’ 
 
The February 2008 election results effectively consigned the Musharraf regime to a 
slow but inevitable demise. This was the third significant moment of transition from 
military to civilian rule in Pakistan’s history. Unlike the previous occasions, this time 
the prospects of a stable and lasting democratic dispensation appeared promising. 
Pakistan’s political elites represented in the large national and regional political parties 
had assimilated the model of corporate action established by the military, and reached 
an agreement to contain disagreement up to a certain limit in order to deny the 
possibility of political ingress and another military intervention. The ‘Charter of 
Democracy’ negotiated amongst the major political parties in 2007 represented a 
consensus on democratic continuity as well as major political issues necessary to 
stabilize a civil-democratic dispensation. Only one significant issue remained 
unresolved: the fate of the deposed Chief Justice Chaudhry, and by extension the role 
of the Supreme Court in Pakistan’s governance scheme. 
 
Justice Chaudhry was finally reinstated as the Chief Justice after another phase of the 
relatively populist mobilization led by the lawyers in March 2009. Although Justice 
Chaudhry had been dismissed by General Musharraf, it was the elected PPP 
government that resisted his restoration to office for more than a year, until a 'Long 
March' towards Islamabad by the Lawyers’ Movement and the combined opposition 
compelled it. Thus began the second period in Pakistan’s history in which the superior 
judiciary found the political space to exert and expand judicial power. The PPP 
government was based on a stable coalition that lasted a full five-year parliamentary 
term, but was not strong enough to suppress a resurgent judiciary that saw itself as 
having a populist, proto-democratic mandate. A tussle between the PPP government 
and the Chaudhry Court appeared imminent as the court looked to assert its perceived 
mandate. Unlike the 1990s this shaped up to be a jostling for power directly between 
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the elected and judicial institutions, rather than a scenario where the court would be 
called upon to mediate the tensions between other political players. 
 
Through its expansive judicial review the Chaudhry Court constructed a narrative of 
corruption and malgovernance by the elected government. In particular, the Supreme 
Court’s use of its powers to initiate suo motu actions based on media reports of 
governmental corruption threatened to destabilize a relatively weak civilian 
government. While the overt political tensions between the judiciary and the elected 
government garnered the overwhelming share of the attention, the more significant 
assertion of judicial power by the Chaudhry Court was predicated on a consolidation of 
the various strands of administrative law.  Many of the constitutional controversies had 
administrative issues at their core as the court insisted on restoring to the bureaucracy, 
police and other law enforcement agencies some capacity for decision-making and 
action independent of political influence. The Chaudhry Court, which had experienced 
extra-constitutional upheaval and blatant intervention into the judicial domain, 
consciously sought security of tenure in public support. The causes of anti-corruption 
and administrative propriety resonated with the urban and peri-urban middle classes. 
The court also proactively engaged in judicial review in human rights cases, and 
challenged illegal detentions and abuse of police powers which enabled it to further 
broaden its support base.  
 
The court used the popular support that it garnered through its brand of judicial review 
to expand its institutional role, as well as resist the anticipated pushback form the 
political executive. The resistance came in the form of a successful effort by the 
government to delegitimize its aggressive judicial review practices as politically 
motivated. By the end of Chief Justice Chaudhry’s tenure, the criticism of judicial 
activism had taken a hold in public discourse. As a result, in the post-Chaudhry era the 
Supreme Court experienced a gradual shift in its direction under the leadership of five 
different Chief Justices. Except for a brief period of twenty-three poetic days in which 
the twenty-third Chief Justice of Pakistan briefly rekindled the legacy of Chaudhry, the 
court progressively curtailed its Original jurisdiction and dramatically reduced the use 
of suo motu powers. Nonetheless, the court remained a powerful institution and the 
centrality of its role within the governance system of Pakistan appeared to be an 
irreversible development. On multiple occasions the post-Chaudhry Supreme Court 
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was reluctantly dragged into the midst of political crises that threatened the very 
existence of the democratic system and the constitutional scheme on which the court 
claimed to found its powers. In such circumstances the court remained the only 
institution with the capacity to decisively and credibly resolve such crises and mediate 
between the key stakeholders of Pakistan’s governance system.  
 
THE ‘CHAUDHRY COURT’ 
 
The Second Phase of the Lawyers’ Movement  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the election in March 2008, the PPP and PML-N reached 
an accord whereby the two largest parties in parliament would form a coalition 
government at the centre, and the judges deposed during the emergency would be 
restored within thirty days. Yousaf Raza Gilani, the PPP’s candidate, became the prime 
minister with the overwhelming support of National Assembly members, and 
immediately ordered the release of those Supreme Court judges who had been under 
house arrest since the imposition of the emergency, including Justice Chaudhry. 
Optimism about the restoration of judges began to fade, however, as disagreement over 
the modalities of the reinstatement emerged between the coalition partners. The PML-
N and the leaders of the Lawyers' Movement took the view that since the dismissal of 
the judges was unconstitutional to begin with, and hence void ab initio, the judges could 
be restored through a simple notification issued by the executive to that effect. They 
were also of the opinion that judges appointed to the superior courts after the imposition 
of the emergency had been appointed illegally, and would be removed so that the 
composition of the courts may be restored to the status quo ante.  
 
In contrast, the government exhibited a distinct preference for restoring the deposed 
judges through a constitutional amendment that would also retain those judges who 
were appointed by President Musharraf during and after the emergency. This would 
indirectly acknowledge the constitutionality of the entire range of emergency actions, 
as well as reduce the judges removed by President Musharraf to a minority in the 
reconstituted courts. The motivation for this particular stance appeared to be a concern 
that the restoration of the judges in the manner demanded by the Lawyers’ Movement 
would not only result in a fiercely independent judiciary, but also invalidate the 
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emergency and all actions taken pursuant to it, including especially the nullification of 
the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). After two months of wrangling over this 
issue, PML-N members resigned from the coalition government citing the refusal of 
the PPP to honour its commitments with regard to the restoration of the judges. Within 
days, the leaders of the bar associations announced the revival of their protest 
movement that would culminate in a 'Long March' towards Islamabad. In June 2008, 
thousands of lawyers, opposition political party workers, civil society activists and 
ordinary citizens congregated at the federal capital’s Constitution Avenue from all over 
the country. The Long March participants appeared to believe that a democratically 
elected government would have little choice but to bow before such a strong showing 
of popular support for the restoration of the judges.  
 
However, the government withstood the pressure with tact and tenacity by allowing the 
protests to be conducted peacefully for a few days. Unable to continue the protests 
indefinitely, the leaders of the Lawyers’ Movement unexpectedly announced a 
premature end of the Long March without achieving its objective. As the euphoria of a 
peaceful and popular Long March was overtaken by a sense of despondency, divisions 
appeared amongst the leadership of the movement and the political parties backing it. 
The issue of the judges’ restoration continued to simmer as the deposed Chief Justice 
visited more bar associations around the country. After further talks between the 
government and PML-N in early August, rumours circulated that both parties had 
agreed upon a new deal pursuant to which President Musharraf would be impeached 
and the judges restored soon thereafter. As the threat of impeachment crystallized, 
General (retired) Musharraf was forced to resign as President.  The PPP immediately 
announced Asif Zardari as its candidate for the vacant presidency. The agreement 
between the government and the PML-N broke down once again, and it appeared that 
in a remarkable feat of political gamesmanship Zardari had managed to win the support 
of the opposition in displacing President Musharraf without giving any ground on the 
restoration of judges. In September 2008, Zardari comfortably won the election to 
become the president of Pakistan, an office that carried the promise of temporary 
immunity from prosecution on corruption charges, even if the NRO were invalidated. 
 
The Lawyers’ Movement appeared to have lost all steam in the aftermath of President 
Zardari’s election. A number of deposed Supreme Court and High Court judges took 
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the oath of office, thereby breaking ranks with the Justice Chaudhry and the Lawyers’ 
Movement.  Prominent government representatives made frequent statements on 
national media that Justice Chaudhry had been politicized during the movement, and 
he was no longer fit to act in a judicial capacity.  Even the opposition PML-N appeared 
to have dropped the issue of the judges’ restoration from the top of its list of priorities. 
However, as the first anniversary of the imposition of emergency approached, the 
lawyers announced their intent to hold another round of street protests in March 2009. 
In organizing the second Long March the movement appeared to have an important 
advantage on its side. The second Long March was deliberately intended to coincide 
with the retirement date of incumbent Chief Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar. It had been 
one of the key arguments of the government against Justice Chaudhry’s restoration that 
it did not have the constitutional authority to demote Justice Dogar from the post of the 
Chief Justice. Justice Dogar’s impending retirement thus provided a window of 
opportunity for the movement.  
 
In the entire period from the imposition of emergency to the second Long March, the 
superior courts of Pakistan had played the role that could be expected of a subservient 
and docile judiciary. The Supreme Court under Dogar, CJ was widely referred to as the 
'Dogar Court' with a distinctly derogatory connotation. Its actions betrayed a firm desire 
to prove the value of a compliant judiciary to the executive. Several constitutional 
decisions of political significance that favoured the government had discredited the 
Supreme Court.783 However, the timidity of the Dogar Court extended beyond cases of 
political relevance, as the Supreme Court relinquished even a pretence of holding the 
executive accountable. The Dogar Court also attempted to undo a decade of 
jurisprudential development by restricting the Original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court under Article 184(3) – it defined the requirement of public importance so 
narrowly as to invalidate all of the Chaudhry Court’s suo motu human rights and public 
interest actions.784 A summary of the cases decided by the Dogar Court, instances of 
non-interference in the exercise of governmental powers, also provided a useful means 
                                                 
783 For example, the Dogar Court had paved the way for Mr. Zardari's election as President by lifting 
the requirement of holding a bachelor's degree as minimum educational qualification to become a 
member of Parliament or the President. See Muhammad Nasir Mahmood v. Federation Of Pakistan, 
PLD 2009 Supreme Court 107. 
784 See Suo Motu Case No. 13 of 2007, PLD 2009 Supreme Court 217. Examples of suo motu cases 
undone by the Dogar court include In re: Suo Motu Case No. 21 of 2007, 2008 SCMR 563. 
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to identify vested interests that had come to dominate the Pakistani state.785 At the time 
of the second Long March in 2009, the subservience of the Dogar Court thus provided 
the backdrop against which the promise of an independent superior judiciary led by 
Chief Justice Chaudhry stood out in sharp relief. In fact, the expectations invested in 
the Long March, and by extension in the Chaudhry Court, went far beyond the pledge 
of independence, impartiality, procedural propriety and justice according to law. The 
promise held out by the judicial activism of the Chaudhry Court in 2007, and negated 
so starkly by the Dogar Court in 2008, became one of a challenge to decades of elite 
control over state, politics and resources. This was bound to be a weighty charge.  
 
The second Long March was a different affair from that of June 2008. Lahore, where 
the Long March was scheduled to begin, appeared to be under siege on the evening of 
15 March 2009. All the major highways leading into and away from the sprawling 
metropolis had been blockaded by heavily armed police and paramilitary contingents.  
Several processions of lawyers and political party activists that had set off earlier from 
the southern and western parts of the country, with the intent to congregate in Lahore 
and become a part of the march towards Islamabad, had been successfully stopped by 
a determined state apparatus. Pockets of lawyers and activists seeking to gather at the 
Lahore High Court premises had been dispersed by police battalions wielding tear gas 
and wooden sticks. Supporters of the PML-N appeared increasingly resigned to their 
inability to break the police cordon around the Sharif family home in Lahore. Most of 
the other prominent opposition leaders had also been placed under house arrest on the 
preceding days, or had gone in hiding like Imran Khan. It appeared that the federal 
government had managed to choke the Long March and stifle the Lawyers’ Movement. 
 
As millions sat glued to their television screens across the country, surfing Pakistan’s 
several private news channels that were providing live coverage and commentary of the 
                                                 
785 For instance, the Dogar Court protected the grant of lucrative leases of farms on the outskirts of the 
capital city ostensibly for the cultivation of cheaper produce but in reality used to benefit politicians, 
bureaucrats, generals and wealthy businessmen with the necessary links. See In re: Suo Motu Case No. 
10 of 2007, PLD 2008 Supreme Court 673. In another case, it stamped approval on the practice of 
dispensing patronage to senior bureaucrats through the discretionary allotment of valuable residential 
property. See In re: Human Right Case No. 5818 of 2006 (Action on Press Clipping), 2008 SCMR 531.  
In yet another reversal of the Chaudhry Court’s suo motu action, the Dogar Court refused to hear a 
challenge to the alleged irregularities of a rich and politically well-connected property developer in 
compulsorily acquiring land for a private housing development project. See In re: Suo Motu Case No. 
13 of 2007, PLD 2009 Supreme Court 217.  
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unfolding political drama, the tense calm suddenly shattered. Somehow against the run 
of play, the barriers around the Sharif residence were overrun and thousands of 
protesters poured onto the streets of Lahore. By midnight, as a procession slowly moved 
past the old walled city towards the northern exits, the prospect of a bloody struggle 
between the participants of the Long March and the security forces at the disposal of 
the federal government loomed large over Pakistan’s political horizons. Merely hours 
later, as the caravan had moved barely beyond the outskirts of Lahore, the government 
relented and agreed to restore Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry as the Chief Justice of 
Pakistan, as well as reinstate the other judges of the superior courts who had still held 
out. As the prime minister appeared on national television in the early hours of 16 
March to address the nation and formally announce the decision to restore the judges, 
rumours were rife that the military chief had intervened behind the scenes and brokered 
a deal on the judges’ restoration. 
 
The NRO Saga and Judiciary-Executive Tensions 
 
On 24 March 2009, Iftikhar Chaudhry became once again the de facto and de jure Chief 
Justice of Pakistan. The restoration of the judges had been formally accomplished 
through a notification and without the need for a fresh oath, thereby acknowledging the 
strength of the claim that legally Justice Chaudhry and the other judges had never been 
removed from office. Contrary to the fears of an immediate backlash against the elected 
government, the Supreme Court proceeded cautiously in the first few months after its 
restoration and ensured a sense of political equilibrium.786 The court began the task of 
dismantling the legal legacy of the emergency in a measured fashion. First, the Supreme 
Court nullified the decision of the Dogar Court in Tikka Iqbal Muhammad Khan and 
declared the imposition of emergency by General Musharraf to be unconstitutional.787 
                                                 
786 On March 29, President Zardari ended governor's rule in the Punjab, imposed earlier to prevent the 
support of the provincial government for the Long March, thereby cooling the political temperatures by 
one more degree. On March 31st, the Supreme Court reversed an earlier decision on the 
disqualification of Mian Shahbaz Sharif by the Dogar Court which had provided the basis for 
governor's rule, enabling him to resume the office of the Chief Minister of Punjab. See Federation of 
Pakistan v. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, PLD 2009 Supreme Court 644. On July 17, the Supreme 
Court acquitted Mian Nawaz Sharif of all charges in the hijacking case, thereby enabling his complete 
political rehabilitation. See Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. The State, Criminal Petition No. 200 of 
2009. 
787 Tikka Iqbal Muhammad Khan v. General Pervez Musharraf Chief of Army Staff, PLD 2009 
Supreme Court 6. 
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The court then began to put its own house in order. In Sindh High Court Bar Association 
it held that the deposed judges ‘shall be deemed never to have ceased to be ... judges, 
irrespective of any notification issued regarding their reappointment or restoration.’788 
Since the office of the Chief Justice had never fallen vacant, the purported appointment 
of Justice Dogar as Chief Justice was thus void ab initio. As Justice Dogar was never 
the lawful Chief Justice, all appointments to judicial office made in consultation with 
him were, therefore, also null and void.789 
 
The Supreme Court did not, however, automatically invalidate all of the decisions of 
the Dogar Court on the grounds that these were past and closed transactions. In a show 
of respect for the democratic process unfolding in the aftermath of the emergency, the 
court accepted the validity of the February 2008 elections, the formation of federal and 
provincial governments thereafter, and the presidential election of Zardari. Further, 
while the court stripped the presidential ordinances promulgated by General Musharraf 
immediately before and during the emergency of permanence granted by the PCO, it 
did not immediately declare them to be null and void. In a remarkable show of 
ingenuity, the court held that the constitutional life of these presidential ordinances 
would commence from the date of the judgment and not the date of issuance, after 
which period these ordinances would have to be laid before parliament for adoption as 
an Act. Barring such parliamentary approval, the ordinances would lapse. Of these 
ordinances the NRO was of vital significance to the presidency and the federal 
government, as noted earlier. In October, the government tabled the NRO before the 
parliament only to withdraw it when even its allies refused to support the legislative 
measure.  
 
In November, the ordinances promulgated by General Musharraf, including the NRO, 
lapsed. In December, the Supreme Court finally began re-hearing petitions challenging 
the constitutionality of the NRO. Upon the Supreme Court’s insistence the country’s 
                                                 
788 Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2009 Supreme Court 879. 
789 See Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2010 Supreme Court 483. The 
court was particularly severe on those judges who had held office prior to the emergency and had taken 
oath under the PCO in contravention of the seven-member bench's direction issued on the eve of the 
emergency. Contempt of court notices were issued to these judges compelling resignations by most of 
them. See Abdul Hameed Dogar v. Federation of Pakistan, 2010 SCMR 312; Abdul Hameed Dogar v. 
Federation of Pakistan, Intra Court Appeals No. 3, 4, 6 to 11 of 2011; Criminal Original Petitions No. 
93 To 98, 100 & 104 of 2009 and 2, 3 & 4 of 2011; Justice Hasnat Ahmed Khan v. Registrar, Supreme 
Court Of Pakistan, PLD 2010 Supreme Court 806. 
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corruption watchdog, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), presented a list of the 
beneficiaries of the legislative disposal of criminal cases achieved through the NRO. 
The list included three distinct categories of beneficiaries: prominent politicians 
belonging to the PPP government implicated in corruption charges; senior bureaucrats, 
some of whom occupied key posts in the federal and provincial governments, accused 
of graft; and politicians and workers belonging to the MQM, an important ally of the 
government, indicted for violent crimes. Most notably, the list of beneficiaries included 
President Zardari, who stood accused of serious corruption in Pakistan and related 
money-laundering charges in Switzerland, Spain and the UK. The government decided 
not to defend the NRO before the Supreme Court. The thinking behind this legal 
strategy appeared to be a desire to placate the court, and to end the case and surrounding 
notoriety as soon as possible.   
 
After barely a week of the hearings, the Supreme Court issued a short order declaring 
the NRO to be void ab initio and resurrected all criminal cases covered by the 
ordinance.790 In its short order pending a detailed judgment, the court nullified the NRO 
as unconstitutional for violating several clauses of the constitution. Of the bare 
references to constitutional provisions made in the short order, the strongest possible 
ground for invalidating the NRO appeared to be a violation of Article 25 which 
guarantees the equality of all citizens and the equal protection of the law.791 The NRO, 
by providing a preferential treatment to certain classes of politicians and bureaucrats, 
had contravened the equality guarantee. Other reasonable bases for nullifying the NRO 
appeared to be a contravention of the separation of powers and judicial independence 
principles of the constitution. The NRO had essentially operated as a 'legislative 
judgment' dispositive of cases pending before the courts. As such, the short order in the 
NRO case was likely to receive widespread recognition as having been based upon 
robust constitutional arguments. However, additional constitutional references in the 
short order caused nervousness in some sectors of the legal community, and sent ripples 
of anxiety across Pakistan’s political landscape.  
 
                                                 
790 See Dr. Mobashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2010 Supreme Court 1. 
791 See Article 25 cl. 1, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. 
  239
A reference was made to Article 227 which contains a general statement that all laws 
‘shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam ... and no law shall be 
enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions.’792 This provision had been historically 
interpreted as being declaratory in nature.793 The reference to this provision in the short 
order created a doubt that the court might grant indirect justiciability to this provision, 
thereby unleashing a new wave of Islamization.  This touched raw nerves for liberal 
lawyers and human rights activists, many of whom had been at the forefront of the 
Lawyers’ Movement. Furthermore, the court referred to constitutional provisions 
governing the qualification and disqualification of parliamentarians and the president, 
requiring them to be ‘sagacious, righteous and non-profligate, honest and ameen.’794 
These provisions had been inserted by General Zia at the height of the Islamization 
drive in the 1980s. A reference to the provisions suggested that the beneficiaries of the 
NRO, most notably President Zardari, might be subject to disqualification from holding 
public office. The possibility that the Supreme Court might unseat an elected president 
unleashed a storm of political speculation. 
 
The detailed judgment of the Supreme Court in the NRO case, issued in January 2010, 
laid to rest some of the concerns regarding resurgent Islamization and the imminent 
disqualification of the president to a considerable extent.795 Nonetheless, one aspect of 
the judgment ensured that political volatility and wrangling between the elected 
executive and the judiciary would continue. This related to the withdrawal of corruption 
and money-laundering charges against the president in Switzerland, UK and other 
European jurisdictions (the so-called Swiss case). These cases had been initiated 
through a mutual legal assistance request by the Government of Pakistan in 1998. The 
examining Magistrate in Geneva, Switzerland, had convicted Mr. Zardari and Ms. 
Bhutto of the offence of money-laundering after the accused failed to appear before his 
court, and froze bank accounts worth approximately US$ 60 million.  Pursuant to a 
subsequent appeal by the defendants, the Attorney-General of Geneva had set the 
conviction aside and initiated another investigation on a more serious charge of 
                                                 
792 Article 227 cl. 1, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. 
793 As clause 2 of the said article clearly stipulated that effect to the above direction may only be given 
through the mechanism stipulated in subsequent provisions of that chapter of the Constitution, which 
dealt with the creation, operation and powers of an advisory council composed of religious scholars. 
794 Article 62 cl. 1(f) and Article 63 cl. 1(p), 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. 
795 See Dr. Mobashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan, Pakistan, PLD 2010 Supreme Court 265. 
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aggravated money-laundering. The second investigation was nearing conclusion in 
April 2008 when, pursuant to the NRO, the Attorney-General of Pakistan had written a 
letter to the Attorney-General of Geneva stating that the charges against President 
Zardari were ‘politically motivated.’ In August 2008 the Swiss prosecutors had dropped 
all charges against President Zardari as the Government of Pakistan withdrew the 
declaration of its interest as a civil party in the case.  
 
While invalidating the NRO, the Supreme Court took exception to the manner in which 
the Swiss case had been closed. In its short order the court declared that the Attorney-
General’s action in withdrawing the request for mutual legal assistance was illegal, and 
directed the government to take immediate steps to reverse this action.796 This would 
require the federal government to play a role in re-initiating cases against the president 
and the leader of the ruling party in a foreign jurisdiction. Not unexpectedly, the federal 
government resisted. The government also dragged its feet in implementing other 
aspects of the judgment, including the dismissal of all bureaucrats who had availed the 
benefit of the NRO. This resulted in a protracted battle with the Supreme Court, which 
saw contempt and insubordination in the government’s dilatory tactics. In the 
government’s defence, at least as regards the order affecting the Swiss case, there was 
room to argue that the president was covered by international law principles of 
sovereign immunity in the proceedings before the Swiss courts. Another thorny issue 
was that of the immunity of the president from criminal prosecution under Article 248 
of the constitution. 
 
The immunity clause of Article 248 states that ‘[no] criminal proceedings whatsoever 
shall be instituted or continued against the President ... in any court during his term of 
office.’797 While several leading lawyers argued that the president’s immunity was 
limited to bona fide exercises of presidential powers only, the text of the constitutional 
provisions appeared to protect him from any prosecution, at least in Pakistan. Questions 
remained, however, as to whether the immunity clause protected the president from 
prosecution in foreign courts at the behest of the Government of Pakistan, as would be 
the consequence of the Supreme Court’s directive in the NRO case. However, the 
                                                 
796 See Dr. Mobashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2010 Supreme Court 1. 
797 Article 248 cl. 2, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. 
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president never formally claimed immunity before the court. As the NRO order 
remained unimplemented for months, pressure also built upon the court to enforce its 
judgment. It was asserted by some that the court could call the Army in its aid, raising 
the spectre of yet another kind of military intervention.798 As rumours of a military-
judiciary nexus circulated, the government pushed back even harder against the 
Supreme Court. The government attempted fruitlessly to take on the court on the issue 
of judicial appointments, but had to retreat.799 In addition to resisting the enforcement 
of court directives, it appeared that the government’s strategy was to politicize the 
actions of the superior courts, and to create an impression of victimization at the hands 
of the judiciary, and indirectly the military establishment. 
 
CORPORATIST DEMOCRACY AND THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS 
 
Politicization of the Chaudhry Court 
 
There was some circumstantial evidence pointing towards a tacit military-judiciary 
nexus. Concurrently with the unfolding of the NRO saga, the military had also begun 
to reclaim lost space in the national security and foreign policy domains. The immediate 
point of contention between the military and the government concerned the terms of 
the US foreign aid program in Pakistan. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 
of 2009, passed by the US Congress just prior to the start of hearings on the NRO, 
appeared to have shifted the focus to political and development assistance to Pakistan, 
and somewhat away from the historical military and security-oriented partnership 
between the two countries. Certain conditionalities in the draft legislation, known 
popularly as the Kerry-Luger Bill, which related to strengthening civilian control over 
the military, and in particular its intelligence agency ISI, had prompted the military to 
react publicly. The bill was seen by the military and its allied groups on the right of the 
political spectrum as an attempt by the US to intervene in Pakistan’s internal affairs, at 
the behest or instigation of the PPP government. Given this backdrop, the Supreme 
Court’s aggressive stance in the NRO case justified the government’s paranoia about 
                                                 
798 Article 190, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan.  
799 See Moeen Cheema, ‘Pakistan: New 'Judges' Case' in the Making?’, Jurist, 14 February 2010. Also, 
see Nadeem Ahmed Advocate v. Federation of Pakistan, Constitution Petitions No.2, 3 & 4 of 2010, 
Order dated February 13, 2010. 
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an impending judicial coup. Seeing a two-pronged push, the government preferred to 
largely cede national security policymaking to the military in order to gain some 
breathing space. 
 
In another strategic move, the PPP government managed by a politically astute 
president, laid the constitutional foundations of a broad based accommodation amongst 
the political classes. The devolution of power from the centre to the provinces had been 
longstanding demand of the PPP and smaller, mostly regional, parties. The transfer of 
some powers to the provinces would give the governments of different political parties 
in the federating units a share of power, as well as a stake in the continuation of the 
civil-democratic dispensation. This would also enable the PPP government to forge a 
stable coalition with some of these regional parties with presence in both provincial 
legislatures and the federal legislature at the centre. Even the PML-N, the largest 
opposition party at the federal level, would acquire a significant share of power and 
resources through the government in Punjab, disincentivizing the kind of political 
brinkmanship that had led to the political instability of the 1990s. This broad based 
political accommodation achieved through devolution thus essentially froze out only 
those parties which had boycotted the 2008 elections in support of the Lawyers’ 
Movement. Such corporatism on the part of the political elites, waged under the banner 
of stable democracy, provided the PPP government under President Zardari the 
wherewithal to withstand the real opposition to its governance style that came 
increasingly from the courts. 
 
The devolution of powers to provinces was affected through the Eighteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, passed by the parliament in April 2010 with 
widespread support from across the political spectrum.800 The amendment looked to 
somewhat redress the historical imbalance of powers between federation and provincial 
units by abolishing the ‘Concurrent List,’ thereby transferring a range of legislative 
powers to the provinces. The Concurrent List had previously specified legislative 
powers common to both federal and provincial legislatures, which effectively granted 
ascendancy to the federation over these subjects.801 The Eighteenth Amendment also 
                                                 
800 Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010. 
801 Article 142, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, amended by §49 of Constitution (Eighteenth 
Amendment) Act, 2010. Only the areas of criminal law, criminal procedure and evidence were left as 
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undid several aspects of the Seventeenth Amendment passed by the Musharraf era 
legislature that had transferred key powers to the presidency, and tilted the balance of 
powers back towards the parliament and the elected executive, at least as regards 
constitutional form. Most notably, Article 58(2)(b) was expunged from the 
constitutional text yet again, and the president’s powers of dismissing the federal 
government and dissolving the legislature was confined to the narrow circumstances of 
a loss of majority in the National Assembly or advice of the prime minister to that 
effect.802 The authority to appoint provincial governors and military chiefs, a significant 
power in the context of the historical ascendancy of the military within the state 
structure, was reassigned to the prime minister.803 Similarly, the presidential power of 
proclaiming a state of emergency was rendered subject to the approval of provincial or 
federal legislatures.804 The Eighteenth Amendment also introduced significant reforms 
to the electoral process and clarified matters that had earlier been the cause of some 
controversy.805 Presidential discretion in the appointment of the Chief Election 
Commissioner was taken away, and the appointment to this office of vital significance 
to fair electoral processes was entrusted to a parliamentary committee with equal 
representation of the treasury and opposition benches.806 Similarly, the opposition was 
given an equal say in the selection of caretaker governments.807 The bill of rights was 
bolstered with the addition of a right to ‘fair trial’ and ‘due process’ that may have far 
                                                 
common domain. Other provincial concerns of long standing, such as federal control over natural 
resources and decision making on the construction of mega hydro-electric projects were also addressed. 
See Articles 157 and 161, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, amended by §§58 and 60 of Constitution 
(Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, respectively. 
802 See §17 of Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010. 
803 See Articles 243 and 101, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, amended by §§90 and 33 of Constitution 
(Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, respectively. 
804 See Article 232, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, amended by §86 of Constitution (Eighteenth 
Amendment) Act, 2010. 
805 While the 18th Amendment undid most of the constitutional changes brought about by General 
Musharraf, it retained several positive aspects of the military regime's initiatives. Reserved seats for 
women and minorities in the national and provincial legislatures were maintained. The age of voting, 
lowered to eighteen years, was also incorporated.  See Article 51, 59 and 106, 1973 Constitution of 
Pakistan, amended by §§16, 18 and 36 of Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, 
respectively. 
806 See Article 213, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, amended by §77 of Constitution (Eighteenth 
Amendment) Act, 2010. 
807 See Article 224, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, amended by §83 of Constitution (Eighteenth 
Amendment) Act, 2010. 
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reaching impact on the rights jurisprudence of Pakistan’s courts.808 The amendment 
also added rights to information and compulsory education.809  
 
The Eighteenth Amendment was seen by many as a watershed for democratic politics 
in Pakistan. However, while there was much to commend about the amendment, it also 
attracted immediate controversy.  Petitions were filed before the Supreme Court to 
challenge several aspects of the amendment.810 To note one issue, the amended 
provision governing disqualification on the grounds of defection from political parties 
effectively handed over the power to disqualify defecting members to the heads of 
political parties, even if they were not members of parliament or heads of the 
parliamentary group of their party. This appeared to strengthen the dynastic control 
over the major political parties often from outside the parliament. Most significantly, 
the Eighteenth Amendment totally revamped the process of judicial appointment.811 
The Amendment entrusted judicial appointments to a newly-created judicial 
commission and a parliamentary committee. If the Parliamentary Committee were to 
reject a nomination of the Judicial Commission with a three-fourth majority, the 
Judicial Commission would be required to recommend another candidate.812 This 
change in the appointment procedure, so soon after the superior judiciary had won its 
hard-earned independence, aroused suspicion that the real aim of the amendment was 
the subjugation of the judiciary, rather than meaningful reform of the appointment 
process.  
 
In Nadeem Ahmad, the Supreme Court entertained arguments that the Amendment was 
designed to undermine the independence of the judiciary and thus violated the basic 
structure of the constitution.813 The court issued an interim order identifying aspects of 
the amendment – which undermined the role of the Chief Justice, gave the executive an 
equal say in judicial nominations, and the parliamentary committee virtual veto powers 
                                                 
808 Article 10A, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, added by §5 of Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) 
Act, 2010. 
809 Articles 19A and 25A, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, amended by §§7 and 9 of Constitution 
(Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, respectively. 
810 Article 63A, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, amended by §22 of Constitution (Eighteenth 
Amendment) Act, 2010. 
811 See Article 175A, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, amended by §67 of Constitution (Eighteenth 
Amendment) Act, 2010. 
812 See Article 175A cl. 12, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. 
813 Nadeem Ahmad v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2010 Supreme Court 1165. 
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over the recommendations of the Judicial Commission – as problematic. Under 
pressure, the parliament adopted most of the court’s recommendations through the 
Nineteenth Amendment, and gave the judges a larger representation in the Judicial 
Commission.814 In a follow-up decision, the court whittled down the role of the 
parliamentary committee, holding that its reasons for refusing a nomination made by 
the Judicial Commission were reviewable. This effectively brought the judicial 
appointment process in line with that of India with a collegium of senior judges 
deciding on appointments, subject to a requirement of some consultation with the 
executive. Just as in the 1990s, the court had asserted judicial power to enhance its 
institutional independence in a patently self-serving manner. 
 
By 2012, as the government approached a difficult election year, the Supreme Court 
charged, convicted and disqualified the incumbent prime minister with contempt of 
court for defying the court’s directions in the NRO case.815 This was another remarkable 
assertion of judicial power and gave rise to immense controversy. The PPP’s 
replacement in the office of the prime minister found himself in a similar situation, 
facing contempt proceedings before the Supreme Court.816 The tension was finally 
diffused when the successor prime minister finally wrote a letter to Swiss prosecutors 
in accordance with the instructions of the court. The ease with which the controversy 
was ultimately resolved reflected badly on both the elected institutions and the court. 
In addition to Prime Minister Gilani, the Supreme Court disqualified several other 
members of parliament for submitting fake academic degrees in the 2008 elections, and 
for possessing dual citizenship.817 However, the protracted tussle with the executive 
had begun to take its toll on the court’s credibility and its public perception as well. In 
a little more than three years after the successful Lawyers’ Movement, fundamental 
divisions also appeared to have split the lawyers’ communities virtually down the 
                                                 
814 In particular, judicial representation on the Commission was increased from two to four, the 
Parliamentary Committee was required to give reasons in case of a rejection of the Judicial Commission's 
nomination, and the Committee's hearings were mandated to be held in camera. See §4 of Constitution 
(Nineteenth Amendment) Act, 2010. 
815 Criminal Original Petition No. 06 of 2012 in Suo Motu Case No. 04 of 2010, PLD 2012 Supreme 
Court 553; Siddique v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2012 Supreme Court 660. 
816 See Criminal Original Petition No. 74 of 2012, In Suo Motu Case No. 04 of 2010, PLD 2012 
Supreme Court 1086. 
817 See Muhammad Rizwan Gill v. Nadia Aziz, PLD 2010 Supreme Court 828; Mian Najeeb-ud-Din 
Owaisi v. Amir Yar Waran, PLD 2013 Supreme Court 482; Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Federation 
of Pakistan, PLD 2012 Supreme Court 1089. 
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middle, mostly along party-political and rural-urban lines. While many of the district 
and peri-urban bar associations continued to support the judiciary’s robust anti-
government stance, the more prominent High Court and Supreme Court bar 
associations became increasingly critical of the exercise of judicial power, and accused 
the court of having over-stepped its constitutional bounds. 
 
In addition to the prime minimiser’s contempt saga, other Supreme Court decisions in 
2012 courted extensive controversy. The Memo case raised once again the spectre of 
collusion between the court, the military, and this time even the PML-N, to destabilize 
the PPP government.818  The case arose out of an allegation that the ambassador of 
Pakistan to the US had sent a secret missive to the US government, urging certain 
actions against Pakistan military. The manner in which the ISI chief submitted an 
incriminating affidavit against the ambassador leading to his removal, fuelled 
suspicions of a conspiracy between the military and the court against the government. 
However, the controversy which ultimately deflated the Chaudhry Court’s drive to hold 
the government accountable concerned allegations of financial impropriety against the 
Chief Justice’s son.819 A bench headed by the Chaudhry, CJ took notice of allegations 
that a property tycoon had bribed his son to curry favour with regard to a host of cases 
concerning forcible and improper acquisition of property being heard by the court. 
While the tycoon admitted in open court that no such favours had actually been 
forthcoming, details of lavish foreign trips and the unaccountable wealth of his son 
significantly undermined the Chaudhry, CJ’s claim to a high moral ground in the 
crusade against governmental corruption.  
 
The Crisis of Governance and Judicial Review of Executive Action  
 
While the overt political tensions between the judiciary and the elected government 
garnered the overwhelming share of the attention, the real turf of institutional struggle 
was in the domain of administrative law. In several cases the Supreme Court 
aggressively pursued charges of corruption and crony capitalism against ministers and 
affiliates of the federal government, senior members of the federal bureaucracy, and 
                                                 
818 See Watan Party v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2012 Supreme Court 292.  
819 Suo Motu Case No. 5 of 2012, PLD 2012 Supreme Court 664. 
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appointees to public corporations and regulatory authorities. Many of these cases were 
taken up suo motu upon reports of alleged corruption in print and electronic media, and 
had a dramatically negative impact on the public perception of the executive’s integrity 
and competence. The court’s insistence upon impartial investigations into these 
allegations, and periodic public disclosures on progress before the court, made these 
cases the stuff of almost daily news reports and political talk shows. As the 
investigations initiated on the court’s insistence and subjected to its supervision were 
resisted at every step by the incumbent government, the court’s proactive use of its 
Original jurisdiction to exercise the judicial review of executive action became highly 
visible as well as politicized. 
 
The NRO saga was arguably the quintessential example of the Supreme Court’s 
administrative law jurisprudence. In addition to the constitutional questions concerning 
the validity of the NRO as a legislative measure, the organization and workings of NAB 
came under intense scrutiny by the court. In the interregnum between the NRO case and 
the Prime Minister’s disqualification, the Supreme Court remained preoccupied with 
the failure of NAB chairmen and senior prosecutors to effectively reinstate and pursue 
the corruption cases that the NRO had sought to end in one legislative swoop. In a 
succession of cases the Supreme Court sought to wrest control of the NAB from the 
government, disqualified incumbent chairmen, and attempted to force the appointment 
of independent officials in their place.820  The government attempted to retain control 
over the NAB through subsequent appointments of beholden individuals to these posts, 
leading to continuous friction between the court and NAB. The government’s control 
over NAB also ensured that individual defendants secured acquittals through the special 
accountability courts set up to try corruption cases as NAB prosecutors presented weak 
cases, withdrew vital evidence and granted important concessions. As such, the 
government achieved indirectly and piecemeal through NAB what it could not get 
through the NRO. 
 
As the court’s attempts to compel independent investigations by NAB through rolling 
review and active supervision failed, it looked to alternatives. In several cases the court 
                                                 
820 See The Bank of Punjab v. Haris Steel Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., PLD 2010 Supreme Court 1109; 
Shahid Orakzai v. Pakistan through Secretary Law, Ministry of Law, Islamabad, PLD 2011 Supreme 
Court 365; Ch. Nisar Ali Khan v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2013 Supreme Court 568. 
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painstakingly undertook the task of supervising investigations into corruption and other 
criminal cases by other federal agencies such as the Federal Investigation Agency 
(FIA),821 regular police and the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF). These agencies also 
became the turf of a protracted battle between the Supreme Court and the federal 
government over the appointment of independent officials and the conduct of impartial 
investigations.822 The court took cognizance of the ease with which influence over the 
provincial police and prosecution services enabled the government to shield its affiliates 
from efficient prosecution. Frustrated with its inability to leverage existing institutions, 
the court began to directly investigate corruption charges against ministers and high 
officials by appointing ad hoc fact-finding commissions composed of superior court 
judges or trusted bureaucrats.  However, as these commissions lacked any judicial 
capacity, and the court itself lacked the authority to make conclusive findings of fact in 
its judicial review jurisdiction, even these cases had to be sent back for investigation 
and prosecution to the various law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies. 
 
A prime example of this kind of judicial review, which involved important members of 
the political executive, was the Rental Power Plants case.823 The court took suo motu 
notice of allegations of corruption and deliberate loss to the exchequer in the award of 
contracts to nineteen rental power projects (RPPs). After hearing prima facie evidence 
of wrongdoing, the court directed the NAB to initiate criminal investigations against 
the concerned federal minister and senior officials in the ministry of water and power. 
While the court was successful in undoing the contracts with RPPs and ensured the 
return of funds to the exchequer, NAB investigations against the federal minister and 
other officials remained pending throughout the PPP government’s tenure. Raja Pervaiz 
Ashraf, the concerned minister, was even made the replacement prime minister upon 
the disqualification of Prime Minister Gilani by the Supreme Court. Other notable 
examples of cases in which the court initiated investigations into corruption scandals, 
which revealed a nexus with key appointments in regulatory agencies and public 
corporations, included the OGRA case.824 This case concerned impropriety in the 
appointment of the chairman of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) in clear 
                                                 
821 See, eg, Suo Moto Case No. 18 of 2010. 
822 See, eg, Suo Motu Case No. 24 of 2010 (Regarding Corruption in Hajj Arrangements in 2010), 
Orders dated 20 January and 1 March 2011. 
823 In the matter of Alleged Corruption in Rental Power Plants etc., 2012 SCMR 773. 
824 Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2012 Supreme Court 132. 
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disregard of the established process and required qualifications. The court dismissed 
the chairman and directed the NAB to initiate criminal prosecution for alleged 
corruption in policymaking and the award of concessions and licences by OGRA. 
Likewise, in other cases the court invalidated the appointments of the president of the 
National Bank of Pakistan,825 and the chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan.826 This strand of judicial review reached its high point in a 
remarkable exercise of judicial power in Khwaja Muhammad Asif.827 In a petition 
brought by an opposition politician, the Supreme Court directed the establishment of 
an independent commission for overseeing and advising on key appointments to 
regulatory bodies and public corporations. 
 
The court’s struggles with ensuring independent investigation and prosecution in 
corruption cases against executive officials embroiled it in wider struggles over the 
nature and form of state structures, especially the civil bureaucracy, regulatory agencies 
and public corporations. As the court attempted to break the shackles of political control 
over the state apparatus, and coax a culture of rule-bounded and autonomous action, it 
faced constant attrition and evasion. These battles took a similar form to the 
accountability cases, with the Supreme Court insisting upon transparency and merit in 
appointments to key posts in the bureaucracy to be countered by claims of executive 
prerogative in postings, promotions and incentives.  The political executive had 
historically developed several techniques of ensuring the subservience of the 
administrative setup, including discretionary promotions to the senior-most ranks, 
discretionary transfers to powerful and lucrative posts in disregard of seniority, 
transfers to minor or sidelined positions as disincentive, and the retention of retired 
bureaucrats on key posts on short-term contracts. The Supreme Court persevered in 
insisting upon transparent processes in promotions to the senior ranks, and in Tariq 
Aziz-ud-Din and Anita Turab, for example, resisted the claims of executive prerogative 
in postings, promotions and transfers.828 
 
                                                 
825 Mir Muhammad Idris v. Federation, PLD 2011 Supreme Court 213. 
826 Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana v. Pakistan, 2013 SCMR 1159. 
827 Khwaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan, 2013 SCMR 1205. 
828 See, eg, In re: Tariq Aziz-ud-Din, 2010 SCMR 1301; Syed Mahmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Federation of 
Pakistan, PLD 2013 Supreme Court 195. 
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One visible weakness in the Supreme Court’s role as the regulator of the state, however, 
was that the effects of the court’s administrative law jurisprudence were limited to 
either discursive gains or minimal changes at the top of the administrative hierarchy. 
Beyond obstructing or reversing questionable transactions and highlighting the nature 
and extent of the elected government’s control over the apex bureaucracy, the court 
achieved little. While these cases also developed a public perception of endemic 
corruption amongst the political classes and the apex bureaucracy, by and large the 
government was successful in thwarting the court’s campaign of de-politicizing the 
administration. Since the court was dependent upon the executive for the enforcement 
of its actions, when its decisions were unpalatable a prolonged tussle involving all 
manner of dilatory and avoidance tactics was inevitable. This involved the court in the 
exasperating task of going up the bureaucratic hierarchy, step by step in subsequent 
enforcement and contempt proceedings, in an effort to identify the stumbling blocks 
and over-ride them with the threats of sanction. As these cases dragged on, the court 
also became visibly frustrated with its inability to counter this perceived culture of 
governmental impunity and lawlessness. Arguably, it is this frustration which 
ultimately manifested itself in the contempt proceedings against two prime ministers, 
and the conviction and disqualification of an elected head of government. Ultimately, 
however, the court failed in its endeavour as most of the corruption-related and other 
administrative law cases dragged on without an end in sight.  
 
Just as in the domain of administrative law, the court also built up on the groundwork 
historically laid down by the superior courts in challenging detentions and abuse of 
police powers. The court took up such issues en masse, and exercised its Original 
jurisdiction much more liberally than at any previous juncture in its history. The court 
did that through a creative interpretation of Article 184(3), as it subtly defined any 
violation of an individual’s fundamental rights as also a matter of public importance, 
thereby merging the two threshold requirements for a case to fall under the Original 
jurisdiction. The court also employed a novel device, or rather virtually created a new 
institution in the form of a Human Rights Cell (HRC), tasked with the responsibility of 
sifting through the daily newspapers, electronic media reports and hundreds of letters 
sent to it from potential petitioners, in order to identify human rights cases suitable for 
the court’s cognizance. Many of these grievances concerned blatant abuse and torture 
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by police,829 and the court expanded the ambit to include refusal to address honour 
crimes and domestic violence against women.830 The court also took up grievances 
against administrative action such as illegal dispossession of land by revenue 
officials,831 and causing of death or personal injury through negligence and regulatory 
failure.832 While the court converted a relatively small number of these into formal 
proceedings,833 the threat of a suo motu hearing, public humiliation by the court and 
possible disciplinary consequences terrorised police and executive officials implicated 
in alleged violations.  This gave the HRC tremendous powers, which by its own account 
disposed more than 180,000 such grievances, wielding a threat of conversion into a suo 
motu human rights case.834  
 
The court’s human rights activism served to garner a populist legitimacy, which the 
court leveraged in its administrative, accountability and constitutional domains. On one 
level, the court’s human rights crusade was an unquestionable good, for how could the 
redress of grievances that no other institutional was willing or able to meaningfully 
address be wrong! However, the long-term effectiveness of the court’s actions in 
challenging the culture of illegality, impunity and corruption in the police and the 
bureaucracy were questionable. Instead of pushing for structural reforms in the 
postcolonial state that might over time develop a culture of rights protection, the court 
offered an ad hoc mechanism for individual petition and redress.  The failure to 
institutionalise rights protection meant that which and how many suo motu actions were 
to be initiated, and the role that the HRC was meant to play, remained the prerogative 
of the incumbent chief justice. Nonetheless, the court’s efforts at regulating the 
administrative apparatuses unmasked the full extent of the illegalities of the 
                                                 
829 See, eg, Human Rights Case No. 5466-P of 2010; Suo Moto Case No. 66 of 2009; Human Rights 
Case Nos. 44 of 2008 & 14 of 2009; Human Rights Case No. 1109-P/2009. 
830 See, eg, Human Rights Case No. 5466-P of 2010; Human Rights Case No. 57 of 2009; Human 
Rights Case No. 4181-N of 2009; Human Rights Case No. 12912-P of 2009; Suo Moto Case No. 1 of 
2009. 
831 See, eg, Human Rights Case No. 29 of 2009; Human Rights Case No. 11108-P of 2009. 
832 See, eg, Human Rights Case No. 2041-P of 2009; Human Rights Case No. 2435 of 2006; Human 
Rights Case No. 4805 of 2006; Human Rights Case No. 8207 of 2006. 
833 The Chaudhry Court took up around 200 such cases for hearing. See Asher A Qazi, ‘Suo Motu: 
Choosing not to Legislate, Chief Justice Chaudhry’s Strategic Agenda’ in Moeen Cheema and Ijaz 
Gilani (eds), Politics & Jurisprudence of the 'Chaudhry Court' (2005-2013) (Oxford University Press, 
2015). 
834 Faisal Siddiqi, ‘Public Interest Litigation: Predictable Continuity and Radical Departures’ in Moeen 
Cheema and Ijaz Gilani (eds), Politics & Jurisprudence of the 'Chaudhry Court' (2005-2013) (Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
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postcolonial state, the mass of de jure and de facto discretionary and unaccountable 
powers built into the state structures, which have historically rendered them amenable 
to the political purposes of both military regimes and elected governments. 
Furthermore, the court’s actions revealed the absence of any other redress mechanism, 
whether internal to the administrative state or in the form of administrative tribunals or 
effective ombudsman system.  
 
The most remarkable, and at times controversial, aspect of the court’s methodology was 
the level of media attention that the hearings garnered, magnifying the court’s impact 
far beyond individual cases. While it appeared that it was beyond the court to undo the 
structures and culture of patronage-based administration that appeared to have reached 
crisis proportions, the court did manage to keep the crumbling state structure at the 
centre of judicial, and hence public, attention. It is this aspect of media attention which 
imparted a remarkable discursive power to the court’s jurisprudence. However, it is 
also this aspect that fuelled the criticism and brought on a concerted attempt by the PPP 
government to politicize the court’s actions in response.  
 
POSTSCRIPT: A FRACTURING OF THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT 
 
As Pakistan moved towards another general election in May 2013, and an elected 
government neared the completion of its term for the first time since the 1970s, there 
was considerable optimism for the holding of free and fair elections and a peaceful 
transfer of power to the next government. Pursuant to the Twentieth Amendment, an 
independent chairperson of the Election Commission and caretaker governments were 
appointed with the agreement of the PPP and the opposition PML-N.835 While the 
Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI), led by former cricketer-turned politician Imran Khan 
who had finally emerged as a serious electoral contender, expressed reservations over 
the neutrality of the caretaker set-up and certain actions of the Election Commission 
leading up to the elections, it decided to fully participate in the elections. The PTI 
appeared to invest considerable faith in the superior judiciary to act as guarantor of free 
and fair elections, and even demanded that the vital roles of returning officers be 
entrusted to members of the lower judiciary rather than the bureaucracy, as had been 
                                                 
835 See Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act, 2012. 
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the case in previous elections. The PTI was rightly concerned that both the PML-N and 
the PPP had successfully formed deep roots and cultivated loyal factions in the state’s 
bureaucratic apparatuses.  
 
By the eve of the 2013 elections it appeared that the real contest would be between the 
PML-N and the PTI, especially in the heartlands of Punjab and the north-western 
province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (previously NWFP). The PML-N, which had 
effectively ruled the Punjab for more than two-third of the previous three decades, was 
the front runner. However, another hung parliament and a weak coalition government 
appeared to be the most likely post-election scenario. Contrary to this expectation, 
however, the May 2013 elections resulted in a resounding victory for the PML-N.  Not 
only had the PML-N emerged as the largest party in the National Assembly, it was set 
to command an outright majority, despite having little support outside Punjab. The 
party had won the Punjab, with more than fifty percent of the population and hence 
constituencies in the National Assembly, in such a landslide that it would be able to 
form the federal government without the support of any other party. Although all major 
political parties other than the PML-N complained about large scale organized rigging 
in the election, all but the PTI agreed to accept the results in accordance with the 
parameters of the corporatist accommodation forged during the PPP’s tenure.  
 
In July 2013, the PTI began a concerted campaign to call in question the credibility of 
the elections claiming widespread and systematic rigging. PTI candidates filed election 
petitions before the election tribunals in several constituencies. The party’s central 
leadership demanded a thorough investigation into four constituencies as a means to 
test whether rigging had taken place, and demanded that the Supreme Court take suo 
motu notice of, and initiate an inquiry into the conduct of the elections. Frustrated with 
the Supreme Court’s refusal to initiate such a suo motu hearing, Imran Khan criticized 
the ‘shameful’ role played by the judiciary. Deeming the comments as scandalous and 
prejudicial to the prestige of the judiciary, the Supreme Court instead initiated contempt 
proceedings against the chairman of the PTI.836 The contempt proceedings were 
discharged accepting Imran Khan’s application that the comments were directed 
                                                 
836 See Criminal Original Petition No. 92 of 2013 (Contempt Proceedings against Imran Khan, 
Chairman PTI).  
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exclusively at the role of the members of the lower judiciary acting in an administrative 
capacity as the Returning Officers. Ironically, the decision of the Chaudhry Court which 
left the most significant political legacy for the contemporary political landscape of 
Pakistan was this rare instance of non-intervention in the conduct of elections. Relying 
on Article 225 of the constitution, which vests exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
election disputes in specially-constituted election tribunals, the Supreme Court declined 
to set-up a commission to investigate the charges of large-scale electoral fraud.837 While 
strictly in accordance with the text of the constitution and the established practice of 
not interfering in individual single-constituency disputes in electoral matters, the 
decision appeared to be a clear departure from the court’s more interventionist stance 
in electoral matters prior to the elections.838  
 
With the end of the Chaudhry Court era in December 2013, the Supreme Court began 
to retreat from the strong form of judicial review that it had developed, and slipped 
away from the public gaze. The charge of judicial activism had resonated to such an 
extent that the post-Chaudhry Supreme Court felt compelled to adopt a position of 
judicial restraint on a range of political questions that were raised before it. The suo 
motu and human rights jurisdictions dwindled, and the Supreme Court progressively 
resettled in a more traditional judicial role. The issue of election rigging simmered in 
the political domain as the court repeatedly declined the call to act as the arbitrator in 
this dispute. In August 2014, more than a year after the conduct of elections and while 
the overwhelming majority of election petitions remained unresolved, the PTI launched 
a protest movement beginning with yet another Long March on Islamabad. By 
December 2014 a protest sit-in continued in front of the Parliament house and the 
Supreme Court, while the PTI also organized public meetings, and calls for strikes and 
protest marches in various urban centres all over the country. Speculations of tacit 
support of the protesters by the military, and the threat of direct military intervention, 
re-emerged to haunt Pakistan’s political landscape. All this while Supreme Court, the 
                                                 
837 The PTI filed a Civil Miscellaneous Application in a constitution petition decided earlier by the 
Supreme Court in 2012 to indirectly raise the matter before the court in an effort to by-pass the 
objection to a petition’s maintainability. However, this CMA remained pending. See C.M.A. 7679 of 
2013 in C.R.P. No. 191 of 2012 in Constitution Petition No. 87 of 2011 (Application on behalf of Mr. 
Saifullah Nyazee, Additional Secretary PTI for recount of votes in 4 constituencies, after verification of 
thumb impressions). 
838 See generally, Moeen Cheema, ‘Election Disputes or Disputed Elections?: Judicial (Non-)Review 
of Elections in Pakistan’ in P J Yap (ed), Judicial Review of Elections in Asia (Routledge, 2016). 
  255
only institution seemingly capable of resolving this toxic political deadlock in a 
constitutional manner, sat quietly on the sidelines holding on to a resurrected political 
question doctrine. This legacy of the Chaudhry Court’s refusal to investigate allegations 
of electoral rigging provided the starkest example of political instability resulting from 
judicial restraint. The course of judicial restraint or quietism thus proved to be as 
political in its consequences as the decision to pursue judicial activism.  
 
In January 2015, the PTI was forced to call off its protest movement in the aftermath of 
a gruesome terrorist attack on a school in Peshawar. In March, the PML-N government 
finally relented and agreed to the formation of a judicial commission comprising the 
chief justice and two and other judges of the Supreme Court to investigate the PTI’s 
allegations of electoral fraud.839 As a result, the judiciary was unwillingly thrust back 
into the role of mediating a question of pure politics that could possibly lead to a change 
in government. In July, after extended hearings, the commission found that while the 
electoral process had been marred by considerable irregularities, there was no evidence 
of systematic rigging. Despite the setback, the PTI accepted the findings of the 
commission. As a result, a controversy that had threatened the existence of not only the 
government but the entire civil-democratic system was averted. In the interim, it was 
evident that the PML-N government had ceded the national security and foreign policy 
domains to a re-energized military command.  The court’s inactivism had allowed a 
resolvable dispute to destabilize the government, and provided the military with the 
space to once again act as the mediator of political disputes. 
 
In a notable concession to the military, the government and the opposition combined in 
parliament to pass a constitutional amendment for the creation of military courts to try 
civilians in terrorism cases.840 In the Twenty-First Amendment case, a full bench of the 
Supreme Court asserted its power to review even constitutional amendments, but 
upheld the establishment of military courts by a majority of eleven to six. One key 
factor weighing upon the majority’s opinions was the sunset clause in the amendment, 
whereby the military courts would cease to exist after a two-year period. However, in 
2017 the parliament again passed the Twenty-Third Amendment extending the life of 
                                                 
839 General Elections 2013 Inquiry Commission Ordinance, 2015 (Ordinance No. VII of 2015). 
840 See Constitution (Twenty-First Amendment) Act, 2015. 
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military courts for another two-year period. In a number of appeals against the decisions 
of the military courts, the Supreme Court did not question the validity of the 
amendment, and continued to uphold the convictions and sentences of capital 
punishment given to proclaimed terrorists. The court claimed a rather narrow 
jurisdiction to review the record of the decisions of the military courts, and disavowed 
appeals on the merits of individual cases. The court further held that the trials by 
military courts did not contravene the right to fair trial under Article 10-A of the 
constitution. This was highly problematic given the weak procedural safeguards, lack 
of transparency and the heavy reliance on confessions and secret evidence by the 
military courts. 
 
The PML-N government enjoyed barely a year of stability in the aftermath of the 
electoral rigging controversy when in May 2016 the International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists released the leaked documents of a Panama law firm. The so-
called 'Panama Papers' revealed several offshore companies owned by Nawaz Sharif’s 
two sons based in London, and proved their ownership of expensive properties in Park 
Lane. The Panama Papers reignited allegations of corruption, money laundering and 
tax evasion dating back to Nawaz Sharif’s two terms as prime minister in the 1990s. 
Under immense pressure from the main opposition parties, especially the PTI, Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif made speeches on the floor of the parliament and on national 
TV offering vague explanations, and promising to make public the complete financial 
accounts of his family’s holdings. However, negotiations between the government and 
the opposition over the formation of another judicial commission, to investigate 
corruption and money-laundering allegations against the ruling family, failed. In 
August 2016, Imran Khan decided to take the matter to the Supreme Court. In addition 
to filing a petition under Article 184(3), Imran Khan launched another campaign of 
public agitation against the government, calling for the resignation of the prime minister 
until the charges against him had been independently investigated. 
 
Facing yet another call for protests on the Constitution Avenue of the capital, the court 
decided to take up the matter for expedited hearing. Curiously, however, before 
reaching a decision the bench disbanded in early December 2016 on account of court 
holidays and the incumbent Chief Justice’s imminent retirement at the end of the year. 
A reconstituted five-member bench presided over by Justice Khosa, the senior puisne 
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judge who, as required by the seniority and retirement rules, will be the next Chief 
Justice of Pakistan, announced its final decision in July 2017 after lengthy and 
complicated proceedings. The Supreme Court disqualified Nawaz Sharif from holding 
public office for life, and directed NAB to initiate corruption charges for possessing 
wealth beyond known means of income against the deposed prime minister and other 
members of his family.841  This was Nawaz Sharif’s third term as prime minister and 
the Panama Case was the third instance of his premature dismissal. Just as during the 
tenure of former Chief Justice Chaudhry the court ended up in an overt tussle with a 
government that was determined to present itself as a victim of a 'judicial coup' in the 
year leading up to the messy business of elections. The disqualification of the head of 
the largest political party in Pakistan in the run-up to an election raised anxieties about 
a political court acting in collusion with the country’s powerful military, intent on 
destabilizing the transitional democratic system. 
 
After a brief hiatus, the Panama case marked the court’s return to the centre of the 
political stage,842 a position it seems likely to occupy in the foreseeable future. As 
Pakistan enters another election year 2018, the Supreme Court’s decisions in the 
Panama case and its aftermath open the door for judicial review of a broad range of 
issues on electoral and other matters vital for a transition from one elected government 
to another. If achieved successfully, this will be a watershed moment in Pakistan’s 
turbulent political history. The Supreme Court has carved a role for itself as a custodian 
of democracy in Pakistan and will increasingly be called upon to resolve disputes 
between the government and the opposition over electoral processes. In order to reduce 
the perception of political bias, confusion and misreporting of the court’s decisions in 
such an environment, the Supreme Court needs to speak through a clearer and more 
coherent jurisprudence. Furthermore, the court needs to seriously reconsider the nature 
and purpose of its Original jurisdiction and delineate clear parameters for when it is to 
                                                 
841 Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi v. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan, (2016) 
Constitution Petition No. 29 of 2016. In a similar case against Imran Khan, a three-member bench 
headed by the incumbent chief justice dismissed the allegations against the leader of the PTI that he 
had committed money laundering in the purchase of his estate on the outskirts of Islamabad and had 
failed to declare an offshore company in his nomination papers filed with the ECP. Muhammad Hanif 
Abbasi v. Imran Khan Niazi, (2017) Constitution Petition No. 35 of 2016. 
842 See Moeen Cheema, ‘Developments in Pakistani Constitutional Law’ in Richard Albert, David 
Landau, Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda (eds) 2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law 
(I.CONnect- Clough Center, 2016). 
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JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN PAKISTAN 
 
Over the last seven decades, the superior courts of Pakistan have evolved from 
peripheral state institutions to key players mediating the balance of powers in a deeply 
divided and politically fragmented polity. Evaluating this history of expanding judicial 
power, one may claim that the predominant structural effect of this progressive 
expansion of judicial review has been a self-referential (if not self-serving) increase in 
judicial power. Furthermore, the courts’ exercise of their judicial review jurisdictions 
appears to be somewhat ‘promiscuous’ rather than principled.843 Despite the larger 
claims, the superior courts appear to have become ‘institutions of governance’ and 
judicial review the mode of a ‘delicate and political process of balancing competing 
values and political aspirations’ …providing ‘a workable modus vivendi’ which in turn 
enables the courts to claim a seat at the table of high politics.844  
 
Nonetheless, a closer scrutiny of the complex history of judicial review in Pakistan 
undertaken in this thesis reveals that the courts have essentially built upon and expanded 
the logics of three strands of postcolonial legality.  Firstly, in the domain of 
constitutional law and politics the courts have by and large confined themselves to the 
role of mediating between the institutional complexes and allied elite groups that have 
at different times dominated the state structure and those social groups on the periphery 
of these power dynamics. This has resulted in a minimalist or formal constitutionalism, 
and procedural democracy. In every period of direct military rule, for example, the 
courts acknowledged the validity of martial law, and thereby granted a veneer of 
legality to military coups. In the following periods of indirect military and civilian rule, 
the courts pushed governments to accommodate the demands of the political opposition 
and cede space for electoral politics at the federal level. As such, the courts have been 
                                                 
843 For a comparison with the Indian Supreme Court, see Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Indian Supreme 
Court and the Art of Democratic Positioning, in UNSTABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM: LAW AND POLITICS 
IN SOUTH ASIA (Mark Tushnet and Madhav Khosla eds., 2015). 
844 See Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty, 18:2 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 70 
(2007), at 73-75. 
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involved in a seemingly never-ending process of compelling transitions to greater 
democracy. However, at the same time, the courts have been fully on board with the 
centralization of power in the federal state. The superior courts have thus consistently 
undervalued claims of inclusive federalism and constitutional requirements of 
provincial autonomy. Given that for much of Pakistan’s history some of the most 
significant opposition to dominant institutions and elites have come from marginalised 
provincial and regional groups, the courts’ failure to highlight their demands has 
ensured that public law remained centred on the narrow interests of the core of the 
Pakistani state and society.    
  
The second, and arguably the most significant plane of judicial power, has been the 
progressive expansion of the judicial review of administrative action. Even as the courts 
ceded space to military regimes and civilian governments on their core interests, they 
consistently built a robust jurisprudential canon on the proper exercise of administrative 
power. Given that the most significant powers of government have been exercised 
through the career bureaucracy, and increasingly through public corporations and 
regulatory bodies, the courts have fought hard to extend the purview of judicial review 
to the regulators of the economy as well. More recently, the courts have added a 
doctrinal veneer of anti-corruption and transparency, and have extended the reach of 
this strand of judicial review to the elected executive as well. However, the core 
doctrine of the courts in structuring the judicial review of executive action has remained 
an insistence on merit in the appointment, transfers and disciplining of the bureaucratic 
and regulatory apparatus, with a view to ensuring independence in its decision-making. 
The structural independence of the bureaucracy from political influence and its rule-
boundedness were proclaimed as the core principle of administration. While the courts 
have achieved partial success in highlighting the progressive weakening of the 
bureaucratic apparatus, their fidelity to the design of the postcolonial state has left them 
unable to compel more meaningful structural change and reorientation in the priorities 
of governance that such change may render possible.  
 
The third prominent area of judicial action has been the erection of procedural 
protections against the abuse of police powers, including the review of state security 
laws. Military regimes and civilian governments have been more or less equally 
predisposed to utilising the regular policing regime and the criminal justice system, as 
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well as enacting draconian state security laws, to suppress political opposition and 
regional dissidence. Carrying the mantle of the rule of law, the courts have resisted the 
abuse of such laws, imposed procedural safeguards and exercised some oversight. 
Despite fighting an ever-losing battle against evolving techniques of repression through 
sedition, public order and anti-terrorism laws, the courts have built considerable 
credibility for the judicial institutions and lawyers by providing an avenue to challenge 
the state when none other existed. However, even on this plane the achievements have 
been limited, and it is the promise rather than the materialization of the rule of law that 
has attracted tentative support for the courts. The adherence to formal constitutionalism 
has disabled the courts from striking down offensive legislation. The buy-in to the 
nationalist narrative has resulted in a blind spot towards the blatant abuse of security 
legislation against militants and dissidents from the marginalized peripheries of the 
country. The superior courts’ own tendency to arrogate greater power and prestige to 
the apex of the judicial hierarchy, and to normalise the supposedly extraordinary 
remedies of judicial review, has left the lower judiciary progressively less able to 
provide even a modicum of criminal justice and rights protection. 
 
Given the significance of administrative law and procedural review of state security 
and police powers, the evolution of judicial power in Pakistan may thus be 
characterized as the judicialization of governance as much as that of politics. Much of 
the commentary on judicial developments in Pakistan appears to be driven by an 
evaluation that judicial involvement in politics is problematic per se, and hence the 
prescription that courts should eschew getting embroiled in political questions. 
However, there is little focus on how and why the judicialization of governance and 
politics has taken place. Without answering these prior questions, any evaluation or 
prescription will remain a mere matter of faith in liberal constitutionalism. This thesis 
has made an attempt to identify how the judicialization of governance and politics has 
been shaped by the courts through their public law jurisdictions and jurisprudence, 
providing the descriptive basis to undertake an in-depth analysis of the why question. 
While that is a significant project in its own right, some preliminary observations may 
nonetheless be made about how the Pakistan case-study may add to the regional and 




THE JUDICIALIZATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
 
The increasing judicialization of politics appears to be the norm around the world,845 
and most recently courts in Asia have become noticeably activist.846  Pakistan’s courts’ 
increasing role in mediating constitutional developments lends itself to the analysis that 
Pakistan has merely joined the global expansion of judicial power and the rise of 
‘juristocracy’.847 The term judicialization of politics can refer to several related 
phenomena, but at its core denotes the ‘expansion of the province of the courts or judges 
at the expense of the politicians and/or the administrators.’848 It also refers to ‘the 
process by which courts and judges come to make or increasingly to dominate the 
making of public policies that had previously been made (or, it is widely believed, ought 
to be made) by other governmental agencies.’849  The hallmark or the zenith of 
judicialization is when the courts get embroiled in ‘core political controversies and deep 
moral dilemmas related to areas of pure politics (such as those related to electoral 
politics, regime change, etc.).’850 
 
However, the judicialization of politics is not so much new reality as changing 
perception. As Martin Shapiro poignantly notes, the term implies that, 
[C]ourts did not do much politics yesterday, but do a lot today. And surely there 
was some real global spread of and increased significance of judicial interventions 
in public policymaking in the latter half of the twentieth century and beyond . . . .  
[But] to a very large degree it is not so much that courts do more now as that 
students of politics now see more of what courts do.851  
This intuition seems apt in the Pakistani context. After all, as highlighted in this thesis, 
Pakistan’s courts were thrust in the midst of constitutional crises and put in the awkward 
                                                 
845 See generally Tate and Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power, above n 6; Shapiro and 
Sweet, On Law, politics and Judicialization, above n 6; Ginsburg and Moustafa, above n 6. 
846 See generally Björn Dressel (ed), The Judicialization of Politics in Asia, above n 7; Andrew Harding 
et al (eds), New Courts in Asia (Routledge, 2010); Tom Ginsburg et al (eds), Administrative Law and 
Governance in Asia (Routledge, 2009). 
847 R Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy, above n 10. 
848 Torbjorn Vallinder, ‘When the Courts go Marching in’ in C Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder (eds), 
The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York University Press, 1995) 13. 
849 C Neal Tate, ‘Why the Expansion of Judicial Power?’ in C Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder (eds), 
The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York University Press, 1995) 28. 
850 R Hirschl, ‘The Judicialization of Mega-Politics’; R Hirschl, ‘Judicialization of Pure Politics 
Worldwide’, above n 3. 
851 Martin Shapiro, ‘Courts in Authoritarian Regimes’ in Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa (eds), Rule 
by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 326. 
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situation of adjudicating regime change right from the outset. Whilst initially the courts’ 
role was limited to merely validating and providing a veneer of legal legitimacy to 
exercises of naked power, this history partially explains the courts’ increasing comfort 
with deciding such matters of pure politics of their own volition from the 1990s 
onwards.   
Even though the judicialization of politics in Pakistan may predate much of the global 
development on this front, looking at the literature may nonetheless offer important 
clues as to the explanation and evaluation of increasing judicial power in Pakistan. This 
literature generally revolves around three explanatory frameworks which may broadly 
be relied upon to analyse judicialization in a given polity.852 The first (and arguably 
dominant) ‘liberal’ set of explanations focus on the spread of ideals of rights and rule 
of law across the globe.853 The most influential subscribers to this view see 
judicialization as the result of post-World War II rise in human rights discourse. For 
Dworkin, for example, the ascendancy of the Law’s Empire is the product of rights 
protection by enlightened courts that have joined the long march of liberalism.854 While 
the traction of rights discourse may explain aspects of judicialization elsewhere, it 
provides little insight into the expansion of judicial power in Pakistan. Pakistan’s 
various constitutions, including the lasting version of 1973, have included extensive 
bills of rights but which are riddled with exceptions. The protection of individual rights 
has not been a forte of Pakistan’s superior courts, which have tolerated or turned a blind 
eye to deep-seated discriminations along ethno-linguistic, minority religious and gender 
lines. Any meaningful rights jurisprudence from the 1990s onwards have essentially 
been built around collective rights and rule of law aspirations of accountable 
governments, curbing of political corruption, and  protection from arbitrary use of 
preventive detention and security laws, all of which merit a different explanation.  
Ran Hirschl, an influential theorist on the subject, challenges the valorisation of rights-
based constitutionalism as inevitable and inherently valuable, and offers a critical class-
based analysis of judicialization.855  Hirschl considers the judicialization of politics to 
                                                 
852 Björn Dressel, ‘Towards a Framework of Analysis’, above n 8, 4-5. 
853 See generally Tate and Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power, above n 6; C R Epp, 
The Rights Revolution, above n 9; Anne Mary Slaughter, ‘Judicial Globalization’, above n 9. 
854 Ronald Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (Chatto & Windus, 1990). Also, see Bruce Ackerman, 
‘The Rise of World Constitutionalism’ (1997) 83 Virginia Law Review 771. 
855 R Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy, above n 10, 218. 
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be a product of strategic interplay and alignment of the interests of otherwise competing 
elites. The most significant of these are the political elites who see judicialization as a 
means to shield policymaking from democratic political processes in which they are on 
the verge of losing out. The interests of political elites are matched by those of the 
economic elites that see constitutionalization of rights as a means to achieve security 
and stability of contract and private property rights.856 Judiciaries, the most direct 
beneficiaries, are important but relatively minor strategic players that see judicialization 
as a means to improve their own position within the state structure, as well as a means 
to enhance the reputation and prestige of judges.857 Hirschl thus sees judicial review 
centred on adjudication of constitutional rights not only in terms of unelected courts 
dominating political decision-making, but as part of a broader movement whereby 
political and policymaking power is shifted to semi-autonomous and professional 
institutions in general – and as a result to those classes and groups that have access to 
and influence upon such institutions.858 These pro-judicialization elites are bolstered by 
urban intelligentsia, the legal profession, and the managerial classes, all of whom also 
stand to benefit from the judicialization of politics in various ways.859  
Hirschl explains the ceding of power to judiciaries by political elites as a useful strategy 
to entrench policies, insure them against the vagaries of democratic process, or to avoid 
responsibility for politically costly decisions.860 The motivation for such voluntary 
ceding is particularly strong when governments foresee losing power in the near future, 
and judicialization becomes a means to limit the options of political opponents and 
successor governments.861 This type of judicialization happens when the judiciary 
already enjoys a positive repute, and the judges have been appointed by and/or share 
ideological commitments with the dominant elites. This ‘hegemonic preservation 
thesis’ thus concludes that the ‘constitutionalization of rights is . . . often not a reflection 
of genuinely progressive revolution in a polity; rather, it is evidence that the rhetoric of 
rights and judicial review has been appropriated by threatened elites to bolster their own 
position in the polity.’862  
                                                 
856 Ibid, 12, 43. 
857 Ibid, 46. 
858 Ibid, 12. 
859 Ibid, 44. 
860 Ibid, 39-40, 47. 
861 Ibid, 41-42. 
862 Ibid, 12. 
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Hirschl’s framework may help us understand important aspects of the judicialization 
process in Pakistan. The courts’ assertiveness during periods of civilian rule can be 
partly explained by the alignment of the judiciary with the military and its allied classes 
that have lost the grip on the state, but find the courts as a useful vehicle to reassert 
some of their power. In every period of transition from military to civilian rule, the 
courts exhibited a renewed vigour and a conservative form of judicial activism that 
imposed limits on the social and economic policymaking by elected governments, 
especially of the supposedly progressive and left-leaning Pakistan Peoples’ Party 
(PPP). This was notably the case in the early 1990s when the courts undermined key 
aspects of the social and economic manifesto of Benazir Bhutto’s governments, and 
permanently curtailed the prospects of land reforms and large scale redistributive efforts 
by declaring them un-Islamic. Noticeably, most of the incumbent judiciary in the 1990s 
had been appointed by the military regime of General Zia and the right-leaning Muslim 
League factions allied with it. The judicialization of pure politics, such as governmental 
change, can also be partially explained through this analytical lens. The cases 
challenging the dissolution of governments through the exercise of Article 58(2)(b) 
powers in the 1990s, for example, bear the visible marks of judicial alignment with the 
military and/or dominant political interest. The flexing of the social and political 
conservatism of Pakistan’s judiciary during periods of civilian rule thus fits well within 
the departing hegemon thesis. 
However, the socio-economic conservatism of the judiciary runs deeper than overt 
political ties and is founded as much on the rising influence of narrow urban, 
professional upper-middle and managerial classes, from which the most significant 
groups of lawyers and judges have historically arisen. In the midst of the first wave of 
judicialization in the 1990s, whilst the strategies of the Public Interest Litigation 
deployed by the courts appeared to be similar to those developed earlier by the Indian 
Supreme Court to push for an egalitarian and social justice agenda, Pakistan’s public 
law appeared to be largely aligned with the interests of urban middle classes. During 
the 1990s, the courts robustly policed urban development and land acquisition which 
impacted private property rights, thereby providing a useful forum for the middle 
classes to safeguard their interests from governmental intrusion. Likewise, another 
noted aspect of Pakistan’s courts’ activism, their good governance and anti-corruption 
stances, can also be explained through Hirschl’s framework. Political corruption as a 
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salient political issue has not only historically resonated with Pakistan’s middle classes, 
but has also provided justification for direct military action. The Chaudhry Court’s anti-
corruption campaign against the PPP government thus not only garnered it considerable 
populist support, it also considerably destabilised the government at a time when it 
looked likely to take on the military on key aspects of national security and foreign 
policy. Therefore, the Chaudhry Court’s actions provided sufficient basis for a 
suspicion that the focus on high-level corruption was strategically designed to both 
assist the military’s position as well as elicit its support for a judiciary locked in a power 
tussle with the elected government.  
 
THE JUDICIALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE 
 
However, whilst Hirschl’s analytical framework enables us to dissect some key aspects 
of judicialization in Pakistan, it does not elucidate much of the historical evolution of 
judicial power. In particular, Hirschl’s framework fails to shed light on the 
developments in administrative law and the courts’ consistent challenges to the 
securitization of the state, even under military rule.863 As highlighted in this thesis, the 
Pakistan’s courts safeguarded their writ jurisdictions even during periods of Martial 
Law, and expanded them during the following periods of quasi-military rule. In fact, 
the foundations of administrative law were carefully constructed by the courts under 
the 1962 presidential constitution of General Ayub. Even under General Zia’s much 
more authoritarian regime, the courts used the Islamization of law to construct the very 
foundations of the Public Interest Litigation that represented the first wave of 
judicialization in the post-Zia years. As such, the judicialization of administrative 
governance in Pakistan demands a different framework of analysis. 
A ‘functionalist’ strand of the judicialization literature, which accords greater weight 
to the strategic motivations and institutional incentives of judiciaries, may have greater 
explanatory power than Hirschl’s departing hegemon thesis in the Pakistani context.864 
                                                 
863 Hirschl himself identifies Pakistan as an exception to his thesis as Pakistan is a rare case of 
judicialization that has happened in a society that has not been a democracy for a large part of its 
history and was under direct military rule when Hirschl expounded his thesis. See R Hirschl, Towards 
Juristocracy, above n 10, 31. 
864 See Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences, above n 11; Robert H Bork, Coercing Virtue, 
above n 11; Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution away from the Courts, above n 11; Shapiro and 
Sweet, On Law, politics and Judicialization, above n 6; John Ferejohn, ‘Judicializing Politics, 
Politicizing Law’, above n 11. 
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According to this framework of analysis, courts gain relevance and power in weak or 
fragmented political systems where no one institution or class is able to exert 
preeminent hold over the state and political processes. In such a scenario, a number of 
important and highly contentious issues end up by default before the courts, giving 
judges the opportunity to strategically expand the role of the courts in resolving critical 
political and social issues. The courts may be supported in limited aspects of 
judicialization by diverse groups and institutional complexes, that see value in using 
the courts to achieve specific goals even when they have little capacity or incentive to 
push for or enable judicialization at a macro level. Such a process of judicialization is 
thus driven by the courts themselves, who seek to align with and hence use the support 
of various groups, classes and institutional complexes at different times and around 
different sets of issues. 
Such a framework of analysis resonates with the political realities in Pakistan. Pakistan 
is a deeply divided society whose state and ruling elites have had to contend with 
complex and intractable ethno-linguistic, provincial/regional, class, religious/sectarian 
and political divisions from the beginning. As a result, it has been impossible for one 
state institution or political party to exercise exclusive power for long. Even the military 
had to rely on the support of elements of the political elite and the bureaucracy, and as 
a result was compelled to manage tortuous transitions to procedural democracy in 
which power initially seeped and ultimately flooded to the political classes. When a 
political party has briefly enjoyed overwhelming parliamentary support during periods 
of civilian rule, that has been the product of a first past the post electoral system, low 
voter turnout and/or rigging. Civilian rule has thus suffered from prolonged crises of 
legitimacy and destabilizing political opposition. As a result, not only has the Pakistani 
state as a whole enjoyed relative autonomy from the elites but also different parts of the 
state – the military, bureaucracy and judiciary – have exhibited considerable 
independence from each other and from the dominant political classes, as they have 
been able to align with different groups and constituencies. Therefore, a strategic-
institutional framework of judicial empowerment in the context of a fragmentary state 
appears to have relevance to Pakistan’s political landscape.  
More importantly, Ginsburg and Moustafa’s analysis of the politics of courts under 
authoritarian regimes may help explain the judicialization of administrative 
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governance, which has arguably been the most significant if not the most visible plane 
of judicial action in Pakistan.865 As Ginsburg and Moustafa note, courts are often used 
by authoritarian regimes, both military and civil, to achieve a range of ends. These 
include the exercise of social control through criminal law, gain legal legitimacy in the 
absence of democratic support, implement controversial policies from a political 
distance, and ensure discipline within the administration.866 For the courts to serve such 
vital political functions, they must have institutional effectiveness and coherence. For 
the courts to impart some legitimacy to the regime, they must have some autonomy. If 
courts are visibly subject to complete subservience or constant manipulation by a 
regime, their stamp of legal validity will provide no legitimacy to the regime. However, 
while somewhat autonomous courts serve important functions for authoritarian 
regimes, they also emerge as potential forums for ‘rightful resistance’ – ‘a form of 
popular contention that … employs the rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to 
curb the exercise of power [and] hinges on locating and exploiting divisions within the 
state.’867 Legal challenges to low level administrative action can thus emerge as an 
important site of day to day resistance to authoritarian regimes.868  
Judicial review of administrative action provides the courts with a means to manage the 
precarious dialectics of autonomy/utility and resistance/compliance. The courts can 
achieve ‘core compliance’ to the regime’s interests by imparting legal validity to the 
more significant interests of the regime, while still holding out limited opportunities of 
resistance on issues of lesser import. In fact, the interests of the regime and courts might 
align – judicial review of administrative action may help the regime with resolving 
principal-agent problems, especially at times when it is attempting to exert greater 
control over the bureaucracy.869 Furthermore, the availability of judicial review to 
challenge some level of governmental action, without undermining the regime’s core 
                                                 
865 See Ginsburg and Moustafa, above n 6.  
866 Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa, ‘Introduction: The Functions of Courts in Authoritarian 
Politics’ in Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa (eds), Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in 
Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 4-11.  
867 Ibid, 13. 
868 As Ginsburg notes, while much of the judicialization literature focuses on constitutional issues, 
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administrative law.” See Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Judicialization of Administrative Governance: Causes, 
Consequences and Limits’ in Tom Ginsburg and Albert H Y Chen (eds), Administrative Law and 
Governance in Asia (Routledge, 2009) 1. 
869 See Tom Ginsburg, ‘Administrative Law and the Judicial Control of Agents in Authoritarian 
Regimes’ in Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa (eds), Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in 
Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 59-63. 
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interests, may emerge as a safety valve to vent political frustration that may otherwise 
build up and spill over in more destabilizing fashion. As such, authoritarian regimes 
may see value in allowing the courts to develop robust administrative law, so long as 
they reciprocate by granting legal validation to the regime’s existential interests in the 
domain of constitutional law and politics. 
Such interplay of autonomy and compliance in a fragmentary-yet-authoritarian state 
structure accounts for the seemingly disjointed and sporadic developments in the 
judicial review of administrative action in Pakistan. The steady advances in 
administrative law during the three extended periods of military rule may be seen in 
terms of the alignment between the military’s needs of extending control over the 
civilian state apparatuses and the judiciary’s need to retain some credibility and 
legitimacy, despite the curtailment of constitutional review and human rights 
jurisdictions. The Ayub regime tolerated judicial review of administrative action in the 
1960s as it assisted with the military’s needs of cutting a still-powerful postcolonial 
bureaucracy down to size, and chimed with its proclaimed agenda of far-reaching 
administrative reform. The Zia regime, which needed to restore cohesion to a 
bureaucracy that had been shaken up by Bhutto-era administrative reforms, and needed 
to purge it of PPP loyalists, found judicial review useful in solving its principal-agent 
problems at a time when the bureaucracy had an enhanced economic role in managing 
state-owned corporations and implementing licensing regimes, in addition to traditional 
administrative functions. The Musharraf regime, facing a confluence of the challenges 
confronting earlier military regimes, needed to both break down the hidden webs of 
patronage and loyalty amongst the bureaucracy to the elected government it had 
displaced, as well as claim some quasi-democratic credentials through local 
government and administrative reforms. The continuing judicial review of 
administrative action as a bridge across the chasms of martial rule thus fitted in with 
the interests of both the military and the judiciary.  
The visible and highly contentious waves of judicialization during periods of elected 
rule following military regimes have been the product of fundamental re-alignments 
over the judicial review of executive action. For civilian governments, much less secure 
in their hold over the state structure and mindful of the military’s lingering presence in 
the background, the desperate need to establish control over the bureaucracy resulted 
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in a tendency to see judicial review of executive action as an existential threat. On the 
judicial side of the equation, however, the courts have historically been much less 
willing to give space to elected governments seen as less powerful, lacking full 
democratic legitimation and prone to political corruption.870  While the government of 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s was successful in curbing the judiciary – in part 
because of its manifest populism, but as much due to its aggressive military-style 
campaign to limit the powers of the court through constitutional design – the PML-N 
and PPP governments post-1990 failed to achieve similar judicial compliance. Judicial 
activism during civilian rule invariably led to overt tensions between the executive-
legislature and judiciary waged in ideologically-charged, universal-sounding, but 
ultimately self-serving rhetorics of democracy and separation of powers on the one 
hand, and constitutionalism and rule of law on the other. Juxtapose these tussles with 
the interests of the military as departing hegemons, vocal and at times violent 
opposition willing to lend public support to the judiciary, and the bureaucracy’s internal 
incentives to win some autonomy; it should not be surprising that judicial review of 
administrative action has been the terrain of such political contention that it was during 
the 1990s and the tenure of the Chaudhry Court.   
 
THE POSTCOLONIALITY OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
While the strategic-institutional framework of judicialization enables much more 
insightful analysis of how courts find the space to exert greater influence and power 
with the support of important segments of state and society, it still fails to fully explain 
what motivates the courts to expand their role. Such a framework rests on the 
assumption that judges are rational actors driven mostly by their class and institutional 
interests, and will seek to maximise their power and influence if the opportunity exists. 
Without denying an element of truth in the foregoing assertion, the intuition that courts 
act purely strategically does not sufficiently explain several cases of non-judicialization 
where the courts have chosen not to avail the opportunities to expand their power, 
despite having institutional independence.871 On the other hand, the strategic account 
                                                 
870 This phenomenon is not unique to Pakistan and has been witnessed in other jurisdictions in Asia. 
See Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Judicialization of Administrative Governance: Causes, Consequences and 
Limits’, above n 868, 7.  
871 See Björn Dressel, ‘Towards a Framework of Analysis’, above n 8, 6-7, for what are referred to as 
instances of the ‘politicization’ of judiciary. 
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of judicialization does not explain why Pakistan’s courts chose at times to take on 
military rule, even on issues defined as lying within the regime’s core interests, risking 
their independence and provoking dangerous retaliation. More importantly, looking at 
courts as purely strategic players does not explain how and why in moments of 
confrontation with military regimes and civilian governments the courts were able to 
push back, counting on the support of lawyers as well key segments of society, even 
when there were no institutional interests of the judiciary or of their backers that could 
be tangibly served through such action.  
Such cold, structural, political science analyses of the judicialization of politics and 
governance canvassed so far adopt an external perspective on legal institutions. Such 
analyses thus overlook fundamental ideational dimensions that often drive judges, 
lawyers and litigants. Legal institutions are founded on the inherent normativity of law 
and conceptions of what ought to be law expressed in the language of grand ideals such 
as constitutionalism, rights and rule of law. Such ideals not only articulate and in turn 
shape the judges’ conception of their role, but also the expectations of important 
elements in the state and society. The quest for legitimacy by the courts, in addition to 
a range of political factors and strategic alignments identified earlier, explains why 
courts sometimes take on a judicialization agenda even when it is not seemingly in their 
institutional interest to do so. The popular legitimacy, or lack thereof, also enables an 
understanding of why courts succeed or fail in their attempts to take on the military or 
civil executive, and why certain groups and classes beyond the legal complex support 
the courts in their attempts to exercise their role. 
The quest for legitimacy should not, however, be reduced to the abstract, universalistic 
and deontological claims of liberal political and legal theory. There is no denying that 
judges’ self-conceptions of judicial role and public perception of their legitimacy may 
be articulated by reference to dominant liberal ideals of constitutionalism and rule of 
law. However, the concrete form that these ideals take are the product of extended 
institutional engagement with particular types of controversies. Not only judges, 
lawyers and litigants, but also distant observers form ideas of what these grand norms 
are, and are worth, based on what the legal institutions can deliver in terms of tangible 
outcomes over the long run. The multiple, at times competing, conceptions of 
constitutionalism and rule of law are thus, in the broadest sense, articulations of the role 
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of law – the place law ought to have in society, in state and in polity. These are thus 
deeply contextualised accounts of the authority of legal institutions and the legitimacy 
of law. The resonance of particular conceptions of constitutionalism and rule of law in 
Pakistan, as in any other place, can then be explained only in light of the historical ways 
the courts have shaped expectations through actual and promised interventions in 
constitutional politics, state structure and social orderings.  
The dominant ideational framework within which Pakistan’s courts have operated, 
cultivated the support of specific groups, garnered an aura of legitimacy and shaped 
expectations of their role is that of postcolonial legality. Over the last seven decades, 
the judiciary has progressively expanded the logics of constitutionalism and rule of law 
encoded in their bequest by colonial legal institutions. With the new demands that crises 
in constitutional politics, changes in the state structure, reconfigured elite dynamics and 
global normative pressures imposed, the courts have had to adapt and define their role 
to meet emergent challenges. Nonetheless, they have defined their progressively 
expanding and more prominent role with considerable fidelity to the rationales of 
postcolonial legality. This has been evident in the courts’ interventions in constitutional 
politics that were rooted firmly in a faith in parliamentary democracy and separation of 
powers that colonial rule promised but never delivered. Likewise, the courts 
increasingly assertive role in regulating the bureaucratic administration has largely been 
bereft of innovative ideas and success, as they have incessantly invested in restoring 
the mythical independence and structural integrity that the colonial bureaucracy 
bequeathed to the postcolonial state. The courts’ commitment to postcolonial ideas of 
legality has been somewhat matched by the military, political elites, bureaucracy and 
the intelligentsia, all of whom have historically internalized related principles of 
postcolonial statecraft. The acceptance of key ideas of postcolonial legality partially 
explains why both military and civil-authoritarian governments have grudgingly 
tolerated, and important social groups have supported the courts’ assertiveness along 
the axis of postcolonial legality. 
The strongest evidence of the postcoloniality of Pakistan’s public law is provided by 
the courts’ consistent challenges to the securitization of the state. As military regimes 
and civilian governments defined over-arching narratives of existential threats to the 
nation, and purported to counter these with repressive security laws that principally 
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targeted political opponents and dissidents, the courts felt compelled to step in to 
impose limited procedural safeguards. That authoritarian military and civilian 
governments needed an imprimatur of legality through instruments such as the Security 
of Pakistan Act, the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, or Article 
10 of the 1973 Constitution, which provides room for as well as fixes limitations on 
preventive detention, is similarly evidence of corresponding internalization of 
postcolonial legality by the ruling elites. The rituals of this dialectic of rule by and rule 
of law were deeply embedded by and during colonial rule, as shown by the Punjab High 
Court and the Federal Court’s decisions on sedition both pre- and immediately post-
partition show. The courts’ commitment to the limited procedural version of rule of law 
was a lasting legacy of colonialism which drove the courts to challenge the 
establishment of military courts to try civilians at serious risk to their institutional 
interests. It was only at the turn of the century that this pattern of repressive security 
laws and courts’ insistence on strict adherence to procedural requirements temporarily 
broke, when the Supreme Court declared the establishment of military courts as 
unconstitutional and the Musharraf regime adopted the use of completely unregulated 
enforced disappearances. However, with the Twentieth Constitutional Amendment 
authorizing the establishment of military courts to try terrorism offences the old rituals 
of postcolonial rule of law have been reinstated.    
Other examples of rule by/of law – in India, Myanmar and Singapore, for example – 
indicate the existence of deep ideational structures that propel courts to define their role 
in former British colonies in similar ways and regardless of military, civil authoritarian 
and formally democratic regime types. A reliance on the ‘colonial rule of law’ charted 
in the first chapter of this thesis was a feature which distinguished the British from other 
European colonialisms. Along with the dependence on legal institutions for a particular 
form of social engagement and control, the limited legitimacy and elite loyalty that 
over-arching narratives of rule of law enabled the British Empire to create the most 
efficient and penetrating state structures of all European colonizers. That the framework 
of postcolonial legality developed such deep roots, and has lasted this long in Pakistan, 
is thus of little surprise. This insight provides the basis for a research agenda of 
comparative postcoloniality which would trace the evolution of public law and judicial 
review practices in former British colonies in Asia and Africa to the legal institutions 
and the ideational structures of colonial rule of law. Unlike the dominant liberal 
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teleology of much of the discourse on constitutionalism and rule of law, and beyond 
the political science analysis of recent judicialization literature, such scholarship would 






Afghan Jihad Insurgency against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan in 
the 1980s 
Afghan Mujahideen Rebels fighting the Russian occupation of the country in the 
1980s 
Barelvi-Sunni A doctrinal and religious movement of the Sunni sect which 
has been predominant in South Asia 
Diwani Revenue and bureaucratic administration of early colonial 
Bengal 
Hadd  Mandatory criminal sanction under Islamic law 
Hudood laws  Islamic criminal laws related to adultery and fornication, theft, 
highway robbery and consumption of alcohol  
Islamization  Controversial policies, constitutional changes and legislation 
enacted by the Zia regime (1977-88) to enforce purportedly 
Islamic injunctions 
Jagirdars Holders of Mughal-era revenue estates 
Jirgas Customary dispute resolution forums in north-western Pakistan  
Khilafat movement Movement of conservative Indian Muslims protesting the 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the 
Caliphate in aftermath of the First World War 
Kutchehri Court premises. The terms colloquially refers to the judicial 
system, especially the lower courts. 
Madrassahs  Religious schools 
Mofussil Rural hinterland of the Presidency towns in early colonial 
period 
Muhajirs  Descendants of migrants from India 
Nawab Nominally vice regents of the Mughal Empire but by the late 
1700s de facto rulers of the provinces 
Nizamat Law, order and policing administration of early colonial Bengal 
Panchayats Local and customary arbitration forums 
Patwar Land registration and revenue administration 
Qisas and Diyat  Islamic laws concerning homicides and other offences against 
the person which provided for strict retribution and pardon in 
lieu of compensation 
Raj   British Crown rule in colonial India (1858-1947) 
Sadr courts Provincial appellate courts of the East India Company 
Sardars Local and tribal chiefs 
Satyagraha Indian National Congress’ non-violent civil disobedience 
movement in the late colonial period 
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Sepoys Soldiers of the East India Company armies 
Shariat courts Appellate courts and benches created in 1980 which were 
granted with the powers of judicial review of legislation for 
conformity with Islamic law 
Shia A minority sect of Islam 
Sunnah Tradition (words and actions) of the prophet Muhammad 
Swaraj Self-rule or independence for colonial India 
Tazir  Discretionary criminal sanction under Islamic law  
Thana Police station. The terms colloquially refers to the entire 
policing system. 
Thugs Criminal gangs in early colonial India 
Ulema Islamic scholars recognized as having specialist knowledge of 
Islamic law 
Vakil Indian lawyer 
Wahabbism Orthodox doctrine and religious movement dominant in Saudi 
Arabia and some other parts of Middle East 
Zina The sin and crime of adultery or fornication 
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